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FOREWORD
This book comprises a series of opinions on the so-called Hun­
garian optants question.
This question of the Hungarian optants in Transylvania has 
its origin in the agrarian reform which, for imperative reasons 
of social welfare, Roumania was forced to introduce before the 
Great War.
For some time past, the distribution of rural property in 
Roumania, essentially an agricultural country, was abnormal. 
Half the arable land of the country was owned by 4,ooo large 
landowners out of a population of nearly; eight million inhabi­
tants. The predominating peasant class owned none and were 
employed as agricultural labourers. This state of affairs consti­
tuted a continual menace to social peace. The peasant revolts of 
1907 had already brought home to the Roumanian legislators the 
necessity of remedying such a situation and of introducing an 
agrarian reform. , The object of the reform was therefore of a 
social as well as of a moral nature.
In May 191/1, a Constituent Assembly was elected for the 
purpose of amending the Roumanian Constitution in such a way 
as to render the agrarian reform possible. A few months later, 
the Great War broke out ; in 1916 Roumania was herself engaged 
in hostilities and nothing could be done regarding the reform 
until 1917.
At this time, the social and political doctrines of the countries 
adjoining Roumania were beginning to threaten the very foun­
dation of individual ownership.
The agrarian reform therefore became urgently necessary not 
only as a remedy to the abnormal distribution of land, but also 
as a social defence law. It was necessary to consolidate the basic 
principles of ownership and, in consequence, to make it possible 
for the overwhelming majority of the population — the peasants 
■— to participate in the preservation of individual ownership.
The Constitution of 1917 resulting from the elections of 1914 
came into existence and large estates were expropriated and 
converted into small holdings which were handed over to the 
peasants. The Constitution also fixed the compensation to be 
granted to the dispossessed owners ; this took the form of annuity 
stock (redeemable in 5o years and bearing 5% interest) the nomi­
nal value of which was considered as being equivalent to the 
cash value of the expropriated property. At this date, the Rou­
manian currency stood at gold parity.
Once the peasant became his own landlord, the irregular dis­
tribution of landed property was adjusted and by reason of the 
invisible bonds which tie a peasant to his land, the basis of indi­
vidual ownership was thoroughly consolidated.
This Constitution of 1917 subsequently became law in the new 
territories annexed to Roumania and, therefore, in Transylvania. 
On the one hand, there could not reasonably be more than one 
single Constitution for the whole of the new Roumania. On the 
other, the distribution of property in the new territories was 
just as defective and the need for social defence just as impe­
rative.
843,448 small landowners, representing 87.6 % of the total 
number, with small holdings of from 1 to 20 jugars, possessed 
only 34% of the agricultural property in the country, whereas 
8,439 large landowners, with estates of 100 jugars and upwards, 
possessed 4i.a5%, or nearly half, of the agricultural land.
It must be added that the events which took place in Rudapest 
in 1919, when Bela Kuhn took possession of power and orga­
nised bolshevism in Hungary, made it indispensable to extend 
the same reform to these provinces.
In its memorandum submitted to the Peace Conference : 
“The agrarian reform in Transylvania”, the Hungarian Govern­
ment frankly admits that Transylvania was a centre of bolshevist 
agitation (1).
The decrees of His Majesty the King published in December 
1918 and September 1919 put the agrarian reform into operation, 
and the laws of 1921 ratified these measures, which were taken 
without any distinction of nationality and on the principle of 
absolute equality.
(1) Sec the publication by the Hungarian Government : « The Hungarian 
Peace Négociations. An account of the work of tho Hungarian Peace Delega­
tion from January to March 1920 » Volume 1.
The Hungarian peasants in Transylvania benefited by the 
new distribution of land just as the Roumanian peasants bene­
fited thereby in the former Kingdom, and the landowners in 
Transylvania and the former Kingdom were subjected alike to 
the same expropriation.
H. M. the King was the first to set an example and the whole 
of the arable land belonging to the crown was expropriated.
In order to avoid any appearance of arbitrariness, the price 
of the expropriated land was calculated by applying coefficients 
to the rental value.
Since 1917, However, when the national currency stood at 
gold parity, and since 1918-1919 when the currency was still 
fairly firm, Roumania, like many other countries has seen the 
fall of her exchange. Consequently, the compensation granted 
to the dispossessed owners no longer represented the gold value 
of their land.
This situation obviously entailed a sacrifice on the part of the 
owners ; but they realised that it is sometimes necessary to adopt 
the methods of a -ship’s captain who jettisons part of his cargo 
in order to save the remainder, especially when, as in this case, 
it was a question of preserving social order.
Only one protest was lodged—that of the Hungarian optants ; 
such is the designation of the landowners in Transylvania who 
had opted for Hungarian nationality.
On August 16th, 1922, the Hungarian Government lodged a 
complaint with the Conference of Ambassadors on behalf of the 
Hungarian optants. It was advised to refer the matter to the 
League of Nations.
On March i5th, 1923, therefore, the Hungarian Government 
appealed to the Council of the League of Nations and requested 
it to pronounce on the question of substance by declaring that 
the Roumanian agrarian laws were contrary to the provisions of 
the Treaty of Trianon and by ordering that the land formerly 
belonging to the Hungarian optants should be restored to them 
and compensation paid.
The two parties having been heard, the discussion of the 
matter was adjourned to the July session, the two Governments 
being invited to reach an agreement in the meantime. Under 
the auspices of Ambassador Adatci, the representative of Japan, 
the two parties signed an agreement al Brussels on May 26th, 
192.3, under the terms of which it wras recognised that in so far 
as concerned the discrepancy between the Roumanian agrarian 
laws and the Treaty of Trianon “it is admitted—and the Hunga­
rian representatives do not dispute the point—that the Treaty 
does not preclude the expropriation of the property of optants 
for reasons of public welfare, including the social requirements 
of agrarian reform.”
A draft resolution was accepted and signed by the two parties 
and it then seemed that the matter was at an end. Hungary, 
however, disowned her plenipotentiary.
M. Adatci, the rapporteur for this question, in submitting 
a memorandum to the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
wrote as follows :
“So far from having failed, as the Hungarian communication 
would suggest, the negotiations which were carried on at great 
length in Brussels between the distinguished representatives of 
the Hungarian and Roumanian Governments under the auspices 
of M. Adatci, have led to certain results which may assist in the 
solution of the difficulties now pending between the two coun­
tries. These results represent certain points on which the dele­
gates of the two Governments have reached an agreement. Accord­
ingly, M. Adatci is surprised to learn from the communication 
of the Hungarian Government that the latter apparently wishes 
to cast a doubt on these results. It is obvious that the work of 
the Council of the League of Nations to maintain good relations 
between Members who are parties to a dispute would be ren­
dered impossible if, in contravention of all international use, the 
delegates sent by the Parties and duly authorised by them to 
negotiate under the auspices of a Member of the Council could 
subsequently be repudiated by their Governments.”
M. Adatci went on to say :
“This, however, is not the central point of the Brussels nego­
tiations. The central point is that, during the conversations 
which took place directly between them, the representatives of 
the two Parties, duly authorised for that purpose—in the pre­
sence of certain officials of the Secretariat of the League of 
Nations, whom M. Adatci had requested to be at the disposal of 
the delegates—arrived by common agreement at certain conclu­
sions on a number of points on which the Hungarian request 
was based, this request being in itself the foundation on which 
the Council forms its views on the matter. These points of agree­
ment are recapitulated in a report which has been formally 
approved by the representatives of both Parties.
“Copies of the report are in the possession of both Parties. 
There is no need to give a summary of the various points here. 
In his report to the Council M. Adatéi proposes to begin by 
stating these positive results, which cannot be called in ques­
tion.”
The Council adopted the Brussels resolution and took note 
of the declarations made by the parties, which constituted posi­
tive results which could not again be disputed.
The Hungarian optants themselves recognised the validity 
of the Roumanian agrarian laws by applying to the Roumanian 
courts and on the basis of the agrarian law they exhausted the 
courses of legal procedure ; then followed a motion for revision 
before the Agrarian Committee. A number of the optants won 
their case.
But they were not yet satisfied and they returned to the attack.
The matter was, however, no longer submitted to the League 
of Nations or to the Roumanian courts ; in December 1926, the 
Hungarian optants laid their case before the Roumano-Hunga- 
rian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal set up in virtue of Article 289 of 
the Treaty of Trianon. The jurisdiction of this Tribunal is strictly 
limited to questions relating to the liquidation of ex-enemy 
property. The optants now claimed that the Roumanian agra­
rian reform, which the Hungarian Government regarded as 
compatible with the Treaties and which the Hungarian optants 
themselves, in their pleadings before the Roumanian courts, 
agreed was a measure of expropriation for reasons of public 
welfare, was war liquidation and therefore contrary to Article 260 
of the Treaty of Trianon ; they consequently demanded—ten 
years after the law had been introduced—that their land should 
be restored to them or that compensation equivalent to its gold 
value be paid to them. It was in this way that the agrarian 
reform became war liquidation in the eyes of the Hungarian 
optants.
The Roumanian Government thereupon raised the question of 
the incompetence of the Tribunal.
The agrarian reform began before the war ; it was introduced 
for reasons of social peace and social welfare ; it is not therefore 
a war measure taken for the purpose of waging or of continu­
ing a war. The agrarian reform is not a differential measure 
affecting ex-enemies as such, since it is applied to all landowners, 
whether they be nationals, allies, neutrals or ex-enemies. No 
profits are realised on this reform ; on the contrary, it costs the 
Roumanian Treasury considerable sums in compensation paid 
to the owners of land which has been expropriated and trans­
ferred to the peasants.
The agrarian reform is therefore in no sense war liquidation.
To ask the Roumano-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to 
pass judgment on the agrarian reform is to ask this Tribunal to 
pronounce on a matter entirely outside its jurisdiction, which 
is strictly limited to questions relating to the liquidation of 
ex-enemy property.
By a majority of two votes to one, the Tribunal by its decision 
of January loth, 1927, nevertheless declared itself competent 
to hear and determine the question of the Hungarian optants, 
without seeking to assure itself whether it was a question of 
legal expropriation applicable to all owners irrespective of nation­
ality or whether it was a question of differential measures 
affecting the Hungarians as such, hence a liquidation.
But any judgment given outside the jurisdiction of the arbi­
trators is and'remains a dead letter. Such is the ransom for an 
award given outside the jurisdiction of the Court—the condition 
which must exist in order that full confidence may be placed 
in arbitral proceedings.
In these circumstances, Roumania refrained from discussing 
the question of substance and on February ?./jth, 1927, she decla­
red that the Roumanian arbitrator would no longer take his seat 
on the Tribunal in connection with agrarian matters. This arbi­
trator was withdrawn from the Tribunal only in so far as 
concerned agrarian questions ; that is to say, only in respect of 
questions outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. That attitude 
was the legitimate defence of the Roumanian Government in a 
question taken up by the Roumano-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal in excess of its authority.
Simultaneously with her withdrawal of her arbitrator, Rou­
mania appealed to the Council of the League of Nations under 
Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Covenant with a view to stating 
the reasons which had led her to withdraw the Roumanian arbi­
trator from discussions regarding agrarian matters.
The Tribunal having been guilty of an excess of authority, 
the decision whereby it declared itself competent was of no value 
and had no legal force. The question of the Hungarian optants 
was therefore a subject of dispute between Roumania and Hun­
gary and was laid before the League of Nations.
Hungary then requested the Council to appoint a deputy arbi­
trator to replace the arbitrator who had been withdrawn.
The Council of the League of Nations asked Sir Austen 
Chamberlain to submit a report on the question in June, and at 
his request, the representatives of Chili and Japan were appoint­
ed to act with him.
This Committee of Three convened the representatives of Hun­
gary and Roumania in London in May, and at Geneva in June, 
with a view to reaching a settlement between the parties. The 
meetings were, however, unsuccessful.
In these conditions, the Committee of Three examined the 
question and had it examined by jurists of the highest authority 
chosen from six different nationalities, and after obtaining their 
unanimous opinion it submitted its unanimous report on Sep­
tember 17th, 1927 (2).
The report laid down the principles which the signing of the 
Treaty of Trianon rendered obligatory for Roumania and Hun­
gary, and made a distinction between expropriation and liqui­
dation. Expropriation in virtue of agrarian reform does not fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. Only 
liquidation—that is, differential measures taken with a view 
to affecting the property of Hungarians as such—is within the 
competence of the Tribunal.
Roumania accepted the principles laid down in the report but 
Hungary rejected them.
The real nature of the claims submitted by the optants was 
revealed in the course of the discussion of the Committee’s 
report. Hungary claimed, on behalf of the optants, not equal 
treatment with nationals, allies and neutrals, but a preferential 
treatment.
According to the Hungarian argument, the fact of being a 
Hungarian optant was sufficient to warrant a more favourable
(2) See the Iteport, page 2i>. 
treatment than that accorded to all the other landowners in 
Roumania.
Consequently, the optants were not claiming that their pro­
perty should not be liquidated, or that there should be no differ­
ential treatment of Hungarians as such ; on the contrary, they 
were claiming preferential treatment, more favourable than 
that accorded to nationals, allies and neutrals.
If this permanent privilege claimed by the Hungarian optants 
had been recognised, Roumania would never have succeeded 
in an agrarian reform applicable to all estates situated within 
her territory, notwithstanding the imperative and urgent neces­
sity for such a reform. This principle was, moreover, absolutely 
contrary to the decisions taken at the Peace Conference on which 
the succession States relied when they signed the Treaty of Tria­
non. In point of fact, in reply to the request submitted by these 
States to the effect that a clause should be inserted in the Treaty 
explaining that the right of the optants to retain their immo­
vable property did not mean that their rights had priority over 
those held by nationals, the Peace Conference declared that it 
was happy to confirm this interpretation but “that, in its opi­
nion, it did not appear necessary to insert an additional clause 
to maintain, without any kind of preference, under the régime 
of national law the property belonging to the optants.”
Hungary herself, moreover, did not ask for anything beyond 
the fact that Hungarians and Roumanians should be on the same 
footing.
In fact, the maximum of the request submitted to the Peace 
Conference by Count Apponyi, the Principal Hungarian Dele­
gate, was for equal treatment of Hungarians and Roumanians. 
The text of his request was as follows : “We ask for a reassuring 
declaration to the effect that no property belonging to our nation­
als situated in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy should be sequestrated, liquidated or expropriated in 
virtue of a legal provision or by a special measure which floes 
not apply in the same circumstances to the subjects of the liqui­
dating State or the State carrying out this measure” (3).
And the Treaty could not give them more than they had asked 
for.
(3) See the publication by the Hungarian Government : « The Hunaarian Peace 
Xegoliations. An account of the work of the Hungarian Peace Delegation from 
January to March 1920. Vol. 2, page 460.
The question may be summed up in one word. The question 
of the Hungarian optants is a problem of exchange. If the Rou­
manian currency were at the gold parity to-day, there would 
be no discontent. But when a whole nation is afflicted with 
a fall in the exchange, it is impossible to save one category of 
interests only, the Hungarian optants, from the consequences, 
especially when the Hungarian Government never asked more 
for them than national treatment and when Roumania signed 
the Treaty of Trianon only on the strength of the declaration 
of the Peace Conference that the property of the optants should 
remain under the régime of the national law, without preferen­
tial treatment of any kind.
The above is, in brief, the history of the question of the Hun­
garian optants.
After reading the opinions contained in this volume, the 
following are the ideas which stand out most clearly :
i) That in the question known as the “Affair of the Hungarian 
Optants”, the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 
in giving its award of January roth, 1927, arrived at by a majo­
rity of two votes to one, exceeded its powers when it declared 
itself competent on a question which manifestly does not come 
within its competence ;
2) That neither common international law nor the peace trea­
ties form any obstacle to the agrarian reform carried out in 
Roumania ;
3) That although the “Affair of the Hungarian Optants” has a 
certain legal aspect, its character is undeniably political in the 
highest degree.
A) That it is not only the right but even the duty of the 
Council of the League of Nations, to which Roumania submitted 
the question in virtue of Article 11 of the Covenant and Hungary 
in virtue of Article 23p of the Treaty of Trianon, to refrain from 
appointing a deputy in place of the Roumanian arbitrator on the 
Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal which — Io 
employ the unanimous expression of these learned jurists — 
has been guilty of a “usurpation of power. ”
5) That the attitude of the Council of the League of Nations in 
this affair, al the session of September 1927, is in conformity 
with legal principles and, in particular, with the letter and the 
spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
6) That the Council now has before it a question which has 
been thoroughly examined and that there is no need to ask for 
the opinion of any other international institution.
DOCUMENTS

Decision of the Roumanian-Hungarian Arbitral Tribunal 
in a test-case relating to Hungarian optants(1>
The Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, regularly 
composed of MM. de Cedercrantz, Chairman, Székács and Antó­
niádé, Arbitrators, assisted by M. Zarb, Secretary, meeting in 
full session at Paris, 67, rue de Varenne and deliberating in 
camera;
Considering the request submitted on December 29, 1923, by 
M. André Bartha, residing at Budapest (Hungary), 35, Erzsébet- 
Köruth (8th), whereby the Tribunal was asked:
1) To give a ruling by declaring that the enactments restrict­
ing the right of ownership as applied by the Roumanian Govern­
ment to the property of the plaintiff are contrary to the provi­
sions of Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon;
2) To order the Roumanian Government to restore to the 
plaintiff his property free from all charges and in the condition 
in which it existed before the execution of the said enactments; 
further, to reinstate the property in its original position in the 
land registers;
3) To order the Roumanian Government to pay to the appli­
cant compensation equivalent to the total loss suffered as a 
result of damage done to the property, and of loss of enjoyment, 
together with the reimbursement of all costs and expenditures 
incurred as a result of the application of the enactments against 
which the plaintiff protests;
j) In addition, to order the Roumanian Government to pay to 
the plaintiff the cost of replacing the whole or part of the said 
property as well as the whole or part of its accessories in the event
(1) Translated from the French version 
of their restitution by the said Government being proved to be 
impossible;
5) To calculate the amount of the above-mentioned compensa­
tion ex œquo et bono;
6) To order the defendant to pay all costs and charges;
7) To request the Roumanian Government to suspend the exe­
cution of all measures restricting the right of ownership and of 
a nature to affect the property here in question;
Considering the exceptional request, recorded on June 16th, 
1925, whereby the defendant concluded that the Tribunal was 
not competent in the matter;
Considering the reply to the exceptional request received on 
September 26th, 1926;
Considering the replication delivered on January 4th, 1926;
Considering the rejoinder received on April i5th, 1926;
Considering the corrigendum of the Roumanian Government 
received on November 27th, 1926;
Considering the documents in the dossier;
Considering the minutes of the hearings which were held in 
Paris on December i5th, 16th, 17th, 20th, 21st, 22nd and 23rd, 
1926;
Having heard Maître Millerand, barrister at the Court of 
Appeal, Paris; Professor Politis and Maître Rosenthal, barrister 
at Bucarest, for the Roumanian Government;
Having heard Professors Gidel and Brunet, barristers at the 
Court of Appeal, Paris, for the plaintiff;
Having heard MM. Popesco-Pion and Gajzâgo, Agents General 
of the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments respectively;
Whereas, in his exceptional request, the defendant urges that 
the measures objected to by the applicant were taken in virtue 
of the agrarian law in Transylvania and constitute expropriation 
measures under agrarian reform which apply to all land owners, 
whether nationals or foreigners; and, moreover, that compensa­
tion for expropriation is paid to all owners so dispossessed; that, 
in this case, it is not therefore a question of measures of retention 
or of liquidation in the meaning of Article 25o of the Treaty of 
Trianon and that, in consequence, the measures do not come 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;
And whereas the defendant first urged that in order that a 
claim under Article 25o may be brought before the Tribunal the 
measure objected to must have been taken between November 
3rd, 1918, and the coming into force of the Treaty, that is July 
26th, 1921;
And whereas this argument, developed by the defendant in 
the written procedure, was abandoned in the course of the oral 
discussions and note should be taken thereof;
And whereas it must first of all be pointed out that in inserting 
Article 25o in the Treaty of Trianon, the intention of the Allied 
and Associated Powers was fully to protect the property, rights 
and interests of Hungarian nationals, situated within the terri­
tory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, from all the 
measures mentioned in Article 282 and the Annex thereto, of 
Section IV, as well as in Article 25o itself, and to place these pro­
perties, rights and interests under the régime of common inter­
national law;
And whereas this emerges clearly from the preparatory work 
relating to Articles 267 of the Treaty of Saint Germain and 260 of 
the Treaty of Trianon as well as from the very language of this 
latter article;
And whereas it is therefore upon the principles of common 
international law that the Tribunal must rely whenever it is 
called upon to pass on a claim submitted by Hungarian nation­
als, optants or otherwise, regarding property, rights and inter­
ests situated within the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, when such property, rights and interests have been 
subjected to the measures enumerated in the said article;
And whereas, in this case, it is precisely to this latter point 
that the defendant refers in his argument, maintaining as stated 
above, that it is not a question of measures of retention or of 
liquidation in the meaning of Article 25o;
And whereas, in order properly to judge of the question of 
the competence of the Tribunal it must above all be ascertained 
whether or not the measures here objected to have the character­
istics of one or other of the measures which, in the terms of 
Article 25o can give rise to claims that can be laid before the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal; and whereas if the Tribunal finds that 
such is the case it is furnished with elements sufficient to estab­
lish its competence, but it is only after examining the substance 
of the claim that the Tribunal will be in a position to judge 
whether the circumstances of the case are really of a nature to 
justify the application of Article 20o;
And whereas the statement made by the defendant to the 
effect that these measures were taken in execution of the agrarian 
reform law in Transylvania, the Banat, Grishana and Maramures, 
has no bearing on the question of competence; and whereas it 
is only in the event of the Tribunal declaring itself competent 
that the defendant can, in submitting his arguments as to the 
substance of the matter, state his reasons based on agrarian 
reform legislation, or any other reasons he may wish to advance 
to prove that Article 20o should not operate in this case;
Whereas, regarding the measures forming the subject of the 
applicant’s protest, his statements in this connection have not 
been contested by the other party and whereas it is therefore 
established that the applicant was the owner of certain rural 
immovable property situated at Szliágysomlyó, in the comitat of 
Szilágy, having a total area of about 2 i/4 cadastral jugars, that 
this property was first subjected to forced administration, then 
formally seized and finally taken away entirely from the appli­
cant in virtue of agrarian legislation; that the Roumanian 
Government was substituted for the applicant as the registered 
owner; that an insignificant sum by way of compensation was 
promised but has not yet been paid; .
Whereas, in order to judge of the import of this measure it 
is unnecessary to dwell on the question whether the compensation 
promised to the applicant is or is not to be considered adequate; 
that point, moreover, is essentially one of substance;
And whereas the other facts advanced by the applicant are 
sufficient to show that, in this case, it is a question of a measure 
affecting the ownership of ex-enemy property in that it was 
taken, away in its entirety from the owner and without his 
consent; that this measure constitutes a violation of the general 
principle of the respect of acquired rights and oversteps the 
limits of common international law and that it is quite in the 
nature of a liquidation in the meaning of Article 260 and conse­
quently falls to be included among the measures referred to in 
that article;
Whereas the defendant claims that the measure referred to in 
Article 25o under the name of “liquidation” is a war measure 
taken for war purposes, the most characteristic feature of which 
is that it affects ex-enemy property “as such” and that the expro­
priations arising out of the agrarian reform do not, by their 
very nature, constitute liquidation since they are in no manner 
whatsoever discriminatory measures and, in any event, are not 
measures taken for war purposes; that they are therefore in no 
way incompatible with Article 25o;
. Whereas it emerges clearly from the provisions of Articles 23a 
and 25o and from paragraph 3 of the Annex to Section IV that 
the liquidation in the meaning of Article 25o can be either war 
liquidation or post-war liquidation, that the meaning of either 
of these operations is the same and that they differ only in their 
object; that, in both cases, it is a question of subjecting ex-enemy 
property, rights or interests to a treatment which constitutes a 
derogation to the rules generally applied in so far as concerns 
the treatment of foreigners and to the principle of the respect 
of acquired rights;
And whereas the question as to whether or not the expro­
priations referred to in this case are discriminatory measures is 
of essential interest regarding the substance of the dispute and 
does not therefore call for examination at this juncture;
Whereas, in these conditions, the Tribunal is undoubtedly 
competent to examine claims arising out of this measure and 
presented by a Hungarian national and whereas the question of 
deciding whether or not, in taking such a measure, the defen­
dant was duly authorised to proceed in derogation to the prin­
ciples of common international law is reserved for the examin­
ation of the question of substance;
Whereas in the course of the oral discussions the defendant 
advanced a new argument and urged that the compatibility of 
the expropriations with the treaty of Trianon was recognised by 
the representatives of the Hungarian Government in certain con­
versations which took place at Brussels on May 27th, 1923, 
between the representatives of the two Governments, as well as by 
the Council of the League of Nations in its resolution of July 
5th, 1923;
Whereas the official texts published in the Journal of the 
League of Nations show that, by its application under date of 
March i5th, 1923, the Hungarian Government relying on the 
second paragraph of Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, called the attention of the Council of the said League to 
the measures of expropriation being taken by the Roumanian 
Government in respect of immovable property belonging to 
persons who had opted in favour of Hungarian nationality, 
following the transfer of Hungarian territory to the Kingdom of 
Roumania, and that the Hungarian Government formulated 
certain demands in this connection; that after the Council had 
dealt with this question at its meetings of April 20th and a3rd, 
igaS, it formed the subject of negotiations at Brussels, in the 
month of May following, between the representatives of the two 
Governments, and that at its meeting of July 5th, 1923, the 
Council, after having considered the report of its rapporteur on 
the negotiations at Brussels, and the documents thereto 
appended, which included minutes of these conversations, 
approved the report and took note of the various declarations set 
forth in the minutes;
Whereas the defendant relies on the following passage contain­
ed in the minutes: “As regards the question of the discrepancy 
between Roumanian law and the provisions of the Treaty which 
deal with the rights of Hungarian optants, it is admitted — and 
the Hungarian representatives do not dispute the point — that 
the Treaty does not preclude the expropriation of the property 
of optants for reasons of public welfare, including the social 
requirements of agrarian reform”;
Whereas the said minutes of the conversations which took 
place at Brussels between the representatives of the two Govern­
ments definitely state everywhere by whom the statements 
contained in them were made, either by reproducing textually 
such statements or by merely summarising them; and whereas 
the passage quoted by the defendant contains no such reference; 
and whereas for this reason alone, it is at least doubtful whether 
this passage actually constitutes a formal declaration, at any rate 
on the part of the Hungarian representatives; and whereas, in 
any case, the minutes later state that on examining the question 
of compensation “the Hungarian delegate was of the opinion 
that a payment in gold known as a deferred payment could not 
be taken into consideration. In matters of expropriation cash 
payment alone was justified”, from which statement it may be 
assumed that in no case did the Hungarian delegates interpret 
the word “expropriation” contained in the passage quoted above 
to mean the withdrawal of property belonging to Hungarian 
optants without adequate compensation; and whereas it follows 
from the foregoing that the finding of compatibility between 
the expropriations and the Treaty therefore necessarily pre­
suppose, in the view of the Hungarian representatives, the obser­
vance of all the ordinary rules of expropriation, including the 
immediate payment of adequate compensation and whereas this 
part of the argument advanced by the defendant loses all value in 
view of these considerations;
Whereas, moreover, admitting for the sake of argument that 
it is a question of actual recognition -- it is necessary to recall 
that this recognition was given during the conversations between 
the representatives of the two Governments with a view to 
arriving at an understanding on the matter forming the subject 
of the request of March i5th, 1928; that, in this connection the 
conversation turned on five different points which together con­
stituted the very subject of the dispute between the two Govern­
ments and that the passage above quoted refers to the first of 
these points; and whereas, if a conciliatory declaration was made 
by the Hungarian representatives at an early stage of the nego­
tiations it can, of necessity, be interpreted only as an expression 
of a desire to reach an understanding or as a concession made 
in the hope of obtaining like concessions from the opposite party 
on other points in order finally to arrive, by this means, at an 
understanding on all five points and thus on the entire matter 
in dispute, a result which was not achieved; and whereas in fact 
the minutes state under point 3 (“determination and nature of 
the compensation”) that, after an exhaustive discussion and 
following declarations by both parties, “the two representatives 
considered it inadvisable to prolong the discussion on the ques­
tion of the repurchase price, no reconciliation of their respective 
points of view appearing possible”; and whereas, although agree­
ment was reached at Brussels on other disputed points — a matter 
with which the Tribunal is in no way concerned — it has, in any 
case, been established that on at least one point Of primary 
importance the minutes had to record absolute disagreement be­
tween the representatives; whereas it is not admissible in law 
to detach, as the defendant does, an isolated statement from the 
text of the minutes without taking into account the circum­
stances in which it was made, to cite it as an official recognition 
by the Hungarian Government of a nature to bind all Hungarian 
nationals and to deprive them, in consequence, of the right which 
they undeniably hold in virtue of Article a5o and which allows 
them to submit to this Tribunal all claims under that article; 
whereas, in these conditions, even if there really had been recogni­
tion by the representatives of the Hungarian Government, it 
should be noted that such recognition is of no value whatsoever 
in the settlement of the present dispute;
Whereas the defendant further declares that the plaintiff 
voluntarily appeared before the Roumanian Courts without 
alleging an exception to Article a5o, that he submitted his 
defence as to the substance of the case and thus recognised that 
the measures to which objection is now raised constitute acts of 
expropriation; that having then recognised before the Roumanian 
courts that the agrarian laws constitute expropriation, the appli­
cant cannot now claim before an international tribunal that the 
same laws constitute liquidation in the meaning of Article 25o;
Whereas the defendant would be unable to invoke any prin­
ciple of law in support of these allegations, which in fact, are 
contrary to the universally recognised principle, namely that in 
international jurisdiction there is nothing to prevent the indiv­
idual concerned from exhausting first the means of recourse 
offered by national law before turning to international juris­
diction; and whereas the fact that he invoked only the national 
law before the Roumanian courts could not deprive him of the 
right to rely on the provisions of an international Treaty in 
pleading before this Tribunal;
Whereas, as already stated, the question of compensation is 
essentially one of substance and the Tribunal is consequently, 
at the present stage, not prepared to take into consideration the 
observations submitted by the defendant in this connection;
Whereas the defendant wrongfully cites in support of his 
argument a letter of August i3th, 1923, addressed to the Chair­
man of the Czechoslovak Delegation, alleging that it emanated 
from the Peace Conference; and whereas this letter is, in reality, 
signed by the Chairman of the Commission for the new States 
and Protection of Minorities and has no connection with the 
labours that preceded the drafting of the Treaty of Trianon but 
refers solely to the framing of certain articles of the Treaty on 
the protection of minorities and has no convincing weight in 
the present case;
For these reasons,
i) The Tribunal declares itself competent ;
2) Requests the defendant to deliver his reply on the sub­
stance of the question within a period of two months as from 
the date of the notification of the present decision;
3) Reserves the question of costs.
Paris, January 10th, 1927.
For the Roumanian Arbitrator : Signed : Gedercrantz.
Signed : Cedercrantz. Singned : Szekacs.

Dissenting opinion of the Roumanian Arbitrator in the 
agrarian questions laid before the Roumanian-Hungarian 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal regarding the plea of incompetence* 1 ■
The undersigned Roumanian arbitrator differs from the opinion 
expressed by the majority of the Tribunal as to the competence 
of the latter in the matter forming the subject of dossier No i/n, 
a matter on which, in deference to international justice, the 
Roumanian Government has furnished explanations but has 
declared that it would not submit any conclusions as to the sub­
stance of the question and made all reservations as to the action 
it might take in the future (see inter alia the case for the defence 
submitted by Maître Millerand).
Subject to the foregoing, the undersigned Roumanian arbi­
trator submits the following statement:
Whereas by his request of the first process the applicant 
requests the Tribunal to give a ruling by declaring that the 
measure of expropriation taken in virtue of Roumanian agrarian 
legislation, in regard to his immovable property situated in 
Transylvania, is contrary to the provisions of Article 25o of the 
Treaty of Trianon; to order the Roumanian Government to 
restore his property to him free from all charges and to pay to 
him the damages incurred as a result of the expropriation; in 
addition, in the event that restitution in kind should prove to be 
impossible, to pay compensation in full, the amount of which 
shall be calculated ex ccquo et bono, plus all costs and charges;
Whereas, before delivering any reply on the substance of the 
question, the Roumanian Government has submitted an excep­
tional request to the effect that the Tribunal should declare itself 
incompetent, since the measure taken in regard to the property 
of the applicant docs not fall to be dealt with under Article a5o,
(1) Translated from the French version
the only article which determines the competence of the Trib­
unal in this instance, and since the measure is a measure of 
expropriation taken in the interest of national welfare under 
agrarian reform laws and cannot be regarded as a measure of 
retention or liquidation in the meaning of that article ;
Whereas the ruling on the competence of the Tribunal is set 
forth in Article a5o in the following terms : “Claims made by 
Hungarian nationals under this Article shall be submitted to the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for by Article 239”, the whole 
discussion turns on the question whether the measure against 
which the applicant protests is a measure of retention or liquida­
tion in the meaning of that article;
Whereas, before embarking upon an examination of this point, 
it is to be noted that, whenever it has been a question of passing 
on their own competence, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals have 
displayed the utmost caution and as special international juris­
dictions with limited competence, have invariably abstained from 
giving wide-reaching interpretations in order not to deprive the 
defendants of their natural judges;
Whereas this caution is all the more justified when, as in the 
present case, it is a question of a jurisdiction which in many 
respects is of a special nature, first by reason of the special 
character of this Tribunal and secondly by reason of the special 
provisions of Article 25o which depart from the general rule of, 
Treaties in the matter of retention and liquidation of ex-enemy 
property in favour of a single ex-enemy Power and to the 
detriment of a single group of Allied Powers, viz: the Succession 
States; finally, by reason of the capacity of the d jfendant party, 
a sovereign State which cannot be indicted before a special court 
(whatever the status of this court might be) unless it has formally 
accepted such a procedure, in connection with acts committed in 
the free exercise of its sovereign’powers ;
Whereas Article a5o contains an exception to a principle pre­
viously inserted in the same Treaty (and common to all the 
Treaties which put an end to the Great War) and provides that 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 282 and the Annex 
to Section IV, the property, rights and interests of Hungarian 
nationals or companies controlled by them situated in the terri­
tories which formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian Mon­
archy shall not be subject to retention or liquidation in accord­
ance with these provisions”, to understand the meaning and 
purport of this defence reference must be made to what is per­
missible in virtue of the general rule to which the new provision 
constitutes an exception;
Whereas the derogation contained in Article a5o in favour of 
Hungarian nationals refers to the provision of Article 232, para­
graph b) which reserved to the Allied and Associated Powers the 
right to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interests 
which belong to nationals of the former Kingdom of Hungary, 
or companies controlled by them, and are within the territories, 
'colonies, etc., of such Powers;
Whereas the powers granted by this clause which, it must be 
admitted, constitutes an important exception to the principles 
of common international law and a privilege in favour of the 
Allied and Associated Powers which has been regarded as exagger­
ated, have the character of special measures the nature and 
object of which, in the spirit and letter of the Treaty, must be 
defined;
Whereas the right to retain and liquidate is granted to the 
Allied Powers with a strictly definite object and, in so far as its 
effects are concerned, is regulated by various provisions to be 
found, in particular, in Section IV, Part X of the Treaty (cf. 
Article 2.32 h, j; paragraphs 4, 9 and i5 of the Annex, and 
Article 173 of Part VIII); and whereas this object is the repar­
ation of war damage suffered by the Allied Powers and their 
nationals and for which Hungary is declared responsible (Art­
icle 161);
Whereas, apart from the characteristic deduced from their 
object, the measures of retention and liquidation so authorised 
have a distinctive feature due to their very nature: that of being 
essentially discriminatory measures, that is to say, they affect 
certain property, rights and interests in so far as they belong 
to ex-enemy nationals and solely because of the status of the 
owners; and whereas this distinctive feature was recognised by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, which in its award 
No 7 (page 32) declares “that it is incontestable that the system 
of liquidation instituted by the Treaty of Versailles (as by the 
other Treaties) refers to German property as such”;
Whereas the applicants have, both in the written proceedings 
and during the oral discussion, contested the discriminatory
character of the measures of retention and liquidation and, in 
support of their argument, have referred to the jurisprudence of 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal which in the case of special war 
measures taken and arrangements made by ex-enemy Govern­
ments within their territory to the detriment of the property, 
rights and interests of nationals of the Allied and Associated 
Powers does not require that such measures should be of a 
discriminatory nature before any decision can be taken regarding 
damage suffered by their nationals, a case which is met in par­
ticular by paragraph e of Article 282 (corresponding to Article 
297 e of the Treaty of Versailles), a jurisprudence which they 
wish to extend by analogy to the cases of liquidation defined by 
Articles 282 b and 25o;
Whereas Article 282 of the Treaty of Trianon (Article 297 of 
the Treaty of Versailles) refers to two different operations: on 
the one hand, measures taken during the war by the ex-enemy 
Governments in respect of property, rights and interests of Allied 
and Associated nationals (paragraphs a, e, f, g); on the other, 
measures taken during the war, or to be taken after the war 
with a view to reparation by the Allied and Associated Govern­
ments, in respect of property, rights and interests of ex-enemy 
nationals within their territory (paragraphs b, c, d, h, i, j); and 
whereas the jurisprudence cited has been established only in so 
far as concerns the first hypothesis, in which, being faced with 
the obligation to compensate an Allied national who, as a result 
of war measures, became involved against his will in a war 
against his own country, the Tribunals could not logically take 
the view that the only essential factor in the prejudicial measure 
was that it was taken for war purposes, the discriminatory nature 
of the measure not being indispensable to give it the character of 
a war measure; and whereas it is certain that in all the jurispru­
dence to which reference is made the identification of a discrim­
inatory action can be dispensed with only in the case of a charact­
erised war measure;
Whereas, although the Tribunals have not yet had occasion 
to express an opinion on the other hypothesis, where it is no 
longer a question of making good damage arising out of war 
measures, it is none the less true that the spirit and even the 
letter of their jurisprudence show that had they been called upon 
to pass on this second hypothesis they would have insisted on the 
discriminatory nature of the measure, especially when dealing 
with liquidation operations effected after the war (cf. the juris­
prudence which served as a precedent for all subsequent cases; 
German-Belgian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal : Rymenans and C° v. 
the German Government, Vol. I, page 878 and, in particular, 
considerations 1 and 2, page 885; consideration 3, page 887; 
consideration 4, page 888 and consideration 1, page 891) ; and 
whereas the objection thus deliberately confuses two distinct 
ideas and should be set aside and the discriminatory nature of 
.the measure of liquidation maintained;
Whereas such are the characteristic features of the measures 
sanctioned by Article 282 b, the same features should be present 
in the case of a measure precluded by Article 260;
Whereas the measure of expropriation objected to by the 
applicant can in no way be assimilated to a liquidation since it is 
foreign to all idea of reparation of war damages and excludes 
all differential treatment; and whereas it emerges both from the 
history of Roumanian agrarian reform and from the provisions 
of the various laws applied in the several provinces of the King­
dom, — and in the present case, the agrarian reform law of July 
3oth, 1921, applied in Transylvania, the Banat, Grishana and 
Maramures — that it is here a question of extensive reform of a 
social and economic nature with a view to creating peasant 
ownership, the principle of which had been established by the 
Roumanian Government before the war and incorporated in the 
Constitution of the Kingdom by the constitutional law of July 
20, 1927, — that it is therefore a question of a -measure of a 
general nature dictated by the requirements of a sovereign State, 
the sole judge of its vital interests, and applicable to all landown­
ers irrespective of nationality, to Roumanian nationals as well 
as to all foreigners, neutrals, allies or ex-enemies in the same 
legal conditions in so far as concerns the portion of property to 
be expropriated, the compensation to be paid and the conditions 
of payment;
Whereas, under these circumstances, it cannot be said, as 
alleged in the written proceedings, that the agrarian reform in 
Transylvania was merely a disguised means of affecting Hungar­
ian owners only and, by a deceitful system, of arriving at a real 
liquidation of their immovable property; and whereas it would 
then be a question of doubting the good faith of a State, which. 
according to all principles and in accordance with the jurisprud­
ence of the Permanent Court of International Justice (award 
No 7, page 3o) must always be taken for granted, it being 
incumbent upon the person contesting it to furnish proof of his 
allegation;
Whereas, expropriation for reasons of social welfare cannot, 
in view of these considerations, be assimilated to the juridical' 
conception of liquidation, the measures taken by the Roumanian 
Government are therefore not inconsistent with Article a5o of 
the Treaty and the Tribunal might simply refuse to acknowledge 
its competence;
Whereas, moreover, the compatibility between agrarian 
expropriations in Roumania and the Treaty of Trianon was form­
ally recognised by the Hungarian Government in an agreement 
reached on May 27th, 1923, at Brussels between its plenipoten­
tiaries and those of the Roumanian Government, of which the 
Council of the League of Nations took note in its resolution 
of July 5th, 1923, at Geneva;
Whereas, as regards this agreement, the official documents 
published in the Journal of the League af Nations show that by 
a request dated March i5th, 1923, the Hungarian Government, 
acting under Article 11 of the Covenant, called the attention of 
the Council of the League of Nations to the measures of expro­
priation taken by the Roumanian Government in Transylvania 
in respect of immovable property belonging to persons having 
opted for hungarian nationality, and asked the said Council to 
decide that the legislative and administrative enactments of the 
Roumanian Government were contrary to the Treaties and to 
order that the immovable property belonging to Hungarian 
optants be restored to them with full compensation for the 
damage suffered; and whereas, as a result of this request, the 
Council, after having heard the representatives of the two 
Governments at its meetings of April 20th and 23rd, 1923, 
decided to postpone the examination of the matter to its July 
session and requested the parties to make every effort to arrive 
at an amicable settlement in the meantime; and whereas, during 
the interval that followed, M. Adatci, the rapporteur for this 
question, having summoned the representatives of the two 
Governments in order that they might under his auspices open 
negotiations with a view to a settlement, these representatives 
proceeded to Brussels where their conversations ended on May 
97th, 1923, in the drafting of a report, dealing with the five 
points forming the subject of the controversy between the two 
Governments and recording the declarations made by the parties 
on each of these points; whereas, in regard to the first point on 
the question of incompatibility between the Roumanian agrarian 
law and the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon relating to the 
rights of Hungarian optants “it is admitted, and the Hungarian 
representatives do not dispute the point, that the Treaty does not 
preclude the expropriation of the properly of optants for reasons 
of public welfare, including the social requirements of agrarian 
reform”; and rvhereas, as a result of this document signed at 
Brussels and notwithstanding the disavowal by the Hungarian 
Government of its own plenipotentiaries, (a disavowal which the 
Council of the League of Nations did not think fit to take into 
consideration), the rapporteur taking the view that “the two 
parties had, by mutual agreement, reached certain conclusions 
on several points forming the basis of the Hungarian request and 
that he could not agree that the definite results obtained should 
again be brought into question”, recommended the Council to 
lake note of the declarations set forth in the Brussels document; 
and whereas the Council, at its meeting of July 5th, 1923, after 
having heard the representatives of the two Governments, the 
rapporteur and the statements made by several of its members 
who were all agreed as to the existence of the Brussels agreement 
settling the dispute between the two Governments, approved the 
report submitted by M. Adatci, took note of the various declara­
tions contained in the minutes attached to the report, and added 
that it “hoped that both Governments would do their utmost to 
prevent the question of Hungarian optants from becoming a 
disturbing influence in the relations between the neighbouring 
two countries”;
Whereas this agreement, in that it recognises that the Rouma­
nian agrarian law is compatible with the Treaty of Trianon, 
represents I he official interpretation Avhich the two Governments 
concerned have given to the provisions of that Treaty regarding 
the immovable property of Hungarian nationals in transferred 
territory by recognising that the protection of this property docs 
not preclude agrarian reform dictated by social requirements;
Whereas it is incontestable that the Slates which have signed 
a Treaty have the authority and power to interpret it and to 
define the meaning and scope which their plenipotentiaries gave 
to its clauses; and whereas this interpretation is of an official 
nature and partakes of the compulsory force of the instrument 
itself in which it is incorporated; and whereas this interpreta­
tion is binding not only on the Governments which gave it and 
which cannot retract it, but also on their nationals who cannot 
give any interpretation other than the one agreed by their 
Governments;
Whereas, in order that such an interpretation may be valid, 
there is no necessity, as argued during the oral discussions, 
for it to be set forth in an agreed formula or subsequently and 
officially ratified, since according to diplomatic doctrine and 
practice it is sufficient for the interpretation adopted to be 
inserted in a protocol drawn up at the close of a conference or 
confirmed in an exchange of correspondence, or duly recorded 
in the form of reciprocal declarations (cf. Fauchille, Traité de 
Droit International Public, Vol. i, page 878 if and the examples 
therein mentioned);
Whereas the applicants, defendants in the exceptional request, 
deny firstly that there was any agreement at Brussels and assert 
that the instrument signed on May 27th, 1928, merely records 
the failure to reach agreement on various points; and whereas' 
in any case, if a declaration were made by the Hungarian pleni­
potentiaries as to the inconsistency between the Roumanian 
agrarian reform and the Treaty, it was intended to refer exclusi­
vely to expropriation with adequate compensation in accordance 
with the rules of international law; and whereas, finally, the 
declarations made at Brussels form an indivisible whole from 
which it is impossible to detach an isolated statement and use it 
in evidence; and whereas this isolated declaration, which was 
made solely with a view to obtaining concessions on other points 
under discussion, loses all its value when no agreement exists 
on the principal point, namely the amount of the compensation 
to be paid to the expropriated persons;
Whereas the first objection, that is the non-existence of the 
agreement, is fully answered by the documents tljemselves; and 
whereas, if no agreement was reached, it is difficult to under­
stand why the Hungarian Government felt it necessary to disown 
its plenipotentiary, a step which the Council did not sec fit to
discuss; and whereas it is inconceivable that such an important 
and powerful body as the Council of the League of Nations 
should have considered, discussed at length and finally ratified 
an instrument that did not exist; >
And whereas, in regard to the second objection, it is certain 
that during the Brussels negotiations the discussions did not bear 
on agrarian reform in the abstract with a view to defining the 
general principles of international law but on the Roumanian 
agrarian reform in concrete, all the particulars of which were 
known to both parties, a reform which, with all its definite 
conditions, formed the very substance of the request submitted 
by the Hungarian Government to the Council of the League of 
Nations;
And whereas, in regard to the last objection, — indivisibility 
•of the Brussels agreement — this argument loses all value in 
view of the fact that the plenipotentiaries, who agreed to discuss 
in their logical order all the reasons advanced in the Hungarian 
request, first examined the question of principle which domina­
ted the whole issue, viz : compatibility or incompatibility 
between the agrarian law and the Treaty, the only international 
question in the controversy, the other points for discussion : 
■absenteeism, conditions of payment of the compensation, the 
amount of such compensation, the provisions of Article x8 of 
the Roumanian Constitution and various other specific provisions 
of the agrarian law, being merely questions connected with the 
internal legislation of Roumania; if therefore an agreement was 
reached on the primary question and if it was recognised that 
the Roumanian Government had not violated the Treaty of 
Triainon — as was in fact recognised — the entire question lost 
its international importance and became an internal question 
to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereign State of Roumania; 
and whereas it cannot therefore be validly alleged that the crux 
of the controversy was other than this; and whereas this point 
was recognised by the Council of the League of Nations which 
merely look note of it and made the following recommendations 
to the parties : “The Council is convinced that the Hungarian 
Government, after the efforts made by both parties to avoid any 
misunderstanding on the question of optants, will do its best to 
reassure its nationals, and that the Roumanian Government will 
remain faithful to the Treaty and to the principle of justice upon 
which it declares that its agrarian legislation is founded, by 
giving proof of its goodwill in regard to the interests of the 
Hungarian optants”;
Whereas, in view of this agreement on the compatibility 
between the agrarian expropriations and the Treaty of Trianon, 
the question of the competence of this Tribunal is definitely 
settled in the sense that the Tribunal is radically competent and 
all further examination becomes henceforth superfluous;
Whereas, apart from the recognition on the part of the Hun­
garian Government, the Hungarian applicants themselves have 
explicitly recognised that the measure affecting them was 
juridically an act of expropriation and was not in the nature of 
a liquidation precluded by Article a5o, this being recognised in 
the proceedings before the Roumanian courts competent in the 
matter of expropriation when all the applicants exhausted the 
course of procedure by submitting their case in a detailed manner 
in so far as concerned the substance of the question without 
pleading an exception to Article 250 or without making the 
slightest reservation as to the nature of this measure; and 
whereas these applicants recognised, in a property question and 
on the basis of a legal contract freely entered into, which led 
to juridical decisions having the authority of res judicata, that 
the agrarian laws applied to them constituted expropriation and 
not liquidation and therefore can no longer claim before an inter­
national court that these same laws constitute a liquidation in 
the sense of Article a5o;
Whereas, in order to annul these decisions having the 
authority of res judicata, recourse cannot be had to a rule of 
international law whereby a case must be examined by all the 
competent national courts before it can be referred to interna­
tional tribunals, since this rule presupposes that it is the same 
case which is laid before the international tribunal; and whereas, 
in the present instance, in virtue of a legal contract freely entered 
into, the plaintiffs finding themselves confronted by decisions 
having the authority of res judicata on the nature of the measure 
taken, seek to institute fresh proceedings before the international 
tribunal for an examination of the case on a new basis, viz : 
liquidation;
Whereas, in reply to these juridical arguments the Hungarian 
applicants, in order to involve the competence of the Tribunal 
nt any cost, allege that, as a result of the return to common 
international law by the insertion of Article a5o as an exception 
to the provisions of Article 282 b, the property of Hungarian 
nationals in ceded territory acquired a special statuts which 
protects it for all time from any prejudice and that in conse­
quence and in accordance still with Article 25o, the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal shall be competent whenever there arises a 
question of such prejudice; that the measures of retention and 
liquidation precluded by Article 25o are therefore acts which 
in some way transgress the rules of common international law 
and that, for the tribunal to be competent it is sufficient that 
a measure taken against Hungarian property should have the 
appearance or offer the theoretical possibility of infringing a 
rule of common international law;
Whereas this twofold thesis must be examined in the light of 
the express provisions of the Treaty and the principles of inter­
national law;
Whereas, if it is true that Article 25o, annulling the privilege 
of Article 282 b, reverted to common international law in so far 
as Hungarian property in transferred territory is concerned, it 
does not necessarily follow that a preferential status is thereby 
created for such property but simply that the protection granted 
to all foreign property is extended to the property in question;
Whereas the doctrine of international law as well as the 
conventional jurisprudence whereby these questions are settled 
between States, recognises that a foreigner is entitled to protec­
tion, personally as well as in regard to his property, in the same 
way that nationals are protected by the laws of their country; 
and whereas this equal treatment implies that the immovable 
property of a foreigner is subject to the laws governing immo­
vable property in the country in which they arc situated; and 
whereas, although there has recently been a tendency among 
certain publicists to claim greater protection for property owned 
by foreigners than that given to nationals, this tendency is not 
generally supported by doctrine or adopted in conventional law 
(cf. Fauchillc, op. cit. Vol. 1, pages g3o-g44; de I.outer, Droit 
International Posit if, Vol. I, page 206; Treatise by Professor 
Borchaert in Bibi. Vischcriana, Vol. HI, page g ff);
Whereas Hungarian property, like all foreign property is, 
under common international law, treated in exactly the same 
manner as the property of nationals and expropriation for State 
requirements (public or national) — a necessary and vital insti­
tution for the Stale — is therefore, not excluded in principle and 
can be applied to foreigners and nationals alike;
Whereas the accounting system regarding expropriation for 
reasons of public welfare in accordance with common interna­
tional law is formally recognised by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice by its decision N° 7 (page 22);
Whereas the principle of national treatment is the rule 
generally recognised in international law and was therefore 
followed in several articles of the Treaty of Trianon (and in all 
the other Treaties) in connection with Allied property, rights 
and interests in Hungarian territory, particularly in paragraph c 
of Article 211 in which Hungary undertakes “not to subject the 
nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, their property, 
rights or interests... to any charge, tax or import, direct or 
indirect, other or higher than those which are or may be imposed 
on her own nationals or their property, rights or interests”; and 
in Article 233 b, to which there is a corresponding article in all 
the other treaties (Versailles 298, Saint-Germain 25o, Neuilly 
178), in which Hungary undertakes “not to subject the property, 
rights or interests of the nationals of the Allied or Associated 
Powers to any measures in derogation of property rights which 
are not applied equally to the property, rights and interests of 
Hungarian nationals”; and whereas this same paragraph adds : 
“and to pay adequate compensation in the event of the applica­
tion of these mesures ”, it is to be noted that it does not provide 
the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal by way of 
sanction, which provision would have been no more than a 
logical counterpart if the said competence had been admitted for 
the examination of cases of expropriation imposed on Hungarian 
nationals in transferred territory and if it were the duty of these 
tribunals to pass on all acts which were in derogation of common 
international law;
Whereas the application of the principle of equal treatment 
was claimed by the Hungarian Government itself in the course 
of the labours which preceded the signing of the Treaty of Tria­
non; and whereas, first by its Note N° 8 of January i/jlh, 1920, 
calling the attention of the Peace Conference to the danger 
threatening Hungarian property in ceded territory as a result 
of certain schemes of agrarian reform in Czechoslovakia and 
Roumania, the Hungarian Government requested that, in regard 
to the latter State, a special clause should be inserted to the effect 
that “physical or legal persons belonging to the Hungarian 
minority shall not be subject, cither in law or in fact, to any 
treatment which, from the point of view of their material 
interests, differs from that of Roumanian nationals proper”; and 
whereas in the observations subsequently presented by the 
, Hungarian {Delegation concerning Article a5o (Note XXXVII in 
the documents published by the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, Budapest, 1921, 2 vols. entitled ‘The Hungarian Peace 
Negotiations’), the said Delegation, cognisant of the tenor of 
Article a5o in the matter of exemption from retention and liqui­
dation and considering that this article was not a sufficient 
safeguard against possible expropriation by Roumania or Cze­
choslovakia, asked for a “reassuring statement to the effect that 
no property belonging to our nationals on the territory of the 
former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy shall be sequestrated, 
liquidated or expropriated by virtue of a legal provision or by 
means of a special measure which does not apply, in the same 
conditions, to the subject of the liquidating State or of the State 
putting such a measure into force”, — a reassuring statement 
which, moreover, the Peace Conference refused to give (covering 
letter from the President of the Conference); and whereas all 
these documents show that national treatment represented the 
limit of the requests submitted by the Hungarian Government 
itself regarding the protection of Hungarian property in transfer­
red territory;
Whereas further proof of the spirit which prevailed at the time 
of the framing of the Treaties regarding the position of ex-enemy 
property in Allied territory is found in the letter dated August 
i3th, 1919, from the President of the Commission for the new 
States and the Protection of Minorities to the Czechoslovak 
Delegation, (filed with the documents of the case); and whereas 
this Delegation, at the time of the drafting of Article 3 — 
Treaty on Minorities (the text of which corresponds to Article 63, 
paragraph 4 of the Treaty of Trianon) which provides that 
Hungarian oplants wilt be entitled to retain their immovable 
properly in the territory of Czechoslovakia, — asked that this right 
be made subordinate to the condition that the property of the 
optants be subject to the same regime as that of Czechoslovak 
nationals and was informed in reply that “the Commission had 
not considered that the insertion of an additional clause was 
necessary to ensure that all property situated within the territory 
of the Republic of Czechoslovakia would be subject to the 
régime of Czechoslovak law without any preference whatsoever”;
Whereas it cannot therefore be deduced that any privilege 
whatsoever was established in favour of Hungarian property 
in transferred territory’; whereas it is all the more necessary to 
refute the extreme, and at least dangerous, argument submitted 
in the written pleadings and heard during the oral discussions, 
that in addition to being protected by common international 
law immovable property belonging to Hungarians in Transyl­
vania enjoys also a real privilege or a kind of mortgage secured 
on the territory of Transylvania granted to it in compensation 
for the dismemberment of Hungary and as a condition governing 
territorial cessions;
Whereas the radical flaw in the argument claiming such a 
privilege lies in the hazardous allegation that since Article a5o 
by excluding the principle of liquidation reverts to common 
international law and consequently precludes and penalises any 
derogation to this right; and whereas, for this to be true, any 
violation of the principle of common international law would 
have to constitute a liquidation, a consequence which cannot 
be proved for the simple reason that the extension of the two 
conceptions is not identically similar, since the scope of the idea 
of a “derogation to international law” is very much wider than 
that of the idea of “liquidation”;
Whereas this argument, which relies on a petitio principii, 
since it assumes as proved precisely what remains to be proved, 
is inadmissible, its consequence, — the supplementary argument 
to the effect that the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is competent to 
hear and determine not only all cases of violation or of deroga­
tion to common international law but also all cases of apparent 
or possible derogation —, has also little legal force and should 
share the same fate;
Whereas the theory of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, the 
perpetual guardian of common international law, invalidates 
itself by the inadmissible consequences to which it leads; and 
whereas, if this theory were admitted, these Tribunals, which 
are special courts with limited jurisdiction, would thus become 
courts vested with the most extensive international jurisdiction 
in existence restricted only by the very vaguely defined limits 
of common international law; and whereas by such an inordinate 
extension of competence, these tribunals would have to hear and 
determine not only all cases closely or remotely affecting the 
property, rights and interests of Hungarian nationals in trans- 
. ferred territory but would also exercise control over all internal 
legislation of the Succession States, including fiscal laws and 
their application and even over their most vital social laws and 
so over their very Constitution; and whereas this would 
ultimately amount to recognising that the Treaty of Trianon 
imposed upon Roumania, Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of 
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, in favour of Hungary, a kind 
of capitulation more extensive and more humiliating than that 
imposed on uncivilised countries;
Whereas all the foregoing considerations lead to the conclusion 
that Article 25o can apply only to the hypothesis therein men­
tioned, namely retention and liquidation with a view to repara­
tion; that a measure of expropriation by virtue of agrarian reform 
(a non discriminatory measure) cannot be assimilated to 
liquidation—the only measure falling within the competence 
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals; that even if in connection with 
such expropriation it wrere objected that there was derogation to 
common international law on the grounds that the compensation 
granted to the dispossessed owners was inadequate, an examina­
tion of the controversy shows that the rules by which the 
compensation is fixed are the same for both Roumanian and 
Hungarian owners and that, in any case, it is not for this 
Tribunal to hear and determine this question of derogation;
Whereas, in these conditions, the Tribunal cannot, in 
contradiction with the definite texts and the principles which 
should govern its actions, extend its jurisdiction without being 
guilty of a manifest abuse of power;
For these reasons,
The undersigned arbitrator is of the opinion that the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal is not competent to take up the matter forming 
the subject of the dossier with a view to examining the substance 
of the question.
Paris, January 10th, 1927. Signed : C. Antóniádé.

The Report of Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Council 
of the League of Nations* 0
“ This question, as set out in the above titles, is only one aspect 
of the question which was submitted successively to the Confe­
rence of Ambassadors and the Council of the League of Nations 
in 1922 and 1923.
“ On August 16th, 1921, the Hungarian Government applied to 
the Conference of Ambassadors in regard to the eipropriation — 
undertaken by Roumania in connection with the scheme of 
agrarian reform — of the immovable property of persons who, 
while possessing rights of citizenship (indigtnat} in the territories 
transferred to the Kingdom of Roumania by the Treaty of Tria­
non, had opted for Hungarian nationality under Articles 63 or 
64 of that Treaty, and also under Article 3 of the Roumanian 
Minorities Treaty- The Conference of Ambassadors, in a note 
dated August 3ist, 1922, informed the Hungarian Government 
that its claims related entirely to the stipulations of the Treaty 
between Roumania and the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers concerning minorities, and should, under the Treaty, be 
addressed to the League of Nations. On a further request by 
the Hungarian Government, the Conference of Ambassadors, in 
a letter dated February 27th, 1923, informed Hungary that she, 
or another Member of the League, should take the initiative in 
bringing the matter before the Council.
“ Hungary therefore applied to the League of Nations, stating 
that a satisfactory solution had not been obtained by direct 
negotiations, and formulating the following demands :
“ (1) That the Council should deal with the substance of 
the question, in view of the urgency of the matter, at its 
next session ;
(1} CM7lh Scssion/P.VJ.
« (2) That it should give a ruling on the substance of the 
question by declaring that the Roumanian legislative and 
administrative enactments in question were contrary to the 
Treaties ; by ensuring, as regards the future, that Roumania 
should act in conformity with the provisions of the Treaties; 
by ordering that the immovable property of Hungarian 
optants should be restored to them and that it should in 
future be free from all charges contrary to the provisions 
of the Treaties ; and, finally, that full compensation for 
damage should be given to the injured parties.
“ The Council considered this question in April and July 1923. 
The proposals made at the April session to refer the question to 
the Permanent Court to obtain a decision, or even an advisory 
opinion, were not accepted by the Roumanian representative.
“ M. Adatci, The Rapporteur, was then requested to prepare the 
ground for a fresh discussion before the July session of the 
Council, and the Council expressed the hope that, in the interval 
between the sessions, the two Governments would do their best 
to reach an agreement. With this object, the representatives of 
Hungary and Roumania proceeded, on the invitation of 
M. Adatci, to Brussels on May 6th, 1923. The results of these 
negotiations will be found in a report to which a draft recom­
mendation and a summary of the conversations were appended 
(see Annex 533a, page rorr, of the Official Journal, August 
1923J.
“On July 5th, 1923, during the twenty-fifth session of the 
Council, the Brussels negotiations were the subject of protracted 
discussions, the Roumanian delegate appealing to the Brussels 
‘Agreements’ and the Hungarian delegate stating that no 
agreement had been reached. The following resolution was then 
proposed :
“The Council,
“ After examining the report by M. Adatci dated June 5th, 
1923, and the documents annexed thereto ;
“Approves the report;
“Takes note of the various declarations contained in the 
Minutes attached to the report of the Japanese representative, 
and hopes that both Governments will do their utmost to 
prevent the question of Hungarian optants from becoming 
a disturbing inlluence in the relations between the 
neighbouring two countries.
“The Council is convinced that the Hungarian Govern­
ment, after the efforts made by both parties to avoid any 
misunderstanding on the question of optants, will do its best 
to reassure its nationals ;
“And that the Roumanian Government will remain 
faithful to the Treaty, and to the principle of justice upon 
which it declares that its agrarian legislation is founded, 
by giving proof of its good will in regard to the interest of 
the Hungarian optants.’
“ This resolution was adopted by all the members of the Coun­
cil, with the exception of the Hungarian delegate, who 
refrained from voting and stated that, in his opinion, the whole 
problem remained open ; he added, inter alia, that his Govern­
ment reserved the right to take any further steps which the 
Treaties and the Covenant of the League of Nations might allow 
in order to obtain justice for those whom he had the right and 
the duly to represent.
“ From December 1928 onwards, a number of applicationa 
from Hungarian nationals or optants owning lands in the 
territories transferred to Roumania were submitted to the secre­
tariat of the Roumano-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 
provided for in Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon, asking, 
among other matters, that the Tribunal should declare that the 
measures restricting their right of ownership, which had been 
applied to their movable and immovable property by the Rouma­
nian State, were contrary to the provisions of Article 25o of the 
Treaty of Trianon, and that it should order the Roumanian 
State to make restitution.
“ In 1925, the Roumanian Government submitted applications 
objecting to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. After hearing the 
counsel of the two parties between December i5th and 23rd, 
1926, the Tribunal, on January 10th, 1927, declared itself 
competent, in virtue of Article 25o, paragraph 3, of the Treaty 
of Trianon, and called upon the defendant (Roumania) to 
forward her reply within a period of two months.
“ On February 24th, 1927, Roumania informed the Tribunal 
that she would refrain from submitting her reply regarding the 
substance of the question and that, consequently, her arbitrator 
would no longer sit in connection with any of the agrarian 
matters brought forward by Hungarian nationals. At the same 
time, she submitted to the Council, in virtue of Article n, 
paragraph 2, of the Covenant, a request to allow her to acquaint 
the Council with the reasons on which her attitude was based.
“ This question came before the Council on March 7th, 1927.
“ The Roumanian representative explained the reasons which 
had led the Roumanian Government to withdraw its arbitrator 
from the Tribunal.
“ The Hungarian representative asked the Council to appoint, 
in accordance with the Treaty of Peace, two members to enable 
the Tribunal to continue its work.
“The Council, on the proposal of the President, requested the 
British representative to report on this question at its next 
session. Sir Austen Chamberlain having expressed the desire that 
two of his colleagues should be appointed to act with him for the 
purpose of examining the question, the Council requested the 
representative of Japan and the representative of Chile to assist 
Sir Austen Chamberlain in preparing a report for the next 
session. The two parties to the dispute accepted this proposal, 
which was adopted by the Council-
“ On May 3ist, Sir Austen Chamberlain, on behalf of the 
Committee of Three, convened the Roumanian and Hungarian 
representatives in London. The conversations took place on May 
31 st and June 1st. The delegates of both countries stated at the 
outset that they could not definitely bind their Governments. 
The Committee first of all heard the additional statements of the 
two parties and certain particulars which they furnished. The 
Committee thought it its duly to try all possible means of reach­
ing a final solution by conciliation. In doing so, it was confident 
that it was fulfilling the wishes of the Council and conforming 
Io the established practice of that body. It therefore asked the 
delegates to obtain from their respective Governments all possible 
concessions with a view to reaching a satisfactory solution. On 
the proposal of the Committee, the delegates of the two Govern­
ments agreed to inform the Committee of the point, of view of 
their respective Governments at the June session of the Council.
“ At the June session of the Council, the Committee of Three 
met on several occasions at Geneva and maintained close contact 
with the representatives of the two Governments.
“ Looking at the problem as a whole, the Committee desired 
to find a solution which would allay discontent- It could not 
forget that the matter had originally been submitted to the 
Council not under Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon but under 
Article 11 of the Covenant, and that its intervention had been 
asked for, on that occasion, first of all by Roumania and then 
by Hungary. In these circumstances, it could not evade the duty 
Imposed on it by the Covenant and confine itself simply to the 
election of the two deputy members for the Mixed Arbitral Tribu­
nal, which the Hungarian representative had as a result of the 
proceedings demanded.
“ If it did so, it would have failed to discharge its political 
duties as a mediator and conciliator in a dispute which extended 
far beyond the actual terms in which it had been originally 
submitted by the two parties.
“ Moreover, the Committee could not take a purely and strictly 
legal view of the Council’s duties, especially as it realised that 
the election of the two deputy members would not have finally 
ended a difference which had been successively submitted to 
three international authorities.
“ On the contrary, it attempted on more than one occasion to 
bring about a general settlement which would have terminated the 
controversy and led to better feelings.
“ The Council, however, had further reasons for not playing 
a purely mechanical part.
“In 1923—as to-day—the two parties stated their points of 
view at great length and dealt with all aspects of the dispute 
both as regards substance and form.
“ The Council has merely followed the discussions of the two 
parties, and, having regard to the complexity of the problem., it 
recommended them in 1923 to do everything possible to prevent 
the question of the optants from becoming a disturbing in­
fluence in the relations between the two neighbouring countries.
“ It recommended Hungary to reassure her nationals and Rou­
mania to give evidence of good will in regard to the interests of 
the Hungarian optants.
“Would the question with which we have been dealing since 
our session last March have arisen if the two parties had followed 
these recommendations ?
" The Committee of the Council during its June session 
submitted certain formulas to the two parties, always with a view 
to conciliation and in the hope that the two Governments would 
agree.
“ The Committee is forced to confess that its hopes have been 
disappointed and that the two parties have been unable to accept 
the conciliatory formulas which it proposed.
“ As the two parties rejected the compromise proposed by the 
Committee of Three, the latter convened them again on Septem­
ber 2nd, with a view to a final attempt at conciliation. During 
these fresh conversations, the representatives of the two countries 
communicated certain proposals to the Committee. The Hunga­
rian representative renewed the offer made in March that the 
question of jurisdiction of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal should 
be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, but 
declared that he was unable to make new concessions- This offer 
was not accepted by the Roumanian representative, who in his 
turn submitted certain formulas based on the proposals made 
by the Committee of Three with a view to compromise. These 
formulas were rejected by the Hungarian representative. Under 
these circumstances, the Committee of Three was compelled 
to abandon its hope of reaching a settlement by direct concilia­
tion.
“The Committee was therefore obliged to seek a solution by 
other methods. A minute examination of the question of the; 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction seemed to be of primary 
importance. It therefore asked the following questions :
“i. Is the Roumano-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
entitled to entertain claims arising out of the application of 
the Roumanian Agrarian Law to Hungarian optants and 
nationals?
“2. If the answer to that question be in the affirmative, 
to what extent and in what circumstances is it entitled to 
do so?
“The Committee, after examining these questions and having 
them examined by eminent legal authorities, arrived at the 
following conclusions:
“The Mixed Roumano-Hungarian Arbitral Tribunal owes its 
establishment to the Treaty of Trianon. It is an international 
tribunal and its jurisdiction is therefore fixed by the terms of 
the Treaty which created it. It has no jurisdiction beyond that 
which the agreement of the contracting parties has conferred on 
it- The limits of its jurisdiction are defined by Articles 23g and 
25o of the Treaty of Trianon.
“The question at present submitted to the Council for exami­
nation relates to the claims addressed under Article 25o to the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal by Hungarian nationals. The provisions 
of this article prohibit the retention and liquidation, dealt with 
in Article 23a and in the Annex to Section IV of Part X of the 
Treaty, of the property of Hungarian nationals situated in the 
territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. They also 
provide for the restitution to their owners of goods freed from 
any measure of this kind and from any other measure of dis­
posal, of administration or of sequestration taken in the period 
which elapsed between the Armistice and the entry into force 
of the Treaty. They authorise the submission of claims, by 
claimants who are Hungarian nationals, to the Mixed Roumano- 
Hungarian Arbitral Tribunal provided for in Article 23g.
“If it could be established in any particular case that the 
property of a Hungarian national suffered retention or liquida­
tion or any other measure of disposal under the terms of Ar­
ticles 232 and 25o as a result of the application to the said pro­
perty of the Roumanian Agrarian Law and if a claim were sub­
mitted with a view to obtaining restitution, it would be within 
the jurisdiction of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to give relief.
“The Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is not competent to give decisions 
on claims arising out of the application of an agrarian law as 
such unless the case mentioned in the preceding paragraph 
of an agrarian law was involved.
“Since these considerations show that the claim of a Hungarian 
national for restitution of property in accordance with Article 25o 
might come within the jurisdiction of the Mixed Arbitral Tribu­
nal even if the claim arises out of the application of the Rouma­
nian Agrarian Law, we shall proceed to the definition of the 
principles which the acceptance of the Treaty of Trianon has 
made obligatory for Ronmania and Hungary.
“i. The provisions of ihe peace settlement effected after the 
war of igi4-i8 do not exclude the application to Hungarian nation­
als (including those who have opted for Hungarian nationality} 
of a general scheme of agrarian reform.
“Article 25o forbids the application of Article a32 to the pro­
perty of Hungarian nationals in the transferred territory. Under 
the terms of Article a5o, the prohibition to retain and liquidate 
cannot restrict Roumania’s freedom of action beyond what it 
would have been if Articles 23a and a5o had not existed. Even if 
none of these provisions appeared in the Treaty, Roumania 
would none the less be entitled to enact any agrarian law she 
might consider suitable for the requirements of her people, 
subject to the obligations resulting from the rules of internation­
al law. There is, however, no rule of international law exempt­
ing Hungarian nationals from a general scheme of agrarian 
reform..
“The question of compensation, whatever its importance from 
other points of view, does not here come under consideration..
"2. There must be no inequality between Roumanians and Hun­
garians, either in the terms of the Agrarian Law or in the way in 
which it is enforced-
“Any provision in a general scheme of agrarian reform which; 
either expressly or by necessary implication singled out Hun­
garians for more onerous treatment than that accorded to Rou­
manians, or to the nationals of other States generally, would 
create a presumption that it was intended to disguise a retention 
or liquidation of the property of Hungarian nationals as such 
in violation of Article 260 and would entitle the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal to give relief. The same would apply in the case, of a 
discriminatory application of the Agrarian Law.
“The prohibition against the holding of immovable property 
by Hungarians in the territories transferred to Roumania, even 
if applied to all foreigners, would not be in accordance with the 
obligations which Roumania has contracted by the Treaty to per­
mit Hungarian optants to keep their immovable property, but 
this is a question which does not come within Article 260.
“3. The words ‘retention and liquidation’ mentioned in Article 
a5o, which relates only to the territories ceded by Hungary, apply 
solely to the measures taken against the property of a Hungarian 
in the said territories and in so far as such owner' is a Hungarian 
national.
“The right which the Allied Powers reserved to themselves 
under Article a32 to retain and liquidate Hungarian property 
within their territory at the time of the entry into force of the 
Treaty applies to the property of a Hungarian inasmuch as he is 
a national of an ex-enemy country. It is not sufficient that these' 
measures entail the retention of Hungarian property by the Go­
vernment and that the owner of this property is a Hungarian. 
The measure must be one which would not have been enacted 
or which would not have been applied as it was if the owner of 
the property were not a Hungarian-
“The Committee of the Council therefore ventures to suggest 
that the Council should make the following recommendation:
“a) To request the two parties to conform to the three prin­
ciples enumerated above;
“b) To request Roumania to reinstate her judge on the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
“The Committee of the Council hopes that the two parties, in 
so far as each is concerned, will accept these proposals.”
“In the event of a refusal by Hungary, the Committee consi­
ders that the Council would not be justified in appointing two 
deputy members in accordance with Article 289 of the Treaty 
of Trianon.
“In the event of a refusal by Roumania, in spite of the accept­
ance by Hungary of the above proposals, the Committee considers 
that the Council would be justified in taking appropriate meas­
ures to ensure in any case the satisfactory working of the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal.
“In the event of a refusal of the above recommendations by 
both parties, the Committee considers that the Council will have 
discharged the duty laid upon it by Article 11 of the Covenant.”
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Roumania, like certain other European countries, had for some 
lime past been in a peculiar position regarding the distribution 
of rural property; half the country, or about four million hec­
tares, was owned by only four thousand persons out of a popula­
tion of more than seven million inhabitants. This abnormal 
state of affairs gave rise to considerable unrest which threatened 
to disturb social peace. Reforms wrere absolutely necessary and 
the Bucarcst Government took up the matter as early as igi3.
Inspired by the present and future interests of the country, 
the Government endeavoured to democratize property and, for 
this purpose, introduced the agrarian laws of 1917 and 1918, 
which were completed by those of 1920 and 1921. These laws 
entirely revolutionised rural life by transferring practically the 
whole of the arable land of the country to the peasant popula­
tion, which until then had cultivated it only as agricultural 
labourers. On more than one occasion, these laws gave rise to 
energetic protests from the dispossessed owners for, by very 
reason of the object in view, they were applied to all the 
inhabitants without distinction, both to nationals and foreigners.
(1) Article published in Vraronc. Xotirclle, 507 of 29.10.27, page ] 150,
and translated from 1I10 French ver-ion.
Immediately after the war of 1914-1918, Transylvania which 
had hitherto formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
was allotted to Roumania by virtue of the Treaty of Trianon.
The agrarian laws in force in Roumania, and those 
subsequently enacted, were applied in this province in exactly 
the same manner as in the former Roumanian territories and 
other newly acquired territory: Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovi­
na, and Bessarabia. They consequently affected the “Hungarian 
optants”, who had retained possession of their landed property.
The Hungarian Government interpreted the application of the 
agrarian laws to its nationals as a measure of liquidation, or 
rather as an act of spoliation.
On March i5th, 1928, it addressed a request to the Council of 
the League of Nations. This document after briefly setting forth 
the facts of the case, asked for a decision on the substance of 
the matter and, in accordance with Article 282 of the Treaty of 
Trianon, that it should be decided :
1) That the Roumanian legislative and administrative 
enactments were contrary to the Treaty;
2) That the immovable property of Hungarian optants 
expropriated as a result of the Roumanian agrarian reforms 
should be restored to them;
3) That full compensation for the above damage should 
be given to the injured parties.
At the meeting of the Council held on April 20th, 1928, the 
Roumanian Government maintained that Article 282 was in no 
way in question; it declared that no act of spoliation had been 
committed against Hungarian nationals since the agrarian laws 
applied without discrimination to all the inhabitants of the 
country and that the Hungarian landowners were treated in 
exactly the same manner in law and in fact as the Roumanian 
owners. It added that the granting of such a request would be 
equivalent to creating a privilege in favour of Hungarian optants, 
which the Treaty of Trianon had no intention of establishing.
The Council adjourned the examination of the question to its 
July session and requested the parties to do their utmost to arrive 
al an amicable settlement before that dale.
Pursuant to the wish expressed by the Council, M. Adatci, 
appointed rapporteur on this question, asked the Hungarian and 
Roumanian representatives to meet in Brussels on May 25, 1923, 
with a view to a discussion of the matter under his auspices.
These negotiations ended in the drafting of minutes dated 
May 27th, in which it was stated, in particular, that “it is 
admitted, and the Hungarian representatives do not dispute the 
point, that the Treaty of Trianon does not preclude the expropria­
tion of the properly of optants for reasons of public welfare, 
including the social requirements of agrarian reform ”
A draft resolution on these lines was accepted by the two 
parties on May 29th, and the matter could have been regarded 
as closed if, on June 12th, the Hungarian Minister for foreign 
Affairs had not informed M. Adatci that the Hungarian Govern­
ment could not stand by the resolution accepted by its represent­
ative at Brussels, who had exceeded his powers and had signed 
with “an absence of mature reflection which the very serious 
nature of the act would have required.”
In a memorandum addressed to M. Daruvary, Hungarian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Adatci expressed his surprise 
at the attitude of the Hungarian Government and laid stress on 
the fact that the work of the Council of the League of Nations 
would be ^rendered impossible, if, in contravention of all 
international use, the delegates sent by the Parties and duly 
authorised by them to negotiate under the auspices of a Member 
of the Council could subsequently be repudiated by their Govern­
ments; finally, he made an earnest appeal to the Hungarian 
Government to find an amicable solution of the controversy.
The Hungarian Government did not, however, accept this 
suggestion and instructed its representative to state the Hun­
garian case before the Council at its meeting of July 5th, 1928. 
At this same meeting, the Roumanian representative explained 
why the Council should maintain the agreement signed at 
Brussels.
The Council — with the exception of the Hungarian delegate 
who refrained from voting — unanimously adopted the 
resolution drafted at Brussels on May 27th, and took note of 
the declarations made by the Parlies on the substance of the 
question. Thus, the point of view upheld by the Roumanian 
Government\was given full satisfaction.
The Hungarian nationals of Transylvania, however, did not 
consider the matter closed. They therefore applied to the 
Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal sitting in Paris 
and created in execution of Article a3g of the Treaty of Trianon. 
They claimed the restitution of their land or a sum, by way of 
compensation, the amount of which would be fixed after 
discussion.
The Jurists for the Roumanian Government pleaded in 
opposition the incompetence of the Tribunal, which, under the 
terms of the Treaty of Trianon was qualified only to hear and 
determine certain claims, which in no wray included the case 
presented by the Hungarian Government.
The hearing lasted from December i5th Io 2.3rd, 1926, and 
by its resolution of January 10th, 1927, the Tribunal, relying 
on paragraph .3 of Article 25o, declared itself competent in the 
matter.
The Roumanian Government entered a protest and, by a note 
dated February 24th, 1927, addressed to the President of the 
Tribunal, informed the latter that it withdrew its representative; 
Jater, on March 7th, 1927, it laid the matter before the Council 
of the League of Nations in application of paragraph 2 of 
Article 11 of the Covenant. The Hungarian Government 
requested the Council to appoint two deputy members for the 
Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to enable the 
latter to continue its work.
The President of the Council, after having heard both Parties, 
stated that the fact that the Roumanian Government had raised 
this question on the basis of Article 11 of the Covenant was 
evidence of the high importance which that Government itself 
attached to it; that the matter was more serious than a dispute 
between two Members of the League since the point at issue 
was that of the competence of arbitral tribunals in rdlation 
to national and international law's on the same subject; he added 
that it was necessary to go thoroughly inlo the question and, 
with that object in view, he proposed the appointment of a 
rapporteur to study the question in detail and to report to the 
Council. He asked Sir Austen Chamberlain to be kind enough 
to undertake that duly. Sir Austen Chamberlain accepted but 
asked the Council to appoint two of his colleagues to act with 
him in order, he explained, to give the report all the more 
influence, and authority. The Chilian and Japanese represent­
atives were appointed to assist Sir Austen Chamberlain.
This Committee of three Members thought it its duty to try 
all possible means of reaching a final solution of the dispute by 
conciliation. It met on several occasions in an endeavour to 
find a formula acceptable to both Parties but its hopes were 
disappointed.
After examining certain points of law and after having 
consulted enlinent jurists on these points, the Committee laid 
down the three following principles which in its opinion should 
be accepted by Roumania and Hungary as signatories of the 
Treaty of Trianon :
i) The provisions of the peace settlement effected after 
the war of 1914-1918 do not exclude the application to 
Hungarian nationals (including those who have opted for 
Hungarian nationality) of a general scheme of agrarian 
reform;
2) There must be no inequality between Roumanians and 
Hungarians either in the terms of the agrarian law or in the 
way in which it is enforced;
3) The words retention and liquidation mentioned in 
Article 25o, which relates only to the territories ceded by 
Hungary, apply solely to the measures taken against the 
property of a Hungarian in the said territories and in so far 
as such owner is a Hungarian national.
In consequence, the Committee suggested that the Council 
should make the followings recommendations :
a) To request the two Parties to conform to the three 
principles enumerated above;
b) To request Roumania to reinstate her judge on the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
The Committee concluded its report by suggesting the 
appropriate measures in the event of the refusal of the above 
recommendations by one or other of the Parties.
After a prolonged discussion before the Council, the latter, on 
the proposal of the President, adopted the conclusions of the
report. It further decided that the recommendations therein, 
suggested should be submitted to the interested Governments 
for examination and that these Governments should be asked 
to conform to the principles therein formulated.
The points of law to be considered.
From the foregoing it will be seen that, strictly speaking, 
there are now no questions of law to be elucidated; those that, 
arise have, in fact, already been discussed either by the lawyers 
of the Parties or by the Committee of the Council after 
consideration of the Jurist’ report.
We think, however, that the three following questions should 
be considered, at least in a general manner, as they dominate 
the issue and arc of a nature to place the Hungarian claim in 
its true light :
a) What is the status of foreigners within the territory of 
another State, according to the principles of present international 
law; and to what extent can they or their Governments sue 
that State for damages, effective or otherwise, suffered in that 
territory?
b) Does the application of the Roumanian agrarian laws in 
Transylvania imply spoliation, liquidation or even an act of 
disfavour towards Hungarian optants who owned property in 
that province?
c) What is the value of the decision whereby the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal declared itself competent to hear and determine claims 
submitted by Hungarian optants?
What is the status of foreigners within the territory of 
ANOTHER STATE, ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PRESENT INTER­
NATIONAL law; and to what extent can they on their Govern­
ments SUE THAT STATE FOR DAMAGES, EFFECTIVE OR OTHERWISE, 
SUFFERED IN THAT TERRITORY?
This aspect of the problem was not, strictly speaking, 
discussed during the proceedings; but it certainly merits 
consideration not only because it elucidates the second point 
bid also because the partisans of Hungary have in various Press 
articles endeavoured to show that the Hungarian optants are 
right.
One of the features of our Lime is the great number of for­
eigners residing in certain countries, either with the intention of 
establishing themselves there permanently, as in the States of 
America, or with the intention of remaining there only tempo­
rarily, as is the case in several European countries.
This feature has a great repercussion on international law for, 
owing to the innumerable problems it gives rise to, it is neces­
sary to revise or define the existing principles regarding the 
status of foreigners, or to establish special rules to meet the new 
situations.
What are the principles in force in this connection? M. de 
Lapradelle, an eminent authority on international questions and 
Professor at the Faculty of Law, expressed the following opinion 
in an article published in Le Temps of September 5th, 1926, on 
the question of the Hungarian claims :
“There is an indisputable principle in international law, 
which has frequently been asserted in doctrine and juris­
prudence, to the effect that the treatment of a foreigner is 
not judged by that applied to a national but directly by the 
requirements of the human personality and international 
life; it may thus be either more or less favourable according 
to the standard of local civilisation.”
I
We do not agree with that opinion. The principle which it 
formulates is too absolute in character.
In the present issue, we are dealing with a question regarding 
which there has been established no universal and absolute 
principle or equal juridical treatment.
The conditions of civilisation and the geographical and social 
conditions ruling in the different continents or even in the differ­
ent regions of a given continent play an extremely important 
part in this matter. In point of fact, during the XIXth century, 
the Western civilised Slates (European States and America) claim­
ed, in this question of the status of foreigners, that their nationals 
living in the Eastern civilised States (Turkey, Asiatic countries) 
should have the same status as they had in their own territory; 
in other words, that foreigners in these (Eastern) countries should 
enjoy rights which were not held by the natives. The claims 
have sometimes formed the subject of special treaties known as 
“capitulations”. This preferential status has always been looked 
upon with disfavour by the Eastern civilised countries. The 
national awakening that has manifested itself in the last few 
years, particularly in the far East, and which is characterised by 
the hatred of foreigners, is chiefly the result of the preferential 
status of the latter.
In the reciprocal relations between the civilised countries of 
the West, this question of the status of foreigners was exclusively 
a matter of internal legislation. European countries and the 
States of America have always taken and still continue to take a 
different view on this subject. Until about fifty years ago, under 
the legislation of practically every European country, a forei­
gner — even a subject of a western civilised country — was in 
a position manifestly inferior to that of a national; in particular, 
he was not permitted to own immovable property. To-day, 
although he enjoys a higher status, that status is still inferior to 
that of a national' of the country in which he has elected domi­
cile.
In America, however, the situation is different. These States 
obtained their independence more than a century ago and ever 
since then a foreigner has held the same civil rights as a national; 
he is entitled to plead these rights before the same authorities 
in the same form and in the same conditions as a national 
without any restriction whatsoever (there is no judicatum solvi 
surely). But there is one important point to be noted : the 
States of America have never, in any instance or for any reason 
whatsoever, allowed a foreigner to hold more rights than a 
national. Foreigners and nationals have exactly the same status 
and the country of which such foreigners are nationals cannot 
intervene on their behalf unless the legislation of the State in 
which they are residing precludes them from appealing to the 
legal authorities or unless the latter have treated them with 
manifest unfairness, particularly on account of their foreign 
nationality (refusal of justice).
If foreigners residing in America cannot for any reason or 
under any circumstances enjoy a more favourable position than 
nationals, the same is true, a fortiori, in European countries.
If foreigners were permitted to hold'more rights than the 
nationals of the country which has given them hospitality, this 
preferential status would constitute an offence against the nation­
als. This would be particularly the case if a country compen­
sated foreigners and refused to grant the same compensation to 
its nationals; it would thereby be guilty of an injustice towards 
the latter, who would be quite justified in claiming such compen­
sation.
The same principle should hold good when a foreigner has- 
suffered loss as a result of the enactments of his country of resi­
dence. If the country of which he is a national could lodge a 
complaint whenever such loss had occurred, the States would 
no longer have sovereign power in their own territory; in last 
resort, their actions would almost invariably be subject to a 
foreign authority which would judge of their legality. No State 
is prepared to accept consequences of such a nature.
Furthermore, in special cases, the most civilised countries 
may enact laws or introduce measures which, in normal times, 
would be regarded as a violation of the protection of citizens 
or as an attack on individual interests. Such, for example, are 
the laws enacted in time of war, which limit freedom of transit, 
impose special conditions on foreigners, grant moratoriums to 
debtors, make paper money forced currency, etc... Enactments 
of this nature can never form the subject of a claim.
Finally, there may be laws which are directly prejudicial to 
the interests of foreigners, who have no right of appeal when 
these laws are introduced for reasons of social welfare or in the 
general interest of the country; such, for example, are the laws 
which prohibit foreigners from holding property in certain 
regions of the country, notably on the frontier. This, moreover, 
is the custom in several European countries. But, here again, 
no claim could be admitted.
The State therefore cannot be held responsible in regard to a 
foreigner unless the law enacted by it tends directly to cause him 
damage as a foreigner and without justification on the grounds 
of general interest.
According to the conditions of contemporary international life, 
the principles which are generally recognised in regard to the 
status of foreigners are as follows : a foreigner shall have, in his 
country of residence, the same status as a national; that is to say, 
he shall hold the same rights as a national and shall have the- 
same obligations. The Slate of which the foreigner is a national 
can intervene on his behalf only in the following special cases, 
namely :
a) When the State against which the complaint is preferred is 
of a lesser degree of civilisation as compared with average civili ­
sation of Western countries and disregards certain fundamental 
rights of individuals;
b) When, although having a standard of Western civilisation, 
it falls into a state of anarchy or establishes a regime of violence 
which is condemned by civilised nations and seriously offends 
the rights of foreigners;
c) When there is a breach of conventional obligations;
d) When, as a result of the legislation of the country, it is 
impossible for a foreigner to appeal to the local authorities and is 
treated with manifest injustice, particularly on account of his 
foreign nationality.
This question of responsibility of States was discussed at the 
last session of the Institute of International Law which was 
recently held at Lausanne. We will not deal here with the 
manner in which the Institute dealt with that question, but the 
foregoing conditions are in full agreement with the resolutions 
adopted at Lausanne in this connection. Were this not the case, I 
no State would be prepared to accept them.
If we apply the above conditions to the present controversy, 
it will be seen that the Roumanian Government has violated no 
principle of international law in regard to Hungarian optants in 
the application of its agrarian laws and that, in consequence, 
there is no justification for the Hungarian Government’s request 
in the matter.
DOES THE APPLICATION OF THE ROUMANIAN AGRARIAN LAWS IN 
TRANSYLVANIA IMPLY SPOLIATION, LIQUIDATION OR EVEN AN ACT 
OF DISFAVOUR TOWARDS HUNGARIAN OPTANTS WHO OWNED PRO­
PERTY IN THAT PROVINCE?
Although the reply to this question has already been given in 
the preceding observations, we wish specially to examine this 
point. It may be divided into two parts :
a) With what object in view did the Roumanian Government 
enact the agrarian laws?
b) Considering their object and scope, did the said laws cons­
titute an act of spoliation, a liquidation or even an act of disfa­
vour towards the Hungarian optants?
i. Certain European countries which, in the past, were placed 
in the same position as Roumania as regards the distribution of 
landed property, resorted to more or less drastic measures to 
remedy this state of affairs, since normal or moderate measures 
would have been inadequate in view of the object to be attained.
Since the memorable night of August 4th, 1789, and especially 
at the present time, it is universally agreed that the interests of 
large landowners should give precedence to the general interest 
of the country. This is one of the most important instances of 
the application of what is called social justice. Roumania has 
also realised the necessity of following that course.
The object of the agrarian laws enacted by Roumania was there­
fore to settle a problem of vital social interest to the country, 
a problem which affected not only her domestic peace but also 
her present and future economic development.
In view of the fact that these laws were enacted with the object 
of furthering' social and general interests, they bear the seal of 
morality, for in matters of internal policy, any measure intro­
duced in the national interest is moral, in the same way that 
anything undertaken for reasons of general welfare in external 
relations is moral.
2. Furthermore, the Roumanian agrarian laws are of a general 
character since they apply to Roumanian territory in its entirety 
and to all persons or property residing or situated therein. 
These are the characteristics of general laws.
Granted the two conditions enumerated above, it cannot be 
said that the Roumanian agrarian laws were in the nature of a 
spoliation or even that they gave rise to unequal treatment in 
regard to nationals of other countries. This criticism could not 
have been levelled at the laws even if certain persons — nationals 
or foreigners — had had to suffer the consequences more than 
others. The character of a measure is determined by the object 
in view and not by its repercussion, more or less serious, on 
certain persons whom it was nntspprinlly ininpjgd to affect. If
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the: measure is taken in the general interest, there can be no 
question of an exceptional measure and still less, of spoliation.
In the Brussels Agreement referred to above, the Hungarian 
Government recognised the legitimacy of the Roumanian pro­
cedure; even if the Hungarian representative was not sufficiently 
authorised to sign this agreement, the value of his acquiescence 
is in no way diminished.
Further,, at its session held on September 17th, 1927, at 
Geneva, the Council of the League of Nations acted fully in 
accordance with, the principles of justice and equity in formulat­
ing the three principles which it laid down and which were ren­
dered obligatory for Roumania and Hungary by the Treaty of 
Trianon.
WHAT IS THE VALUE OF THE DECISION WHEREBY THE MIXED ARBITRAL
TRIBUNAL DECLARED ITSELF COMPETENT TO HEAR AND DETERMINE 
CLAIMS SUBMITTED BY HUNGARIAN OPTANTS?
The fundamental rule in the matter of international arbitral 
jurisdiction is that the judges or tribunals are only competent to 
hear and determine questions expressly submitted to them by 
the parties. The will of the parties is here the fundamental law.
The Mixed Tribunals owe their existence solely to this will 
of the parties and consequently have no other functions than 
those expressly assigned to them. For any other questions, 
even connected questions, they have absolutely no jurisdiction; 
it may be asserted categorically that, in that respect, the Tri­
bunals are inexistent. In consequence, there is no necessity for 
the parties to refuse to accept the jurisdiction of the Tribunals; 
they can purely and simply disregard them.
In case of doubt, the Tribunal can of course decide as to its 
own competence, by interpreting the will of the parties. But 
when its competence is obvious, the resolution which it takes 
in declaring itself competent is valueless since it is then guilty 
of a veritable usurpation of powers.
If the Tribunal gives an award on questions outside its juris­
diction, the parties are free (o accept or to reject it. Interna­
tional jurisprudence is entirely in agreement on that point. 
There have been several very important cases in which one of 
the parties has refused to carry out the award because it did 
not fall within the express and definite wording of the terms of
submission, notwithstanding the fact that it remained within 
the limits of the controversy. In this connection, special men­
tion should be made of the refusal by the American Senate to 
accept the arbitral award given by the King of Holland on 
January 10th, i83i, in a frontier question between England and 
the United States.
The Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, set up under the Treaty of Tria­
non (Article a3g) was constituted exclusively to examine cases 
of war liquidation expressly referred to by the said Treaty and 
bearing no relation to agrarian reform, social or general meas­
ures, conceived long before the advent of the Treaty. Its com­
petence extends no further.
Consequently, the declaration by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
to the effect that it is competent to hear and determine the Hun­
garian claim is entirely valueless. It should be regarded as 
inexistent.
THE COMPETENCE OF THE COUNCIL 
OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.
There remains yet another question to be examined. What 
is the competence of the Council of the League of Nations in the 
question at present before usp What recommendations can it 
put forward? What solutions can it suggest in case the parties 
should fail to reach an agreement as it has asked them to doP 
In order to reply to these questions, we must examine the 
nature of the Council, the rôle it plays, its duties and the criteria 
which guide it in solving the questions submitted to it.
Owing to the ever-increasing interdependence of States in the 
XIXth century, the necessity for an organisation to watch over 
general interests and the maintenance of peace began to assert 
itself. This organisation found its being in the union of the 
Great Powers before the Great War, and in the Council of the 
League of Nations after the formation of the latter.
According to the spirit of the Covenant, the “European Union” 
was to disappear and a collective policy, which was formerly a 
monopoly of the Great Powers was to become universal, that is 
to say, exercised by the League of Nations cither by all its Mem­
bers meeting in Assembly or by the Council.
According to the provisions of the Covenant, the Council is 
primarily a political organisation.
The role of the Council, even for questions of a delicate nature, 
is chiefly that of a mediator (Articles 12 and i5 of the Covenant). 
But its role is even more important, as will be seen later. In the 
concrete case here examined, these properties of the Council 
were emphasized by the rapporteur, Sir Austen Chamberlain. 
In his report submitted to the Council on September 17th, 1927, 
he stated that the Council could not confine itself simply to the 
election of two deputy members for the Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunal : “if it did so, if would have failed to discharge its poli­
tical duties as a mediator and conciliator in a dispute which 
extended far beyond the actual terms in which it had been ori­
ginally submitted by the two parties.”
This, moreover, was the attitude adopted by the Council in all 
questions referred to it.
But its role is even still more important. Under Article 11 of 
the Covenant, the Council is competent to take any action effect­
ually to safeguard the peace of nations, and the second para­
graph declares :
“It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Mem­
ber of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly1 
or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting inter­
national relations which threatens to disturb international 
peace or the good understanding between nations upon 
which peace depends”.
Finally, Article 12 adds :
“The Members of the League agree that if there should arise 
between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they 
will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry 
by the Council...”
Owing to the character of the Council, its role and preroga­
tives, the criteria which guide it are not of a juridical nature, 
the latter being frequently based on abstract logic or pervaded 
with the idea of absolute justice. It is especially and primarily 
inspired by political criteria, which take into consideration all 
the aspects of a question, particularly the economic, social and 
political aspects and the reasons of expediency. In short it 
follows the principle of social justice. It concentrates on the 
general interests of peace, interests which take precedence over 
all other considerations, and to attain that objective it can even 
depart from juridical rules if it deems proper to do so.
The Council asserted these principles in a famous case which 
was referred to it : the Italian-Greek dispute. Certain of its mem­
bers even frankly declared that they were quite unacquainted 
with international law (Declarations by Lord Robert Cecil; cf. 
report of the 26th session of the Council, meeting of September 
22nd, 1928).
This critérium has dominated all the decisions taken by the 
Council in questions submitted to it, notably in the question of 
the Aaland Islands, the case of Upper Silesia, the Greco-Bulga­
rian dispute and the Mosul incident.
The above-mentioned report by Sir Austen Chamberlain also 
supports this same view. He stated that it was impossible for 
the Committee which had been appointed :
“to take a purely and strictly legal view of the Council’s 
duties, especially as it realised that the election of the two 
deputy members would not have finally ended a difference 
which had been successively submitted to three international 
authorities. On the contrary, it attempted on more 
than one occasion to bring about a general settlement which 
wrould have terminated the controversy and led to better 
feelings”. ('17th session of the Council, meeting of Septem­
ber 17th, 1927.)
According to the foregoing observations, the Council is com­
petent to hear and determine the Roumanian-Hungarian dispute 
under Article 11 of the Covenant. It can recommend to the 
Parties any means it deems appropriate to bring about better 
feelings between them. The recommendations which it made 
at the last session arc of a nature to bring about that result.
Finally, if the Parties fail to arrive at an agreement, the Coun­
cil can take any resolutions deemed proper in the circums­
tances.
Conclusions.
Consequently, and for the reasons set forth above, we are of 
the opinion :
i) That the application of the Roumanian agrarian laws to 
the property of Hungarian nationals in Transylvania does not 
fall to be dealt with under the provisions of Article a5o or of any 
other Article of the Treaty of Trianon;
2) That, in imposing the conditions of its agrarian laws on the 
sa;d Hungarian nationals the Roumanian Government acted 
in the full exercise of its sovereignty, committed no act of spo­
liation towards these nationals and violated no principle of 
international law;
3) That if it were obliged to compensate the said Hungarian 
nationals, the Roumanian Government would thereby be accord­
ing them preferential treatment which is in no way justified 
and which has never been in the intention even of the Hungarian 
Government itself, since it declared (note of February 1920) that 
all it claimed for its nationals was equality of treatment. If such 
compensation were granted, justice would require that if be 
granted also to every inhabitant of the Kingdom — nationals or 
foreigners — to whom the Roumanian agrarian laws have been 
applied.
The ideas contained in these three conclusions have moreover 
been expressly recognised by the Committee of the Council and 
accepted by the Council as being the principles which became 
obligatory for both Parties when they signed the Treaty of 
Trianon;
fû That the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, constituted under the 
Treaty of Trianon and given a strictly defined mission, is not 
competent to hear and determine claims submitted by Hungarian 
optants concerning damages which they allege to have suffered 
as a result of the application of the Roumanian agrarian laws, 
and that the resolution voted by the said Tribunal should be 
considered as null and void;
•r) That if, in response to the request of the Council of the 
League of Nations, the Roumanian Government reinstated its 
judge on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, it must be fully under­
stood that it is solely in order to hear and determine claims 
coming within its competence and not those relating to the 
agrarian laws;
6) That there is no necessity to ask for the opinion of the Inter­
national Court of Justice on questions examined by the Com­
mittee of Three appointed by the Council — as requested by the 
Hungarian Government — in view of the fact that, notwith­
standing a certain juridical aspect of the problem, it cannot be 
denied that the Council has before it a question which is of an 
essentially political character. Moreover, it must be borne in 
mind that, after having thoroughly studied the problem itself, 
the Council considered it expedient to consult absolutely impar­
tial authorities of the highest international reputation and of 
undeniable juridical competence. By so doing, the Council 
wished to arm itself with every necessary guarantee. It has given 
proof of extreme prudence although it was in no way obliged 
to follow that procedure. In these conditions, it may be categor­
ically asserted that the Council is under no obligation what­
soever to seek any further advice on the question herein exam­
ined.
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Member of the Institute, Dean of the Faculty of Law, Paris.
The application of the Roumanian agrarian laws resulted in 
the expropriation of many properties situated in Transylvania 
belonging to Hungarian nationals.
Invoking Article a5o of the Treaty of Trianon, these Hunga­
rians instituted proceedings before the Roumanian-Hungarian 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal for restitution and compensation.
Roumania pleaded the incompetence of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal. Article a5o of the Treaty of Trianon in fact is for the 
purpose of guaranteeing Hungarian nationals against retention 
and liquidation carried out as war measures and not against the 
consequences of laws which constitute the common law of the 
Roumanian State.
The plea of incompetence has been rejected. Consequently, 
Roumania, the defendant, refusing to plead the substance of the 
question withdrew her arbitrator from the Mixed Arbitral Tribu­
nal thus rendering it impossible for that body to give an award 
on the substance of the dispute.
The affair was laid before the Council of the League of Nations 
simultaneously by the Roumanian Government and by the 
Hungarian Government.
On this occasion, the Roumanian Government exercised the 
friendly right conferred by Article n, paragraph 2 of the 
Covenant on each Member of the League “to bring to the atten­
tion of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance what­
ever affecting international relations..... ” It wished to avoid
(•) Translated from the French version.
being accused of having disregarded the obligations assumed in 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
The Hungarian Government invoked Article 289 of the Treaty. 
It requested the Council to appoint two members to the Tribunal 
from among whom to choose a judge to fill the vacancy caused 
by the withdrawal of the Roumanian arbitrator.
This gave rise to the two following questions :
Question 1. — Is the Council of the League of Nations obliged 
to appoint the two arbitrators requested by the Hungarians ?
Question 2. — If the Council of the League of Nations does 
not comply with the Hungarian request, what measures can it 
take to settle the dispute and to what extent will those measures 
apply to the parties to the dispute ?
* it ★
Question 1. — Is the Council obliged to ensure the functioning 
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal by making the choice of a third 
judge possible ?
A literal interpretation of Article 289 a) of the Treaty calls for 
a reply in the negative. This Article reads as follows :
Article 289 a). — “Within three months from the coming 
“ into force of the present Treaty, a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
“ shall be established between each of the Allied and Asso- 
“ cialed Powers on the one hand and Hungary on the other 
“ hand. Each such Tribunal shall consist of three members. 
“ Each of the Governments concerned shall appoint one of 
“ these members. The President shall be chosen by 
“ agreement between the two Governmnts concerned.
“ In case of failure to reach agreement, the President of 
“ the Tribunal and two other persons, either of whom may 
“ in case of need take his place, shall be chosen by the Coun- 
“ cil of the League of Nations....
“ If in case there is a vacancy a Government docs not 
“ proceed within a period of one month to appoint as pro- 
“ vidcd above a member of the Tribunal, such member 
“ sbnll be chosen by the oth°r Government from the two 
“ persons mentioned above other than the President—”
In fact, the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
was constituted in accordance with paragraph i of this text. 
Agreement was reached for the appointment of the President. 
The Council of the League of Nations was therefore not called 
upon to intervene in order to appoint at the same time as an 
unofficial President, two other persons either of whom might 
in case of need take the place of the defaulting members.
Without doubt, the withdrawal of the Roumanian representa­
tive caused a vacancy within the Tribunal, a case provided for 
and settled by paragraph 3. The Roumanians fully intend this 
vacancy to remain unfilled since they plead that the Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunal is incompetent to judge the questions submitted 
to it by the Hungarians. Paragraph 3 of Article 23g says indeed 
that in case there is a vacancy the member intended to fill that 
vacancy shall be chosen by the other Government from the two 
persons chosen to take the place of the President in case of need. 
In the case under consideration these two persons do not..exist : 
thp occasion to appoint them has not arisen, and it is not clear 
under what text of the Treaty the Council of the League of 
Nations would be obliged or even able to appoint them.
It may be said that Article 23g is incomplete and inadequate 
bv not having; furnished a solution to all difficulties which might 
arise. Granted I It none the less, by its definite and restricted 
language, constitutes the law of the parties. We can deduce 
from it only the obligations which it imposes on one of the 
parties and the rights which it confers on the other.
The Roumanian Government cannot be obliged to retain an 
arbitrator to pronounce on disputes which are outside the terms 
of reference and the competence (limited by the treaties) of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. The Hungarians, it is true, maintain 
the contrary and invoke the decision taken in regard to the 
question of competence as having force of res judicata. In 
reply, we maintain that only decisions on questions referred to 
them for settlement under the terms of reference, accepted by 
both parties, have, by arbitral award, the force of res judicata. 
In fact, the authority of the arbitrators rests solely on the 
agreement of the parties concerned. Now, it is quite impossible 
to maintain that the parties arc in agreement to leave it to the 
arbitrators ot declare whether the Roumanian common law is 
or is not applicable to Hungarian nationals owning property in 
Transylvania I We are told that this is begging the question 
and, that the controversy bears on the meaning of Article 260 
of the Treaty of Trianon and, in particular, on the interpreta­
tion which renders that Article applicable to the measures of 
which the Hungarians complain.
Our answer is that no doubt exists as to the meaning of Ar­
ticle 25o ; it presents no ambiguity and gives rise to no contro­
versy. We add, moreover, that the conditions in which the 
agrarian reform has been applied in Roumania are above 
suspicion, that the executory provisions of the said laws, applied 
equally to Roumanians and foreigners irrespective of nationality, 
have nothing in common with the measures provided for or 
prohibited in Article 25o. A controversy is not created by the 
mere assertion that it exists. No dispute can be raised between 
the Hungarian optants and the Roumanian Government within 
the category of measures submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
The Roumanian Government, it is true, did not evade the 
discussion on the question of competence before the said Tribu­
nal. It acted thus, however, only out of deference and after 
having warned the judges that it would not agree to discuss 
the substance of the question. Ry declaring their competence, 
it was not for the arbitrators, in fact, to take upon themselves 
to deal with claims or protests which the parties had by no 
means agreed to submit to them.
We have said that the literal interpretation of Article 23g a) 
of the Treaty of Trianon does not sanction the exaction from the 
Council of the League of Nations of the appointment of two 
persons in order that the claimants may choose from these two 
persons a substitute for the Roumanian judge who has been 
withdrawn.
Assuming that the Council deems itself authorised to do 
so : even so it could not agree if it were shown that the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal, which has to be completed, is arrogating to 
itself an exorbitant competence which is compatible neither 
with the principles of international law, nor with the provisions 
of the Treaty of Trianon.
* **
We will here comment on the second question submitted to 
us : // the Council of the League of Nations does not accede to 
the request submitted to it by the Hungarian Government what 
measures can in take to settle the dispute and to what extent 
will those measures apply to the parties to the dispute ?
Without setting itself up as a court of appeal in regard to the 
question of competence, the Council of the League of Nations, 
whose mission and duty it is to make every effort to bring 
about conciliation, is indisputably qualified to examine the 
reasons why the Roumanians refuse to accept any award in 
regard to the substance of the question. If these reasons are 
decisive, it need only reject the request for the appointment of 
deputy judges as unjustified. The Hungarian optants, in fact, 
will be obliged to accept such a decision. There are judges in 
Roumania who are qualified to deal with any irregularities 
committed in the application of the agrarian laws. The Hunga­
rian optants are well aware of the fact, since they first submitted 
their claims and protests to those judges (we will add that out 
of about 3oo cases, 70 were favourably received by the Rouma­
nian courts). Nonsuited on that side by regular decisions, the 
Hungarian optants, who are now complaining, cannot appeal 
to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal because that jurisdiction deals 
only with disputes arising out of the war (sequestration, 
retention, liquidation), and not with disputes arising out of the 
application of ordinary national laws. If, however, the Council 
of the League of Nations has any scruples, if it has any doubt, 
in particular, that the said incompetence of the Roumanian- 
Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal might adversely affect the 
authority of these arbitral jurisdictions in general, it may invite 
the Roumanian Government to fill the vacancy, but only on 
two conditions. Firstly, that the Hungarian optants previously 
and formally agree to certain definite rules both on the general 
principles and on the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Treaty ; and secondly, that any failure to observe such principles, 
any departure from this interpretation involves nullity of the 
award, thereupon found to be an exceeding of powers.
It is this rather more complicated solution which seems to 
be favoured by the Council of the League of Nations. In practice, 
the two methods of procedure lead to the same result, the 
rejection of the claims of the Hungarian optants.
In fact, the reasons why Roumania was unable to grant the 
Hungarian claims are based precisely on these principles, on 
these rules, and on this interpretation of text which the Council 
of the League of Nations considers to be the dominant factor 
in the controversy.
In order to explain this statement, we must recall the acts 
giving rise to these disagreement and summarise the various 
aspects of the dispute.
To establish the jurisdiction of the Roumanian plea it will 
suffice to prove :
i) That there can be no doubt as to the legality of the agrarian 
reform applied within the Kingdom of Roumania ;
2) That no serious controversy can be raised on the meaning 
of Article 25o of the Treaty Trianon, which the Hungarians are 
endeavouring to abuse by misinterpreting the scope of that 
article and vainly cointesting its perfect clearness.
I. — The agrarian, reform in Roumania.
This reform was introduced before the war. At the end of the 
XIX century, Roumania and the neighbouring countries were 
menaced with serious disturbances. The disturbances were 
provoked by the contrast which existed between the landed 
wealth of certain large landowners and the condition of the pea­
sants, who form the immense majority of the population. 
Neither the abolition of serfdom (i8f>4), the efforts made to create 
small holdings (1881-1889), nor, later, the attempt to organise 
agricultural credits and the creation of a farmers bank had any 
serious results. At the end of the Ralkan War, half the arable 
land belonged to a few thousand landowners. The possible 
acquisition of property by the peasants was merely a theory. In 
practice, what they held was negligible.
Detailed documents and reliable statistics have been invoked 
or reproduced in the numerous memoranda dealing with the 
question. What we must bear in mind is the intention formu­
lated as early as 1913 and introduced into the political programme 
of M. Bratiano to remedy, by means of a radical agrarian reform, 
the distressing inequalities which had become a danger for the 
very stability of social welfare.
This revolution (for it was one) had numerous precedents. It 
was to consist in the expropriation of the latifundia and in their 
distribution among agricultural labourers. To realise a reform 
of that immensity, it was moreover necessary Io modify the con­
stitution of a Kingdom in which property was declared inviolable. 
Roumania did not try to evade this necessity ; a Constituent 
Assembly was convoked. It had just been elected when the war 
broke out, and the scheme had to be postponed.
It was revived on July 19, 1917, by a modification in Article 19 
of the Constitution and immediately after the conclusion of the 
Armistice, the King himself took the initiative by his famous 
message, accepted by most of the Roumanian landowners without 
vain recrimination : “Circumstances”, says the message, “once 
more give us the opportunity to fulfil my promise to you... My 
Government will carry out constitutional reforms which will 
ensure universal suffrage to every citizen and the ownership of 
two million hectares of the large private estates as well as land of 
the domains of the Crown, the State, hospitals...
“This reform will ensure more justice and gain for all workers 
in our social and economic life... etc.”
The origin of the agrarian reform, therefore, is above suspicion, 
a fact which cannot be too strongly emphasized. We would 
state moreover that it was not imposed by the people, by the 
proletariat, as before the war universal suffrage did not exist in 
Roumania. The reform was planned, approved and decided upon 
by men elected by limited suffrage, i.e. by an assembly in which 
landowners naturally occupied, if not a preponderating, at least 
an important place.
The agrarian reform which, in given conditions, involved the 
expropriation of the latifundia (and sometimes even of average 
sized domains) was realised by successive stages, from 1917 to 
1921.
We will not stay to criticise the severity of certain measures 
arising out of this expropriation, or to deplore the fact that 
coming at the same time as the monetary crisis and the fall of 
the lei the reform appeared in many cases to impose sacrifices 
for which the landowners were only very inadequately compen­
sated. Was it not the same in France after the waiving of their 
feudal rights by the landowners ? Do not works on political 
economy contain numerous examples of similar cases taken not 
only from ancient, but from more recent and almost contem­
porary history ?
Agrarian laws giving rise to expropriations against inadequate 
compensation have been imposed in Prussia (1811), Austria 
(i848). Russia (1861) and even in the United Kingdom when that 
Kingdom included Ireland.
Was it not of the possibility of similar measures that the 
authors of the new constitution of the German Empire were 
thinking when they expressed Article i53 as follows :
“Expropriation can be carried out only for the good of 
“the general public and in virtue of legislative measures. 
“It is made against fair compensation unless not otherwise 
“provided for by any law of the Reich. Any dispute in 
“regard to the amount of compensation must be submitted to 
“the ordinary courts, unless otherwise provided for by the 
“laws of the Reich.”
This then is the constitutional legislation of a great State claim­
ing to be one of the first (if not the first), on account of its 
culture, which makes reservations for the case of a Reich law 
imposing, for purposes of national welfare, expropriation without 
compensation, in other words, actual confiscation 1
We give this example and make this observation only to show 
how singular, not to say fantastic, were the awards of the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal which state that the application of the Rou­
manian agrarian laws is exorbitant in what it calls “common 
international law.”
Apart from the origin of these agrarian laws which suffices to 
protect them from being measures of circumstance created for the 
confiscation of ex-enemy properties, we note the peculiarity of 
making no distinction between the nationality of the landed pro­
prietors to whom they apply. They affect Roumanians in the 
same way as foreigners. The latter do not receive unfavourable 
treatment, which is really the utmost that can be legitimately 
claimed by foreigners.
It will doubtless be observed that the conditions of expropria­
tion arc not identical throughout the Kingdom. Account had 
to be taken of the nature of the land to be distributed and of the 
size of the rural populations to be satisfied. This is why the law 
docs not apply in the same way in Bessarabia as in the former 
Kingdom and that special provisions were enacted for Transyl­
vania, a mountainous country. The essential point however, is 
that in each province there is perfect equality of treatment be­
tween Roumanian subjects and cx-cncmy nationals.
Wc will therefore lake this fact for granted : the agrarian laws 
are above suspicion. They can therefore not be regarded as 
exceptional laws directed, in consequence of or after the war, 
against Hungarian nationals. They were enacted by Roumania 
in virtue of her complete internal sovereignty.
A Roumanian newspaper which appeared recently (the Ade- 
verul of October 3oth, 1927) publishes the frank admission of 
Count Karolyi, a former Hungarian Minister. M. Karolyi holds 
that Roumania’s right to proceed to such a reform is incontest­
able. He does not hesitate to state that if he himself had been 
Governor of Transylvania he would not have been afraid to 
impose similar sacrifices on the Magyar nobles.
No doubt can exist as to the economic, political, juridical and 
social character of the agrarian reform. The events of which 
the Hungarian optants complain are the consequence of the 
normal application of this reform.
2. — What is he meaning of Article 260 ?
We have added that no ambiguity exists as to the meaning 
of Article 260 of the Treaty of Trianon. A careful perusal of the 
text amply prove? this. Article 260 provides for exceptions to the 
application of Article 282 : it has no other object.
What therefore does Article 23a say ?
“a) The exceptional war measures and measures of transfer 
“taken in the territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary with 
“respect to the property, rights and interests of nationals of 
“Allied Powers... shall be immediately discontinued or stayed and 
“the property, rights and interests concerned restored to their 
“owners...
“b) Subject to any contrary stipulations which may be provided 
“for in the present Treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers 
“reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights and 
“interests which belong to nationals of the former Kingdom of 
“Hungary... The liquidation shall be carried out in accordance 
“with the laws of the Allied or Associated State concerned, and 
“the owner shall not be able to dispose of such property, rights or 
“interests nor to subject them to any charge without the consent 
“of that State.”
The provisions laid down in this Article arc couched in the 
language of treaties which have terminated a war. We will
' ft 
summarise them in a few words : measures of sequestration, 
retention or liquidation can no longer be applied in the conquered 
countries to the property of nationals of the victorious countries; 
inversely, the sequestration, retention or liquidation of the pro­
perty of nationals of the conquered countries may be maintained 
within the victorious country.
It is this provision, in so .far as it inflicts hardships on ex­
enemies, that Article a5o suspends in the annexed provinces. 
Let us see what it says ; it leaves no room for misinterpretation :
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 232, the prp- 
“perty, rights and interests of Hungarian nationals or com- 
“panies controlled by them situated in the territories which 
“formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
“shall not be subject to retention or liquidation in accordance 
“with these provisions.
“Such property, rights and interests shall be restored to 
“their owners freed from any measure of this kind, or from 
“any other measure of transfer, compulsory administration 
“or sequestration, taken since November 3rd, 1918, until 
“the coming into force of the present Treaty, in the condi- 
“tion in which they were before the application of the 
“measures in question.”
In reading and quoting this text, we ask how, in good faith, 
expropriations carried out in application of agrarian laws can be 
possibly confused with the retention, liquidation or sequestration 
of ex-enemy property, that is, with the exceptional war mea­
sures mentioned in Article 23a against which the Hungarian 
optants arc guaranteed by Article 260.
Has not this latter text specified fairly clearly what it was guar­
anteeing in saying in its very first lines that it was encroaching 
on Article 232 and that it freed the property of ex-enemies situated 
in the ceded territories “from retention on liquidation in 
ACCORDANCE WITH THESE PROVISIONS 1”
There are none so deaf as those who won’t hear, says the pro­
verb. The wish not to read in Article 260 what is plainly written 
there is all the more to be condemned on the part of the defen­
dants in that they had only to refer to the preliminary draft of 
Ihis text to be convinced of its limited scope. Before being 
finally adopted, the draft of Article a.fio was communicated to the 
Hungarian representatives. They expressed the desire that the 
application of the text should be extended and declared contrary 
to any measure >of expropriation ’whatsoever against Hungarian 
nationals :'“We ask”, they said, “for a reassuring statement to 
the effect that no property belonging to our nationals on the 
territory of the former Austro-Hungarian .Monarchy shall be 
sequestrated, liquidated or 'expropriated ’by virtue of a legal pro­
vision, orby means of a special measure, which Moes not apply, 
in the same conditions to 'the subject of the liquidating State 
or of the ^State ^putting such a measure into force.”
The request thus expressed was not granted. It was not even 
agreed to insert in favour of the ex-enemies the peculiar privilege 
that no expropriation was applicable to their properly whereas-the 
property 'Of the nationals was liable to this risk, Let us mole 
further how much more moderate and less unreasonable the 
demands of the Hungarian Government were then (than the 
claims of the Hungarian optants to-day. It asked only for equal­
ity <of treatment between Hungarians and Roumanians. This 
equality was not prejudiced by the application of the Roumanian 
laws putting-into effect the agrarian reform.
Article a5o was not modified ; it retained its very definitely 
restrictive part, since it appeared necessary to keep the two ques­
tions distinct—-that of exceptional war measures, and that of 
expropriation having nothing in common with the consequences 
of the war. The only concession made to the Hungarians — out 
of which they, are now trying to make capital — consisted of 
providing the jurisdiction of the Mi?;ed Arbitral Tribunal to deal 
with any protest against the application of Article a5o.
It must be understood, however, that the protests which may 
be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals shall be those 
regarding measures arising out of exceptional measures of reten­
tion, sequestration or liquidation, and not out of any measures 
of expropriation whatsoever.
Another proof of the bad faith of the Hungarian claimants is 
supplied by the rejection, which they had to endure, of the 
claims of the same kind which, in igaa and iga3, their Govern­
ment thought fit to submit to the Conference of Ambassadors, and 
afterwards to the Council of the League of Nations.
The claim of the Hungarian Government in appealing to the 
Council of the Longue of Nations was the same then as the optants 
arc now advancing before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. Arti­
cle 25o, it maintained, protects Hungarian nationals in annexed 
territory from all expropriation and confiscation, of whatever 
nature they may be, or under whatever pretext they may be, 
applied. The agrarian law is merely a pretext for dispossessing 
ex-enemy subjects.
M. Titulesco, the Roumanian representative, put forward the 
arguments set forth above. He made a clear distinction between 
categories of acts of which the Hungarians might have to com­
plain. The Council postponed the question to the next session, 
entrusting M. Adatci, Ambassador, with the task of convoking 
the parties and reconciling them. The Ambassador was successful 
in this, and at a conference between the two parties, held in 
Brussels and recorded in official minutes, the Hungarian repre­
sentative admitted that “the Treaty of Trianon does not preclude 
the expropriation of the property of optants for reasons of public 
welfare, including the social requirements of an agrarian reform.” 
Unfortunately the Hungarian Government, in defiance of all inter­
national usage, disavowed its representative at Brussels, and, in 
particular, Count Emery de Czachi, a former Hungarian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, from whom this admission emanated.
This disavowal, against which vehement protests were made, 
not only by M. Adatci, but by several members of the Council, did 
not impose upon that eminent Assembly. On July 5th 1928, a 
unanimous declaration was made., which gave the victory to the 
Roumanian thesis : “The Council, after examining the report by 
M. Adatci, dated June 5th 1923...” (which contained the admis­
sion, the acquiescence, of the Hungarian Goverment, recorded 
and signed by the Hungarian Delegate) “approves the report, 
takes note of the various declarations contained in the Minutes 
attached thereto...”
But behold the Hungarian optants, who did not consider them­
selves beaten, reopening the questions once more by devious 
means — quousque tandem ? — and summoning the Roumanian 
State before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, whose ear they seem 
to have won I
What are the arguments to which the judges could give heed ?
Those recorded in the shorthand accounts of the speeches of the 
honourable Counsel for the claimants, and included in the 
reasons for the award on the question of competence, are founded 
on truncated texts and on principles difficult to defend. Their 
slenderness is astonishing, their conclusions arc disconcerting.
Article a5o, it is stated, may be summed up ir the following 
three propositions :
First proposition. — In transferred territory, the nationals of the 
dismembered State cannot be deprived of their property by 
any measure whatsoever unless the Successor State undertakes 
to pay them the value of it.
Second proposition. — In transferred territory, the nationals of 
the dismembered ' State cannot be deprived of the right to
RETAIN THEIR PROPERTY IN KIND.
Third proposition. — in order to ensure the observance of 
these provisions, in the event of violation being alleged by the 
nationals of the dismembered State, against the annexing State, 
the dispute shall be within the competence of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal (see. Opinion of M. de Lapradelle, Recueil de la jurispru­
dence des T. A. M., Vol. IV, p. 88).
The first proposition is inexact. To give it a semblance of truth, 
it is necessary to leave out of the text relied upon all that defines 
it and limits its bearing. The only measures against which Hun­
garian nationals in Transylvania are protected are liquidation, 
retention, sequestration and, in general, all the war measures 
mentioned in Article 282. It is extraordinarily daring to conclude 
from the fact that ex-enemy property is freed from “retention or 
liquidation in accordance with these provisions” (that is, in accor­
dance with the provisions of Article 282 and the Annex to Sec­
tion IV) that it is forbidden to deprive ex-enemies of their pro­
perty by any measure whatsoever, including the measures which 
might normally be applied to nationals.
The second proposition is no sounder. We need not dwell 
upon the fact that its language is in obvious contradiction with 
the first ; if the property of Hungarians must be restored to them 
in kind, this means that they cannot even be deprived of it in 
return for fair compensation. This is an unimportant detail 
which has escaped the honourable Counsel. Less unimportant 
is the fact that, like the preceding proposition, the second takes 
for granted that restitution in kind (reserved for property Avhich 
was wrongfully sequestrated, seized or liquidated by war mea­
sures) may be extended to any other cause of expropriation, 
which is manifestly contrary to the text under interpretation.
The- third proposition. is- only true, in sn far as it permits Hun­
garian optants to defend themselves against the insufficient appli­
cation of Article a5o, that is against a measure which, in viola­
tion of this text, has the character of a retention on a liquidation 
a& a war measure-..
The; texts are thus, elusive — as soon as they are. examined! with 
attention — and fail to supply the claimants with the; support, 
which they expect.
The same applies- to- the principles which are invoked and 
which the awards on competence have nevertheless thought fit 
to rely on.
The principle which forms, as it were, the leitmotiv of the 
arguments of the Hungarian optants, is the rule' habitually 
accepted by all civilised States — including, Roumania — of the1 
sanctity- of property;.. The: peculiar conclusion is drawn that, any 
prejudice to property is contrary! to. common, international', law, 
and cannot, find\ a place in, ai peace', treaty F
This conception of a common international law,, that is» of an 
internal law which is binding, on all civilised nations, and confers 
a sort, of acquired right on those who enjoy, it, is. new.. It is so 
exorbitant, so extravagant,, one might say,, that it is sufficient to 
discredit the cause on behalf of which, it is invoked.
Will anyone dare to maintain that States which are sovereign 
as regards the rules of conduct which,, within, their territory.,, they 
can impose on. their citizens in conformity with the national will*  
are obliged to be more restrained and. less free, with regard to the 
foreigners whom they shelter?
There have, at all times, been discussions as to what could or 
should be the status of aliens. The greater facility of commu­
nication, the development of. cosmopolitanism, the multiplica­
tion! of international exchanges,, have had the happy result of 
gradually doing away with most of the differences which are 
made practically everywhere between the status of nationals 
and that of foreigners. The States of the New World,, which are 
the most liberal, abolish all differences once the foreigners have 
been considered digni intrare. — But it is paradoxical to maintain 
that in countries of the same, civilisation, circumstances can arise 
which authorise foreigners to demand more guarantees than 
nationals I Let us not obscure the. issue by bringing in argu­
ments which can only be applied when it is a question of deter­
mining relations with races of a very different civilisation (like 
the Far East) or a very inferior one (like Central Africa). This 
is obviously what our colleague de Lapradelle did in ref erring, in 
a political newspaper (Le Temps of September 5th, 1926), in com- 
nection with the Roumanian-Hungarian conflict, to the fact that 
“the treatment of the foreigner cannot always be measured by that 
“of the national, but must be measured directly by the exigencies 
“of human personality and of international life.” Applied to the 
relations between European nations, propounded as a definite 
principle, this assertion is pure sophistry. It is not sufficient to 
make the conception carry conviction that foreigners can, in any 
country whatsoever, by relying on a so-called “common inter­
national law”, demand, as an acquired right, a benefit which 
the nationals cannot enjoy.
Besides, what will this “common international law” be, and 
how is its scope to be defined? Does it follow from the fact that 
the laws of all countries of western civilisation include the régime 
of property and the subordination of expropriation to fair com­
pensation made in advance, that no exception—of whatever kind 
— can be made to the rule ? I mentioned above the history of the 
agrarian laws in Roumania. I spoke of the new German Consti­
tution and the reservation which it makes in the event of the 
Reich’s imposing, by law, measures of expropriation without 
compensation. It is impossible to deny — even if one were to 
admit that the generalisation of a principle or a legal régime 
makes it a “rule of common international law” — that it is also 
common international law that a legislative measure, in confor­
mity with the constitution of the country in which it is passed, is 
sufficient to make a breach in the common régime, through which 
the so-called acquired rights of foreigners will go by the board 
together with the rigths which the nationals previously enjoyed.
Let us be done with these confused conceptions, these danger­
ous innovations. The general principles which the Roumanians 
can certainly oppose to the argument of “common international 
law” are those granting to each State the right to determine its 
national legislation in its own way, to impose both on its nation­
als and on the foreigners admitted to its territory any rules of 
conduct which it may please the legitimate authority to enact. 
It is with full powers that the legislators of any country subject 
the régime of property, inheritance, contracts and, in general, 
all the juridical relations of their citizens and their subjects, to 
any procedure which they may deem reasonable and expedient.
The Roumanians have deemed the agrarian laws expedient. It 
is constantly acknowledged that the sacrifice which they imposed 
on the proprietors of the latifundia has spared them a revolution. 
If they were mistaken in the methods employed, that is not the 
business of any foreigner.
What the texts tell us is that the Roumanians have not retained 
the right to apply to the Hungarian nationals in the annexed 
provinces the war measures (sequestration, retention or liquida­
tion) provided for in Article 282 b ; — that a Roumanian-Hunga­
rian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is institued to take cognisance, 
within limits, of complaints which may be brought by Hungarians 
in the event of a violation of the Treaty, that is, if directly or 
indirectly war measures (retention, liquidation or sequestration) 
have been applied to them as ex-enemies ; — that the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal has no competence, and can assume none under 
pretext of verifying its competence, to pronounce on acts which 
do not constitute acts of war and are on no score exceptional war 
measures applicable to ex-enemies alone.
These considerations, these principles, these texts have not 
convinced the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. We know the sequel.
A
The Council of the League of Nations appointed a committee of 
three members, with Sir Austen Chamberlain as rapporteur, to 
study the whole affair. The report read at the Council meeting 
of September 17th was entirely favourable to the cause of the 
Roumanian Government. It first stated that it was impossible for 
the Council to accede to the request for the nomination of deputy­
arbitrators. If it confined itself simply to the election of the 
two deputy members for whom Hungary had asked, the Com- 
“ mittee would have failed to discharge its political duties as a 
“ mediator and a conciliator in a dispute which extended far 
“ beyond the actual terms in which it had been originally sub- 
“ mitted by the two parties.” The Committee of Three then 
asked itself the following questions.
1) Is the Roumano-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal entitled 
to entertain claims arising out of the application of the Rouma­
nian Agrarian Law to Hungarian optants and nationals?
2) If so, to what extent and in what circumstances is it entitled 
to do so?
These questions were submitted to eminent legal authorities, 
who were unanimous in solving them in the sense which we 
have indicated above.
“ If it could be established in any particular case that the 
“ property of a Hungarian national suffered retention or liqui- 
“ dation or any other measure of disposal under the terms of 
“ Articles 282 and 280 as a result of the application to the said 
“ property of the Roumanian agrarian law and if a claim' were 
“ submitted with a view to obtaining restitution, it would be 
“ within the jurisdiction of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to give 
“ relief.” — But three principles were bound to dominate the 
whole discussion and the report expresses them as follows :
1) The provisions of the peace settlement effected after the war 
of igi4-i8 do not exclude the application to Hungarian nation­
als (including those who have opted for Hungarian nationality) 
of a general scheme of agrarian reform.
2) There must be no inequality between Roumanians and Hun­
garians, either in the terms of the agrarian law or in the way in 
which it is enforced, i
3)The words “retention and liquidation” mentioned in Article 
25o, which relates only to the territories ceded by Hungary, 
apply solely to the measures taken against the property of a Hun­
garian in the said territories and in so far as such owner is a Hun­
garian national.
The rapporteur followed . up these three principles with a 
twofold recommendation, and considered the different results 
which would follow the acceptance or the refusal by the parties, 
or by one of them, to accept these proposals : a) the request 
that the two Parties should conform to the principles enumerated 
above ; b) the request that Roumania should reinstate her judge 
on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
“ In the event of a refusal by Hungary, the Committee considers 
“ that the Council would not be justified in appointing two 
“ deputy members in accordance with Article 289 of the Treaty 
“ of Trianon.”
“ In the event of a refusal by Roumania, in spite of the 
“ acceptance by Hungary of the above proposals, the Committee 
considers that the Council would be justified in taking appro- 
“ priate measures to ensure in any case the satisfactory working 
“ of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
“ In the event of refusal of the above recommendations by 
“ both parties the Committee considers that the Council will 
“ have discharged the duty laid upon it by Article n of the 
“ Covenant.”
The Council,, after a very keen discussion, in which the two 
points of view were defended, on either side, with the greatest 
skill and vehemence — the Hungarian point of view by Count 
Apponyi, the Roumanian point of view by M Titulesco — 
decided to adopt the three principles enunciated, but abstained 
from adding the twofold recommendation which was the only 
thing capable of putting an end to the dispute. The decision 
to be taken was adjourned until December.
It is already certain, however, that Hungary rejects the sug­
gestions of the Council, while Roumania accepts them — condi­
tionally, of course — since the reinstatement of the Roumanian 
judge on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal could only be allowed if 
the decision of the Tribunal is made contingent on the acceptance 
of the three principles laid down.
It has. been suggested — although timidly — that, the opinion 
of the Permanent Court of The Hague should be requested. The 
decision to be taken on this point has also been postponed until 
December. We do. not consider, moreover,, that the request for 
the opinion of the Permanent Court can be submitted unless the 
Council is unanimous, and, in particular, unless both parties 
expressly give their consent.
We ourselves can see no reasonable solution of the dispute 
other than those provided in. Sir Austen Chamberlain’s most 
remarkable, precise and perfectly logical report. Is was intended 
that the two parties should have time to become reconciled.
There can be little hope that Hungary will accept with a good 
grace the three clear definitions of the Council. If the recons­
tituted Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is obliged to conform to them, 
it will be forced to nonsuit the Hungarian oplants, none of whom 
have so far been able to complain of anything but measures in 
execution of the agrarian laws, without establishing any connec­
tion between these measures and those provided for and prohi­
bited. by Article a5o of (he Treaty of Trianon.
If the Mixed. Arbitral Tribunal, in spite of accepting the three 
principles recommended to its attention by the Council and 
accepted by its claimant, were to persist in the reasoning on 
which it founded its first decision, it would once more be 
guilty of exceeding its powers, and its award would be null and 
void, since the decisions of arbitral jurisdictions receive their 
authority only from the prior adhesion of those who have 
consented to defer to their judgment, and only in so far as they 
have consented to do so.
November 10th 192-7.
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Chichele Professor of International Law and Fellow 
of All Souls College, Oxford
I am asked to give my opinion on the two questions fol­
lowing :
i) Under Article n of the Covenant and Article 289 of the 
Treaty of Trianon, can the Council refuse to nominate an auxi­
liary judge ?
21) Should the Council refer to the Permanent Court of Jus­
tice at the Hague for an advisory opinion on the rulings which 
it has suggested to the litigants ?
The controversy between Roumania and Hungary out of which 
these two questions arise has been protracted and complicated, 
but the questions addressed to me are specific, and the follow­
ing passages taken from the report presented by Sir Austen 
Chamberlain to the Council of the League on September 17th, 
1927, contain a non-controversial statement of facts, which is 
sufficient to explain how the questions arise.
"From December 1923 onwards, a number of applications from 
Hungarian nationals or optants owning lands in the territories 
transferred to Roumania were submitted to the secretariat of the
Roumano-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, provided for in 
Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon, asking, among other mat' 
ters, that the Tribunal should declare that the measures restrict­
ing their right of ownership, which had been applied to their 
movable and immovable property by the Roumanian State, were 
contrary to the provisions of Article 25o of the Treaty of Tria­
non, and that it should order the Roumanian State to make res­
titution.
“In 1925, the Roumanian Government submitted applications 
objecting to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. After hearing the 
counsel of the two parties between December i5th and 23rd, 1926, 
the Tribunal, on January 10th 1927, declared itself competent, 
in virtue of Article 260, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Trianon, 
and called upon the defendant (Roumania) to forward her reply 
within a period of two months.
"On February 2/dh, 1927, Roumania informed the Tribunal 
that she would refrain from submitting her reply regarding 
the substance of the question and that, consequently, her 
arbitrator would no longer sit in connection with any of the 
agrarian matters brought forward by Hungarian nationals. At 
the same time, she submitted to the Council, in virtue of Ar­
ticle 11, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, a request to allow her 
to acquaint the Council with the reasons on which her attitude 
was based.
‘This question came before the Council on March 7th, 1927. 
The Roumanian representative explained the reasons which had 
led the Roumanian Government to withdraw its arbitrator from 
the Tribunal.
“The Hungarian representative asked the Council to appoint, 
in accordance with the Treaty of Peace, two deputy members 
to enable the Tribunal to continue its work."
Sir Austen Chamberlain went on to state that the Council 
appointed a Committee of Three, with himself as rapporteur, 
to examine the question ; that this Committee had failed in its 
attempts to induce the parties to reach a settlement .by methods 
of conciliation, and had therefore been compelled to undertake, 
with the assistance of certain eminent legal authorities, an exa­
mination of the question of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal’s juris­
diction.
As a result of this examination the Committee defined three 
principles which, in their opinion, the acceptance of the Treaty 
of Trianon had made obligatory for Roumania and Hungary. 
These principles were :
“0 The provisions of the peace settlement effected after the 
war of iqi.4-18 do not exclude the application to Hungarian 
nationals (including those who have opted for Hungarian nation­
ality) of a general scheme of agrarian reform.
“a) There must be no inequality between Roumanians and 
Hungarians, either in the terms of the Agrarian law, or in the 
way in which it is enforced.
“3) The words ’retention and liquidation’ mentioned in Arti­
cle 25o, which relates only to the territories ceded by Hungary, 
apply solely the measures taken against the property of a Hunga­
rian in the said territories and in so far as such owner is a Hun­
garian national.”
These are the "rulings” referred to in the second question sub­
mitted to me.
Question I
The contention of the Hungarian Government on this point 
may be stated in words used by Count Apponyi in the Council 
on the 17th September <927.
“Article 239 of the Treaty of Trianon and the annexed para­
graph A lays down absolutely that, in cases where, for some 
reason, a seat on a Mixed Tribunal becomes vacant, and when 
the State which had appointed this judge has not, within a 
period of one month, arranged for his replacement, the Council 
is to act in accordance with the terms of the same articles of 
the Treaty, that is to say, it shall appoint two persons who are 
nationals of countries which were neutral during the war, from 
which persons the other party shall choose the substitute judge 
to take the place of the one who has been withdrawn. It is not 
exact, therefore, to state that we have asked the Council to 
appoint this judge. We do not ask a favour for ourselves. We 
have merely staled before the Council that this is an absolute 
obligation imposed by the Treaty.”
In my opinion this argument cannot be sustained for two 
reasons : i) it neglects the fact that the Council is seized of the 
matter under paragraph n of the Covenant and 2) it does not 
correctly state the provisions of Article 289 of the Treaty of 
Trianon.
Under Article 11 of the Covenant (which is also Article 11 of 
the Treaty of Trianon), paragraph 2, it is declared “to be the 
friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the 
attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance 
whatever affecting international relations which threatens to 
disturb international peace or the good understanding between 
nations upon which peace depends. ” It is indisputable that in the 
present case circumstances “affecting international relations” 
in the way described have been brought to the attention, of the 
Council ; for this state of things is a fact, whatever view we may 
hold of the responsibility for it having been brought about, and 
it is a fact, which the Council, acting under Article n, clearly 
cannot neglect. What action, therefore, does the Article pres­
cribe to the Council in an event such as has arisen ? Paragraph 2 
contains no specific directions at all ; but in the case dealt with 
in paragraph 1, of “any war or threat of war”, “the League shall 
take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safe­
guard the peace of nations,” and it can hardly be contended 
that the duty of the Council under paragraph 2 is different. If 
this is so, it means that the Council is absolutely free to deter­
mine, in the light of its own appreciation of all the circum­
stances, what action is “wise and effectual to safeguard the peace 
of nations”, or in other words that its action is intended to be 
political and not judicial. Unless therefore it can be said that 
the discretion conferred by Article 11 is in some way restricted 
by Article 289, it is clear that the Council may refuse to nomi­
nate an auxiliary judge, and indeed must refuse to do so if it 
deems that such a nomination would not promote the interests 
of peace and good understanding.
Does then Article 289 restrict the discretion of the Council 
.under Article 11 9
To answer this question the following considerations are rele­
vant. In the first place if the words of Article 289 were peremp­
tory, which in fact they are not, there would be a conflict of 
duties under the same Treaty, between which it would be neccs- 
sary for the Council to choose. But the duty, if any, under Arti­
cle 289 is merely incidental to the general functions of the Coun­
cil; for the Council is there introduced merely as part of the 
machinery for constituting Mixed Arbitral Tribunals. But the 
Council is much more than an adjunct of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunals, and its paramount function, which is the promotion 
of international peace, is contained in the Covenant. If, there­
fore, the two duties conflict, it is manifestly right that the 
Council should prefer its duty under Article 11.
Secondly, it is difficult to see how the alleged or any other 
duty can be imposed on the Council by a Treaty to which many 
ot the States which are members of the Council are not even 
parties.
Thirdly, in my opinion, it is impossible to read an imperative 
direction to the Council into the language of Article 289. That 
Article relates to the constitution of Mixed Arbitral Tribunals 
between each of the Allied and Associated Powers on the one 
hand and Hungary on the other hand; and the relevant provi­
sions are these : ;
“Each such Tribunal shall consist of three members. Each 
of the Governments concerned shall appoint one of these mem­
bers. The President shall ,be chosen by agreement between the 
two Governments concerned.
“In case of failure to reach agreement, the President of the 
Tribunal and two other persons, either of whom may in case 
of need take his place,/ shall be chosen by the Council of the 
League of Nations...
“If in case there is a vacancy a Government does not proceed 
within a period of one month to appoint as provided above a 
member of the Tribunal, such member shall be chosen by the 
other Government from the two persons mentioned above other 
than the President”. And paragraph 1 of the Annex to the 
Article adds :
“Should one of the members of the Tribunal either die, retire, 
or be unable for any reason whatever to discharge his functions, 
the same procedure will be followed for filling the vacancy as 
was followed for appointing him.”
The draftsmanship of the Article is curious. It contemplates 
that the Council should choose a President and two substitute 
members in a certain event, namely, “in case of failure to reach 
agreement”, (in the French text the words, are “au cas ou cet 
accord ne pourrait intervenir”), words which clearly have refe­
rence to the possibility that the two parties might fail to agree 
in the- choice of. a President. But the event that has happened 
in the; present case: is that Roumania has informed the Tribunal 
that her. arbitrator will. no. longer sit. to hear matters, arising out 
of the Roumanian Agrarian reforms. Even if we assume that 
this Roumanian action has created a “vacancy”,, all that the 
Article actually says is that in that event a substitute for the 
Roumanian member “shall be chosen by the other Government 
from the two persons mentioned above other than the President”, 
that, is, to say, from two persons chosen by the Council because 
of the failure of the parties to reach agreement on the choice of 
a President, an event which has not occurred. No doubt, ut res 
magis valeat quam pereal, we are entitled to read into the Article 
a power in the Council to nominate the two persons in the event 
of a vacancy, but when the suggestion is, as here, that the Article 
imposes, in Count Apponyi’s words, an “absolute obligation” on 
on the Council, it is relevant to point out that the present diffi­
culty is actually, on the terms of the Aricle, a casus omissus. At 
the most it may be said that the Article assumes that the Council 
will appoint the two substitutes; but the mere fact that the 
Tribunal cannot function unless the Council does so cannot of 
itself by implication create an obligation on the Council to make 
the appointments, and no such obligation is contained in the 
words of the Article.
QUESTION II
The power of the Council to ask for an Advisory Opinion from 
the Permanent Court arises under Article i4 of the Covenant, 
which declares, “the Court may also give an advisory opinion 
upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by 
the Assembly.” The Council therefore has the right, if it thinks 
fit, to ask for an- Advisory Opinion on the rulings which it has 
suggested to the litigants.
But the question submitted to me is whether the Council 
“should” do so, and to that the short and; sufficient answer 
appears to me to be that there are no circumstances whatever in 
which the Council is under an obligation to take this course, 
which can never be more than one among possible alternative
courses for its consideration. In the present case, the Council 
has presumably hitherto taken the view that this course would 
not be “wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations”, 
and I am not asked to give, and it would be presumptuous in me 
to offer, any opinion on this view, beyond saying that it is 
clearly a view which the Council is within its legal rights in 
taking. In regard to this question, as in regard to Question i, 
the Council is bound both by the letter and by the spirit of the 
Covenant to take whatever course it regards as most likely to 
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The undersigned Giulio Diena, Professor at the Royal Univer­
sity of Pavia, having been consulted on the two following ques­
tions :
Question r : « Gan the Council of the League of Nations, appri­
sed under Article n of the Covenant and Article 23g of the Treaty 
of Trianon, refuse to appoint a deputy judge for the Roumanian- 
Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal ?”
Question 2 : “Should the Council refer to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice for an opinion on the recommendations 
which it has suggested to the Parties ?”
Expresses the following opinion :
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In order to reply to the questions thus submitted, it is first of all 
necessary to examine the facts which led up to the Roumanian- 
Hungarian dispute to which these questions relate. We will 
confine ourselves to giving a very brief summary of these facts, 
recalling in particular the circumstances of special importance 
regarding the points of law to be analysed.
(•) Translated from the French version.
As a result of the agrarian laws voted in Roumania involving 
the expropriation of immovable property, without any distinc­
tion as to the nationality of the owners, Hungary, in the interest 
of those owners w’ho had opted for Hungarian nationality, niter 
having unsuccessfully appealed to the Conference of Ambassa­
dors, apprised the Council of the League of Nations in 1923, 
requesting it to deal with the substance of the question and to 
give a ruling by declaring that the legislative and administrative 
measures enacted in Roumania in this connection were contrary 
to the Treaties and that the immovable property of Hungarian 
optants should be restored to them with full compensation for 
the damage suffered.
The Council of the League of Nations examined this question 
in April and July 1923, and having failed to obtain the consent 
of the Parties to a reference of the matter to the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, asked the rapporteur, M. Adatci, 
to act as mediator between the two Powers concerned. With a 
view to arriving at a settlement the representatives of the latter 
met at Brussells and opened conversations which terminated in 
the .drafting of minutes on .May 27th, 1923, from which it is 
seen that the Hungarian representatives admitted that the Treaty 
of Trianon did not preclude-the expropriation of the property of 
optants for reasons .of public weljare.
The Hungarian -Government, however,, having disowned its 
representatives and alleged that no .agreement in this matter had 
been reached, on June 5ih, 11923, the Council, after having 
approved the report drawn .op by M- Adatci on these conversa­
tions, expressed the hope that the Hungarian Government would 
do its best to reassure its nationals and that the Roumanian Go­
vernment would give proof of its goodwill in regard to the inte­
rests of the Hungarian optants.
Following this resolution, which was adopted by all the mem­
bers of the Council with the exception of the Hungarian dele­
gate, a certain number of nationals, Hungarian optants, sub­
mitted applications to the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal, provided for in Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon 
asking it to .declare that the measures applied to their property 
by virtue of the agrarian daws -enacted in Roumania were con­
trary to the provisions of Article 260 of the Treaty of Trianon.
Notwithstanding the plea of incompetence advanced by the 
Roumanian Government, the Mixed Tribunal, by its decision of 
January to th, 1927, declared itself 'competent and called upon 
Roumania to forward .her reply on the substance of the question 
within a period of two months.
On February 24th, 1927, Roumania informed the Tribunal 
that she would refrain from submitting her reply regarding the 
substance of the question and that her arbitrator would no longer 
sit in connection with any of the agrarian matters brought 
forward by Hungarian nationals. At the same time, Roumania 
submitted to the Council, in virtue of Article 11, paragraph 2, 
of the Covenant, a request to allow her to acquaint the Council 
with the reasons on which her attitude was based.
The Council met on March 7th, 1927, nnd the Roumaman 
representative explained the reasons -which had led the Roumanian 
Government to withdraw its arbitrator from the 'Mixed Tribunal, 
whereas the Hungarian representative -asked the Council to 
appoint, in accordance with Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon, 
(two deputy .members .to enable the Tribunal io continue its work.
The Council thereupon decided io request Sir Austen Chamber- 
lain to report on this question. The rapporteur having 
•expressed the desire that two of his colleagues should be appoint­
ed to act with him, a Committee of Three was formed. This 
Committeemade several attempts to bring about an understanding 
between the Parties but its hopes were completely disappointed. 
In fact, the Hungarian representative confined himself to renew­
ing the proposal already made to refer the question of the com­
petence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, a proposal which was not accepted by 
the Roumanian representative ; the latter was prepared to accept 
certain recommendations suggested by the Committee of Three 
but these recommendations were rejected by the Hungarian repre­
sentative.
As will be seen from the report which it submitted to the 
Council, the Committee was obliged to seek a solution by other 
methods- After a detailed study of the controversy it came to 
the conclusion that the question of the competence of the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal was one of primary importance- After exa­
mining this question and having it examined by eminent legal 
authorities it arrived at the conclusion that the limits of the juris­
diction of the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
were fixed by Articles 282 and 280 of the Treaty of Trianon. 
However, to determine the scope of these provisions, in regard
to the case under discussion, the Council considered that it was 
necessary to lay down the following principles :
i) The provisions of the peace settlement effected after the war 
of 1914-1918 do not exclude the application to Hungarian nation­
als (including those who have opted for Hungarian nationality) 
of a general scheme of agrarian reform.
2) There must be no Inequality between Roumanians and Hun­
garians, either in the terms of the agrarian law or in the way in 
which it is enforced.
3) The words “retention and liquidation” mentioned in Arti­
cle 200, which relates only to the territories ceded by Hungary, 
apply solely to the measures taken against the property of a Hun 
garian in the said territories and in so far as such owner is a 
Hungarian national.
The Committee therefore suggested that the Council should 
make the following recommendations :
a) To request the two Parties to conform to the three principles 
enumerated above ;
b) To request Roumania to reinstate her judge on the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal.
The second part of the report referred to the sanctions to be 
applied if one or other or both of the Parties rejected these recom­
mendations.
This report was discussed by the Council at its meetings of 
September 17th and 19th, 1927, and during the four sittings 
occupied by the discussion, the representatives of the Parties 
were given every opportunity to explain their points of view. 
On this occasion, Count Apponyi, on behalf of the Hungarian 
Government, proposed that the Council should ask the Court at 
Ilie Hague for an advisory opinion, even on the question as to 
. whether the three principles laid down in the report submitted 
by the Committtee of Three wore really legitimate ; M. Titulesco, 
on the other hand, slated the reasons for which Roumania was 
unable to accept such a proposal.
The Council then unanimously approved the report by the 
Committee of Three—the representatives of the Parlies concerned 
abstained, at the suggestion of the President—and adjourned any 
further resolution to the next meeting of the Council, in the hope 
that Roumania and Hungary would, in the meantime, come to 
an agreement.
QUESTION I
We have recalled that the Council of the League of Nations, 
apprised by Roumania in virtue of paragraph 2 of Article 11 of 
the Covenant, was asked by the Hungarian representative to fill 
the vacancy on the Roumanian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal caused 
by Roumania’s withdrawal of her judge, in accordance with the 
terms of Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon-
In order to decide whether, in case the Parlies should fail to 
reach an agreement, the Council is or is not obliged to grant 
this request, it is not sufficient to take the said Article into 
consideration ; account must also be taken of Article 25o of the 
same Treaty as well as of the provisions of the Covenant, in par­
ticular: paragraph 2 of Article 11, cited by Roumania.
For the question under discussion, it is Article 25o that fixes 
the limits of the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. 
However, the Committee of Three appointed by the Council and 
the Council itself immediately realised that the question of the 
competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was of primary impor­
tance in arriving at the solution to be adopted or recommended 
regarding the dispute laid before the Council.
It is, in fact, obvious that if, by declaring itself competent, 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal has (as the undersigned believes) 
exceeded its powers, the Council in granting Hungary’s request 
would only be encouraging the same Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to 
exceed its powers in other cases.
If it were objected that the Council is competent neither to 
revise nor cancel awards given by Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, such 
an objection would be irrelevant, for the simple reason that Rou­
mania, as shown in the foregoing recital of facts, has never 
asked the Council to exercise real powers of competence in this 
respect.
There is no doubt that although the Council is essentially a 
political organisation there is nothing which precludes it from 
examining the legal aspects of a given situation or report which 
has led to a dispute or from acting in accordance with its legal 
findings. Thus paragraph 8 of Article i5 of the Covenant pro- 
vides that: “If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one 
of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out erf a matter 
which by international law is solely within the domestic jums- 
diction of that party, the Council shall so report...’'
This proves that the Covenant recognises that the Council is 
competent to express an opinion also on strictly juridical ques­
tions, and this competence stands even if in certain cases, for 
example : the dispute between 'Great Britain and France concern­
ing the nationality of their nationals in Protectorates, the Coun­
cil in fulfilling its mission preferred to ask ‘the Permanent Court 
of International Justice for an advisory opinion (i).
In any case, we must here lake into ^consideration paragraph 
of Article 11 of the Covenant on which the request submitted by 
Roumania to the Council is .based. This .clause is 'conceived and 
drafted in the broadest possible manner inorder that it he Council 
may have complete liberty of action as to the methods it may 
choose for the purpose of maintaining peace and good 
understanding between nations.
This is generally recognised by the authors, who studied the 
provisions of the Covenant with a view to their interpretation. 
If, for example, we refer to the excellent commentary by Messrs. 
Schücking and ‘Wehberg (Die Satzung des Völkerbundes, and 
edition, Berlin ig%4) we find, on page .469, that these writers 
recognise that, according to paragraph a of Article n, the meas­
ures which are to be regarded as permissible for the Council are 
not only timely intervention and mediation but also all measures 
which may appear necessary to maintain peace and good under­
standing between nations (cf. a similar opinion by Strupp, Ele­
ments of International Public Law, French edition published by 
Rousseau, Paris, 19^7, page 3o6). This view ds shared by certain 
French writers, in particular by Fauchille (Traité de droit inter­
national public, 8th edition, Part 3, page 668) who, after observ­
ing in connection with Article it i that this clause of the Covenant 
is extremely vague, adds that “it must be inferred that the Coun­
cil and the Assembly are given every latitude regarding the choice 
of the measures to be taken ; they may resort to diplomatic me-
(1) M. Henry Holin, in nn article entitled : «Où en est la Société des Nations» 
(Extract from (he Ilevue Peine of January 1st and 15th 1927, pages 10-12) while 
pointing out that the Council's function of judging .disputes shows a 'cndcncy to 
disappear nevertheless explicitly recognises that this function .was assigned 
to it by the Covenant.
thods, juridical methods-or :to methods xif an essentially political 
nature such as mediation, the constitution -of an rntemationail 
Tribunal, and 'the appointments] a 'Committee sf jurists vested 
with international authority ” «(See also Charles Rousseau, “the 
competence of the League of Nations in the settlement of inter- 
mational disputes," iParis, published by Pedone, 1927, pages 
30-Z17).
The interpretation was confirmed, if not authoritatively, rat 
‘least officially, by a report approved by the Committee of .the 
Council on March 17th, 1927, submitted by a small Committee 
appointed by the League df Nations .in ^connection with the reduc­
tion of armaments and instructed to examine and recommend the 
“appropriate measures .to be adopted to expedite the preparation 
of resolutions to be taken by the Council to give effect >to the 
.provisions of the’Covenant.”
Among the declarations contained in this report is to be found 
the following :’“The procedure opened in virtue of Article ti 'in 
ho way excludes that followed under the other provisions of the 
Covenant.” The report also examines the .situation that exists 
when there is no threat/of war, <or when ’the case ds of no imme­
diate urgency and adopts, inter alia, the following resolution: 
“If the Council considers it necessary for the fulfilment of its duty, 
it may in certain appropriate cases, either aSk the Permanent 
Court for an advisory 'opinion, or by reason of certain special 
■circumstances, Obtain such an ^opinion jrom a Committee <fff 
jurists appointed by it."
It’therefore follows that if, with a view to enlightenment, the 
’Council preferrod to adopt the second alternative rather than refer 
the question, as suggested by Hungary, to the ’Permanent Court 
of International Justice Tor an advisory opinion, it was perfectly 
ijustified in doing so. It is for the Council alone to judge with 
entire liberty of action -whether, account being taken of the cir­
cumstances, one method should be adopted in preference to the 
other, and it may be added that the circumstances of the present 
dispute were such that the Council was fully justified in .its 
choice.
Even if Roumania and Hungary failed to reach an agreement, 
there is no reason why the Council should abandon ’the attitude 
which it has adopted. In point of fact, this dispute cannot be 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court if one or other of the 
Parties refuses to give its consent to such a step. It .is common
knowledge that in the absence of terms of submission drawn up 
between the Parties, the jurisdiction of the Court is obligatory- 
only by virtue of a convention previously concluded and having 
a general character (i); these conditions are lacking in the pre­
sent case.
It is not however appropriate (as the Council has thought up 
to the present) that the Council should apply to the Court request­
ing it to give an advisory opinion. Since, for good reasons, Rou- 
mania objects to thie procedure, it cannot be regarded as a 
measure calculated to guarantee a good understanding between 
the nations concerned. It is further to be noted that the Rou­
manian-Hungarian dispute submitted to the Council, although 
a juridical question, is at the same time, in the highest degree. 
of a political nature (2), for whatever may be the solution ultima­
tely adopted, it is apt to have the most far-reaching consequences, 
not only in the matter of law but also from a political, social and 
economic point of view- It should also be pointed out that the 
effect of the solution of the dispute laid before the Council may 
be of capital importance, even in countries which, by enacting 
laws similar to those voted in Roumania, have realised an agra­
rian reform of the same kind. This is proved by an official 
letter dated September 16th, 1927, signed by Dr. Bénès, in the 
name of the Czechoslovak Republic, and addressed to the Council 
when it was dealing with the Roumanian-Hungarian dispute; 
this letter lays stress on the considerable political, social and 
economic importance that Czechoslovakia attaches also to the 
question of her agrarian laws, a question which she very rightly 
refuses to consider as falling within the competence of the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunals.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that an opinion given 
by the International Court of Justice at the request of the Council 
has no obligatory force since it is given only as an advisory
(1) Among Ihe numerous references that could be cited in this respect, see 
for example BouncoiN, The Court of International Justice, (Revue de droit 
international et de legislation comparées, Brussels, 1921, pages 17 and ff ; espe­
cially pp. 28-29) ; Blociszewski : De la compétence de la Cour permanente de 
justice internationale (Revue générale de droit international public, Paris, 1922, 
pages 23 and if, especially pages 25-27).
(2) In regard to the very serious difficulties encountered in endeavouring 
clearly to distinguish the juridical from the political questions, reference can 
be made with advantage to the discussions which took place m the Institute of 
International Law during the session held at Grenoble in 1922 on the scheme 
relating to the « Classification of judicable disputes » (Annuaire de I'lnslitul 
I. 2g (1922) p. 225 and ff).
opinion and the Council is therefore not bound to conform to 
it (i).
In the present case, however, the Council, after carefully 
examining the question and after having had it examined by its 
legal experts from the juridical point of view, must also consider 
the political consequences involved; it might then conclude that 
it would not be advisable to adopt the opinion expressed by the- 
Court. The result then would be to diminish the prestige of 
that great authority, which it is to the interest of all to keep­
intact and to uphold.
The whole economy of the Covenant, moreover, and particu­
larly of Article 12, points to the conclusion that when the parties, 
are not agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration or to a 
juridical authority for settlement, it is for the Council to hear 
and determine the question. This was explicitly admitted by 
the Hungarian Government itself when in 1923 it laid the matter 
before the Council, since—as already recalled—it requested the 
latter to give a ruling on the substance of the question.
There is yet another objection which we must set aside. If,' 
it might be argued, an endeavour is made to deprive the finding 
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal of the character of a res judicata, 
its nullity must be.pronounced by an authority competent to do 
so; it might also be added that only a juridical body such as the 
Permanent Court of International Justice has that competence.
An argument of that nature has no juridical foundation. Im 
domestic law, parties to an action can demand that the decision 
of a juridical authority should be regarded as void on the ground’ 
that the judges have exceeded their powers, without the inter­
vention of an authority competent to pronounce the nullity of 
the decision for that reason- In international law, however, in 
the absence of clauses of an agreement providing otherwise, the 
procedure at present followed is different. A judgment pro­
nounced by an arbitral tribunal, voidable by reason of an exceed- 
ding of powers, is non-existent and is binding on neither of the 
parties at issue. Thus Article 27 of the Regulations for interna­
tional arbitral procedure adopted by the Institute of International 
Law at its session in 1875 (General schedule of the labours of the 
Institute (1873-1892), Paris, 1893, pages i24-i3i), declares that-
(1) See Salvioli, La Carle permanente di gitislizia internationale (Ricisla di 
diritlo internationale, 1924 ; pp. 309 and 322).
“An. arbitral award, shall be» void in; cases, of... exceeding of 
powers...” without making the nullity contingent upon a formal 
ad-hoc declaration.
The Hague Conventions.- of 1899-(Article. 55). and, 190.7 (Article 
83.) on the pacific, settlement, of. international disputes permit the 
revision of a judgment only in the case, of the discovery of' a 
hitherto unknown fact likely to have a decisive influence on the 
issue; Article 61 of the Statutes of the Permanent Court, of Inter­
national Justice is drafted, in. the same sense. But. the. revision 
of a judgment by reason of the discovery of new, evidence is. of 
quite, a different nature from that of a? declaration nullifying a 
judgment on, account of an. exceeding: of powers. A judgment 
susceptible of. revision is nevertheless a judgment which EXISTS 
juridically; on.the other, hand, a, ruling given by arbitrators who 
have exceeded, their powers does not exist juridically,, at- least 
from, the point of view of international, law.,
It is conceivable that, a motion for revision might,, without 
any great, disadvantage, be. submitted to-the. same, authority that 
gave the judgment, whereas, the duty of deciding, whether an 
arbitral award is voidable by reason, of an exceeding of powers 
must obviously be entrusted, to a, judge other than the. one. who 
pronounced the judgment in question..
This duty, however,, as we have already observed-, could not in 
any case be. entrusted to ths Permanent Court, of International 
Justice without the consent of both, parties, for this consent cons­
titutes, the primary and, essential basis-of its- judicial compe.- 
tence (1).
The above being’ stated,, we. can. now, concentrate- our attention 
on. the first of the two questions submitted; the. reply thereto can 
now be given very, briefly. In substance, it. is a question of 
determining, whether the duly entrusted to the Council by Ar­
ticle a3g of. the Treaty of Trianon is,, as claimed by the Hungarian
(1) Even when apprising the: Arbitral Court' at The Hague, constituted. in 
virtue of the Convention of 1899,. of a motion for revision in-connection with 
the controversy between the United Slates of America and Venezuela, already 
examined by an Arbitral Commission, it was necessary to draft special terms 
of submission which were signed al Caracas by these Powers on February 
13lh„ 1909. Cf; Scuelle : Une. instance en révision decant la Cour de La Haye 
(Revue générale de droit international public-,. 1911, p. 164 and if.).
Government, a compulsory duty,, or whether it is merely of an 
optional nature.
Both the textual and logical interpretations, of the second sub­
paragraph of paragraph a), of Article 289 demand that this pror- 
vision should be regarded merely as optional. In fact, the 
French text reads as follows : Au cas où cel accord ne pourrait 
intervenir} le Président du. Tribunal et deux autres personnes, 
susceptibles l’une et l’autre, en cas de besoin, de le remplacer,, 
seront choisies par le Conseil de la Société des Nations et, jus­
qu’au moment où il sera constitué, par M. Gustav. Ador, s’il y 
consent...” If it was intended to impose an actual obligation: 
on the Council, a different expression would' have, been employed 
viz; “ devront être choisies". Similarly, in the Italian text, we. 
find the words “saranno, scelti” and not “dovranno esser scelti”. 
Finally, in the; English, text we have the expression “shall be 
chosen” which is-merely the future tense of the verb “to choose”. 
In any case, according to Article 36Zj of the Treaty of Trianon, 
in case of a divergence between one: or other of the three texts 
(French, English and Italian) of this instrument, the French text 
shall prevail, except in Parts I and XIII, where the French and 
English texts shall be of equal force.
The undersigned does not wish to dwell on these textual con­
siderations, for there are: others, which, in his opinion have; far 
greater weighty /
During the discussion that took place in the afternoon sitting; 
of the Council on September 17th,, 1927,, His Excellency M- Titu- 
lesco, speaking’ on behalf of Roumania, made an observation 
which, at. first sight,, may seem quite simple but which was, in 
reality, of the utmost importance. He stated that many States. 
Members of the League of Nations are not bound by the: Treaty 
of Trianon nor by any other Peace Treaty. His Excellency 
M. Titulesco concluded that Article 289 could not have created 
an imperative duty for States which did. not sign the Treaty 
which includes this, provision..
To this consideration which, in our opinion, is of the greatest 
juridical importance, we would add another, regardless of wheth­
er we expose; ourselves to. the criticism that we are merely 
expressing a commonplace: All the Slates signatories: of the: 
Treaty of Trianon are also signatories of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, which forms; the first part of that Treaty. 
Consequently, the provisions of the Covenant and the provisions 
contained else,where in the same Treaty should be considered as 
forming an organic whole. It follows that Article 289 of the 
Treaty of Trianon can be interpreted and applied only in corre­
lation to the provisions of the Covenant, particularly, those of 
Article 11.
The obvious conclusion is that the Council could never inter­
pret and apply Article 289 in such a way as to counteract Ar­
ticle 11, when on the basis of this article it might consider that 
it would be prejudicial to the maintenance of peace and good 
understanding to replace the arbitrator withdrawn by Roumania 
from the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
We do not think that there is any conflict between Article 11 
of the Covenant and Article 23g, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of 
Trianon, in view of the fact that the latter article entrusts the 
Council with a merely optional duty. And even if it were to be 
assumed that, in this respect, there was a conflict between two 
articles, it is Article 11, which is, so to speak, of a constitutional 
and fundamental character that should prevail.
QUESTION II
The foregoing remarks greatly facilitate and reduce our task 
as regards the reply to be given to the second question submitted 
to us.
We have recalled that the Council adopted three principles, 
which, if they were accepted by Roumania and Hungary, would 
constitute the law of parties for the interpretation and application 
of the Treaty of Trianon by the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal.
When difficulties arise in the matter of obtaining the consent 
of two Powers to submit to arbitration, it is wise and advanta­
geous first to attempt to bring about an agreement between these 
Powers on the legal principles which the arbitrators would be 
called upon to apply. There are certain well-known precedents 
in this connection: the most famous of all is the arbitration 
which took place at Geneva in 1871, under the chairmanship of 
Count Sclopis, on the “Alabama” affair, after the United States of 
America and Great Britain, the two parlies in the case, had agreed 
to accept certain juridical principles, known as the Washington 
principles.
The undersigned is not here required to examine from a juri­
dical point of view the three principles suggested by the Council 
in the present case, but merely to examine whether the Council 
should ask the Permanent Court of International Justice for an 
advisory opinion on these principles.
Even if the question be viewed from that aspect, the under­
signed ventures to point out that, in his opinion, these principles 
obviously constitute the most accurate and juridical interpretation 
of Articles 282 and 25o of the Treaty of Trianon.
The conclusion arrived at by the undersigned is based on the 
same reasons which :led him to express the opinion that the 
Czechoslovak-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was not com­
petent to pronounce on the legality of the agrarian laws enacted 
in Czechoslovakia, when he had the honour to be consulted on a 
dispute between the Republic of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
which was exactly similar in nature to the controversy at present 
before the Council. The chief points of these reasons may be 
briefly summarised as follows: since the provisions relating to 
the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals are an exception 
to the general rules regarding competence, they should be inter­
preted in a restrictive sense and quite expressly in regard to the 
rules of competence .mentioned in Article 25o of the Treaty of 
Trianon, which are in derogation to those constituting the com­
mon law of the Treaty such as they emerge from Article 282. 
According to Article 25o, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals are com­
petent only in cases of retention, liquidation or war measures, 
but the Czechoslovak agrarian laws (like the Roumanian agrarian 
iaws), in view of their social object and general character, in so 
far as they are applicable irrespective of the nationality of the 
owners to be expropriated for reasons of public welfare, are not 
measures of liquidation. A measure of this nature, exists, in the 
meaning of the Treaty, only when it is a case of a war measure 
or a measure arising out of the war and imposed on ex-enemies 
as such; this, however, is not the case in regard to the agrarian 
laws under consideration. Assuming even that the expropria­
tion of property, as organised by the laws here in question, cons­
titutes a violation of the principles of international law, the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunals would not be competent to examine it, since 
their jurisdiction is limited exclusively to a case of actual “ liqui­
dation” in the strict and definite meaning of the Treaty.
Since, by examining the question and by having it examined 
so meticulously by its legal experts, the Council has been able 
to form an opinion on the meaning And legal effect -of Articles 
232 and -25g of the ‘Treaty of Trianon, at is difficult to see why 
it should submit the principles which 'it has formulated in this 
matter to the Court .at The Hague for a further opinion.
There can be no 4oubl that the application to <the Court for an 
opinion is merely san optional measure for the Council ; not only 
would such a measure be superfluous in this -case hut there are 
definite reasons of expediency (those set forth in the considera­
tion of Question r) for setting it aside.
Account must, moreover, be taken of the precedents, which 
show that, on more than one occasion, the Council has, in 
dealing with important questions and in order to obtain advice 
as to the limits of its powers, requested a Committee of jurists to 
formulate the principles to be followed; these principles were, 
in those .cases, adqpted by the Council without consulting the 
Permanent Court of International Justice,
It is obvious that in the present case, there can be no question 
of \eompulsory •jurisdiction, of the Court. It is true that, according 
to Article r3 of the Covenant, the Members of the League agree 
that whenever any dispute arises between them which they 
recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which 
cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit 
the matter to arbitration, and that among the disputes of a 
nature to be settled by juridical or arbitral proceedings this 
article refers to those relating to the interpretation of a Treaty. 
But in order that a juridical settlement under Article i3 may be 
passible, independently of the clauses of a general or special 
convention, the parties must be agreed in recognising that their 
dispute falls within the class of question that can be solved by a 
court of justice. Further, if Article i3 speaks of the interpre­
tation of a Treaty, it does so solely by way of example, so that 
even if one of the parties is of the opinion that the interpreta­
tion of a given Treaty, in some respect or other, involves 
questions of a political character, that party can with good reason 
refuse to submit the matter to the Court at The Hague. (See in 
this connection, Schucking and Wehberg, op. cit. pages 524- 
526 ; Fauchili.e, op. cit-, Part. .3, pages 635-636. — See also 
Ch. Rousseau, op. cit., pages 2g8-3of).
It only remains to add a few -words to .refute some of the consi- 
•derations contained in an article relating to “the decision of Ja­
nuary 10th, 1927, taken by the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal” published by Professor Scelle in the “Revue 
générale du droit international public”,, 1927, 4th edition, pages 
433 and ff.
According to M. Scelle (see in particular pages 473-48i), any 
assimilation of Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon to terms of 
submission to arbitration, which forms the basis of the Rouma­
nian argument, is inadmissible. Such a condition would not only 
lead to compulsory arbitration but would also create a veritable 
authority accessible not to the two Governments but to the nation­
als of one of these Governments for the purpose of upholding 
individual rights, and before which it is quite unnecessary to cite 
terms of submission in order to determine the question of 
competence. Relying on one of the grounds of the judgment 
forming the subject of his article, M. Scelle declares that the 
Hungarian nationals, the direct beneficiaries of the provisions 
of Article 25o of the “Traité-loi de Trianon” (to use M. Scelle's 
expression) cannot, as a result of an agreement which might be 
reached between the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments, 
be deprived of the protection afforded to them in the jurisdiction 
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. In Tils opinion, such an agree­
ment would have no juridical value without the assent of the 
international community itself, here represented by the Council 
of the League of Nations.
The undersigned has no hesitation in agreeing that the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunals, considering, in particular, the duties assigned 
to them and the persons having access to them, must be regard­
ed as Arbitral Tribunals of a special class. And if he were 
asked to describe their juridical character, he would be inclined 
to say that they are bodies of a complex nature.
The undersigned, however, has no need to discuss that point. 
It is sufficient for him to recall that, in any section of law, in 
order to determine the competence of an Arbitral Tribunal, it 
is necessary to take into consideration the will of the parties 
which agreed to create such a Tribunal and to submit to it 
certain disputes which directly or indirectly concern them. In 
the case under examination, the wijj of the eonlracting parlies 
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manifested itself in the terms of Articles 23g and 256 of the 
Treaty of Trianon. The limits of the competence of the Rouma­
nian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal can therefore be fixed 
only by those terms, a conclusion which was fully recognised 
by the Council of the League of Nations.
With reference to the Hungarian nationals, who according to 
the expression used by M. Scelle, are the direct beneficiaries 
of Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon, their rights may, in 
regard to Mixed Arbitral Tribunals find support in the domestic 
law of Hungary, in that this Treaty was published in that 
country in the manner required by the Constitution. But the 
principles of domestic law thus established must be absolutely 
in accordance with the will of the States signatory to the Treaty. 
Consequently, the rights of the Hungarian nationals can be no 
other than those derived from the Treaty clauses, which must 
be interpreted and applied, even in respect of those nationals, 
in accordance with the will expressed by the contracting Powers 
at the time of the signing of the Treaty. Anything of a nature 
to contribute to the elucidation of the real meaning and exact 
scope of that expression of will imposes itself even on the Hun 
garian nationals.
In spite of the singular nature of the opinion expressed by 
M. Scelle, however, there is no need for us to discuss it here ; 1 
he claims, as we have already seen, that the Roumanian and 
Hungarian Governments cannot agree to modify Article 25o of 
the Treaty of Trianon without the consent of the Council of 
the League of Nations. It is not here a question of modifying 
tut merely of interpreting and applying Article 25o of the Treaty 
of Trianon correctly, and for this purpose we have not only the 
consent of the Council but also*  the principles of interpretation 
which it has laid down.
In view of these considerations, we reach the following con­
clusions :
CONCLUSIONS
i) The Council of the League of Nations, apprised under 
Article ii of the Covenant and Article 23g of the Treaty of Tria­
non, is not bound to appoint two deputy judges for the Rouma­
nian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal if it considers that such 
a step would be likely to disturb peace or at least the good 
understanding between nations ;
2) The Council is not bound to ask the Permanent Court of 
International Justice for an advisory opinion on the principles 
which it formulated, requesting Roumania and Hungary to 
accept them as a means of settling their dispute concerning the 
Hungarian nationals and the Roumanian agrarian laws.
Milan, November 12th, 1927.
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The question of substance.
Can a1 country freely modify its system of land1 tenure by a 
domestic legal enactment and does1 the W introduced for that 
purpose apply indiscriminately to all land' within its territory, 
irrespective of the nationality- of the owners?'
I have studied law for fifty years but T fail to understand how 
such a question can be answered in the negative*.  The system 
of land tenure has always been, and must continue to be1, regu­
lated with sovereign independence by local legislation.
(1)' Article- published in the a Revue de droit international et de législation 
comparée b (Brussels) N” 4-5, 1927, and translated from the French version.
The contrary view has however been taken by several eminent 
jurists in connection with the Roumanian agrarian reform of 
1921. In support of the theory put forward by Hungary, they 
have declared that, in this respect, the effect of Article 260 of the 
Treaty of Trianon was to limit the powers of the Roumanian 
legislature. This Article reads as follows: “Notwithstanding the 
provisions of Article 232 the property, rights and interests of 
Hungarian nationals or companies controlled by them situated in 
the territories which formed part of the former Aus|ro-Hungarian 
Monarchy shall not be subject to retention or liquidation in 
accordance with these provisions.” Relying on this text, these 
jurists have alleged that the provisions of the Roumanian agra­
rian reform law was not applicable to property situated in Transyl­
vania and belonging to Hungarian nationals.
Their fertile imagination has enabled them to accumulate, in 
support of that theory, a whole series of arguments, each worse 
than the last, which, in spite of the respect I have for their 
learning, I venture to describe as sophistical. They have all 
come to grief on incontestable facts. Article 25o of the Treaty 
of Trianon refers expressly to the measures provided by Article 
232 and for that reason can apply only to the war measures 
taken in regard to property belonging to Hungarians, that is 
any measures of liquidation and requisition taken as a result 
of the war and which are recognised by Article 282 but which, 
by exception, are prohibited in Roumania in respect of property 
belonging to Hungarian nationals.
Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon—and this was expressly 
recognised by Hungary herself at the time of the Peace negotia­
tions in 1920—leaves the Roumanian legislature entire indepen­
dence, and the latter is free to take any measures modifying the 
system of land tenure throughout its territory and applicable 
Nvithout distinction to all immovable property, irrespective of the 
nationality of the owners thereof. Legislative enactments of this 
nature are undoubtedly the prerogative of the national authorities 
of Roumania and in declaring itself competent to pronounce on 
the claims submitted by Hungarian nationals in this connection, 
the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal committed 
an act which constitutes a usurpation of powers.
I have no desire to resume the discussion of the question here. 
As stated above, I cannot understand why it should have given 
rise Io such controversy, for the situation seems to me definite 
and indiscutable. I concur entirely and without any reservation 
whatsoever in the extremely clear demonstration of the problem 
given by MM. Millerand, Politis and Rosental, counsel for Rou- 
mania, in their pleadings before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. 
I will confine myself to adding two observations.
M. Millerand proved in an admirable manner that the measures 
taken in virtue of the Roumanian agrarian law could from no 
point of view be regarded as measures of liquidation or seques­
tration arising out of the war. He brought out very forcibly the 
character of the war liquidations which, under Article a5o, the 
Roumanian Government was precluded from effecting in regard 
to immovable property belonging to Hungarians. He further 
stated with every justification that the agrarian measures were 
not measures of liquidation but measures of expropriation, which 
applied indisputably and indiscriminately to all landed property 
irrespective of the nationality of the owners; expropriation, in 
fact, which was not prohibited by the Peace Treaty.
M. Millerand was right. For the sake of precision, however, 
it may be added that agrarian reform does not, strictly speaking, 
constitute expropriation; in reality, it is something different. 
Taken in its true sense, expropriation means an individual 
decision whereby the State, for reasons of public welfare, takes 
possession of certain immovable property after paying the owner 
equitable compensation. Agrarian reform, it is true, involves 
dispossession but it is the consequence of a general enactment. 
Its direct object is not the dispossession of any given owner; 
it is a general redistribution of land and a reorganisation of the 
system of land tenure as a whole. It does not even imply per se 
that compensation will be paid to the owners whose position 
undergoes a change. Still less does it imply that the compen­
sation which may be granted to the owner must be paid before­
hand and represent exactly the value of the property of which he 
is deprived. No doubt it is only fair that a State effecting agrarian 
reform should compensate injured parties, but it is not obliged 
to do so by law; it is still less bound by law to pay compensation 
beforehand and equal to the value of the property affected.
Strictly speaking, Roumania has not committed an act of 
expropriation. She has reorganised the system of land tenure 
and distribution of land. She has placed the ownership of landed 
properly on a new basis. She wished to generalise it and there­
by put in on a sounder footing in order to avoid a revolution 
among the peasants; and to; maintain peace; and order by applying 
methods of justices Although’ she- was? under no imperative 
legal obligation to do so, she granted compensation, to the dis­
possessed' owners. It cannot be claimed? against her- that owing 
to a fortuitous circumstance;—the fall, of the exchange—this 
compensation; did not exactly represent the damage finally suffe­
red by the owner. Still less can; it? serve as? an? argument to- the 
fay the owner:. Still! liess can; it serve’ as. an; argument to the 
effect that in so- far as the Hungarian' nationals are concerned, 
this agrarian reform; amounted to wan liquidation as provided by 
Articles 282 and! 200 of' the Treaty of Trianon.,
My second observation relates to common international law 
regarding which the- Hungarian lawyers' have; made much ado.
Professor-Scellfe; wrote as follows on this point: “It is agreed 
By both sides that as Article 25d is derogatory to Article 282 
which iir turn is derogatory- to the principles of common law 
since it provides- for- the possibility of liquidation, whereas 
common law proclaims' the respect of property and acquired 
rights; of foreigners, Hungarian-owners must, vis-à-vis the State 
of Roumanie-, be1 subject to the principles- of common law 
regarding the- status' of foreigners. Now, the fundamental prin­
ciple of common1 law is-the respect of private ownership; and, in 
case of annexation, the respect of acquired rights in the-territory 
annexed. Any acf assailihg'the-rights-of ownership and acquired 
eighth is contrary to the- rules of common international law” (2).
There is here an ambiguity which it is Both necessary and 
easv to express. There is no doubt—and1 nobody contests the 
point—that every State must respect and protect property belong­
ing to foreigners and that, in the event of annexation of territory, 
the private property sibilated' on that new territory is inviolable. 
That Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon- recognised’ this prin­
ciple by diminishing-the effect of Article 282, I admit"; that’ point 
is' agreed.
There is, however, another principle of international law which 
is no less firmly established and which is not in contradiction 
with the one cited above: the system of land tenure in every 
country is governed by territorial law, or, in other words, local 
legislature is alone competent to regulate, without the interven-
(2- Scelle, The decision of January 10, 1927. lallen by the Roumanian-Hun­
garian M. A; T. a Revue générale de droit international », 192L N' 4 (Special 
issue).
tion of any other authority, the. system of. land tenure, to modify 
it as it. deems; fit. and. as required by the social conditions of the 
country; any enactments, to this. end. apply indiscriminately to 
all owners irrespective of nationality, whether the reform be 
bénéficiai or detrimental, to them.
In asserting, the inviolability of property belonging, to foreign­
ers, precedents are cited and. reference: is made to a number of 
qualified, writers who have asserted it in the past. These pre­
cedents and. statements, exist; I take- note, of them and approve 
them unreservedly. But at: the same time, the oldest precedents 
and the authority of our oldest and most celebrated writers, from 
the time of our oldest law-givers,, are in favour of the: territorial 
statute, that is the principle whereby the. system of land tenure 
of. a. country is always, regulated and. can be, regulated only 
by territorial law. The. two. principles:,, as I have already stated*  
are not contradictory. A State must respect the right: of foreignr 
ers: I. agree.. But. it is always free to reorganise its system of 
land tenure and. it will not. violate the. right of foreigners by 
subjecting their land to the: same regime as that imposed, on the 
land owned by Its. nationals; To deprive, a State of this right 
would be to deny it its. legislative independence; it. wonld prevent 
it from, ensuring,, on its own territory, the conditions of social 
peace;
1 will refrain from quoting, from what.might be: a never-ending, 
list, of writers^ I will confine myself to. reproducing the. state­
ments of two eminent contemporary lawyers.
Professor Weiss, Member of the Permanent Court, of Inter­
national Justice: and author of a-treatise that has become a classic 
on. the subject of private international, law, writes as follows: 
“In short, the right of ownership: considered alone, indepen­
dently of the person exercising-that right and of his own parti­
cular interest, is always, governed in. its nature and extent by 
the law of the country in which his property is situated: since 
it affects the vital interests of the State as well as its. economic 
system and public law” (3).
M. Alvarez, the eminent Chilian jurisconsult and. Vice-Presb 
dent o£ the Institute of International Law, after quoting a passage 
from an article by M. de l.apradelle published in 'Le Temps’ ofi 
September 5th, 1927, in which it is stated Ihat “there is an indis-
(3) Weiss. JVftintiel de droil international privé, Slh cdiiion, 1920, page 528. 
putable principle in international ‘law... to the effect that the 
treatment of a foreigner is not judged by that applied to a natio­
nal”, writes as follows : “We do not agree -with that opinion... If 
foreigners were permitted to hold more rights than the nationals 
of the country which has given them hospitality, this preferen­
tial status would constitute an offence against the nationals... 
If the country of which the foreigner is a national could prefer 
a complaint whenever he has suffered damage, the States would 
no longer have sovereign power in their own territory; in last 
resort, their actions would almost invariably be subject to a 
foreign authority which would judge of their legality. No State 
is prepared to accept consequences of such a nature” (4).
M. Alvarez is absolutely right. How could Roumania and 
Czechoslovakia have agreed to remain for ever bound by such 
an obligation? How could they have assumed the permanent 
engagement not to introduce agrarian reform laws which were 
not to be applied to the whole of the domains situated within 
their territory? How could they have undertaken to assure a 
privilege to Hungarian owners for all time to the detriment of 
public safety and peace? Such a renunciation by these States 
can never have entered the mind of the parties signatory to the 
Treaty; this is fully proved by the fact that, at the time of the 
negotiations, Hungary herself did not think of it and merely 
asked that equal treatment be assured to all owners of Hungarian 
and Roumanian nationality in the territories transferred to Rou­
mania.
In the work published by the Hungarian Government under 
the title: The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, and with the sub­
title: Report on the labours of the Hungarian Peace Delegation 
at Neuilly from January to March 1920, we find in Vol. II, page 
46o a note worded as follows: “In order to attain the object 
mentioned in the first paragraph of Article a5o, we ask for a 
reassuring statement to the effect that no property belonging to 
nationals on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monar­
chy shall be sequestrated, liquidated or expropriated by virtue 
of a legal provision or by means of a special measure which does 
not apply, in the same conditions, to the subjects of the liquida­
ting State or of the State putting such a measure into force.”
(4) Alvarez, La ré[onnc agraire : Le litige hungaro-roumain devant le Conseil 
de la S. D. N., « L'Europe Nouvelle », October 29, 1927, page 450.
Now, the provisions of the Roumanian agrarian law apply in 
exactly the same conditions and with the same consequences 
to all holders of land situated in Transylvania, whether they be 
of Hungarian or Roumanian nationality.
In consequence, Hungary has formally recognised in advance 
that such measures were not of the same nature as those provided 
for in Article 25o of the Treaty, that it could not be claimed that 
they did not apply to Hungarian nationals or that they came 
within the jurisdiction of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
II
The decision of competence, taken by the Roumanian-Hungarian 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal on January 10th, 1927, 
constitutes a usurpation of powers.
There is here no need to go into the question why Hungary 
changed her attitude; why, after having recognised in 1920 that 
any agrarian reform which was not of a discriminatory nature 
did not fall to be dealt with under Article 25o, that it applied in 
the same conditions to all Hungarian or Roumanian landowners 
and that it did not come within the jurisdiction of the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal, as early as igi3 she submitted claims on this 
subject to the Council of the League of Nations and, in 1927, 
supported her nationals in the request that the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal should declare itself competent to pronounce on the 
consequences of the agrarian measures enacted by Roumania. 
However this may be, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was apprised 
by certain Hungarian nationals who asked it to declare itself com­
petent 1) to decide that, in so far as those nationals were con­
cerned, the terms of the Roumanian agrarian law were inopera­
tive, and 2) to order Roumania to pay compensation.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal was not competent to pronounce on such claims; that, 
as the Hungarian owners had at first admitted, the only authori­
ties competent in the matter were the Roumanian national 
tribunals. Roumania could not admit this alleged competence 
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. She could quite legitimately 
refuse to plead before that body and she categorically declared 
that if she nevertheless maintained her representative ithereon 
and pleaded the >case for incompetence, 51 was purely out of defe­
rence to that high authority. M. Millerand -stated this on more 
than one occasion in the course of his speech. Furthermore, 
in the letter which he addressed to the President -of the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal on February 24th, he wrote: “I hastened to 
add that it was only deference to international justice that had 
brought ns before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in order that we 
might state these reasons, but that we should refuse in any case 
to plead in regard to the substance of the question. Remember­
ing that we were dealing only in appearance with a legal 
procedure, I reserved in the most formal manner, on behalf of 
the Roumanian Government, its right to take what decision and 
attitude it might consider desirable in accordance with circums­
tances.”
It cannot therefore now be argued against Roumania that she 
is precluded from rejecting the competence of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal because she is said to have already recognised that com­
petence. Roumania has never recognised that the Tribunal was 
competent. She is therefore perfectly free to maintain that this 
decision by which the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal declared itself 
competent is non-existent and cannot be cited in evidence.
1
Neither is there any legitimate ground for invoking1 against 
Roumania the provisions of Article 289, paragraph g) which 
states that: ^The High Contracting Parties agree to regard the 
decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal as final and conclusive, 
and to render them binding upon their nationals.” In fact, in 
order that the decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal may be 
binding on all parties, it is obvious that the Tribunal in taking 
those decisions must remain within the limits of the jurisdiction 
assigned to it by the Treaty. If it has pronounced on a question 
affecting Hungarian property, its decision is sovereign and bind­
ing on all parties, and they have no recourse whatsoever, not 
even do the Council of the League of Nations. But if the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal pronounces, as it did on January 10th, on any 
other question, and if it considers itself competent to examine a 
legislative enactment exclusively within the sovereign jurisdiction 
of Roumania and which therefore can be examined only by 
national authorities, it is guilty of a usurpation of powers ; its 
decision is valueless and non-existent. Il cannot be binding on 
the parties which have .every right to lay this case before (the 
League 'Of Nations.
'For this reason, Count Apponyi was entirely wrong when, 
speaking on behalf of Hungary'before the Council of the League 
of Nations on September 17th, 1927, he invoked the principle 
of res judicata: “As far as I am concerned”, he declared, “this 
question is res judicata. There is a decision by the Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunal and it is (therefore final, I therefore wish to state 
m advance that mo .one will (Succeed in drawing me into a discus­
sion on the question of the (competence of the Mixed .Arbitral 
Tribunal. The very interesting arguments contained in the 
report... have served the Council when it was pursuing the line 
of conciliation which it has taken up, and it will serve again 
when it pursues further, perhaps, that .same >line of conci­
liation. But (these arguments in no way affect the question 
res judicata as to the (competence of mixed arbitration in this 
matter. So far as I am concerned, the argument .on this subject 
is closed.”
Yes, the argument is closed, but not in fhe manner understood 
by Count Apponyi. The argument is closed because the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal has departed from the sole sphere in which 
it Is competent. It has pronounced ion a question outside its 
jurisdiction; its decision has therefore neither -value nor weight. 
The question is, in consequence, no (longer a jurisdictional (one. 
There remains only a de facto controversy (between Hungary and 
Roumania, which has been brought to the notice of the Council 
of the League of Nations; the Council then ds free io carry out 
the mission of peace entrusted to it by the Covenant and, in par­
ticular, exercise fhe powers conferred upon it by Articles 12 and i5„ 
without it being claimed that the matter has been transferred 
from the juridical to the political sphere. It has necessarily 
been removed from the juridical sphere as a result of the usur­
pation of powers by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
There is no difficulty in bringing light to bear on (this question 
of usurpation. There exists the indisputable principle that any 
tribunal is judge of its own competence, both of its competence 
ratione loci and its competence ratione materioe. it is obvious, 
however, that it can pronounce on the latter only by judging of 
the nature of the act which gave rise to the question of law 
submitted to it. In countries, such as France, which have 
adopted the system whereby disputed claims are dealt with either 
by administrative or by juridical authorities, an administrative 
tribunal which declares itself competent decides that the matter 
laid before it relates to an administrative act. Any decision on 
a question of competence rations materios implies the recognition 
of a certain character concerning the act from which the dispute 
arose.
Similarly, whatever may be said on this point and whatever 
its own view may be, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in declaring 
itself competent pronounced on the question of substance. It 
decided implicitly that the agrarian measures enacted by Rou- 
mania and applicable without distinction to all holders of land 
situated within Roumanian territory were measures of liquidation 
in so far as concerned the Hungarian nationals, and under this 
pretext, it assumed a competence in a sphere which was not and 
which could not belong to it; it encroached on the competence 
of the national courts of Roumania. It was in that respect that 
the Tribunal was guilty of a usurpation of authority; it is for 
that reason that its decision is not only void but non-existent.
There is now an established and generally recognised principle 
to the effect that when an act is juridically non-existent, the 
situation should be the same as if that act had never been com­
mitted. No doubt, certain courses of law are available but they 
are intended to be used with a view to obtaining a declaration 
of nullity. The nullity of an act is not and cannot be declared 
when that act is juridically non-existent. The courses of law 
available are the same as those which existed before the act was 
committed and continue to exist in the same form. Since, in 
law, the act is non-existent, matters remain as they were.
When should an act be regarded as non-existent? Whenever 
one of the constitutive factors of the juridical act under consi­
deration is lacking. For example, an act is non-existent if the 
fundamental factor, namely: will, is lacking. When a decision 
emanates from an administrative authority or from a jurisdiction, 
another essential factor must be present, otherwise the act is 
non-existent: the authority in taking the decision must remain 
within the province assigned to it by the objective law by which 
it is governed. Subject to these restrictions, competence may be 
shared by several officials and if, although remaining within 
these limits, one of them commits an act encroaching upon the 
competence of another, his decision is not inexistent, it is simply 
void. But if the official leaves the sphere assigned to the body 
of which he is a member, he is guilty of a usurpation of autho­
rity. For example, he may issue a warrant of arrest; this would 
be not only an excess of authority but a usurpation of authority. 
The warrant is not only invalid, it is non-existent, or more cor­
rectly, there is absolutely nothing. The situation, as at the 
outset, is a mere situation of fact.
This theory, which is supported by irreproachable juridical 
analysis, holds good both in public international law and public 
domestic law. I have, moreover, protested for some time past 
against the tendency among many persons to erect impenetrable 
barriers between the various classes of law, that is, between public 
and private law, and between public domestic law and public 
international law. In public international law, this theory of 
usurpation of authority and non-existence finds its application 
in a very evident manner and the decision of the Roumanian- 
Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is a striking example. In 
overstepping the limits of the jurisdiction which had been fixed 
for it by objective international law, it acted in the same manner 
as an administrative authority passing a resolution of a juridical 
nature. In both cases, there is usurpation of authority and the 
taking of a non-existent decision.
That the Tribunal failed to confine itself to its own sphere is 
abundantly proved. It must be remembered that it is one of the 
principles of international law that disputes are not settled by 
tribunals; consequently, an international tribunal can intervene 
only within the limits strictly assigned to it by conventional texts.
This rule, regarding competence, which is true of all interna­
tional tribunals, is still more true—stricter, if possible—in regard 
to the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal concerning 
which, M. Politis in his brilliant pleading clearly showed that 
its competence is exceptional in three different ways: it is excep­
tional from a general point of view, as in the case of any mixed 
tribunal; it is exceptional from a specific standpoint since, as it 
deals with claims relating to the liquidation of enemy property, 
it departs from the common law of peace treaties; it is excep­
tional for a still more specific reason because it exists only in 
regard Io a certain category of Allied countries : the Successor 
States of Austria-Hungary and in regard to only one ex enemy 
country: Hungary.
The object of this thrice exceptional competence, as will be 
seen on referring to Articles 282 and a5o of the Treaty of Trianon, 
is the sequestration or forced administration of Hungarian pro­
perty as a result of the war. This is more than fully demons­
trated at the beginning of this article. The agrarian measures 
taken by Roumania without discrimination are neither measures 
of liquidation nor sequestration. Consequently, by declaring 
itself competent to pronounce judgment on the claims sub­
mitted in this connection by Hungarian nationals, the Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunal incontestably overstepped the bounds of the very 
limited jurisdiction assigned to it and rigourously defined by 
the Treaty of Trianon; its decision therefore, is of no value.
This usurpation of authority by the Roumanian-Hungarian 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is obvious to any unbiassed observer if 
viewed from a very simple standpoint: The sole raison d’être of 
this tribunal, as of all mixed tribunals instituted by the several 
peace treaties, was the war. If there had been no war, the 
question of the creation of such bodies would not have arisen. If 
there had been no war, there would have been no war measures, 
the consequences of which have had to be examined; there would 
have been no mixed tribunals. They came into existence merely 
as a result of the Avar and because it was necessary to settle certain 
measures taken during the period of hostilities. Consequently, 
if it is a question of problems which would have arisen in 
exactly the same manner in times of peace; if it is a question 
of examining measures which, since they have no relation to the 
war and might have been taken by any Stale on its own terri­
tory—even after a prolonged period of peace—there can be no 
question of a mixed arbitral tribunal’s examining these problems 
for the purpose of forming a judgment on these measures. So 
far as they are concerned, this Tribunal does not exist and if it 
should, by exception, take a decision on these matters, that 
decision is totally inexistent.
I ask this question: Could Roumania have carried out her 
agrarian reform if international peace had not been disturbed? 
Could she have carried it out in the terms of the law enacted? 
Most decidedly, she could have done so. Therefore, the measu­
res taken are in no way whatsoever related to the hostilities. 
Consequently, the two persons who declared themselves com­
petent to form a judgment of the consequences did not constitute
a mixed arbitral tribunal. The decision was taken by a group 
of persons that did not form a tribunal: two men without any 
authority and with no mandate, who declared themselves com­
petent; therefore, the whole situation should now be the same as 
if nothing had been done.
This irreproachable conclusion in law has already been reached 
by jurisconsults of the highest authority.
M. Titulesco, representing Roumania, when submitting his 
observations to the Council of the League of Nations on September 
17th, 1927, quoted a passage from an opinion by MM. Basdevant, 
'Jeze and Politis to the following effect: “When an international 
tribunal has heard a case which is not within its competence, it 
has not pronounced judgment in the place of another tribunal— 
it has usurped the function of judge. The matter is not merely 
one of incompetence but of usurpation of powers. The interna­
tional tribunal which exceeds its competence usurps power 
belonging to no other tribunal; it violates the fundamental prin­
ciple of public international law, according to which disputes 
cannot be settled by tribunals. Its decision is non-existent. The 
act will not produce any of the legal effects'desired by the person 
concerned. Any interested party can plead this non-existence 
by any means at any time. The irregularity can never be covered 
in any way.”
In the above-mentioned article published in L'Europe Nouvelle, 
M. Alvarez, Vice-President of the Institute of International Law, 
puts forward the same argument with his characteristic autho­
rity, as follows : “The Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, set up under 
the Treaty of Trianon, was constituted exclusively to examine 
cases of war liquidation expressly referred to in the said Treaty 
and bearing no relation to agrarian reform, social or general 
measures, conceived long before the advent of the Treaty. Its 
competence extends no further. Consequently, the declaration 
by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to the effect that it is competent 
to hear and determine Hungarian claims is entirely valueless. It 
should be regarded as inexistent I” (5)
The solution in law leaves no room for doubt. It remains now 
to consider the logical consequences; these are of the utmost 
importance.
(5) L’Europe Nouvelle, October 20th, 1927, page 1453.
III
The powers of the Council of the League of Nations.
Since the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, by 
declaring itself competent to pronounce judgment on the claims- 
submitted by Hungarian nationals in regard to the Roumanian 
law, has usurped the powers of another authority, we have left 
the jurisdictional sphere and entered the political sphere, and we 
are confronted with a disagreement of fact between two Members 
of the League of Nations. The Council was apprised and, in 
law, it is free to exercise in this connection, all the powers con­
ferred upon it by the Covenant.
In his declaration before the Council on September 17th, 1927,, 
Count Apponyi, speaking on behalf of Hungary, laid particular 
stress on transferring the question from the jurisdictional field 
and entrusting it to the Council, which, he declared, was exclu­
sively a political body. He added: “This is what is particularly 
troubling me. 1 see here a tendency to ask the Council to assume 
the role of an arbitral tribunal, setting itself up above the Court 
constituted by the Treaty itself. I see a tendency for a confusion 
to arise between political power and the judicial work of a court, 
and this seems to me most dangerous.” Count Apponyi also 
very forcibly pleaded res judicata.
This eminent diplomat would have been right if the Rouma­
nian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal had remained within 
the limits of the jurisdiction assigned to by its raison d'etre. But 
as it has been established that it was guilty of a usurpation of 
powers, it is impossible to rely on the alleged authority of a 
jurisdictional decision which does not exist. The whole question 
was removed from the jurisdictional field, not on account of the 
attitude adopted by Roumania but as a result of the course 
followed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, and by Hungary who 
supported the claims submitted by her nationals. There is no 
question of appealing against the decision of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal before the Council of the League of Nations. The latter 
is not, and does not claim to be, a High Court of International 
Justice. It is merely an organisation created with the intention 
of facilitating the amicable settlement of disputes arising between 
States. It is for it and for it alone to settle the dispute between
Roumania and Hungary. Contrary to the argument advanced by 
the Hungarian representative, its duties cannot be limited to the 
appointment, in accordance with Article 23g of the Treaty of 
Trianon, of two deputy members in place of the Roumanian 
delegate who, after the decision of January 10th, 1927, declared 
that he would refrain from taking his seat on the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal in connection with agrarian matters. If the Council 
adhered to that view, it would recognise the usurpation of 
powers committed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal and would 
fail in the high mission of international pacification entrusted 
to it by the Covenant of the League of Nations.
For this reason also, Roumania cannot and should not accept 
the terms of submission proposed by Count Apponyi, whereby 
it was suggested that Roumania and Hungary should submit the 
following question to the Permanent Court of International Jus­
tice : “By declaring itself competent to deal with the so-called 
agrarian cases, has the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal exceeded its competence, thereby enabling Roumania 
legitimately to refuse to recognise the decisions taken by that 
Tribunal ?...”
If she accepted such a proposal, Roumania would surrender 
her independence ; she would be allowing an international juris­
diction to judge of the scope and effect of the legislative 
measures which, with sovereign independence, she takes on her 
own territory. The jurisdictional questions which may arise in 
regard to the agrarian law can exist only in the relations between 
Roumania and owners who, as Hungarian nationals or Rouma­
nian subjects, are affected by the reform ; such questions fall 
exclusively within the competence of the national jurisdictions. 
The Hungarian owners fully understood this since, at first, they 
did not consider laying their case before any other body. To 
accept the terms of submission would be to recognise that the 
question is a jurisdictional one in the relations between the two 
States. This, however, is not so ; it is a question quite outside 
the competence of an international authority. The right to 
pronounce on the consequences of an agrarian law in a given 
country can be held only by the authorities of that country. Te 
accept the terms of submission would mean that Roumania 
herself refuses to acknowledge her legislative power ; it would 
be depriving her of the intangible right to organise her system 
of land tenure as she thinks fit and appropriate.
The situation is that an international jurisdiction has over­
stepped the limits of its own sphere of competence ; it has assailed 
the legislative independence of a State within its own territory. 
This State very justly protests. It cannot agree to refer to arbitra­
tion because it would thereby recognise that, in certain cases, 
its legislative independence is not assailable ; this it cannot do. 
If there is disagreement on this matter, it is for the Council of 
the League of Nations and for that body alone to settle the 
controversy.
Contrary to the argument advanced by Count Apponyi, 
therefore, it cannot be claimed that if the Council of the League 
of Nations intervened, it would be exceeding its powers and 
acting beyond its assigned duties. It is incorrect to state that 
by so intervening, it would be passing judgment on the decision 
of an authority or assuming the powers of a Court of Appeal in 
relation to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. No award has been 
given against which an appeal can be lodged, since the alleged 
decision whereby the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal declared itself 
competent constitutes a usurpation of powers and is therefore 
non-existent. There is simply a dispute betwen two 
States Members of the League of Nations. The dispute has been 
referred to the Council and it is for that body and for that body 
alone to take all the appropriate steps with a view to an amicable 
settlement.
There is no doubt that this right is held by the Council • this 
is shown by the spirit which inspired the authors oi the 
Covenant as well as by the formal provisions therein contained. 
The guiding principle observed by the men who had the honour 
of founding the League of Nations was primarily to ensure the 
peace of the world. They provided for the constitution of two 
organisations : the Assembly and the Council, without making 
any definite distinction between the duties allotted to them. In 
point of fact, the clauses of the Covenant defining their powers 
are identical : “The Assembly (the Council) may deal with any 
matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting 
the peace of the world” (Article 3, paragraph 3, and Article 4» 
paragraph 4). The Assembly meets at stated intervals as occasion 
may require but the Covenant does not oblige it to meet. The 
Council also meets as occasion may require, but under the terms 
of the Covenant it is bound to meet once a year (Article 4, para­
graph 3). This clearly proves that the Council is essentially
the active body of the League of Nations, and that it is princi­
pally upon the Council that devolves the duty of taking all the 
measures necessary for an amicable settlement of any dispute 
or conflict.
This duty, which we assign to the Council by reason of the 
object for which it was created, devolves upon it even when, 
strictly speaking, there is no danger of war. It will be sufficient 
to recall a few provisions of the Covenant. For example, para­
graph 2 of Article n says : “It is also declared to be the friendly 
right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention 
of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever 
affecting international relations which threatens to disturb 
international peace or the good understanding between nations 
upon which peace depends.” Further, paragraph i of Article 12 
provides that : “The Members of the League agree that if there 
should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, 
they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry 
by the Council.” Finally, and above all, paragraph 1 of Article i5 
declares : “If there should arise between Members of the League 
any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted 
to arbitration in accordance with Article i3, the Members of the 
League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council.”
The meaning and scope which we assign to these clauses were 
confirmed by the Council when, on March i5th, 1927, it 
approved the report on “suitable methods or rules for expediting 
the preparation of the decisions to be taken by the Council to 
give effect to the obligations of the Covenant.” It is therein 
slated, in particular, that : “If there is no threat of war, but 
certain circumstances threaten to disturb the good understand­
ing between nations on which peace depends, any Member of 
the League may bring these circumstances to the attention of the 
Assembly or of The Council in order that the Assembly or the 
Council may consider the action to be taken to restore this good 
international understanding (6).”
Hungary herself recognised, in 1923, that such were the 
powers of the Council. In the request submitted to the League 
by the Hungarian optants in 1923, M. Daruvary, the Hungarian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, concluded by asking the Council : 
“t) to give a ruling on the substance of the question, namely : by
(6) OHicial Journal 0/ League 0/ Nation':, July 1927, p. 832.
declaring that the legislative and administrative enactments of 
The Kingdom of Roumania, to which reference has been made, 
are contrary to the Treaties ; by ordering that the immovable 
property... should "Be restored and that full compensation for 
damage should be given to the injured parties.”
The Hungarian Government was not then asking the Council 
to make recommendations ; it was asking for an actual decision. 
Il is therefore wrong to claim now that the duty of the Council 
should be confined to the automatic appointment of two judges 
to complete the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. 
'Ilie right and duty of the Council is to deal with the matter 
in its entirety and to take any measures it may deem suitable 
for the settlement of the dispute in accordance with the highest 
principles of law. If it did not do so, it would be failing in its 
mission. It has, moreover, quite understood this.
IV
The decision of the Council of the League of Nations.
The Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal having 
declared, on January 10th, 1927, that it was competent to pro­
nounce on the claims forwarded by Hungarian optants regarding 
the Roumanian agrarian law, and having called upon Roumania 
to deliver her reply on the substance of the question within a 
period of two months, the latter, on February 24th, 1927, 
informed the Tribunal that she would refrain from submitting 
her reply and that, consequently, her arbitrator would no longer 
sit in connection with any of the matters relating to agrarian 
reform. At the same time, she submitted to the Council, in 
virtue of Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, a request to 
allow her to acquaint the Council with the reasons on which 
she based her attitude. The Council was, at the same time, 
requested by Hungary to appoint two arbitrators to complete the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, in accordance with Article 23g of the 
Treaty of Trianon.
On March 7th, 1927, the Council heard the representatives of 
the two States. Apprised of the question by Roumania and 
Hungary, and particularly by Roumania in virtue of Article n, 
paragraph 2 of the Covenant, the Council could not, as requested 
by the Hungarian representative, confine itself to the appoint­
ment of deputy members for the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. It 
would thereby have disregarded its duties and failed in the 
important mission entrusted to it by the Covenant. In the 
preceding paragraph, I have shown how Articles n, 12 and i5 
entrusted to the Council, when notified by one of the parties, 
the duty of assuring by every means in its power the amicable 
settlement of any dispute arising between Members of the League 
■of Nations.
Therefore, the Council very justly considered itself notified 
of the matter as a whole, and competent to take any measures 
that would make it possible to settle the difficulty and put an 
•end to the dispute. It requested the eminent British representa­
tive, Sir Austen Chamberlain, to report on this question at its 
next session. The British Minister having expressed the desire 
that two of his colleagues should be appointed to act with him 
for the purpose of examining the question, the representative of 
Japan and the representative of Chili were appointed. This 
Committee of Three met in London and at Geneva, heard the 
representatives of the States concerned and consulted eminent 
jurists bn the matter. In June 1927, at the request of Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, the Council adjourned the discussion of the 
question to its next session ; on September 17th, 1927, the 
British representative, on behalf of the Committee of Three, 
read his remarkable report before the Council.
In this report, Sir Austen Chamberlain lays particular stress 
on the duties of the Council, which should not confine itself 
simply to the election of two deputy members to complete the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. Its duty was more extensive — its duty 
■of a higher conception. It must examine the problem as a whole 
and take all appropriate measures to bring about a settlement. 
"Looking at the problem as a whole,” says the eminent rappor­
teur, “the Committee desired to find a solution which would 
allay discontent. It could not forget that the matter had 
originally been submitted to the Council not under Article 289 
of the Treaty of Trianon but under Article 11 of the Covenant, 
and that its intervention had been asked for, on that occasion, 
first of all by Roumania and then by Hungary. In these circum- 
staces, it could not evade the duly imposed upon it by the 
Covenant and confine itself simply to the election of the two 
deputy members for the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal....If it did bo, 
it would have failed to discharge its political duties as a mediator 
and conciliator.”
The report then went on to state that the Committee had 
submitted certain formulas to the parties with a view to con­
ciliation but no agreement had been reached ; the Committee 
was therefore obliged to seek a solution by other methods. A 
minute examination of the question of the Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunal’s jurisdiction seemed to it to be of primary importance- 
and after examining the question and having it examined by 
eminent juridical authorities, it arrived at conclusions which 
can be formulated in the three following principles :
i) The provisions of the peace settlement effected after the war 
of 1914-18 do not exclude the application to Hungarian nationals- 
(including those who have opted for Hungarian nationality) of 
a general scheme of agrarian reform ; 2) There must be no 
inequality between Roumanians and Hungarians, either in the 
terms of the Agrarian Law or in the way in which it is enforced ; 
3) The words “retention” and “liquidation” mentioned in Article 
25o, which relates only to the territories ceded by Hungary, 
apply solely to the measures taken against the property of a 
Hungarian in the said territories and in so far as such owner is 
a Hungarian national.
Finally the rapporteur suggested to the Council that if these- 
principles were rejected by Hungary there would be no necessity 
for it to elect deputy members for the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
as she had requested ; it was further suggested that in case these 
principles were rejected by Roumania, the Council would be- 
justified in taking appropriate measures to ensure the satisfactory 
working of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal ; and finally that, if both 
parties refused to accept the recommendations set forth in these 
three proposals, the Council would have discharged the duty- 
laid upon it by Article 11 of the Covenant.
Count Apponyi, the Hungarian representative, energetically 
objected to the conclusions of the report. In particular, he 
argued that there was res judicata and that it would be most 
dangerous to remove the cognizance of the dispute from an 
international authority to transfer it to the cognizance of an 
exclusively political body such as the Council. He suggested 
that terms of submission should be prepared whereby the Perma­
nent Court of International Justice would be asked to pronounce 
on the question whether the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal had' 
exceeded its powers in declaring itself competent on January. 
10th. He further suggested that the Permanent Court should 
be asked to give an advisory opinion on “the question whether 
the three points enumerated by the Committee of Three in the 
draft Council resolution have, in whole or in part, and if so, in 
which part, been rendered obligatory on Roumania and Hungary 
by the acceptance of the Treaty of Trianon.”
Replying to Count Apponyi, M. Titulesco, representing Rou­
mania, showed that the Treaty of Trianon could not limit 
Roumania’s legislative independence for all time, that it could 
envisage only war liquidations and that the Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunal, in declaring its competence, had been guilty of a 
usurpation of powers. He called particular attention to the right 
held by the Council to deal with the matter in its entirety as 
recommended to it by the Committee of Three and to the fact 
that it was the duty of the Council to take all the appropriate 
measures with a view to a settlement of the controversy and not 
only to appoint deputy arbitrators. M. Titulesco recalled that 
in 1923, Hungary had herself recognised these wide powers of 
the Council. He stated that Roumania could not accept the 
terms of submission on the question of competence because in 
so doing she would be admitting that the Tribunal had not been 
guilty of a usurpation of powers and, further, because Hungary 
and Roumania were in a different position since in one case it 
was merely a question of financial responsibility towards a 
member of her nationals while in the other case social order 
throughout her territory and public peace were at stake. Finally, 
M. Titulesco added that there was no necessity for asking the 
Permanent Court for an advisory opinion, since the Council had 
been completely enlightened in the matter by the study which 
the Committee of Three had made of the question, by the legal 
advice it had obtained and by the lucid report submitted by Sir 
Austen Chamberlain.
Of the observations which followed these explanations I will 
merely refer to the declaration made by M. Paul Roncour, which 
merits special mention : “I listened,” he said “with the closest 
attention to the formidable and often moving arguments present­
ed this morning by Count Apponyi in the name of Hungary. 
Nevertheless, they have not changed my conviction that the 
report of the Committee, founded on the report of the jurists 
whose advice had been asked, furnishes the fairest solution of' 
the dispute and the most desirable politically. We are here in 
virtue of an essential article of the Covenant, Article n. It is 
in the name of that Article and on that basis that we have to 
discuss the question. It was, and in my opinion it must remain, 
conceived in the widest terms, giving the Council the widest 
powers. Nothing can and nothing should limit those powers, 
since it is the article which should allow the Council to prevent, 
in time, any possibility of conflict. We are also here in virtue 
of Article 12, since the Members of the League between whom 
a dispute has arisen have the choice of bringing it either before 
the Court at The Hague or before the Council..... The Council 
is obliged to settle the dispute which is submitted to it. It is 
settling it according to the principles of law.....”.
M. Titulesco, in taking up the discussion again, declared on 
behalf of Roumania, that he accepted the solution recommended 
by the Committee of Three and demanded a vote on the whole 
report submitted by Sir Austen Chamberlain.
Finally, Sir Austen Chamberlain proposed that the Council 
should approve the report of the Committee up to and including 
the following recommendation : “The Committee of the Council 
therefore ventures to suggest that the Council should make 
the following recommendation : To request the two parties to 
conform to the three principles enumerated above ; to request 
Roumania to reinstate her judge on the Mixed Arbitral Tribu­
nal.” This proposal was adopted unanimously on September 
19th, 1927, and the two Governments concerned were asked to 
forward their observations for the December session of the 
Council, “so that the Council may examine what further action, 
if any, may then be required. ”
V
The attitude adopted by Roumania.
From the report submitted in the name of the Committee of 
Three and from the decision taken, it will be seen that the 
Council fully recognised the legitimacy of the Roumanian thesis. 
As I have explained at the beginning of this article, Roumania 
puts forward no other argument; she maintains that the object 
of the Treaty of Trianon could not have been, and its consequence 
cannot be, the permanent restriction of her legislative indepen­
dence ; that Article a5o only prescribes that Hungarian property 
shall not be subject to the measures of liquidation arising out of 
the war; that the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is competent to 
pronounce only on questions connected with such measures ; 
that it has no jurisdiction to form a judgment of the agraian 
measures taken by the Roumanian legislation ; that the latter is 
free to introduce, in virtue of its sovereign independence, any 
agrarian reforms which apply equally and without discrimi­
nation whatsoever to all landowners, irrespective of their 
nationality, in the same way that all the peasants profit by the 
said reforms, irrespective also of their nationality. What are 
the findngs of the Council ? i) The provisions of the peace 
settlement do not exclude the application to Hungarian nationals 
of a general scheme of agrarian reform ; 2) There must be no 
inequality between Roumanians and Hungarians ; 3) The words 
‘'retention” and “liquidation” apply solely to the measures taken 
against the property of a Hungarian in so far as such owner is 
a Hungarian national. Does not that constitute, point by point, 
the essential part of the Roumanian thesis ?
Furthermore, the Council confirms the high mission entrusted 
to ;it by the Covenant of the League of Nations, and, in 
consequence, that it cannot confine itself to the automatic 
election of two deputy arbitrators. It also implicitly recognises 
the usurpation of powers by the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal. In these conditions, there can be no question 
of Roumania’s accepting the terms of submission proposed by 
Count Apponyi whereby the question of the competence of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal should be referred to the Permanent 
Court at The Hague.
Roumania protested very strongly against this competence. It 
pleaded before the Tribunal only out of deference to that body. 
She showed that it was guilty of a usurpation of powers. 
Moreover, a State cannot agree to terms of submission unless 
the situation regarding that State and the country with which it 
has disagreed is the same. All terms of submission necessarily 
imply that the question which it is agreed shall be referred to 
arbitration has the same characteristics and is of equal impor­
tance for both parties. This is not so in the case of the Rou­
manian-Hungarian controversy. In so far as Hungary is 
concerned, it is finally and nothing but a question of compensation 
•claimed, with fhe support of their Government, by Hungarian 
owners of properly situated in Transylvania and affected by the 
agrarian reform. If they fail to obtain the said compensation, 
there can be no consequences of a social nature or any prejudice 
caused to collective interests, nor will public order and social 
peace in Hungary be affected. For Roumania, however, the 
agrarian reform affects a question of vital importance. Thanks 
to the energy displayed in this new distribution of land she was 
able to avoid a revolution of the peasant classes. If the new 
system of land tenure were assailed, social disorders leading to 
fhe most unforeseen consequences might ensue. Public peace 
within Roumania is at stake and she is asked to consent that an 
exclusively national question should be submitted to an inter­
national authority — a question which she alone has the right 
and duty to settle in virtue of her sovereignty.
Neither can Roumania agree that the Permanent Court at The 
Hague should be asked to give an advisory opinion on the ques­
tion of substance. I admit that it is quite legitimate to obtain 
the opinion of that high court whenever the Council of the 
League of Nations considers that it requires further advice, but 
such is not the case here. The Council has itself recognised that 
the Committee of Three obtained all the information and advice 
to enable it to propose a solution in full knowledge of the facts. 
The Council concurred in the findings of the Committee and,' 
after a detailed discussion, it adopted the three principles 
recommended in the report. And now it is suggested that these 
decisions should be repealed and that the Permanent Court 
should be asked to give an advisory opinion. Surely, that is 
a proposal which attacks the dignity of the Council and which 
cannot be entertained by the latter.
The proposal is also in formal contradiction with the very 
terms of the Covenant, particularly of Article 12 which provides 
that : “The Members of the League agree that if there should 
arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they 
will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the 
Council.” The Covenant therefore does not provide only two 
procedures for the settlement of disputes arising between two 
Members of the League of Nations — arbitration or inquiry by 
the Council. These two procedures are not complementary one 
to the other but would seem to exclude each other, and it is for 
the powers concerned to choose between them. Il is Hungary' 
herself who has brought the matter to the attention of the 
Council and she is singularly at fault in asking for the interven­
tion of the Permanent Court, even for the purpose of giving a 
simple opinion. She has every appearance of continually 
suggesting new methods with the intention of indefinitely 
delaying the final settlement of the dispute.
Hungary is all the less entitled to ask for the intervention of 
the Permanent Court since at the negotiations in 1920, as I 
recalled above, she recognised that if there were no differential 
measures in the agrarian laws, they would apply equally to 
Hungarian and Roumanian owners and that Article 200 of the 
Treaty could not be cited against them. This change of attitude 
seems to confirm beyond doubt that she resorts to this last 
procedure solely because she fully realises the unanimous feeling 
of the Council, which, by adopting the three recommendations 
suggested by the Committee of Three, recognised the legitimacy 
of the Roumanian thesis.
Roumania placed herself under the protection of the League of 
Nations and she wishes to remain under that protection. On 
that point, her position is unassailable. She does not in the least 
pretend to evade the legal issue. Although the organisations of 
the League of Nations are essentially of a political character, they 
take no action or decisions outside or beyond the sphere of law. 
They remain subject to the general principles of law interpreted 
in the broadest and highest manner. M. Paul Boncour asserted 
this in admirable fashion wrhen, in addressing the Council on 
September 17th, 1927, he said : “The Council ia obliged to settle 
the dispute which is submitted to it. It is settling it according 
to the principles of law. That does not mean that it is laying 
down the law, as Count Apponyi seemed to imagine this morn­
ing. But it bases its action on the principles of law, as is its 
duty, as it has done in many other cases, as it will be asked 
to do in many other occasions, and as it should in my opinion 
preserve its right to do  This law on which the Committee 
proposes that the Council should base its decision is clearly not 
a law which we have created..... These are principles of law to 
which we can refer, like any individual or any group of 
individuals which has to give an opinion on a definite point.....  
Moreover, these principles seem to me so essential and so strong 
that I do not believe that they can be seriously contested as 
regards the main question.”
VI
The true character of the Roumanian agrarian reform.
In voting her agrarian reform, Roumania merely acted in 
accordance with the higher principles of law. She can affirm 
that her sole object was to ensure a little more justice for her 
people, to ensure order and peace, and thus to carry out the 
essential mission imposed by law on all Governments.
It has sometimes been suggested that the institution and 
realisation of the agrarian reform by the Roumanian Government 
was a loophole for bolshevist doctrines and that it would un­
doubtedly lead to the abolition of individual land tenure in the 
near future. It has been stated that the Roumanians could be 
compared with the forerunners of bolshevism and that they were 
preparing the ground for its extension in Central and even in 
Western Europe. It has been suggested that in seeking the aid 
and protection of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal the Hungarian 
nationals, with the support of their Government, were merely 
safeguarding themselves against the general confiscation to 
which the agrarian reform led, that they were seeking to protect 
themselves against bolshevism and its threatening doctrines.
That is absolutely wrong and shows, moreover, an entirely 
false conception of the situation 1 Far from preparing the ground 
for bolshevism, Roumania is the outpost of latin and western 
civilisation against Asiatic barbarism, of which bolshevism is 
simply the emanation and instrument. Bolshevism proceeds 
by violence and hatred ; it refutes all the principles of law on 
which the life of civilised nations have up to the present been 
based : the higher principle of legality and the respect of the 
treaties. It refutes the very principle of individual ownership. 
It has abolished individual ownership by a stroke of the pen in 
order to realise I know not what dream of levelling communism, 
and for the last ten years it has imposed on a nation of one 
hundred million souls the most tyrannical and the most 
outrageous of dictatorships.
That, in a few words, is the work of bolshevism. Bv reason 
of the principles which have inspired it, by reason of the obiect 
it pursues and by reason of the methods whereby if is realised, 
the work of the State of Roumania is entirely different. The 
principle of individual ownership remains the basis of its
agrarian reform. If the State has intervened, it is not with the 
intention of abolishing that ownership ; on the contrary, it 
was with the object of setting it on a broader and sounder found­
ation. It wishes to rally all land workers to the principle of 
land ownership and thus place it on an unassailable basis. Its 
legislation is impregnated with the spirit o f justice ; it is 
■diametrically opposed to the doctrines of bolshevism.
Following the teaching of Auguste Comte, all sociologists now 
recognise that the position of a landowner is, above all, of a 
social nature, that he fulfils a social duty much rather than he 
exercises an individual right and that his prerogatives are 
legitimate only on condition that he properly carries out the 
duties connected therewith, namely the cultivation of the land. 
It is with a view to realising this principle of sociology and 
social justice that Roumania instituted her social reform and 
limited the extent of landed estates. Further, she compensated 
the landowners for the area of land of wrhich they were dispossess­
ed. No doubt, this compensation did not represent exactly 
the value of the land they lost but this was due to circumstances 
outside the control of the legislature. The principle, however, 
w’as recognised and the essential point is that this principle was 
applied. If the dispossessed owners did not receive compensation 
in full, it was in consequence of the economic and monetary 
situation : the fortuitous circumstance to which I have referred 
and for which the Roumanian legislature cannot be held 
Tesponsible.
By introducing and carrying out the agrarian reform, the Rou­
manians are held in greater esteem and occupy a higher place 
in the thoughts of all those who understand the primary 
principles of law and endeavour to make them prevail. As 
stated by M. Paul Boncour before the Council of the League of 
Nations, “this legislation adopted by Roumania with the full 
force of national sovereignly demands all the greater respect in 
that it imposed greater sacrifices on her citizens.” Not only 
■did she maintain, according to a traditional French expression 
— order and peace with justice on her own territory — the 
primary duty of any Stale, but she also barred the road to the 
bolchcvist invasion which threatened to reach Central Europe 
and even the great countries of the west. In realising this 
reform, the Roumanian Government gave proof of the greatest 
•circumspection. The enactments apply to all owners in the same
conditions and in the same terms, irrespective of their national­
ity. None of them contains a clause which creates a special 
situation for an owner of non-Roumanian nationality ; there are 
no decisions whereby peasants who have retained their Hun­
garian nationality would be placed in a position less favourable 
than the Roumanian peasants.
It is a general reform, affecting all alike, based on justice and 
law, and, as stated at the beginning of this article, I fail to 
understand how it can be claimed that this reform does not apply 
to all owners of land situated in Roumanian territory, that it 
does not apply to all owners of Hungarian nationality. Common 
international law is invoked. Yes ; it is precisely on the grounds 
of this common international law that I assert that the scope 
of the agrarian reform was general ; it is in virtue of this 
common international law that Roumania is entitled to ask the 
Council of the League of Nations to maintain the three principles 
which it has formally laid down.
Bordeaux, November 10th, 1927.
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I am asked to advise on two questions arising out of a dis­
pute between Roumania and Hungary on the position of those 
Hungarians who were residents in that part of the former Hun­
garian Kingdom which was ceded to Roumania by the Treaty of 
Trianon as regards the application to them of the agrarian 
legislation of Roumania. Under this legislation a large quantity 
of land was expropriated for the benefit of the peasantry, and, 
in consequence of the great fall in the value of the Roumanian 
currency the amounts provided for by way of compensation have 
fallen so low that the Hungarian Government contends that the 
compulsory expropriation of the Hungarian owners who have 
opted for their original nationality amounts to “retention or 
liquidation’ contrary to the provisions of Article 25o of the 
Treaty.
The question was raised before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
established under Article 2.3g of the Treaty of Trianon, and the 
Roumanian Government, although appearing before the Tri­
bunal stated that it did so only out of a feeling of respect for 
it, but declared that it was unable to recognize its competence 
in the matter. The Tribunal having declared itself competent, 
the Roumanian judge dissenting, Roumania withdrew the judge 
she had nominated, and appealed to the Council of the League 
of Nations under Art. XI of the Covenant. Hungary also appealed 
to the same body to fill the vacancy alleged to exist by the with­
drawal of the Roumanian judge, under the terms of Art. 23g of 
the Treaty of Trianon
The malter was before the Council of the League in Sep­
tember 1927, and after the Council had taken the opinion 
of six jurists, it adopted the recommendations of the Committee 
of Three to whom it had entrusted the consideration of the 
whole question at a meeting in March 1927. The Council in­
stead of accepting the point of view of either of the disputants 
hoped that they would accept the three principles laid down in 
the report of the Committee of Three as presented to it by Sir 
Austen Chamberlain, the Rapporteur, and that Roumania would 
reinstate her judge on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. Roumania 
has indicated her willingness to accept the recommendations of 
the Council, but Hungary refuses to do so.
The Report of the Committee of Three contained a recom­
mendation as follows : — “In the event of a refusal by Hungary, 
the Committee considers that the Council would not be justified 
in appointing two deputy members in accordance with Arti­
cle 23g of the Treaty of Trianon.” This portion of the Report 
was deferred by the Council.
At the meeting of the Council on the igth September, Hun­
gary proposed that the permanent Court of International Justice 
be asked for an advisory opinion on the three propositions con­
tained in the Report.
I am asked by the Roumanian Government to advise on the 
two following questions :
1. Under Article XI of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon, can the 
Council of the League refuse to nominate an auxiliary 
judge (juge suppléant) ?
2. Should the Council of the League refer to the Ferma- 
nent Court of International Justice for an Advisory Opi­
nion the rules which it has suggested to the Roumanians 
and Hungarians for the settlement of their dispute ?
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It does not appear to me to be necessary to deal in any great 
detail with the facts relating to this dispute which has been 
before the Council since 192.3 ; an adequate summary is given 
in the Report of the Committee of Three presented to the Coun­
cil on the 17th September 1927. Neither is it necessary to 
consider the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to deal 
with cases involving the application of the Roumanian Agra­
rian legislation, nor whether the plea of res judicata urged by 
Hungary is valid. The questions of importance are the compe­
tence of the Council in the dispute and its powers in regard 
to the nomination of two deputy members of the Tribunal, and 
its position in regard to the request of Hungary to obtain an 
Advisory Opinion from the Permanent Court of International 
Justice.
It may be noted that the Covenant of the League is an integral 
part of the Treaty of Trianon ; the whole treaty has, therefore, 
to be considered as one instrument.
The two parties to this dispute have on several occasions 
recognized the competence of the Council in relation to their 
differences arising out of the Roumanian agrarian legislation.
1) Hungary, by a letter of the r5th March, 1928, appealed 
to Article XI, par. 2, of the Covenant, and asked the Council 
to pass on the legality of the legislative and administrative pro­
visions of the Roumanian agrarian laws and to say that they 
were contrary to the provisions of Article 25o of the Treaty 
of Trianon, and to order the restoration of property taken from 
Hungarian optants, together with damages for the wrongs done. 
After lengthy negotiations under the chairmanship of M. Adatci, 
a compromise was arrived at which was subsequently repudiated 
by Hungary.
2) In February, 1927, Roumania submitted to the Council 
under the same Article of the Covenant (XI, par. 2) a request 
to be allowed lo acquaint the Council with her reasons for 
withdrawing her judge from the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal for 
all cases involving the application of her expropriation laws to 
Hungarian optants.
S') Hungary has requested the Council to act under Article a3g 
of the Treaty of Trianon and in consequence of the withdrawal 
of the Roumanian member of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to 
nominate two deputy members.
4) Hungary has made the further request to the Council to 
ask for an Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court on the three 
proposals contained in the Report of the Committee of Three to 
whom the Council entrusted the detailed examination of the 
case.
That both parties have appealed to the Council under Arti­
cle XI is a recognition of the fact that the continuance of the 
dispute is affecting the international relations of the two powers 
and threatens to disturb the peace or the good understanding 
on which peace between the two nations depends. It is impor­
tant to notice that the appeal was not made under Articles 23g 
or 25o of the Treaty of Trianon, but only when the matter was 
before the Council did Hungary appeal to these articles. Arti­
cle XI does not lay down in precise terms what the Council 
or Assembly, as the case may be, is to do when their attention 
has been drawn to disturbing factors in international relations, 
but under the first paragraph of this article which deals with 
war or the threat of war it is provided that the League shall 
take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safe­
guard the peace of nations. Under Articles XII, XIII, and XV, 
provision is made for arbitration or submission to the Council 
of disputes between States. Speaking of Article XI Sir Frederick 
Pollock says : “Quite apart from the specific procedure outlined 
in Articles XII-XV, the League is hereby invested in case of any 
apparent danger to the general peace, with a large authority 
which can be exercised, according to the nature of the case, 
by inquiry, free conference, mediation or timely warning to 
any Power outside the League;” and, I would add, within it. 
(The League of Nations, and ed. p. 137)
The competence of the Council is thus extremely wide. It 
may deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the 
League or affecting the peace of the world (Art. 4, par. 4) and 
any member not represented on the Council is to be invited to 
send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting during 
the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests 
of the member. This has been done, and a Hungarian delegate 
is a member of the Council for the purpose of the consideration 
of this dispute.
It may be urged that for the Council to intervene in a dispute 
on a question which the parties had referred to arbitration would 
be to imperil the whole system of arbitration.
On general principles, where there has been a clear agreement 
between the parties to refer a definite matter to arbitration, and 
where there is no question as to the competence of the Court, 
the Council ought not, under Article XV, to intervene. But this 
is not the case under consideration. Hungary first appealed 
to the Council in 1928 on the question of the legality of the Rou­
manian agrarian legislation before taking any steps to bring 
the matter of their validity in regard to Hungarian Optants 
before the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. Such an act might well be 
construed to indicate that the Hungarian Government had grave 
doubts as to the competency of the Tribunal to deal with the 
question. Roumania raised no objection to the competence of 
the Council to deal with the matter.
Furthermore, though the argument under consideration might 
have some weight if the Council had intervened on the initia­
tive of a third party, or even of one of the parties, in this case 
both parties have at different times appealed to the Council on 
the fundamental subject of the dispute, and have based their 
appeal on the same article of the Covenant, and not on either 
of the relevant articles of the Treaty of Trianon.
I think that the Council has acted within its competence in 
formulating the three principles which it recommends to the 
parties for their acceptance. The dispute turns on the compe­
tence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to deal with cases involving 
the application of the agrarian legislation of Roumania.
Roumania contends that it is wholly incompetent to deal with 
such cases, and refuses to acknowledge the validity of the 
decision affirming its competence. The Council has not accepted 
the point of view of either party. In its recommendations it does 
not purport to act as a Court of Appeal over-ruling the decision 
of the Arbitral Tribunal, but it makes proposals whereby the 
Tribunal may work more effectively if and when Roumania 
reinstates her judge.
III
The Committee of Three proposed that if Hungary refused 
to accept the suggestions put forth, the Council should refrain 
from appointing the two substitute members of the Tribunal 
under Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon. It is urged that 
the Council would not be justified in so acting ; that the action 
of the Council under the Article referred to is mechanical, — 
a mere matter of procedure, on which it has no choice The 
Article makes provision for the establishment of the Tribunal 
and provides for the situation which may arise if the Tribunal 
is not set up owing to the parties failing to agree as to the 
members. In such case the President and two other persons are 
to be chosen by the Council, such persons to be nationals of a 
Power that remained neutral during the late war. The Article 
then proceeds to consider another case where a vacancy occurs 
after the Tribunal has come into being. When this happens, 
if a Government does not proceed within one month to appoint 
a member of the Tribunal, such member shall be appointed by 
the other Government from the two persons before mentioned, 
other than the President. The Article does not indicate in 
what ways the vacancy is to arise ; normally death or resignation 
would be the causes of a vacancy. In this case, the Roumanian 
Government has withdrawn its nominee so far as concerns one 
class of cases. Does this constitute such a vacancy as is 
contemplated by the Article ? I do not think that the Council 
is precluded from examining the whole situation, and deciding 
whether there is in fact such a vacancy. The Council may 
justly envisage the situation which might possibly arise should 
it decide that a vacancy existed, and should proceed to the nomi­
nation of the two deputy-members of the Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunal without the previous acceptance by the parties of their 
recommendations. In this connection an important considera­
tion would present itself to the Council that there was the pos­
sibility that when cases involving the Roumanian agrarian legis­
lation were decided by the Tribunal against the Roumanian 
Government, that Government might refuse to implement its 
findings. In such a case there would be a violation of Sub-sec­
tion (g) of Article 23g, under which the parties agree to regard 
the decisions of the Tribunal as final and conclusive. If this 
situation arose, the tension between the two States would be 
still further increased ; there would be a failure to carry out an 
arbitral award, and the Council would then be appealed to under 
Article XIII, par. 4 to “propose what steps should be taken to 
give effect thereto.” There would then arise a "dispute likely to 
lead to a rupture” which the parties to the Covenant agree to sub­
mit to the Council under Art. XV. Thus the whole matter would 
again come before the Council. The Council, therefore, had the 
right and the duty to appreciate the whole situation in deciding 
the question whether there is such a vacancy as calls for the 
exercise by them of their function of nominating two persons 
under Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon. The action of the 
Council is not purely mechanical. The Council was thus justi­
fied in keeping its prime function in mind, that of maintaining 
peaceful relations between the members of the League. The 
appointment of the two deputy members of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal would not be the end of the dispute between the par­
ties.
IV
There remains ithe question of submitting the three rules 
which the Council has proposed for the acceptance of the 
parties to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an 
Advisory Opinion. By Art. XIV of the Covenant “the Court may 
also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question 
referred to it by the Council or the Assembly." The question 
of a reference to the Court is thus left wholly to the discretion 
of the Council or Assembly, and it would appear that the Court 
is also left with discretionary powers to give or withhold an opi­
nion. The important question arises whether the Council can 
refer a question to the Permanent Court by a majority of its 
members. This has never, so far as I am aware, been definitely 
settled. In a case where both parties to the dispute do not agree 
to a reference, and the question is not merely one of procedure, 
but one where an Opinion would in effect decide the substance 
of the case, I am of opinion that the Council must be unanimous, 
including the parties, who, for the purpose of the pending 
cause, are members of the Council. In this case the Opinion of 
the Permanent Court would in effect be an arbitral award, and 
it is a principle of International Law that no State can, without 
its consent, be compelled to submit its dispute with another 
State to arbitration. States will not submit to arbitration ques­
tions involving their independence, and independence is menaced 
whenever a State is prevented from doing or not doing anything 
which an independent State may justly do or refrain from doing 
(J. Westlake. International Law, Peace 356). Such is the view 
which Roumania takes of the situation. It is because it is recog­
nized that there are cases, — even those which involve legal 
considerations and the construction of treaties — which may 
affect a State’s independence that treaties have made provision 
for the establishment of permanent Commissions of Conciliation. 
The Council exercises the functions of such a permanent Com­
mission. It has acted on legal principles and under expert legal 
advice, and in this dispute both parties have appealed to it, and 
by its findings they should be guided.
The answers I give to the two questions submitted to me are:—
i. Under Article XI of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and Article a3p of the Treaty of Trianon, the Council 
of the League can refuse to accede to the Hungarian request 
for the nomination of two deputy members of the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal.
?.. The Council of the League is under no obligation to 
refer to the Permanent Court of International Justice for 
an Advisory Opinion the rules which it has suggested to the 
Roumanian and Hungarian Governments for the settlement 
of their dispute.
Cambridge. — 28 Nov. 1927.
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After December 1923, a certain number of Hungarian optants 
submitted protests to the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal. Such protests demanded, in particular, the restitution 
of rural properties which had just been expropriated by Rouma­
nia in the territories transferred to her under the Peace Treaty. 
The defendant party made exceptional demands pleading the 
incompetence /of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. Arguments in 
proof of this incompetence were advanced by numerous emi­
nently qualified experts ; on this point, I refer to my first opinion, 
submitted to the Roumanian Government on October 26th, 1926. 
The Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, however, by its decision of 
January 10th, 1927, declared itself competent and called upon 
Roumania to forward her reply within a period of two months.
Roumania, in view of this exceeding of its powers by the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal under the Peace Treaty, declared, on 
February a4th, 1927, that she would refrain from submitting 
her reply regarding the substance of the question and, conse­
quently, that her arbitrator would no longer sit on the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal in connection with any of the protests made 
by Hungarian optants against the agrarian reform. (*)
(*) Translated from Ihc French version.
With a view to reaching a practical solution of the dispute, 
rendered more acute by the decision of January 10th, 1927, 
Roumania submitted to the Council of the League of Nations, in 
virtue of Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, a request to 
be allowed to acquaint the Council with the reasons on which 
her attitude was based.
The Council met on March 7th, 1927, and the Roumanian 
representative asked the Council to appoint two substitutes to 
enable the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to continue its work. A 
Committee of Three formed by the Council to examine this 
question recommended, on September 17th, 1927, that the 
Council should accept three principles as a basis for political 
agreement between the two parties. Hungary, however, refused 
to accept these principles and requested that the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal should be allowed to continue its work. The Rouma­
nian representative was prepared to accept the recommendations 
suggested by the Committee of Three. The Council then invited 
the parties in dispute to reply, before its session of December 
1927, to the recommendations of the Committee.
This is the stage of affairs at which we examine the question 
of the competence of the Council of the League of Nations.
At present it is no longer a question of examining the validity 
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal’s decision of January loth, 1927. 
I believe that the positive provisions of Article 289 of the Treaty 
of Trianon do not permit of the application of the well known 
rules of international law on arbitration to Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunals also. The legal value of the decisions of January 10th, 
therefore, is open to doubt.
The legal course is, however, not the only one by which 
international law may solve an international dispute ; there is 
also the political course.
As early as 1923, Hungary proposed a political solution to the 
Council. Roumania is now, with good reasons, and relying on 
Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, asking for the inter­
vention of the Council of the League of Nations, the supreme 
organ of international politics.
We therefore submit the following questions :
1. — Can the legal award of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
be set aside and replaced by a political solution reached by 
the Council ?
There is no doubt that the Council is a political organisation. 
Although the separation of powers may not be absolutely 
adopted by the Covenant, there is a difference between legal and 
political power. To say that the Council is a legal organisation 
would be to restrict its liberty of action (see Le Fur, Revue de 
droit international, published by A. Sottile, 1927, 4, page 269). 
The Council is not bound by a method of procedure such as that 
of the Tribunals. It is not always obliged to apply the law in 
force. It is obliged to observe the law, but its work corresponds 
to a duty which is higher and more responsible than that of 
laying down the law. As a political organ it has to create the 
new law. First and foremost it is the organ of international 
legislation. It endeavours to create new legal relations of inter­
national law which in most cases are not general “laws”, but 
international conventions, treaties and agreements between 
States. The Council must not violate the law in force, but it 
must encourage the creation of a new and better law.
2. What is the relation between the political solution and 
the legal solution ?
From a legal point of view it might be said that the two 
courses, the jurisdiction of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, and 
the mediation or intervention of the Council of the League of 
Nations, are of equal value. But in practice one of the two 
courses has to be chosen. In the present case, it is a question 
of which of the two must be given preference.
The law of thé League of Nations makes a distinction between 
disputes which are suitable for submission to a Court of Justice 
or arbitration and those not suitable for such a solution (see 
Covenant, Article i3, etc.). In the case of disputes which can 
be settled by law, the preference is given to jurisdiction or 
arbitration, and political disputes are solved through diplomatic 
or political channels. In which category must we class the Rou­
manian-Hungarian dispute?
The simple expropriation of the immovable property of an 
individual by the Stale is — in case of protest — nothing more 
than a legal dispute which should be settled by arbitral award. 
The Roumanian-Hungarian dispute is different. All the expro­
priations imposed by the Roumanian Government on owners of 
land, whether of Roumanian or other nationality, constitute 
primarily a question of internal politics. Further, the collective 
protests of Hungarian optants vis-à-vis the Roumanian Govern­
ment constitute a question of supreme national and international 
policy. These protests by Hungarian optants result more or 
less in the complete disorganisation of the agrarian reform in 
Roumania ; they tend to prevent a reform which . is of vital 
importance for Roumania. The Hungarian optants are demand­
ing after all a more privileged treatment than that enjoyed by 
Roumanian nationals; they are thus endeavouring to introduce 
an inequality of law which is absolutely foreign to the constitu­
tional law of Roumania and to international law. The decisions 
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal as to its competence assail the 
very sovereignty of the State. It is not a question of small 
private interests; the power, integrity and honour of the country 
are affected by the present dispute. Moreover, the friendly 
international relations between Roumania and Hungary are jeo­
pardised thereby.
A whole series of proceedings forming a dispute of such poli­
tical importance ought not to be settled by tribunals which give 
no guarantee of a satisfactory solution from a political point of 
view. It is therefore for very sound reasons that Roumania has 
chosen the political course by submitting the dispute to the 
Council of the League of Nations. A political, rather than a 
legal or arbitral solution, must be found for the Roumanian- 
Hungarian dispute.
3. Has the Council the right and is it its duty to deal with 
the dispute?
The Council has the right to deal with this dispute, not 
because it has the right of supervision over the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunals, but because the proceedings instituted by Hungarian 
optants, which may at first sight appear to be disputes calling 
for legal or arbitral settlement, have as a whole become a ques­
tion which can be settled only by a political solution. The 
cause of this development in the nature of the dispute lies prin­
cipally in the obstinacy with which the Hungarian representatives 
are fighting the agrarian reform in Roumania.
Further, the Council is even obliged to intervene in the Rou­
manian-Hungarian dispute if so requested with good reasons by 
one of the parties.
The cases in which the Council must intervene are, in prin­
ciple, restricted.
Roumania relied upon Articlen, paragraph 2,- of the Covenant 
when she submitted the question to the Council. The cases 
mentioned in paragraph 2 are to be treated in the same way as 
those under the preceding paragraph. The latter refers to war 
and threats of war; paragraph 2 lays stress on “any circumstance 
affecting international relations which threatens (not or threaten­
ing) to disturb international peace or good understanding 
between nations upon which peace depends.” If any disagree­
ment, misunderstanding or dispute between two States begins 
to threaten the peace by disturbances, appeal to the Council is 
admissible. Such disturbances may even affect only one of the 
two parties; if, for example, the feelings of a State against a 
neighbouring State are of a threatening or disturbing nature 
while the neighbouring State remains peaceful, they are never­
theless disturbances of peace w'hich justify appeal to the Council.
4. What measures may be taken by the Council under 
Article 11, paragraph 2?
Paragraph 1 of Article 11 confers upon the Council the right 
and at the same time instructs it to “take any action that may 
be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.”’ 
Paragraph 2 makes no mention of measures to be taken. In 
the case of the latter paragraph therefore the idea is that the same­
measures are admissible as those for cases falling under para­
graph 1. Such measures must be “deemed wise to safeguard” 
etc., but they are not restricted. The Council has full and entire 
liberty to choose among its measures those which are best calcu­
lated to achieve its object, namely, the safeguarding of peace. 
There is no justification for the authors who wished to restrict this 
power of the Council. The Council may even apply military 
sanctions against, a State which is disturbing peace.
There is, however, a certain difference between the treatment 
of cases falling respectively under paragraphs 1 and 2. Speaking- 
of war or threats of war, that is, of more imminent dangers, 
paragraph 1 confers upon the Council the right to apply the 
most effectual and severe measures to restrict the liberty and 
sovereignty of a State. As the cases under paragraph 2 are less 
serious, they may be settled by less severe measures without, 
however, any restriction as to choice of measures.
The measures to be taken under Article 11 of the Covenant 
may consist of restrictions imposed on the functioning of the 
constitutional power of a Slate. The' Council may prohibit the 
execution of arbitral awards, it may even prohibit the sessions 
of the tribunals.
5. Can the Council refuse to appoint two substitutes as 
judges on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal ?
Article 23g (a) paragraphe 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Trianon 
imposes upon the Council the obligation, in case there is a 
vacancy, to appoint two candidates, one of whom may be chosen 
by the Government demanding the appointment (Government of 
the other State). By this obligation, the Council has become the 
executory organ of the former Peace Conference. Being allied 
lo international law and especially to the law created by the 
Peace Treaties, it is not independent vis-à-vis such regulations. 
It shares the responsibility of the work of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunals which, according to the intention of the Peace Treaty, 
must continue to sit.
It is however this very responsibility which might compel the 
Council to prevent the functioning of a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
by a measure necessary for the safeguarding of peace within 
the meaning of Article 11 of the Covenant. This measure might 
even assume the form of refusal to appoint candidates (according 
to Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon).
Having the right of choice between political measures calcul­
ated effectually to safeguard peace, the Council should decide 
whether the dispute is of so serious a nature as to warrant the 
prevention of the functioning of a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. 
Such an eventuality may arise if this Tribunal itself is the cause 
of the disturbances in one or both countries. In the Roumanian- 
Hungarian dispute it seems that the decisions-of January 10th 
are especially calculated to threaten peace between the two 
parties. If, therefore, the Council wished to restrict the powers 
of this Tribunal it could do so with the least political effort by 
refusing to appoint the two candidates.
It might be said that this would constitute intervention by the 
Council in international jurisdiction. This is not true. The 
Council would not interfere with the substance of the questions. 
It would, for reasons of higher policy, merely prevent or delay 
formal proceeding until the situation had become less dangerous.
The Council could exercise these rights on the ground of
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political necessity, but not because the political course is in any 
way superior to the legal course. The great difficulty in regard 
to the political course, which the Council is endeavouring to 
follow, lies in the necessity of uniting the two parlies by mutual 
agreement. In the present case, Roumania alone has declared 
her willingness to accept the recommendations of the Council, 
while Hungary wishes to continue the legal proceedings with an 
arbitrator appointed by the Council.
The Council, having two duties, that of appointing two candi­
dates (a formal duty) and that of preventing the functioning of 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (a fundamental duty) must choose 
the latter, because—as M. Politis has said—of the two duties, this 
is the more imperative, the more urgent and the more efficacious 
(see N. Politis in the Revue bleue, November 19th, 1927, page 677). 
It goes without saying, however, that such a serious course must 
be adopted only as an ultima ratio, since a measure of that kind 
would paralyse an international jurisdiction.
6. Can the Council prevent the execution of a valid decision 
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal ?
Even assuming the decision of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal of 
January 10th, 1927, as to its competence, to be valid, it might 
be asked whether the Council has the right to delay or prevent 
the execution of such a decision. The question must be settled 
by the same reasoning as the preceding question (5). If the 
Council is of opinion that reasons of higher policy necessitate a 
measure of such gravity, nothing will prevent it from putting it 
into operation, since, under Article 11 of the Covenant, its 
powers are unlimited.
Bâle (Switzerland) November 3oth, 1927.
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The undersigned, Member of the Institute of France, Dean of 
the1 Faculty of: Law of the University of Paris, having been 
consulted'on the following, questions1 :
i) Could the question of Hungarian optants, under its twofold 
aspect, political and juridical, be referred to the Council of the 
League of Nations?
2) Had the Council of the League of Nations^ when appealed 
to by Roumania under Article 11 of the Covenant and by Hungary 
under Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon, the right to refuse 
to replace the judge of the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunal withdrawn by the Roumanian Government?
3) In order to take a decision on the dispute under consider­
ation, was the Council of the League of Nations obliged to refer 
the question to the Hague Permanent Court of International Jus­
tice for an advisory opinion?
Expresses the following opinion :
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
None of the above three questions affects the substance of the 
dispute which has arisen between Roumania and Hungary. In 
order to understand the situation, however, it is first of all neces-
(•) Translated from the French version.
sary to give a brief summary of the facts which led up to the 
dispute to which these questions relate.
Some years ago, a serious dispute arose between Roumania and 
Hungary. Before the world war it was decided, for purposes of 
public welfare, to allot to the peasants the lands cultivated by 
them against a payment to be fixed by. Roumania. In 1914, a 
Constituent Assembly was formed, but its labours were stopped 
by the war. Nevertheless, from 1917 to 1921 several laws were 
enacted realising this vast scheme of agrarian reform. It was 
applied throughout Roumania, without distinction. In the ter­
ritories transferred to her under the Treaty of Trianon, this 
reform affected all owners of land whether of Roumanian or 
other nationality, including Hungarian optants. A certain num­
ber of the latter protested against the application of the Rouma­
nian agarian law to their property, declaring that this was con­
trary to the provisions of Article 260 of the Treaty of Trianon, 
which lays down that the property, rights and interests of Hun­
garian nationals or companies controlled by them situated in the 
territories which formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy shall not be subject to retention or liquidation. The 
Hungarian Government supported this claim ; the Roumanian 
Government contested it on the ground that the measure admitted 
by the Roumanian agarian law was one of expropriation and not 
of liquidation. It added that if this measure were not applied 
to Hungarian optants it would give rise to a question of prefe­
rential treatment, whereas, under the general principles of law 
all that foreigners could demand was to be treated in the same 
way as nationals under the laws of the country in which they 
were settled. This dispute was referred by Hungary to the 
Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal which, in virtue 
of Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon, was composed of three 
members, a representative of each of the two States and a Presi­
dent of neutral nationality. The Roumanian Government, as 
defendant, alleged the incompetence of the Tribunal, declaring 
that agrarian reform is not a measure of liquidation or a measure 
of war aficcting only enemy subjects for the mere fact that 
they are enemies. Notwithstanding the evidence in justification 
of the Roumanian argument, the Tribunal declared itself compe­
tent. As a result of the decision recognising the competence 
of the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, the Rou­
manian Government, not wishing to continue to be party to the 
usurpation of powers, declared its intention of withdrawing its 
representative from the Tribunal for the settlement of questions 
relating to the application of the Roumanian agrarian law to 
Hungarian optants. The Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal was thus unable to take a decision as to the substance 
of the dispute.
After the withdrawal of the Roumanian judge, first the 
Roumanian Government, then the Hungarian Government, sub­
mitted to the Council of the League of Nations two protests based 
on the provisions of Article n of the Covenant and those of 
Article 23g :of the Treaty of Trianon respectively.
The Hungarian Government pleaded that the seat of the Rou­
manian judge on the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal was vacant and requested the Council of the League of 
Nations to apply the procedure established by Article 23g of the 
Treaty of Trianon with a view to filling this vacancy.
On its side, the Roumanian Government laid before the Coun­
cil of the League of Nations a protest based on Article n para­
graph 2 of the Covenant whereby each Member of the League 
has the friendly right to bring to the attention of the Council 
any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which 
threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding 
between nations upon which peace depends.
Before the Council of the League of Nations the Roumanian 
and Hungarian Governments were in complete disagreement in 
regard to the respective protests submitted to that organisation.
On the one hand, the Hungarian Government maintained that 
under Article n of the Covenant the Council of the League of 
Nations was not competent to intervene, that it should at least 
request the Hague Permanent Court of International Justice to 
give an advisory opinion and should take the necessary steps 
to fill the vacancy on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal caused by the 
withdrawal of the Roumanian judge.
On the other hand, the Roumanian Government maintained 
that the Council was indeed competent under Article n of the 
Covenant, that it was under no obligation to request an advisory 
opinion by the Hague Court and that it should refuse to replace 
the judge withdrawn by the Roumanian Government from the 




These are the facts on which the .three above mentioned ques­
tions .are based. These questions must be successively examined 
and .solved.
EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTIONS. SOLUTIONS
i) Could the question of Hungarian optants, under its twofold 
aspect, .political and juridical, be referred to the Council oj the 
League of Nations?
It has been maintained, in the name of the Hungarian Govern­
ment, that the Council of the League of Nations could not inter­
vene, being incompetent to examine the question on account of 
its juridical nature. According to the Hungarian representative, 
the Council can be asked to intervene only in the case of political 
questions; there are other organisations for juridical questions, 
which come within the exclusive competence of the Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunals and The Hague Permanent Court of International 
Justice. In support of this opinion, it has been recalled that it 
is usual in the various States, in virtue of the separation of powers, 
for the Tribunals alone to be competent to decide juridical 
questions and it has been alleged that the results would be most 
serious if such questions were referred to persons or organisations 
other than magistrates.
This argument is certainly ingenious, but it is false, and this 
for several reasons.
It :is scarcely necessary to say that dt is doubtless true that the 
principle of the separation of powers admitted in the States ren­
ders it difficult for organisations other than the Tribunals to 
know the facts of questions of a juridical nature. The League 
of Nations, however, is neither a super-State nor even a State, 
it is an institution of a very special nature with a new and special 
organisation. Further, even though the League of Nations were 
to be considered as a State existing by ,the side of States which 
are Members of the League, :this would not necessarily lead to the 
recognition of the principle of separation of powers within the 
League of Nations. This is not a sort of principle of higher 
natural law which ought to be recognised even in the absence 
of any special provision to that effect.
We would search in vain for a clause to this effect in the pro­
visions of the Treaty of Trianon on which the Covenant is based. 
Far from the existence of such a provision, the language of Arti­
cle ii, paragraph 2 of the Covenant implies that the Council of 
the League of Nations is competent to intervene whatever may 
he the nature of the circumstance which threatens to disturb 
peace. Moreover, the main -purpose for which the League of 
Nations was tcreated imperatively demands that the competence 
of the Council of that League be unlimited, that is, that its com­
petence includes juridical as well as political questions.
Article ii, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, on which Roumania 
relied when appealing to the Council of the League of Nations, 
reads as follows :
“It is also declared to.be the friendly right of each Member 
“of the 'League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or 
“of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting inter- 
"national relations which threatens to disturb international 
“peace or the good understanding between nations upon 
“which peace depends.”
The words “any circumstance whatever” obviously imply that 
whatever may be the circumstance ■which threatens to' disturb 
peace and the good understanding between nations it may be 
brought by a Member of the League of Nations to the attention 
of the Council.
Further, if it were otherwise, if the intervention of the League 
of Nations were excluded in regard to questions of a juridical7 
nature, the’ main object in view in the creation of this vast insti­
tution might often be defeated. That object is to ensure the 
maintenance of Peace to the greatest possible extent. When Peace 
is threatened, the Council must by its intervention be able to 
avert the risk of war. If, when questions of a juridical nature 
disturb the good relations between States, recourse to the Council’ 
of the League of Nations were impossible, the question would 
have to be referred to the Hague Court or to a Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal. Having regard to the procedure to be followed before 
such jurisdictions, they cannot naturally pronounce an =award 
with sufficient rapidity to avert war between Stales Pending 
the award, war might be declared and have resulted in extensive 
devastation and loss of human life by the time the .award was 
given.
The Council of the League of Nations is the sole organisation 
which can, with the rapidity which is sometimes necessary, 
pronounce on the dispute which is threatening peace and take- 
the necessary measures to settle an international quarrel.
It is not, moreover, always easy to determine whether a ques­
tion on which States are divided is juridical or political. Again, 
by the side of questions which are exclusively either juridical 
or political, are others which are both juridical and political. 
The question of the Hungarian optants, which is causing such 
a serious division between Roumania and Hungary, seems to 
belong to the latter category.
2) Had the Council of the League of Nations, when appealed 
to by Roumania under Article 11 of the Covenant and by 
Hungary under Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon, the right' 
to refuse to replace the judge of the Roumanian-Hungarian 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal withdrawn by the Roumanian Govern­
ment ?
After having determined the organisation of the Roumanian- 
Hungarian Arbitral Tribunal, Article 23g of the Treaty of Tria­
non (3) envisages the case of a vacancy. Under this clause, if 
in case there is a vacancy a Government does not proceed 
within a period of one month to appoint a member of the Tribu­
nal, the Council of the League of Nations shall choose two 
persons, nationals of Powers that have remained neutral during 
the war, and the other Government shall choose a substitute 
from these two persons. ।
It is doubtful, however, whether the case contemplated By 
Article 23g, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Trianon has arisen. As 
we have just stated, the latter refers to the case of a vacancy. 
Now, a vacancy obviously arises when a judge dies, resigns or 
is completely prevented for some reason or other from fulfilling 
his duties so that in a given instance he does not attend. Is there 
a vacancy, within the meaning of Article 23g, paragraph 2, 
when a judge is merely prevented from participating in the 
discussions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal on a given question 
or on questions of a giv£n category ? It is doubtful. This, 
however, is the case in the dispute under consideration ; the 
Roumanian Government has withdrawn its representative only 
for questions relating to the application of the Roumanian 
agrarian law to Hungarian optants. This is a very special and 
exceptional case. It is not astonishing that the authors of the 
Treaty of Trianon did not even drcam of such an eventuality. 
The procedure laid down by Article 23g, paragraph 2, for the 
replacing of the judge is therefore not applicable to the present 
case.
Further, assuming, on the contrary, that this provision is 
applicable, it does not follow that the Council of the League of 
Nations is obliged to conform thereto. It cannot be too fully 
understood that for the accomplishment of its high and difficult 
mission, the power of the Council of the League of Nations must 
be absolute, so that, according to circumstances which may be 
of the most varied character, it may at its discretion adopt or 
refuse to adopt a certain provision, a certain decision, or take 
a certain measure which is calculated to establish good under­
standing between nations and avert war. It is possible that in 
certain circumstances the Council of the League of Nations may 
deem it preferable not to have recourse to the procedure of 
Article 289, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Trianon to fill the 
vacancy of a judge on a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
In the present case, one of the Governments in dispute, the 
Roumanian Government, rightly alleges that the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal is incompetent, that any award which it might give 
on the substance of the question would be inoperative, so that 
after such an award the dispute would still continue with all 
its inherent disadvantages and dangers. In the presence of such 
facts, why could not the Council of the League of Nations decide 
that it is preferable not to adopt a measure which, it is true, 
would enable the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to give an award, but 
which would not be calculated to put an end to a situation 
threatening the maintenance of peace. To fulfil its mission, the 
liberty of the Council of the League of Nations must be absolute ; 
it has full power to choose among the methods at its disposal.
3) In order to take a decision on the dispute under considera­
tion, was the Council of the League of Nations obliged to refer 
the question to the Hague Permanent Court of International 
Justice for an advisory opinion ?
The principal mission of the Hague Permanent Court of Inter­
national Justice is, as indicated by its very name, to examine 
disputes referred to it and then to give awards. It can however 
be called upon to fill another role ; in the event of difficulties 
of a juridical nature, this supreme jurisdiction may be asked to 
give its opinion, this is called an advisory opinion. Since its 
creation, the Court of The Hague has frequently been called upon 
to pronounce such opinions. Jn .theory, the .advisory opinions 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice are not binding 
on .those who .have solicited them. But, in fact, the parties 
concerned, or, more.generally, those who have appealed to the 
Court, always submit thereto.
It is .certain that the Council of the League of Nations, if not 
sufficiently enlightened on a -question .of law, may, before 
giving its decision, ask.theUague Court of Justice for an advisory 
opinion. This opinion may be of the .greatest assistance ; the 
eminent magistrates who comprise this Court are jurists of the 
highest repute and their unanimous or majority .opinion is 
worthy of the .utmost confidence. But the Council of the League 
of Nations is not.obliged to consult the Court of .The Hague on 
questions of law on which it has to take a decision. This is 
purely optional. The Council, if not sufficiently enlightened, 
has an option as to the measure to which it may resort to obtain 
an opinion for its guidance ; it may appeal to one or to several 
jurists, or to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
The Council of the League of Nations could not be obliged to 
ask the Court of The Hague for its opinion unless there were 
a formal provision imposing such an obligation. The Covenant 
contains no such provision.
There are many very forcible reasons in justification of the 
purely optional character of recourse to the Court of The Hague 
for an advisory opinion. As I .have already said, such an opinion 
is, in theory, certainly not compulsory for the Council of the 
League of Nations, in the sense that it is obliged to conform 
thereto. But, in fact, it is of the greatest significance that when 
an advisory opinion is given by the Court it must be accepted 
in the same way as an award. Otherwise, the authority of the 
Court -.would be seriously assailed. Therefore, in -reality, by 
asking for an advisory opinion, the Council of the League of 
Nations completely relinquishes responsibility ; it is a material 
impossibility for the Council to reject the advisory opinion in 
favour of another .opinion. Naturally, the - Council does not 
wish to resort to a -measure which would lead to the question 
being taken out of .its-hands.
This is not all. Weiknow that when it is called upon to give 
an advisory opinion, the procedure followed before -the Court is 
the same as .in the case of juridical proceedings, (that is, of 
proceedings in .which .the Court has to give an award. There 
is therefore a preliminary exchange of notes between the parties 
concerned, who maintain divergent views, then follow the 
speeches and a discussion by the Court which, in view of the 
extreme conscientiousness with which the magistrates of the 
Court exercise their functions, covers a fairly long period. 
Therefore, several weeks must elapse before the Court is able to 
pronounce its opinion. The period is still further prolonged if 
the Court is not sitting when asked for an advisory opinion.
The gravity of the dispute, the marked feeling of unrest and 
the acts of violence already committed may oblige the Council 
of the League of Nations, asked to intervene in virtue of Article 
ii, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, to take a prompt decision and 
to determine without delay the measures which it may deem 
wise for the maintenance of peace. If the Council had 
previously to appeal to the Court of The Hague for an advisory 
opinion, it would be absolutely impossible for it to take a' prompt 
decision.
For the foregoing considerations it is therefore reasonable that 
when a question of law is referred to the Council of the League 
of Nations in virtue of Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, 
recourse to the Hague Permanent Court of International Justice 
for an advisory opinion should be merely an optional and not 
an obligatory measure.
Paris, November 2nd, 1927.

The roumano-hungarian dispute as to expropriations 
in Transylvania
BY
J. E. G. DE MONTMORENCY, M. A., LL. B. (Cantab) 
Barrister at Law, 
Quain Professor of Comparative Law in the. University of London,
I am asked to answer certain definite questions as to the duties 
of the Council of the League of Nations (under the Covenant of 
the League of Nations annexed to the Treaty of Trianon of June 
4th 1920 and certain articles in the said Treaty) in relation to the 
expropriation of the lands of certain proprietors in Transylvania,, 
known as the Hungarian Optants. The issue between the Hun­
garian and the Roumanian Governments on which these ques­
tions arise is of highest importance, since it involves the ulti­
mate principles on which the authority of the League of Nations 
depends. f
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
The relevant facts relating to this dispute are apparently as- 
follows :
Some months before the outbreak of the War of igi4 a Gene­
ral Election in Roumania affirmed, on the ground of national' 
necessity, the principle of the expropriation of large estates in 
order to create peasant proprietorship on a substantial scale. The- 
outbreak of war delayed legislation, butin 1917 during the war 
the appropriate legislation was passed on the terms that the 
expropriated owners should be granted Government Stock 
payable in 5o years bearing interest at 5 %, the nominal value-
being estimated as equal to the cash value. After the Armistice 
of November nth, 1918, these same social reforms were applied 
to Transylvania and other territories transferred to Roumania as 
the résulte of; the war. The Hungarian peasants in. Transylvania 
benefited in the same way as the Roumanian peasants in the old 
Kingdom of Roumania, and1 the' Hungarian landowners suffered 
with the Roumanian landowners as a result of the fall in the value 
of Roumanian money. The Hungarian landowners in Transyl­
vania who had chosen under the Treaty of Trianon to remain 
Hungarian, subjpcts and are known as the Hungarian Optants 
refused and still refuse to accept these Agrarian reforms unless 
they are compensated in gold. They contend that the operation 
of the Agrarian Eaw amounted in fact to war liquidation or 
retention of enemy property (within the meaning of Article 282 
of the Treaty of Trianon) and' that this is expressly forbidden by 
Article 25o of the said Treaty. Article 25o provides that çlaims 
under the Article shall be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunal provided by Article 289 of the said Treaty. Article 289 
supplies machinery for the creation of this Tribunal of three 
judges; two of the members being appointed by the Hungarian 
and’ Roumanian Governments respectively, and the President 
being chosen by agreement between the same two governments. 
The Article provides a procedure for creating the tribunal in 
the event of disagreement between the Hungarian and Rôu-1 
manian Governements as to the President of the Tribunal, but 
in’ fact' agreement was reached and1 this alternative procedure 
never became operative.
A preliminary question was whether the Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunal was competent to decide the question whether the expro­
priation of the lands of Hungarian Optants was a measure of 
liquidation. This matter was argued before the Tribunal in 
December 1926, the Roumanian Government only appearing for 
the purpose of denying the competence of the Tribunal. On 
January 10th, 1927, the Tribunal declared, by a majority, that 
it was competent, and the Roumanian Government immediately 
withdrew in respect to all Agrarian' cases the judge whom they 
had nominated and who has dissented from the Majority 
Judgment..
On this question of competence it may be said that an Arbitral 
Tribunal, as a rule cannot determine the limits if its own com­
petence unless the instrument which, creates it (in this case the 
Treaty of1 Trianon) makes the jurisdiction depend on the deci­
sion of the Tribunal itself to the effect that a state of! affairs exists 
upon; which the jurisdiction depends. I; am not' asked tb advise 
whether the Mixed: Arbitral Tribunal- was: entrusted by the 
Treaty of Trianon with powers that make it the final judge of its 
own jurisdiction (i) but 1 may say that I find it difficult to detect 
any such delegation of authority in the Treaty of Trianon. In 
any event there is no Court of Appeal from a decision of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
The Roumanian Government as a result of the decision1 and 
the consequent withdrawal of their judge carried', by request 
dated Feb. 2Z1H1, 1927, the whole question (under Article ir, 
paragraph 2 of the Covenant of the lieague of Nations) before the 
Council of'the League in1 order to; explain their action. The 
Hungarian Government replied' by demanding that1 the Council 
of the League should1 replace the judge withdrawn by the Rou­
manian Government, under the provisions of Article 289 of the 
Treaty of ' Trianon. The Council of the League considered the 
matter on March 7th; 1927, and appointed a Committee of1 Three 
to find the solution and to report at the Session of June 1927. 
This Committee sought' the opinion of six eminent international 
lawyers drawn from six different nations and in the light of that 
opinion framed the report which was presented to the Council on 
September (17th, 1927. This report laid down the three follow­
ing principles.
1. Thé provisions of the peace settlement effected after the war 
of 1914-18. do not exclude the application to Hungarian Nationals 
(including those who have opted for Hungarian Nationality) of 
a general scheme of Agrarian Reform.
2. There must be no inequality between Roumanians and Hun­
garians, either in the terms of the Agrarian Law or the way 
in which it is enforced.
3. The words “Retention and’ liquidation”, mentioned in 
Article 25o, which relates only to the territoires ceded by Hun­
gary, applies to the measures taken against the property of a 
(1) As to the question of jurisdiction see the English cases May v. Mitts 
(1814) 38 Tin. 287 ; Price v. Popkin (1839) 10 A'. et E. 139'; r'AniEtt' v. EasttCoun- 
ties Railway Co 1848, 2. Exch. 344 ; A. g. for Manitoba (1922), 1 A. C. 276 ; The 
Betsy G. Spencer Bower Res Judicata (1924) 74-5.
Hungarian in the said territories and in so far as such owner 
is a Hungarian National.
In view of these principles the Committee of Three suggested 
that the Council of the League should make the following recom­
mendation:
a) To request the two parties to conform to the three principles 
enumerated above.
b) To request Roumania to reinstate her judge on the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal.
Other proposals in the case of non-acceptance of either or both 
the parties to the dispute were also made.
The Roumanian Government accepted the proposals of the 
Committee of Three and the Hungarian Government rejected 
these proposals. The Council, after long debate, decided una­
nimously to accept the Report up to and not beyond Paragraph 
(a). The two members of the Council who are parties to the 
dispute were not asked for an opinion but were asked to delay 
their opinion until December 1927 in the hope that they would 
favourably consider the decision of the Council to request the 
two parties to conform to the three principles enunciated above.
I am asked to advise:
1. Under the Article n of the Covenant and Article 289 of 
the Treaty of Trianon can the Council refuse to nominate an 
Auxiliary Judge.
2. Should the Council refer to the Permanent Court of Jus­
tice al The Hague for an Advisory Opinion on the rulings which 
it has suggested to the litigants.
I
OPINION
Under Article 11 of the Covenant and Article 289 of the Treaty 
of Trianon can the Council refuse to nominate an Auxiliary 
Judge?
I approach the question at first from the point of view of the 
textual construction of Article 289. The Mixed Arbitral Tribu- 
nal has decided by a majority of 2 to i that it is competent to 
deal with the question of the expropriation under the Rouma­
nian Agrarian Law of Hungarian Optants who are landowners 
in Transylvania. The Roumanian Judge on the Tribunal was, 
thereupon, withdrawn by his Government. The question Of 
construction is whether the Council of the League can refuse to 
appoint a substitute. At this stage I do not pause to enquire 
whether the Tribunal had power to assert its own competence, 
or whether the decision is right. I am content on this matter 
to adopt the views of the six jurists before mentioned though I 
should wish to express my opinion that the retirement of the 
Roumanian judge from the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in respect 
to all Agrarian matters was entirely justified in the circum­
stances of the case.
. The Hungarian Government has demanded that the Council 
of the League shall appoint under Article 289-of the Treaty of 
Trianon a substitutional or auxiliary judge in order to enable 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to function anew in the Agrarian 
cases. The question falls into two parts :
a) Whether the Council has power on the construction of 
Article 289 to nominate a substitutional judge at all.
b) If so, whether it is compelled to do so.
a) This a pure question of construction on the wording of 
Article 289 and the Annexe to that Article. Annexe 1 provides 
that “Should a member of the Tribunal... retire... the same pro­
cedure will be followed for filling the vacancy as was followed 
for appointing him.” That procedure is indicated in clause a of 
Article 289. The wording is as follows : “Each such Tribunal 
shall consist of three Members. Each of the Governments con­
cerned shall appoint one of the members. The President shall 
be chosen by agreement between the two Governments concern­
ed. In case of failure to reach agreement, the President of 
the Tribunal and two other persons either of whom may in case 
of need take his place, shall be chosen by the Council of the 
League of Nations... these persons shall be Nationals of Powers 
that have remained neutral during the War.”
So far it is clear, in my opinion, that this clause only refers to 
a dispute as to the person to be chosen as President. The Pre­
sident was to be chosen by agreement and if agreement was not 
reached the Council was to choose three persons, Nationals of 
Powers neutral during the war, and nominate one of these as 
President, the other two being available to take the President’s 
place in case of need. In fact in the case of Hungary and Rouma­
nia agreement as to the President of the Tribunal was reached, 
and the Council was not called upon to choose three persons, or 
any person, and there is not in existence any panel of selected 
persons.
The second paragraph of (a) seems to apply only to the origin­
al selection of the President of the Tribunal. But the third 
paragraph appears to enlarge the meaning of the second para­
graph and deals with any vacancy in the Tribunal. It runs 
as follows :
“If in case there is a vacancy a Government does not pro­
ceed within a period of one month to appoint as provided 
above a member of the Tribunal, such member shall be 
chosen by the other Government from the two persons mem- 
tioned above other than the President.”
This paragraph assumes that there are two persons available 
duly chosen by the Council. But there are not any such persons 
because the Council was only directed to choose them on the 
occasion of the setting up of the Tribunal in a case where no 
agreement was reached as to the appointment of the President. 
In my opinion on the due establishment of the Tribunal the 
Council in this respect became functus officiis. The two per­
sons indicated in Paragraph 2, were, by that paragraph, if neces­
sity arose for choosing them, to be available for taking the place 
of the President, and, by Paragraph 3 to be available for Riling 
places vacant on the Tribunal. But no such persons had ever 
been appointed and in my opinion cannot now be appointed. 
It might be contended that if the Presidency of the Tribunal 
became vacant there might be a duty on the Council to appoint 
the President and two other persons if the two governments fail­
ed to agree, but this seems to extend unduly the meaning of 
Clause (a). It should be noted that the French text makes it 
still more clear that the Council can only intervene on failure 
of ah agreement between the two Governments to choose the 
President. The French text runs :
“Le président sera choisi à la suite d’un accord entre les 
deux gouvernements intéressés. Au cas où cet accord ne 
pourrait intervenir le Président...
Hence I am of opinion that the case for the intervention of the 
Council of the League under Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon 
only arises when there is a dispute as to the choice of a President 
for the Tribunal ; that as the occasion for the exercise of this 
power did not arise on the establishment of the Tribunal the 
Council is probably functus officiis in this matter but that in any 
event it could only arise (if at all) on the occasion of a vacancy 
in the Presidency of the Tribunal. In these circumstances Para­
graph 3 of Clause (a) of Article 23g can only operate if it so 
happens (as it has not happened in his case) that “the two per­
sons” are available. The.vacancy must be filled in accordance 
with the Annexe I. “Should one of the members of the Tribu­
nal... retire, the same procedure will be followed for filling the 
vacancy as was followed for appointing him.” Paragraph 3 of 
clause (a) only deals with the case where this original procedure 
fails and it deals with it in a manner that provides no procedure 
that can meet the present case. The case before me is not met 
by Article 23g. It may be that it was an intentional omission 
on the part of the framers of the Treaty of Trianon, or it may be 
that the case is not met per incuriam. Moreover it must be 
remembered that the Roumanian judge was only withdrawn in 
respect of a particular class of case and that there is not a vacancy 
at all in one sense of that term. A judge who declines to hear a 
particular case for adequate reasons cannot be said to have retired 
so as to create a vacncy. The Government appointing him may 
be asked to replace him but that is another matter altogether and 
comes under the provision of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations.
a) and b). I am therefore of opinion that under Article 23g 
of the Treaty of Trianon the Council of the League not only can 
but must refuse, in the existing circumstances, to nominate an 
auxiliary judge of the Roumano-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunal.
The question remains whether there is any duty of the Council 
under Article n (2) of the Covenant which would be unfulfilled 
by the refusal of the Council to nominate an auxiliary judge to 
the Tribunal.
To this question I am clearly of the opinion that the answer 
is in the negative since the right of any member of the League 
to bring to the attention of the Council threatening circum­
stances affecting international relations imposes no duty bn the 
Council to take specific action in any special case. I am, how­
ever, clearly of opinion that the Council, in pursuance of the 
powers bestowed on it by the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
is competent to secure the replacing of a judge on the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal in question. The third paragraph of Article 4 
of the Covenant states in definitive terms that “The Council 
may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of 
action of the League or affecting the Peace of the World”. If 
we apply this power to a case under the second paragraph of 
Article 11 of the Covenant, where a member of the League has 
brought to the attention of the Council a circumstance “affecting 
international relation which threatens to disturb international 
peace or the good understanding between nations on which peace 
depends”, I am of opinion that this is "a matter within the 
sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the 
world”. The word “deal” (“connait”) in Article 4 of the Cove­
nant, in my opinion gives the Council power to arrive at practical 
conclusions for the purpose of preserving the peace of the world 
if this conclusion involves the appointment of an auxiliary judge 
to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in question, I am of opinion that 
the Council, in pursuance of the procedure of Article i5 of the 
Covenant, is entitled authoritatively to ask the Government of 
Roumania to replace the judge (who has been withdrawn from a 
certain class of case) on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, and I am 
further of opinion that a refusal to comply with this request would 
be followed by the penalties indicated in Article i5 of the Cove­
nant. But I am also clearly of opinion that the Council has 
perfect freedom of action in this matter and that there is no 
duty imposed by the Covenant on the Council to appoint an auxi­
liary judge. But this question though answered in the negative, 
leads to a consideration of the second question laid before me.
Question II
Should the Council refer to the permanent Court of Justice at 
the Hague for an advisory opinion on the rulings which it has 
suggested to the litigants ?
Article 11 of the Covenant enables each member of the League 
to bring to the attention of the Council any threatening circum­
stances affecting international relations. By Article 12 members 
of the League agree to submit disputes either to arbitration or 
enquiry by the Council. Article i3 deals with the disputes which 
the parties to the disputes recognise as suitable for submission to 
arbitration. Article i4 provides for the creation of a permanent 
Court of International Justice “to hear and determine disputes of 
an international character which the parties thereto submit to it” 
and to “give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question 
referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly”. Article 15 
provides that in the case of disputes not submitted to arbitration 
under Article i3 “the members of the League agree that they 
will submit the matter to the Council”. This is a compulsory 
submission. Paragraph 2 of Article i5 states “the Council shall 
endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute”, and if successful 
shall make the facts and settlement public, “as the Council may 
deem appropriate”. If the dispute is not settled the Council, 
either unanimously or by a majority vote, shall publish a “Report 
containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recom­
mendations which are deemed just and proper in regard there­
to”. Any member of the Council may do the same.
The facts of this case, in my opinion, come within the class 
of cases which Article i5 of the Covenant was designed to meet. 
Under Article n, Paragraph 2, Roumania has brought to the 
attention of the Council threatening circumstances affecting 
international relations between herself and Hungary. Under 
Article 12 of the Covenant Roumanian and Hungary are bound to 
submit a dispute “either to arbitration or to enquiry by the 
Council”. There has been no agreement between these Sovereign 
States, which are both members of the League, to submit the 
matter to arbitration in accordance with Article i3 and so the 
matter stands compulsorily submitted to the Council under 
Articles 12 and i5. It may be noticed in passing that the deci­
sion must come from the Council as it is too late now to refer 
the matter to the Assembly of the League under paragraph g of 
Article i5.
The Council, in the course of its endeavours to effect a settle­
ment of the dispute, appointed a Committee of Three, who secu­
red the unanimous opinion of six eminent jurists belonging to 
six different nations, and the Council held unanimously that the
report of the Committee of Three, so far as the principles formu­
lated by the said jurists are concerned, should be adopted in 
order to terminate the dispute. The Council therefore reques­
ted “the two parties to conform to the three principles enume­
rated above”. The two parties, being litigants, abstained from 
voting on this question (as provided by Article i5 of the Cove­
nant) but the Government of Roumania made it clear that they 
accepted the report of the Committee of Three and the Govern­
ment of Hungary that they rejected the report. The representa­
tives of the two parties were asked by the President of the 
Council to delay giving their formal opinions until December 
1927, and the Council agreed to submit the recommendations 
contained in the agreed report to the consideration of the govern­
ments interested and to beg them to conform to the principles 
included therein.
The question now is whether in these circumstances the Coun­
cil of the League should refer to the Permanent Court of Inter­
national Justice at the Hague for an advisory opinion on the 
rulings which the Council has suggested to the litigants.
1 may say in passing that if the matter were referred by the 
Council to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the 
Hague for an advisory opinion under Article i4 of the Covenant 
and the decision of that Court was opposed to the opinion of the 
six jurists who have already advised the Council, and if this 
decision of the Permanent Court were accepted—as presumably 
it would be accepted—by the Council, the result would be pre­
ferential treatment of the Hungarian Optants, a result, I am 
instructed, which Count Apponyi specially disclaimed at the 
Peace Conference in 191g.
There can be no doubt that the court in question has power 
to give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question 
referred to it by the Council. But in my opinion the Council by 
the submission of the report to the parties and the publication 
of the report, has exhausted its powers in this particular case. The 
Council in accordance with Paragraph 3 of Article i5 has publish­
ed “a report containing a statment of the facts of the dispute 
and the recommendations which arc deemed just and proper 
in regard thereto”. In my opinion it would be inconsistent with 
the essential dignity of the Council of the League to submit 
recommendations which it has declared to be “just and proper” 
to any Tribunal whalever for review. No doubt the Council 
before issuing its report could have asked the Court at the Hague 
for an advisory opinion. Instead of doing so it chose in its 
absolute discretion to accept an opinion, which was unanimous, 
from six international lawyers of the highest repute. On that 
opinion it issued an unanimous report. If this report were now 
to be submitted to the Permanent Court at the Hague a prece­
dent would be set up by which that Court would become in 
effect a Court of Appeal from the Council and the Assembly on 
combined matters of law and policy. If the Court at the Hague 
disagreed with the conclusions unanimously arrived at by the 
Council of the League it would be equivalent to a direction from 
the said Court to change recommendations which the Council of 
the League has already decided to be “just and proper” within the 
meaning of Article i5 of the Covenant.
The result would be to undermine, in my opinion, confidence 
in the action of the Assembly and the Council of the League in 
matters which threaten “to disturb international peace or the 
good understanding of nations upon which peace depends”. In 
my opinion there is nothing in the wording of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations to suggest such a course of procedure. In 
my opinion Advisory Opinions under Article i4 of the Covenant 
are to be sought by the Council or Assembly of the League in 
order to enable a report to be made and are not to be sought for 
the purpose of testing a report already published.
In these circumstances 1 am clearly of the opinion that the 
Council of the League should not refer to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice at the Hague for an Advisory Opinion on 
the rulings which it has suggested to the litigants as a guide to 
the solution of the questions involved.
November 16th, 1927.

The League of Nations 
and the Mixed Arbitral Tribunalsn
BY
N. POLITIS
Honorary Professor of the Paris Faculty of Law ; Vice- 
President of the Curatorium of the Hague Academy 
of International Law ; Member of the Institute of Inter­
national Law and of the Permanent Court of Arbi­
tration.
The following article was written before the last Session of 
the Council of the League of Nations. As it stands, it is of great 
interest at the present moment since it deals with a question 
which is pending before the League of Nations and which is of 
primary importance for the future of that institution.
Under the Peace Treaties, Mixed Arbitral Tribunals have 
been set up between each of the Allied Powers and each of the 
ex-enemy countries to decide certain very limited categories of 
disputes, which, under common law, fall within the jurisdic­
tion of the defendant State.
The treaties have conferred a certain amount of competence 
on the League of Nations in regard to the constitution of these 
Tribunals.
The Tribunals are composed of three members : one to be 
appointed by each of the Governments concerned and the Pre­
sident to be elected by mutual agreement.
Failing such agreement, the Council of the League of Na­
tions is called upon to appoint a President and two deputies 
from among persons who are nationals of former neutral coun­
tries.
(•) Translated from the French version.
Similarly, if the seat of a judge becomes vacant, and if the 
Government whose duty it is to fill that seat abstains from 
doing so, the other Government shall choose from the two 
persons already nominated by the Council of the League of Na­
tions or whom it is requested to nominate for that purpose.
The vacancy envisaged by the treaties is that which arises in 
case of death or resignation. Experience has shown that it 
may also arise through the withdrawal of a judge by the Govern­
ment which he represents. In this case, if there are no persons 
from among it can choose, the other Government has the right 
to request that they be nominated by the Council of the League 
of Nations.
In such an eventuality a question arises the importance of 
which has not hitherto been appreciated, to wit, must the Coun­
cil, in every case, comply with the request submitted to it.
There is no doubt as to the reply if the request is not op­
posed by the Government having withdrawn its judge : the 
Council has no option, it must appoint a deputy.
The case is quite different, however, if the request is opposed 
by the other party : the Council cannot ignore the divergent 
opinions of the two Governments; before taking a decision, it 
must consider the various aspects of the question. 1
The manner in which the case has arisen in connection with 
the dispute between Hungary and Roumania in regard to the 
application of the Roumanian agrarian reform to the property of 
Hungarian optants in particularly interesting. The case is still 
pending before the Council, and is worthy of deep considera­
tion since it gives rise to problems of the utmost gravity for 
the future of the League of Nations.
* *
The Roumanian-Hungarian dispute already ranks among the 
causes célèbres of international law. It has lasted for more 
than five years; has formed the subject of numerous inter­
national proceedings and given rise to interminable discussions 
in which the facts of the case have been lost to sight.
It originated in the agrarian reform which rendered abso­
lutely necessary in Roumania evn before the end of the war 
by imperative reasons for the preservation of social welfare. 
Expropriations of immovable properties were consequently car­
ried out on a huge scale both in the new territories and in the 
former Kingdom. They affected all owners of land irrespective 
of nationality, foreigners and Roumanians were treated on a foot­
ing of perfect equality. Because, however, these measures af­
fected a certain number of persons in Transylvania, who, having 
by the Treaty of Trianon become Roumanian nationals, had 
opted for Hungarian nationality, the Hungarian Government in 
1922 considered itself justified in appealing to the Conference of 
Ambassadors. The Conference held that such claims came 
within the competence of the League of Nations because they 
referred to the provisions of the treaty relating to minorities.
In 1923, therefore, Hungary appealed to the League of Na­
tions, requesting it in particular to decide that the Roumanian 
agrarian laws were illegal from an international point of view 
and to order the restitution of their property to Hungarian 
optants. The Council instructed one of its members to mediate 
between the two Governments with a view to reaching an agree­
ment. Conversations were opened, which resulted in partial 
agreement, especially as to the compatibility of Roumanian laws 
with the< terms of the Treaty of Trianon. But the Hungarian 
Government disowned its representative. The Council, how­
ever, took note of the agreement concluded and recommended 
the Hungarian Government to reassure its nationals and the Rou­
manian Government to give evidence of goodwill in regard to 
the interests of the Hungarian optants.
At the end of 1923, the dispute assumed another • aspect : 
various Hungarian optants whose property had been expro­
priated submitted applications to the Roumanian-Hungarian 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal asking that it should declare that the 
measures enacted against them were contrary to the provisions 
of Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon and that it should order 
Roumania to make restitution.
The Roumanian Government pleaded the incompetence of 
the Tribunal on the ground that the expropriations in question 
did not come under the prohibition of Article 25o of the Treaty 
of Trianon, because they in no way constituted measures of 
liquidation within the meaning of the said text. During the 
deliberations in December 1926 it set forth through its repre­
sentatives the reasons which led it to plead the incompetence of 
the Tribunal to give a decision; it declared that if the Tribunal 
recognised its competence it would be guilty of an obvious ex- 
céeding of powers which would render its judgment null and 
void; it added, moreover, that it would refrain, in any case, 
from submitting its reply regarding the substance of the ques­
tion, but reserved the right, according to events, to adopt any 
décision or attitude which it might deem expedient.
By its decision of January 10th, 1927, however, the Tribunal 
declared itself competent and called upon Roumania to forward 
her reply within a period of two months.
Quite consistently, the Roumanian Government informed the 
Tribunal that it would refrain from submitting its reply regard­
ing the substance of the question and that its arbitrator would 
no longer sit in connection with any of the agrarian matters 
brought forward by Hungarian nationals. At the same time, 
on February 24th, 1927, it submitted to the Council a request 
to allow it to acquaint that organisation with the reasons on 
which its attitude was based and, in virtue of Article 11, para­
graph 2 of the Covenant, to call the attention of the Council 
to the fact that the principle laid down by the Tribunal, the 
application of which it found impossible to accept, constituted 
an exceeding of powers.
By a cross demand the Hungarian Government requested the 
Council to proceed, in accordance with Article 239 of the Treaty 
of Trianon, to choose two substitutes so that, ignoring the 
opposition of the Roumanian Government, the Tribunal could 
continue its work.
The Council entrusted the examination of the question to 
three of its members, who where to submit a report at its June 
Session. After hearing the representatives of the two parties, 
the Committee of Three endeavoured to reach a solution by 
amicable agreement. At the June Session, the two Governments 
apprised the Committee of their respective points of view. It 
was, however, impossible to reach an agreement. The question 
was therefore again postponed to the September Session in the 
hope that, in the meantime, a basis of agreement might be 
found.
If this hope is realised, the Council will have fulfilled its 
mission. If not, it will have the very difficult task of choosing 
between the Iwo arguments under consideration, one of which 
asks it to appoint judges, while the other represents this as an 
impossibility.
In order to make this choice, it will have to determine the
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE MIXED ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 177 




The Council is faced with a twofold duty : a duty of form 
or procedure and a duty of substance or political expediency.
The first is indicated in Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon 
invoked by Hungary : the Council must enable the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal to continue its work by appointing two substi­
tutes.
The second is laid down in Article n, paragraph 2 of the 
Covenant, invoked by Roumania : the Council’s attention being 
called to a “circumstance affecting international relations which 
threatens to disturb international peace or the good understand­
ing between nations upon which peace depends ”, it “ must 
take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safe­
guard the peace of Nations. ”
At the present stage of the question, it is incontestable 
that the Roumanian-Hungarian dispute comes within the scope 
of Article 11 of the Covenant. It constitues, in fact, for the 
good understanding between the two countries, more than a 
threat, a real danger which the Council must avert by every 
possible means at its disposal.
If it could hope to end the dispute by appointing the judges, 
it would be entitled to adhere to Article 23g of the Treaty of 
Trianon, without paying any further attention to the aim of 
Article n/of the Covenant, thus shown to be inapplicable to the 
present case.
Far from being able to nourrish such a hope, however, the 
Council on the contrary is now assured that the appointment 
of the judges would only aggravate the dispute. For it is cer­
tain that the Roumanian Government, which will under no 
circumstance recognise the competence of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal to determine the international legality of its agrarian 
reform, would not accept any award which is unfavourable in 
regard to the substance of the question. In such case, the Hun­
garian Government would not fail to invoke the last provision 
of Article i3 of the Covenant to the effect that “In the event of 
any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall pro- 
nose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto. ” The 
Council could not support an award which contradicted its
ruling of 1923, namely, that the Roumanian agrarian reform 
was entirely compatible with the provisions of the Treaty of 
Trianon. And the menace to peace would be infinitely greater 
that that with which the iLeague of Nations is now dealing.
Between its two duties, the Council must choose the political 
duty, because it is the more imperative, the more urgent and 
the more effectual. To choose the other would be not only to 
abandon its fundamental mission, the safeguarding of peace, 
it would amount to the failure of the League of Nations, which, 
in presence of an international dispute, must spare no effort 
at mediation and conciliation to re-establish good understand­
ing between Nations.
* *
There seems to be only one possible objection to this solu­
tion, which is based on simple common sense, and imposed by 
the logic of the League of Nations. Upon examination, how­
ever, it is shown to be absolutely wrong, both de facto and de 
jure.
It may be said that the refusal to allow the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal to continue its work by appointing the necessary judges 
would render null and void the decision by which it recognised 
its competence and involve the violation of an important prin­
ciple of order and legality the authority of res judicata. To 
allow the League of Nations to violate that principle would 
be to admit that the justice which it preaches has the funda­
mental rule of international relations, instead of being, as it | 
should be in order to retain its virtue, above politics, is, on the 
contrary, led and dominated by them.
The reasoning appears to be plausible, but it is merely spe­
cious and, in substance, doubly false.
The principle of the authority of res judicata is self-imposed 
in modern communities as a means of ensuring order. It is 
only entitled to respect because it has this virtue. It is no 
longer entitled to respect in exceptional cases, when, instead of 
ensuring order, it runs the risk of disturbing it.
The French Council of State applied this idea in its decree 
of November 3oth, 1923, on the Couiteas affair, when the French 
Government refused, for exceptional reasons, to support the 
execution of a judgment. According to the Council of State, 
in acting thus in that affair “ it merely exercised the powers 
conferred upon it with a view to the maintenance of order and 
public security in a protectorate country... It is the Govern­
ment’s duty to appreciate the conditions of this execution and 
it has the right to refuse the help of an armed force if it con­
siders that order and security are thereby threatened. ”
Commenting on this decision, Professor Jèze (Principes gé­
néraux du droit administrati}, 3rd Edition, Paris, 1925, pages 
279-280) says : “This power of appreciation is justified by con­
siderations of public welfare. Refusal to execute res judicata is 
a danger to social peace, since it is calculated to drive individuals 
to resort to violence in order to obtain justice. But execution 
under any circumstances is also a danger to social peace. Which 
of the two dangers is the more serious? When it is the execution 
which is to result in the most serious consequences for social 
peace, the Government responsible for social order and security 
has the power to suspend or refuse execution of res judicata. ”
If this applies to res judicata of the national Tribunals, there 
is still more reason why it should apply to res judicata of the 
international tribunals and more especially to that of Mixed Ar­
bitral Tribunals, which are quite exceptional jurisdictions. For 
international justice is infinitely less well organised than na­
tional justice and the disturbance of the peace of nations is 
infinitely more serious thant the disturbance of social peace.
Thus, even though the present case were one of res judicata, 
the League of Nations would not be obliged, in every circum­
stance, to ensure the execution thereof. There is more how­
ever in this case; res judicata does not exist. The force of res 
judicata belongs in fact only to an award which is regular and 
valid. Now, the award of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is neither 
regular nor valid, since that body is accused of an exceeding 
of powers.
It is an incontestable and uncontested principle of inter­
national arbitration that the award of a tribunal which is exceed­
ing its powers is null and void (see Basdevant in la Revue géné­
rale de droit international public, 1912, p. 3o6; Politis, La Jus­
tice internationale, p. 91-92). “The arbitral award”, says Fiore 
(above-mentioned Revue, 1910, p. 118 et seq., and p. 2/17 et 
seq.) “ is not valid if the arbitrer has failed to observe the terms 
of submission or if he has usurped a jurisdiction which was not 
stipulated therein.” “This rule”, he adds, “is imposed by the 
general principles of law and by the nature of things. ”
This solution has .frequently been applied by international 
jurisprudence.
In the " Betsey ” affair (United States-Great Britain, February 
24th, x8o4), Commissioner Gore said : “ A party is not bound 
by the decision of the arbitrators when the case does not come 
within the terms of submission : such a decision is a dead letter ; 
it is not a decision. ” (De Lapradelle et Politis, Recueil des Arbi­
trages internationaux, I, 69).
In its award of July 5th, 1901, the Franco-Chilian Arbitral 
Tribunal, composed of three judges of the Swiss Federal Court,. 
after having decided that it was not competent to pronounce on 
one of the points in the conclusions of the plaintiff, declared 
that if it gave an award it “ would be exceeding its powers ” 
and “ that the terms of the award given on this point would 
therefore not have the authority of res judicata” (Descamps et 
Renault, Recueil international des traités du xxe siècle, 1901, p. 
357).
Finally, the judgment of the Greek-Bulgarian Mixed Arbi­
tral of February i4th, 1927, relating to the Sarropoulos affair, 
contains the following passage :
“ The Mixed Arbitral Tribunals are incontestably special in­
ternational jurisdictions set up by the Treaties of Peace which 
put an end to the war of 1914-1918. Their special character 
obliges them to exercise the greatest caution; they cannot, on 
grounds of equity, exceed the limits of competence assigned to 
them by the spirit or letter of the Treaties. Any abusive inter­
pretation might lead to a decision which would be voidable on 
the ground of an exceeding of powers and to the dangerous con­
sequences to which M. Politis calls attention in his work entitled 
La Justice Internationale. ”
The objection based on res judicata cannot therefore be 
taken into consideration since, if the decision of the Tribunal 
is voidable on account of an exceeding of powers, it is inexis­
tent and inoperative.
* * *
On this line of argument, another objection is conceivable.. 
Il might be claimed that in order that the existence of the al­
leged exceeding of powers may be admitted, it is not sufficient L 
for it to be asserted by one of the parlies; it must also be certi­
fied by a third authority whose decision can be legally binding 
<>11 the other party. This authority, however, cannot be the 
Council of the League of Nations since it has only political ju­
risdiction, whereas the problem to be solved is essentially of a 
juridical nature. The only authority qualified to take a final 
decision in the matter is the Permanent Court of International 
Justice. The Council is therefore obliged to consult that body.
The argument would be perfectly legitimate if international 
organisation had reached the same state of perfection as inter­
national organisation, in which the separation of powers forbids 
political authorities to intervene in judicial matters.
In international affairs, however, even with the creation of 
the League of Nations, we are far from having attained such a 
degree of organisation.
Prior to the creation of the League of Nations, when there 
arose the question of quashing a decision voidable on the ground 
of exceeding of powers or of a treaty which had lapsed owing 
to a change in circumstances, there existed no suitable proce­
dure whereby a dispute arising between sovereign States on 
this question could be definitively settled; the difficulty had to 
be settled by amicable agreement. Any party which objected 
to a decision on the ground of an exceeding of powers, or plead­
ed the clause rebus sic stantibus against a treaty, could not 
expect to be taken at its word; it wras therefore necessary to 
begin by convincing the opposing party or other contracting 
party in /order to obtain its agreement that the decision or treaty 
should be annulled. If, however, the applicant encountered 
obvious ill will on the part of the opposing party, it was recog­
nised that he could disregard that attitude and follow the course 
which he considered himself entitled to follow, since there was 
no rule compelling the parties to submit their dispute to the 
examination of an impartial third party.
The creation of the Teague of Nations marked a certain pro­
gress but that progress is limited and only relative. It is no 
longer possible for parties to settle their dispute alone; they are 
obliged to submit them to a third party. This third party how­
ever need not necessarily be a judicial authority. Recourse to 
judicial proceedings is merely recommended to the parties (Ar­
ticles 12 and i3 of the Covenant); it is not imposed upon them. 
If they do not agree to adopt that procedure, they must at least 
lay their dispute before the Council, either in virtue of Article 
11 or in virtue of Article i5 of the Covenant.
The intervention of the Council constitutes a guarantee in 
that the mere will and pleasure of States is no longer recognised. 
This intervention is however no more than an expedient since 
it takes the place of that of a judicial body. This state of affairs 
will continue so long as international justice is not made obli­
gatory.
It is therefore the duty of the Council and of the Council 
alone to examine the question whether the Tribunal has really 
exceeded its powers as claimed by the Roumanian Government.
* 
* *
Not only has the Council the power to undertake this exa­
mination , it is its duty to do so, for it cannot contemplate ap­
pointing the judges until it has assured itself that the Tribunal 
has not exceeded its powers in the present case. Otherwise, it 
would be committing a most flagrant injustice towards Rou­
manie, and in so far as itself is concerned, a veritable act of 
suicide, since it would be giving to a tribunal which has outlaw­
ed itself the opportunity of exercising usurped functions and of 
taking decisions destined to remain dead letters.
Appealed to under Article n of the Covenant, the Council 
has, in this respect, entire freedom of action. Article n is 
the practical application of Article 4, paragraph 4, which pro­
vides that “ the Council may deal with any matter within the 
sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the 
world. ” One writer has said that its scope is “ of incommen­
surable breadth “ the functions which it assigns to the League 
are, so to speak, unlimited ” (R. Redslob : Théorie de la Société 
des Nations, Paris, 1927, p. 5o).
“Article 11”. says the same author (p. 5i) “is the most 
striking manifestation of a tendency which runs throughout the 
Covenant and which consists of giving only general direction 
and allowing as wide a scope as possible for subsequent, expe­
rience. ”
“In virtue of this text”, says another author, “the Council 
may propose any solution which it may deem best calculated to 
safeguard the maintenance of peace. ” (M. Gonsiorowski, La So­
ciété des Nations et le problème de la paix, Paris, 1927, Vol. Il, 
p. 329).
In order to solve the previous question of the exceeding of
powers, the Council, under Article n taken in: conjunction-with 
Article i4 has the right to consult the Permanent Court of Inter­
national Justice. In fact, however, there are very serious ob­
jections, to the exercise of this right. It must first he noted; that 
a question which is not one of simple procedure cannot be re­
ferred to the Court except by unanimous decision,, which.- is 
scarcely possible. Another factor which may prevent the Coun­
cil from adopting this course is the conviction: of the inefficacy 
of such a procedure. For the reasons set. forth before the Court 
by its representatives in 1923 the Roumanian Government will 
maintain its opposition to such a measure. In these conditions, 
it may be.anticipated that it would not accept an unfavourable 
opinion. The Council could not ignore it and appoint the judges 
without, as stated above, creating a deadlock of the utmost 
danger both to its prestige and to the maintenance of peace.
Moreover, the Council is bound by its own jurisprudence 
in the affair, for, as early as 1923, owing to the opposition of 
the parties concerned, it decided to waive its right to request 
an advisory opinion from the Court.
The Council must therefore seek other means of enlighten­
ment. If it finds that it has need of technical advice to assure 
itself as tho the existence of an exceeding of powers, the simplest 
course would be, following a practice which has frequently 
been adopted, to consult a Committee of Jurists chosen by itself.
Once convinced that the Tribunal has exceeded the limits 
of its competence, the Council will be obliged to refuse to appoint 
the judges and will have to seek the most suitable means by 
which to re-establish good understanding between Hungary and 
Roumania.
Even in 1923, the Council was convinced that the political 
side of the question outweighed the juridical side. M. Mandelsta 
admitted it in the course of lectures which he gave at the Hague 
Academy of International Law in 1926 on “ International Con­
ciliation under the Covenant and the Jurisprudence of the 
Council ” (these lectures will be published in Vol. IV of the 
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie pour 1926). He adds : “It 
is this conviction which led the Council, being moreover apprised 
in application of Article 11, to resort, in preference to legal 
measures, to measures calculated to relieve the tension between 
the two parties to the dispute. ”
The development in the affair of the optants since 1923 is such 
as to strengthen the Council in the same conviction and to urge 
it to confirm its previous conclusions.
Faced by a duty of procedure and a political duty, obliged 
for the reasons set forth above to choose the latter, it must refuse 
to appoint the judges claimed by the Hungarian Government 
unless it finds a way, with the consent of the two parties con­
cerned, of laying down rules which enable the Tribunal to 
continue its work in conditions of such a nature as to avoid any 
further exceeding of powers in respect of the substance of the 
question.
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PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS a
In the present survey we are mainly concerned with a question 
of competence, although we shall afterwards indicate the peculiar 
situation which, has arisen in consequence of the decision 
whereby the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
declared itself competent, and the solutions which appear to be 
necessary. The question arose thus : A general agrarian reform 
had been decreed in Roumania. This reform constituted, it 
must be said/ a veritable expropriation for reasons of national 
welfare, and this in return for compensation which, although 
adequate at the outset, became insufficient owing to the fall in 
the exchange after the decree of expropriation. Was this serious 
measure, which was naturally extended to property situated in 
Transylvania and Bessarabia, aimed especially at the Hungarians? 
We might abstain from; examining this question in detail, since 
we are dealing with questions of competence only. Nevertheless 
we shall say a word on this subject also. The necessity for 
agrarian reform had been recognised by Roumania before the 
war. It had been under consideration even before igi3. But,
(1) An Article which appeared in lhe Revue de Droit international el légis­
lation comparée, N*  4, J927. Translated from the French version.
in September igi3, M. Bratiano, the head of the Liberal Party, 
announced in a public communication, that he would make 
expropriation one of the essential points of the programme of 
his future Government. In January rgr4, he became Prime 
Minister. In .May igi4, the constitutional elections took place. 
To make this expropriation possible, the Constitution had, 
indeed, to be revised, since, according to the existing Constitu­
tion, expropriation was authorised only in clearly defined cases, 
and the simple plea of social necessity was not sufficient. A 
remarkable thing happened : although the electoral body was a 
restricted one, the greater number of the votes being held by the 
landed proprietors, an imposing majority was obtained for 
revision of the Constitution, for the purpose of expropriating a 
large proportion of the land held by the large landowners. No 
one can say that this refom was directed against the Hungarians 
of Transylvania, which was not joined to Roumania until many 
years later, as a result of events which could not have been 
foreseen. Nevertheless, behind all the arguments sustained by 
the Counsel of the Hungarian Government before the Hungarian- 
Roumanian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, is the idea that this expro­
priation was directed against Hungarian subjects settled in 
Transylvania. It is true that there could be no thought, 
especially in May igi4, of the almost complete expropriation of 
the large landowners in Transylvania, which has since been 
accomplished. But the principle was already propounded arid 
accepted. Then came the Great War. Roumania remained 
neutral for a time. Then she took up arms, a;nd when, in igiy, 
the Roumanian Army, after brilliant successes, met with defeat 
owing to Russia’s defection, when two-thirds of the Roumanian 
territory were invaded, it was considered that it was a necessity 
for the defence of the country to proceed at once to the legislative 
task of expropriation. This would strengthen the interest of the 
peasant class (which had been freed from hateful serfdom only 
half a century before) in the defence of Roumanian soil. Com­
plete abstention would have seemed to imply forgetfulness of 
the promises of igi4. It was H.M. the King of Roumania who, 
by a message addressed to the soldiers in the trenches in 
January igiy, announced that expropriation would take place 
without delay. Was it then known, could it then be foreseen, 
that Transylvania, the immense majority of whose population 
was Roumanian, would be annexed to Roumania? Could it be 
foreseen that the great agrarian scheme of reform introduced 
into Roumania would one day be extended, by the force of cir­
cumstances, to Transylvania, in consequence of military successes 
which did not seem very imminent; and can it be supposed that 
all these new reforms were directed against the Hungarian owners 
of property situated in Transylvania? Would it have been 
possible to abstain later on, however, on some pretext, from 
extending the effects of this law in Transylvania to foreigners, 
and consequently to Hungarians, when they were incontestably 
affected by it under the former monarchy? Gould they 'be given 
favoured treatment as compared with Roumanians who were 
subject to,this measure? It is clear that such ;an attitude would 
have incensed the Roumanian population all the more as Tran­
sylvania, which formed part of Hungary, had, after all, been 
conquered when Hungary was conquered. It was natural that 
the Roumanian subjects should be affected by the measure ; 
besides, one of the instructions issued by the Government 
contained the following fundamental provision : “ As the law' 
makes no distinction between owners according to nationality, 
it is obvious that it is immaterial whether they are nationals or 
foreigners. Nor can you, in consequence, apply the law in 
different wrays and further on : “ Property liable to expro­
priation must be considered, irrespective of nationality or 
domicile, as property belonging to absentees.” The facts, 
moreover, belie the accusation of alleged partiality in the 
treatment meted out to Roumanians and foreigners w'hen thé 
expropriation was put into effect. The King was the first to feel 
the effects of it. All the arable crown lands w’ere expropriated. 
The same fate befell the whole of the arable land of the Rouma­
nian Academy and the Roumanian hospitals. And in its protest 
of March 1927 to the Council of the League of Nations, the 
Roumanian Government gave some particularly interesting 
examples of expropriation experienced not only by Roumanians 
but by Roumanian women who had married foreigners and who 
were expropriated in loto, and by foreigners who have had the 
same treatment but who submitted without protest. Among 
Roumanan subjects we may cite : Carlo Rasti, 1,000 hectares ; 
Leonita Economo, 1,365 hectares.; Hélène de Reineck, 2,6i4 .hec­
tares; Demètre Mavrocordato, goo hectares; Emile Racovitza, 
1,123 hectares; among Roumanian women married to foreigners : 
Euphrosine Rengcsco, 3a 1 hectares; Marie Ghica, who became 
Baroness Skenkerensty, i,645 hectares; Zoé Alexandresco, 
17,404 hectares; Marie Stribey, Baroness Biome, 14,177 hectares; 
Marie Bibesco, Countess Montesquiou, 19,807 hectares; and 
finally among foreigners : Mme Dauphin (French), a33 hectares; 
Herman Junger (Czechoslovak), 44o hectares; Jecu Nicolici (Ser­
bian), 4,074 hectares; Arghiropolos (Greek), 2,184 hectares; 
Prince Mario Ruspoli (Italian), 4,a4o hectares. All these Rou­
manians and all these foreigners submitted to their expropriation 
because they understood that it was dictated by sheer necessity. 
No doubt they would all have protested, objected, and interested 
their Governments in their objections, if they had not believed 
that, hard hit as they were by the Roumanian agrarian reform, 
they must bow to the inexorable demands of a situation which 
was explained by the economic history of the country and had 
been singularly aggravated by the appalling upheaval caused by 
the world war.
We shall confine ourselves for the present to this simple state­
ment of facts. We do not intend to discuss the rather absolute 
theories of the learned authors of the opinions pronounced by 
the Counsel of the Hungarian Government, which aim at 
showing that in spite of the express provisions of the majority 
of the codes on the sovereign right of a State to regulate the 
regime of property situated in its territory and forming an 
integral part of that territory, in spite of the general principles 
imparted on this subject by the majority of authors, a State has 
the right to protest when its nationals are adversely affected by 
measures which seriously impair their right of ownership over 
their immovable property situated in a foreign country, even 
when these measures equally affect all the subjects of the foreign 
State. It is possible that in certain cases these protests may be 
justified. We shall make no pronouncement on this thorny 
point. It would carry us too far and would be outside the scope 
of the survey which we propose to make. We shall merely state 
that, in our opinion, it would be necessary in any case to make 
distinctions. The distinguo, for which the Jesuits are so often 
criticised, is obligatory for the jurist, and it might almost be 
said that the law lives by distinctions. One might perhaps admit 
the intervention of a State in the internal legislation of another 
State, with regard to the regime for the immovable property 
situated in the territory of the latter, if it were a case of measures 
prejudicing the rights of its nationals which were obviously 
inspired only by purely fiscal interests, or by a desire for the 
enrichment of the Treasury at the expense of private persons. 
Even so, we should make reservations. The case might be 
imagined, and it is no idle hypothesis (it is on the way to reali­
sation), of a State imposing on all the property situated in its 
territory an absolutely exorbitant real estate tax, and raising the 
transfer or death duties to such an extent that the duty itself 
would become almost illusory or disappear after a certain figure. 
Anything is possible in the times in which we live, and it is 
certain that‘even in comparatively prosperous countries, well 
advanced in civilisation, there is a tendency towards a more and 
more strict limitation of private property. There may however 
be merely a financial interest behind these measures. Even so, 
it would be difficult to admit that a State has the right to protest 
because its subjects are prejudiced by an excessive real estate tax 
on their property situated abroad, if they are sharing the 
common fate of all who possess property in that country, and 
if the nationals themselves are not exempt from it. But if more 
radical measures still have been taken in the country in question 
in a higher interest, if they have been dictated by social interests 
of the highest order, by necessities of public welfare, of national 
welfare, and not merely with a view to financial gain, if they 
affect all the owners of immovable property situated in that 
country, then it can scarcely be admitted that a foreign State 
may claim privileges for its nationals.
We do not intend, however, to discuss these serious questions 
in full. They have been sufficiently debated before the Hunga­
rian-Roumanian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, in brilliant speeches, 
and numerous authors have been quoted by both sides. On both 
sides learned opinions have been produced leading to absolutely 
contradictory conclusions. Why did they have this result? 
Why were they bound to have it ? Because they were too general 
and too categorical, or sometimes merely because it was not 
realised that the authorities from whom they emanated subor­
dinated their conclusions to reservations which consecrated 
precisely the needful distinctions already mentioned. To quote 
but one example, we note that Paul Fauchille, whose opinion is 
expressly invoked by M. de Lapradelle in support of his argument 
(p. 90 of his collection), is the very authority whose opinion is 
invoked by M. Rosental, one of the Counsel of the Roumanian 
Government in support of his. How is this? Simply because 
M. de Lapradelle confined himself to taking one sentence out of 
Paul Fauchille’s work : “ If many think that a State, when 
organising its internal Government, can, without provoking 
intervention on the part of the other States, deprive its nationals 
of Tights which are at the foundation of modern civilisation, 
such as the right of ownership, the majority, on the contrary, 
consider that it cannot act thus towards foreigners in its 
territories, without calling forth legitimate protests from the 
State to which they belong.” He did not see that Paul Fauchille, 
expressing his personal opinion, declares definitely that the 
foreigner “ must enjoy the maximum of the rights which he can 
possess, that is, all those from which he is not debarred as a 
foreigner, or through the State’s right of conservation.” And 
he adds :: “ In any case, it may be said in this connection that 
a State cannot give foreigners a more favourable position than 
its own subjects, for it is inconceivable that in any country the 
subjects should be treated less favourably than those who have 
no part in it. ”
We shall' confine ourselves to these few observations concerning 
the difficult position in which the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal would 
be placed if its competence were acknowledged. These observa­
tions were not unnecessary. They make clear what would be 
the task of this tribunal, indubitably created for the purpose of 
settling certain difficult questions arising out of the war, as 
between former belligerents, this ephemeral tribunal which 
would be called upon to decide, not on essentially temporary 
measures, but on the most important questions of international 
law, questions which may arise in (peace time and which once 
settled may bind them indefinitely.
Once more, however, we must declare that although it is 
possible to discuss endlessly the legality or illegality of the Rou­
manian agrarian reform, from the point of view of international 
law, this question does not concern the problem of competence, 
and it is the problem of competence which we intend to discuss, 
but with a reservation as regards the substance, which we shall 
be able to deal with later.
The enormous difficulties raised by the substance of the ques­
tion were recently illustrated by the very animated discussions 
which took place at Lausanne last September, during the last 
session at Lausanne. An excellent account of these was given in 
Le Temps, first by M. de Lapradelle, and afterwards by M. Blo- 
cisiszewski. BL de Lapradelle is delighted at the resolutions 
adopted by the Institute. We consider that, taken as a whole, 
they deserve approval. It is certain however that, to begin with, 
they have not the slightest connection with the question of the 
competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to give a ruling on 
such serious questions. As to the substance, they are absolutely 
in accordance with the opinion which we have expressed : that 
in such a matter, too rigid rules must be avoided and that it is 
necessary to make distinctions, according to particular cases. 
Moreover it is evident, as the discussion shows, that practically 
all that was aimed at was the protection of foreigners against 
damages which they might sustain in a given country, owing to 
the apathy of the officials entrusted with the protection of 
individuals against acts of aggression, whether voluntary or 
involuntary, or owing to the disorganisation of the police or of 
the public forces. Foreigners must have at least the same rights 
as nationals. It is! not stated that they must have more. The 
country owes, according to Article 3, the same protection to 
foreigners as to its nationals. But M. de Lapradelle is quite 
incorrect when he claims to deduce from the very wise rules 
accepted by the. Institute, that this assembly of jurists meant to 
guarantee foreigners against expropriation for reasons of public 
welfare affecting all property situated in the territory of the State 
which decrees it and affecting nationals in the same way as 
foreigners, and among its nationals the sovereign himself. “ The 
illustrious Society,” says M. Blociszcwski, which, like ourselves 
took part in the debate, “ passed these resolutions in the complete 
independence of its scientific convictions. In passing them, it 
had no concrete case in mind; it was considering no one country 
more than another; above all, it was not thinking of any actual 
international dispute. If we venture to insist on this point, 
it is because some stir seems to have been caused in certain scien­
tific or political circles by the article which our eminent colleague 
published in the Temps of Monday, September 5th, and in which, 
with his customary skill, he appeared to indicate a connection 
between the decisions taken at Lausanne by the Institute of Inter­
national Law and the dispute which has arisen between Boumania 
and Hungary regarding the application of the Boumanian law to 
the Magyars of Transylvania who have lost their Hungarian 
nationality.”
Nothing could be more accurate than these observations. But 
there is another point in this discussion which must be borne in 
mind; that is, that the resolutions drawn up by the Institute 
merely express a hope, and this hope is to see consecrated in the 
practice of international law the rules which it proposes with 
regard to the responsibility of States for damages caused on their 
territory to the persons or property of foreigners, when there 
is peace between these States. How can this hope be realised? 
By whom can it be realised? The Institute was careful to answer 
this question. First of all by an international Commission of 
Inquiry, if this is necessary to examine the facts; then, by a 
procedure of conciliation; finally, if nothing comes of this, by 
judicial proceedings before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice or some other inter-, 
national jurisdiction, with a view to a definitive solution. That it 
ever occurred to the Roumanian Government to entrust so serious 
a mission to a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal created solely to judge 
disputes arising out of the war, or that it is the mission of this 
tribunal to lay down the law, to define international law by 
regulating it for the present and for the future, is, however, quite 
out of the question. We do not, of course, mean to speak ill of 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals; we have good reasons for not doing 
so. But texts apart, it seems to us unheard of for the Rouma­
nian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to be entrusted with the 
mission of international legislator, especially in peace time, 
between Roumania and Hungary. For that is what it amounts 
to. Who constitute this Tribunal, after all? A Hungarian 
judge, a Roumanian judge and a neutral president. Now 
although as a general rule — I speak from personal experience — 
when it is a question of awarding justice on a matter of private 
interests, the members of the Tribunal almost always come to an 
agreement with ease, the national judges must cease to be nation­
al when it comes to fixing the international law between two 
countries, to dealing with questions which inevitably affect 
political interests of the highest importance, if they are to define 
the international law between two countries. The redoubtable 
task, generally confided to a Congress, or to Commissions entrus­
ted with the preparation of a Treaty, of laying down the interna­
tional law between Roumania and Hungary, and that for the 
future as well, would thus devolve upon a single judge, a neutral 
judge, who may be a very good jurist, but who is not a shining 
light of international law. The Treaty contains no article to this 
effect.
We have finished examining the conditions under which the- 
expropriation for reasons of public welfare, or rather of publie­
safety, was decreed in Roumania. We would here recall once- 
more that the measure has been wrongly represented as aimed7 
at the Hungarians. The Roumanians are as hard hit as the 
Hungarians. It is true that mistakes may have been made, and- 
have been made. Hungarians who claimed that they had worse- 
treatment than the Roumanians have appealed to the Roumanian 
tribunals and have won their case. Awards in their favour have- 
been mentioned by the Counsel of the Roumanian Government. 
And to put an end to these false statements, M. Titulesco, the- 
Roumanian Delegate made the following declaration in Brussels, 
which he renewed at Geneva : “ If, in practice, other circum­
stances being equal, the Agrarian Law of Transylvania has been, 
interpreted in a different manner for Hungarian optants Jhan; 
for Roumanian subjects, each individual case, ivhen brought to- 
the notice of the, Roumanian Government, will be considered" 
separately, in order to ensure equal treatment for all in confor-. 
mity with the intentions of the law. ”
It is to be hoped that this clear statement will put an end to- 
the incessant assertions by the Hungarian Government and its. 
Counsel that the agrarian law is “directed against the Hunga­
rians ”, an assertion which is the more absurd as the King of' 
Roumania himself, like the humblest of his subjects, was 
affected by it, as we have said above.
The foregoing survey was necessary. It makes it possible to- 
realise the circumstances in which the question of competence- 
has arisen and the nature of the protests on which the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal would have to pronounce judgment, if, as this, 
tribunal has decided, it is really competent. We shall next 
glance at the difficulties which will have to be faced as a result of’ 
this truly unjustifiable decision.
INCOMPETENCE OF THE MIXED ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
A certain number of claims brought by Hungarian subjects, 
against the Roumanian Government were before the Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunal. These Hungarian subjects were Emeric Kulin, 
and others. On behalf of the Roumanian Government, its agent 
opposed in limine litis: an exception of incompetence to the claim. 
On. behalf of the claimants, the agent general of the Hungarian 
Government contested this exception. It does not appear, 
hoovever, that, the Hungarian Government was ever parly to the 
suit. It was never concluded in its name. We do not intend 
to discuss here the somewhat curious consequences which may 
ensue. We shall merely say that it is evident that the award to 
he given will not have the force of res judicata either to the 
advantage of all parties concerned except the claimants or to that 
of the Hungarian Government. We shall deal hereafter only 
with the exception of incompetence and with no other. We 
think that the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was fundamentally incom­
petent to give a ruling on the questions submitted to it by the 
Hungarian Government.
Some general observations will suffice to demonstrate this, 
without any need for analysis or minute examination of the texts. 
The Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is an exceptional jurisdiction. It 
could be competent only in cases in which its competence is 
determined by a definite text. It seems superfluous to insist on 
this point. The claimants therefore maintain, in general, that 
its competence, in the present hypothesis, rests on Article a5o 
of the Treaty. This is the opinion expressed by certain learned 
jurists also, by M. Pillet, for instance, to whose indisputable 
authority the claimants have referred in support of their general 
argument. Unfortunately, as regards the interpretation of 
Article a5o, M. Pillet’s opinion, which is very brilliant, although 
incorrect, we consider, as regards the substance of the law, omits 
all examination or serious analysis of the article in question. He 
has not seen that Article a5o is in close relation as the very text 
of it states, with Article 23a; that the measures from the effect of 
which it exempts Hungarian nationals are the very measures 
which constituted an obligation for them under Article 282, and 
that the measures which constituted on obligation for them by 
virtue of the latter article are the very same exceptional war mea­
sures defined by paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Annex, It is true 
that this fact has not escaped the penetrating analysis of M. de 
Lapradclle, but he indicates a series of other cases in which, in 
his opinion, no text exists. “In all cases where there is no text, 
general principles suffice.” We cannot concur in this opinion.
If there is really no text in support of the jurisdiction of this 
very exceptional tribunal, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, then it 
has no competence and no jurisdiction. This is what, in our 
opinion, the general principles lay down. If then, the compe­
tence of the tribunal does not result clearly from the text of 
Article a5o, it cannot be claimed for it in virtue of these general 
principles which are so skilfully and so prudently relied upon, 
it seems, for the event of the argument drawn from the text of 
this article finding no favour. Let us beware of general princi­
ples. They no doubt have their value, but they are dangerously 
elastic. And let us confine ourselves to Article a5o of the Treaty, 
on which is based the alleged competence of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal to decide as to the validity of an act which has nothing 
in common with the war, which was planned long before the 
war and on which the Roumanian Government decided only 
under the irresistible pressure of a highly dangerous situation.
The first part of Article 25o runs as follows :
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 282 and the Annex 
to Section IV the property, rights and interests of Hungarian 
nationals or companies controlled by them situated in the terri­
tories which formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy shall not be subject to retention or liquidation in 
accordance with these provisions.
“Such property, rights and interests shall be restored to their 
former owners freed from any measure of this kind, or from any 
other measure1 of retransfer, compulsory administration or 
sequestration, taken since November 3, 1918, until the coming 
into force of the present Treaty, in the condition in which they 
were before the application of the measure in question.
“Claims made by Hungarian nationals under this Article shall 
be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for by 
Article 23g.”
Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon expressly refers to 
Article 282 and to the Annex to Section IV. iBy an exceptional 
privilege, which according to M. Millerand is excessive, it frees 
Hungarian subjects from the various kinds of confiscation which 
they would otherwise have suffered. From the actual text it 
may be concluded that the measures of liquidation or expropria­
tion from which Hungarian subjects are freed by way of excep­
tion are those provided for and laid down by Article 282 and by 
certain provisions of Section IV. The exception by which they 
benefit applies to no other measures. Hence the inescapable con­
clusion that the competence attributed to the Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunal affects only exemption from measures provided for and 
regulated by the articles to which it refers.
What are these measures? Is there the slightest allusion to 
the measure which would constitute a general expropriation, in 
return for compensaion, inadequate no doubt, but nevertheless 
recognised in principle, of all' immovable property of a certain 
importance belonging to the subjects of the expropriating State, 
as well as of that belonging to any foreigners whatsoever, and 
not only to conquered belligerents?
There is not ; for no formal provision of the Treaty was requi­
red for the purpose. It would have been completely superfluous. 
It is common law. The Roumanian Government did not base 
its action on any provision of the Treaty. It based it on the ele­
mentary rule whereby immovable property, even if it belongs 
to foreigners, is regulated by the law of its situation, a rule 
accepted by all legislations and recognised by all authors. It is 
possible to discuss endlessly, and this has been done abundantly, 
whether, in virtue of the principles of international law, a State 
on behalf of its nationals or these nationals themselves can protest 
and have their protests recognised, when they maintain that 
these nationals have been prejudiced by an iniquitous applica­
tion of this rule in a foreign country to property which they 
possess there, but the principle itself in incontestable and 
uncontested. Is it possible to suppose for a moment that a 
conquering State could think it necessary to insert it in a treaty 
concluded with a conquered State?
We do not attach much importance to the fact that Article a5o 
made use of the word liquidation rather than the word expro­
priation. In our opinion a liquidation, in the meaning of this 
article, is an expropriation. It is at any rate the consequence of 
one. But this expropriation is such as can take place in the 
absence of any treaty provision. It is not the expropriation for 
reasons of public utility of property situated in the territory of a 
country, affecting not only enemy aliens but even friendly aliens, 
even aliens of any kind whatsoever, and even subjects of the 
country having recourse to this measure. For expropriation of 
that kind no text was required, and it would have seemed truly 
strange if it had been thought necessary to insert it in an inter­
national convention putting an end to the war and determining 
the respective obligations and duties of the former belligerent 
States. It would have been still more absurd if the conquered 
State had been placed in a privileged position in this respect, not 
only as regards all the other foreigners, but as regards foreigners 
belonging to Allied and equally victorious countries, the blood 
of whose subjects had been shed in the common cause, and even 
as regards the subjects of the State itself, which had benevolently 
renounced a right consecrated by general principles of interna­
tional law. For there is certainly no author who does not 
recognise this right, at least in principle.
This observation suffices to destroy completely the claims put 
forward by the brilliant Counsel for the Hungarian Government. 
Nevertheless it has not been made, we beliewe, and it is decisive. 
Let us sum up our arguments :
i) Article a5o has freed the Hungarian Government only from 
the retention or liquidation authorised or prescribed by the pro­
visions of Article 282 and by the Annex to Section IV of the 
Treaty;
2) There was no necessity for these provisions to consecrate, 
on behalf of the Roumanian Government, the right to expropriate 
for reasons of public welfare, the Hungarian property situated 
in territory which had become Roumanian through annexation;
3) The inapplicability of Article 25o of the Treaty to the ques­
tion of expropriation for reasons of public welfare obviously 
follows, since this article only exempted the Hungarian State 
from the consequences of Article 282 and Section IV, which do 
not and cannot concern expropriation for reasons of public 
welfare.
This should suffice and we could stop here, for the foregoing 
demonstration seems to us conclusive. It is certain, moreover, 
that Article 282 of the Treaty does not mention expropriation for 
reasons of public welfare any more than Article 25o. Rut we 
think that the most detailed examination of these articles can 
lead to nothing but the complete confirmation of the observations 
made above. Article 282 is extremely condensed. Some of its 
provisions are not in any way concerned with Hungarian property 
and do not allocate it to the Allied Powers at all, for instance 
Article 23zA. Under Article 25o, it is only necessary to consider 
the property and interests of Hungarian nationals or of companies 
controlled by them situated in the territories which formed part 
of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, that is of Transylva­
nia. But the fundamental rule, and the only one which imme­
diately concerns us, is that of Article 23a B, which runs as 
follows : “ Subject to any contrary stipulations which may be 
provided for in the present Treaty, the Allied and Associated 
Powers reserve the right to retain and liquidate all property, 
rights and interests which belong at the date of the coming into 
force of the present Treaty to nationals of the former Kingdom 
of Hungary, or companies controlled by them, and are within 
the territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates of such 
Powers (including territories ceded to them by the present Treaty) 
or which are under the control of those Powers. ”
This is certainly the most important provision of Article 232 
concerning the right given to Boumania over property belonging 
to Hungarians in general. The others are only concerned with 
the property of Roumanian nationals and not that of Hungarian 
subjects, except the provisions of Article 232, paragraph D, of 
which we shall speak, in a moment. As regards Article 232, 
paragraph B, it is obvious that it only constitutes a simple right 
of retention and appropriation of Hungarian property existing 
in the territory of the Allied and Associated Powers, and that this 
has not the slightest connection with the right of expropriation 
for reasons of public welfare which every State possesses over the 
immovable property situated in its territory, whether it belongs 
to nationals or to foreigners. It is certain that the object, and 
probably the principal object, of Article 260 was to exempt 
Hungarian property from this right of retention and from the 
right to liquidate it, or in other words to alienate it, for this 
liquidation is after all nothing but alienation or a form of 
alienation. Once more, what can there be in common between 
this and expropriation for reasons of public welfare? Nothing 
surely. It is a simple right of retention which, under Arti­
cle 232 C, can only be exercised in return for compensation, but 
which is in no way subject to the condition of public welfare. 
It is in no way an expropriation for reasons of public welfare.
Next comes the provision of Article 232, paragraph D, which 
runs as follows : “ As between the Allied and Associated Powers 
and their nationals on the one hand and nationals of the former 
Kingdom of Hungary on the other hand, as also between 
Hungary on the one hand and the Allied and Associated Powers 
and their nationals on the other hand, all the exceptional war 
measures, or measures of transfer, or acts done or to be done 
in execution of such measures as defined in paragraphs i and 3 
of the Annex hereto shall be considered as final and binding upon 
all persons except as regards the reservations laid down in the 
present Treaty. ”
Let us now see how these measures are defined in paragraphs- 
i and 3 of the Annex. In reality, paragraph i contains no 
definition of exceptional war measures and measures of transfer, 
and it is paragraph 3 which defines them. Paragraph i none 
the less contains interesting indications on what is understood 
in the Treaty by exceptional war measures and especially by 
measures of transfer. Here is the complete text : “ In accordance 
with the provisions of Article 232, paragraph D, the validity of 
vesting orders and of orders for the winding up of businesses or 
companies, and of any other orders, directions, decisions or 
instructions of any court or any department of the Government 
of the High Contracting Parlies made or given, or purporting- 
to be made or given, in pursuance of war legislation with regard 
to enemy properly, rights and interests is confirmed. The 
interests of all persons shall be regarded as having been effect­
ively dealt with by any order, direction, decision or instruction- 
dealing with property in which they may be interested, whether 
or not such interests are specifically mentioned in the order, 
direction, decision or instruction. No question shall be raised as 
to the regularity of a transfer of any properly, rights or interests 
dealt with in pursuance of any such order, direction, decision 
or instruction. Every action taken with regard to any property r 
business or company, wheter as regards its investigation, 
sequestration, compulsory administration, use, requisition, 
supervision or ivinding up, the sale or management of property, 
rights or ïnteresis, the collection or discharge of debts, the 
payment of costs, charges or expenses, or any other matter 
whatsoever, in pursuance of orders, directions, decisions or ins­
tructions of any court or of any department of the Government 
ôf any of the High Contracting Parties, made or given, or 
purporting to be made or given, in pursuance of war legislation 
with regard to the enemy property, rights or interests, is 
confirmed..! ”
All this is very significant. The measures of transfer in 
question here are those accomplished in virtue of exceptional 
war legislation, hence exceptional war measures. This is 
repeated in almost every line. It matters little that certain 
exceptional war measures may to some extent hamper or limit 
the liberty even of neutrals. The essential characteristic of 
exceptional war measures is that they have been taken owing to 
the wai’ and for war purposes. They do not cease to be excep­
tional war measures when they affect the liberty of action, 
movement or even profession of a neutral.
It is therefore very certain that, according to the express terms 
of this article, the right of a belligerent to liquidate, to effect a 
transfer of property (to use the actual words of paragraph 1 of 
the Annex), in other terms to dispose of it, can arise only out 
of exceptional war legislation concerning property, rights and 
interests. It is therefore very much an exceptional war measure. 
This said, let us take paragraph 3 of the Annex. We shall quote 
it in full as we quoted paragraph 1. It is as follows : “ In 
Article 282 and this Annex the expression “exceptional war 
measures’ includes measures of all kinds, legislative adminis­
trative, judicial or others, that have been taken or will be taken 
hereafter with regard to enemy property, and which have had 
or will have the effect of removing from the proprietors the 
power of disposition over their property, though without affecting 
the ownership, such as measures of supervision, of compulsory 
administration, and of sequestration; or measures which have 
had or will have as an object the seizure of, the use of, or the 
interference with enemy assets, for whatsoever motive, under 
whatsoever form or in whatsoever place. Acts in the execution 
of these measures include all detentions, instructions, orders or 
decrees of Government departments or courts applying these 
measures to enemy property, as well as acts performed by any 
person connected with the administration or the supervision of 
enemy property, such as the payment of debts, the collecting of 
credits, the payment of any costs, charges or expenses, or the 
collecting of fees.”
“Measures of transfer are those which have affected or will affect 
the ownership of enemy property by transferring it in whole 
or in part to a person other than the enemy owner, and without 
his consent, such as measures directing the sale, liquidation or 
devolution of ownership in enemy property, or the cancelling 
of titles or securities. ”
This is the text and, from this text, the Counsel of the Hun­
garian Government conclude that the fact of disposing of enemy 
property is not an exceptional war measure. Paragraph 3 of the 
Annex to Article a3a of the treaty speaks, indeed, in its first sub­
paragraph of the right of disposal. They forget, however, or 
they have failed to notice that paragraph i of the Annex has 
already clearly defined the character of the right of disposal. It 
is the right which results from the exceptional war legislation. 
It says so in express terms. Hence the ingenious reasoning 
which they have built up on this error falls the ground.
No, Article 232, paragraph D, was never intended to confer 
upon a belligerent the right to dispose, on any pretext soever, 
of the property of an adversary. It gave him the right to do 
so in virtue of exceptional war legislation. This is expressly 
stated in paragraph i of the Annex to which Article 232 refers. 
And it is from this prejudice to his right of ownership that the 
Hungarian is freed, from this prejudice which would be caused 
to it by exceptional war legislation. But we cannot see any 
reason why, in Article 232, it should be found necessary to sti­
pulate that Roumania, like any other State, had the right of 
expropriation for reasons of public welfare, and we note that no 
such stipulation is made. This Article merely mentions and 
validates the case of expropriation resulting from exceptional 
war measures. It is still more impossible for us to understand 
why the Treaty should grant to the nationals of the conquered 
State, by an unheard-of privilege, exemption for ever from 
expropriation for reasons of public welfare, or even of national 
welfare, which the subjects of any State are liable, as regards 
their property situated abroad, to suffer at the hands of the State 
in which it is situated. As we have just shown, Article 25o of 
the Treaty is not in the least concerned with this. Hence the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is not competent to pronounce judgment 
on protests which may be brought forward by Hungarian nation­
als, on account of an expropriation for reasons of public 
welfare which they have suffered in Roumanian territory, since 
its competence is invoked solely in virtue of Article a5o, which 
has nothing to do with the question. As to the .Annex to Sec­
tion IV, to which Article a5o also refers, it will suffice to point 
out that this reference is absolutely identical with the reference 
to Article 23a, for it is precisely in this Section IV that we find 
Article 282 and its Annexes, which we have just analysed in 
"■detail.
In his remarkable speech, our eminent colleague, M. Gidel, 
analysed at length Award No. 7 of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, between Germany and Poland. We might 
point out, first of all, that the case submitted to the Court was 
complicated by the Geneva Convention. In the case of Germany 
and Poland, as M. Gidel himself pointed out, the texts to be 
applied were contained in two different diplomatic instruments : 
the Treaty of Versailles and the Geneva Convention. But without 
.going into the difficulties to which it may give rise from the 
point of view of the substance of the question, we shall confine 
ourselves to observing that the Permanent Court did not deal at 
all with the question of the competence of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunals. All the same, and this is rather amusing, this award, 
quoted and analysed at great length by M. Gidel, although it has 
nothing to do with the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 
has nevertheless supplied M. Politis with a rather interesting 
argument concerning the real bearing of the Treaty provisions, 
Articles 232 and 25o, and the nature of the provisions which 
first subject Hungarian nationals to the measures prejudicing 
Iheir rights of ownership and then exempt them from these 
measures. If the latter are not to be found in the Treaty of Ver­
sailles, the former are certainly to be met with there. Here is 
what the award says about them : “ The regime of liquidation 
instituted by the Treaty of Versailles is aimed at German property 
as such. ” If aimed at German property as such, it has nothing 
in common with expropriation for reasons of public or national 
.welfare, which affects without distinction all property, all assets, 
situated in the country which decrees it, whoever the owner may 
be.
But since the Counsel for the Hungarian Government have 
dwelt at such length on Award No. 7 of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, although it does not even touch upon the 
question of the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, we 
think that it is our duty to reproduce some of the observations of 
M. Politis on the real bearing of this award :
“ In this affair, it was a question of the treatment of German 
property in Polish Upper Silesia. A special convention conclu­
ded between the countries concerned at Geneva, on May i5, 1922, 
defined and regulated the right of liquidation exercised by the 
Polish Government over German property. Article 6 of that 
Convention lays down to what extent and under what conditions 
the Polish Government may liquidate German property in Upper 
Silesia.
“ The Court came to the conclusion, when interpreting the 
Convention of 1922, that apart from the cases provided for in 
which liquidation is permitted, German property in Upper 
Silesia cannot be liquidated. It hastened to add, however, as we 
must not fail to note, that German property is none the less 
subject to common international law. If it escapes liquidation 
as German property, it may perfectly well be expropriated as 
foreign property (1). The following is the essential passage of 
this award; it may be found on page 22 : “ Only those measures 
are forbidden which international common law does not allow 
to be taken against foreigners : expropriation for reasons of 
public utility, judicial liquidation and similar acts are not 
affected by the Convention. ”
And it is with entire reason that M. Politis observes further on 
that the conclusion to which one is forcibly led is that the 
measures taken in Roumania with regard to the property of 
Hungarian nationals have nothing whatever to do with the pro­
visions of Article 25o. Certainly Article 282 was not required to 
give the Roumanian State the incontestable right, like any other 
State, to proceed to the expropriation, for reasons of public 
welfare (and economic or social necessities are a paramount factor 
of public welfare), of the property even of foreigners situated in 
its territory, and Article 282 has nothing whatever to do with this 
question. Any State has this right; it is a constituent part of 
its sovereignty; and it is absurd to suppose that Article 25o could 
be aimed at or could result in depriving the conquering State, in
(1) We must nevertheless call alien lion here to a phrase which is not well 
expressed. Il may be expropriated not only as foreign properly, but in the 
same way as any properly situated in the territory, irrespective of the owner’s 
nationality.
favour of nationals of the conquered State, of this essential and, 
one might add, inalienable right. Hence Article 25o cannot have 
been aimed at and cannot result in anything but the reesta­
blishment of the ordinary, normal principles of the law, in 
favour of Hungarian nationals, as against the exceptional war 
measures, consecrated by Article 282 and its annexes, to the 
detriment of these nationals.
It is quite true that Article 233 consecrates, in favour of the 
Allied and Associated Powers, more extensive rights. It is no 
longer a question of freeing them simply from all the effects of 
exceptional war measures, which the conquered belligerents may 
have enacted against them. It is a question of complete restitutio 
in integrum, whatever the nature of the measures against the 
nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, and Hungary 
undertakes :
a) “To restore and maintain, except as expressly pro­
vided in the present Treaty, the property, rights and interests of 
the nationals of Allied or Associated Powers in the legal position 
obtaining in respect of the property, rights and interests of 
nationals of the former Kingdom of Hungary under the laws in 
force before the war;
6) “Not to subject the property, rights or interests of the 
nationals of the Allied or Association Powers to any measures 
in derogation of property rights which are not applied equally 
to the property, rights and interests of Hungarian nationals, and 
to pay adequate compensation in the event of the application of 
these measures. ”
This is a very different provision from that enacted in regard 
to the property of the Hungarian nationals and it is only too 
easy to understand. It frees the nationals of the Alliedl and Asso­
ciated Powers not only from the effects of any exceptional war 
measures which may have been taken against them, as Article 25o 
does for the Hungarian nationals, as shown above. It goes infin­
itely further and we believe, with M. Politis, that it consecrates 
a great innovation in international law, at any rate it has solved 
a great question, much discussed in theory, as regards expro­
priation. iBut it seems to us quite inadmissible to claim that 
Article 63, paragraph 4, of the Treaty, consecrates the same pri­
vilege in favour of the Hungarian national who has exercised the 
right of option. What does this provision say? Merely that 
persons who have exercised their right to opt will be entitled to 
retain their immovable property in the territory of the other 
State where they had their place of residence before exercising 
their right to opt. On what conditions are they to retain this 
properly ? On the ordinary normal conditions. Are they to be 
exempted from the effects of the expropriation for reasons of 
public welfare for the past or for the future? Who will maintain 
that this is meant? This article does not mention expropriation 
for reasons of public welfare, any more than Articles 23a and 25o. 
Can such expropriation justify claims under international law 
on the part of the State to which the foreigners belong who 
consider themselves: prejudiced by this measure, and that in 
respect of the property which it affects? And in what cases? 
This is a serious question on which opinions may differ but 
which, in any case, is absolutely outside the scope of the ques­
tion raised and settled by Articles 232 and 260, and which conse­
quently is outside the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
As to the question of competence,, we cannot understand how \ 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal could settle it in the affirmative. 
The following is the most striking argument contained in its 
award : “ Whereas it must first of all be pointed out that in 
inserting Article 25o in the Treaty of Trianon, the intention of 
the Allied and Associated Powers was fully to protect the pro­
perty, rights and interests of Hungarian nationals, situated 
within the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 
from all the measures mentioned in Article 2.32 and the Annex 
thereto, of Section IV, as well as in Article 25o itself, and to 
place these properties, rights and interests under the régime 
of common international law...” Except for the word place, 
for which it would have been better to substitute the word leave, 
it would have been preferable to state what is the truth, namely 
that Article 25o is not concerned with common international law, 
that it has neither placed nor left the rights and interests of 
Hungarian nationals under the régime of common international 
law, that it was concerned only with freeing these nationals from 
the consequences of the exceptional war measures authorised by 
Article 282 and its annexes. Hence the incompetence of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to pronounce on common international 
law follows necessarily, for it is not recognised by Article 260 as 
competent to pronounce on anything but Article 25o itself. It 
is in no way competent to pronounce on common international 
law. The questions raised by all the claimants before the Tri­
bunal were, however, questions of common international law, 
and were not in any way connected with those with which 
Article 25o was concerned. Its incompetence was manifest.
But the tribunal, realising the difficulty, nay the impossibility 
of deriving its competence in questions of common international 
law from the text of Article a5o, fell back on the preparatory 
work. Although, therefore, the Counsel of the Roumanian 
Government do not seem to have taken much notice of this 
argument, we shall say a word on this subject, since the award 
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal has raised it and made much of 
it. But we shall first point out that, although preparatory work 
may be very usefully consulted when it is a question of elucida­
ting an obscure or ambiguous text, it can never prevail against 
a clear and definite text. Now, that excellent jurist, M. de Lapra- 
delle, who resorted to the argument taken from the preparatory 
work, was perfectly aware that the text of Article a5o furnished 
not the slightest argument in favour of the competence of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to pronounce on questions which have 
no connection with those forming the subject of Article 282 and 
its annex, which are pure questions of common international 
law. But he advocates a liberal reading of the text, which has 
nothing small or mean in if. The competence of the Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunal to pronounce on the serious questions of expropria­
tion for reasons of public utility, or of public safely (for nothing 
less is at stake), would, it seems, derive, even before any text, 
from general legal principles. This is very wide and very vague, 
and it would be interesting to know what these general legal 
principles are. All the provisions in question here are pro­
visions of strict and exceptional law, and it would seem truly 
strange if a State, and a conquering Slate at that, -were to submit 
amicably to a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, that is, in reality, to the 
judgment of a single man and a neutral, the gravest questions 
of international law affecting its social and economic life and its 
financial welfare. But, says, AI. de Lapradelle, Roumania 
agreed to do so. This is not exact. Roumania as M. de Lapra­
delle himself admits, agreed to have recourse to the Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunal “ for the settlement of disputes relating to the res­
titution to nationals of the former Kingdom of Hungary of their 
property, rights or interests situated in ceded territory, as pro­
vided for in Article 25o of the Treaty. This is clear, as clear as 
Article 25o of the Treaty, and we cannot understand how, in 
contradiction to such clear texts, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, on 
the strength of preparatory work, which merely reveals an inci­
dental claim on the part of Hungary, not recognised by Rouma­
nia, and absolutely refuted by the text, could claim for the Rou­
manian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal the monstrous right 
to judge the highest and most vital questions of international 
law, quite apart from any war, and without the possibility of 
appeal.
PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE AWARD 
OF THE; MIXED ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
The situation created by the awards of the Tribunal is full of 
difficulties. This was prophesied by M. Millerand, who refused 
from the outset to recognise the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. 
“ Only deference to the Court has brought us here, it being under­
stood that our only task is to set forth the reasons which make 
it impossible for the Court to declare itself competent and that 
we shall refuse in any circumstances to plead the substance of 
the case. Need I add that, having made this statement and 
having asserted that this suit can only be regarded as fictitious, 
I reserve most formally, in the name of the Roumanian Govern­
ment, the right to take, according to circumstances, any deci­
sion and to adopt any attitude it thinks right.” It is therefore 
not astonishing that the Roumanian Government immediately 
communicated to the President of the Roumanian-Hungarian 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal that its arbitrator would no longer sit in 
connection with any of the agrarian matters brought forward by 
Hungarian nationals. But simultaneously with taking this step 
the Roumanian Government thought it right to submit to the 
Council of the League of Nations, in virtue of Article n, § 2, a 
request to allow it to acquaint the Council with the reasons on 
which its action was based. The fact was that the League of 
Nations had still before it a claim brought by the Hungarian 
Government against the Roumanian Government on March i5th, 
1928, under Article 11 of the Covenant. In this claim the Hun­
garian Government maintained that the Roumanian agrarian 
reform must not affect the immovable properly belonging to the
Hungarian optants, seeing that the Treaties secured to them the 
free conservation of this property and requested the Council of 
the League of Nations to pronounce on the substance of the ques­
tion, by deciding that the legislative and administrative enact­
ments of the Roumanian Government were contrary to the trea­
ties and ordering the restitution of their property to Hungarian 
optants.
The Council of the League of Nations was thus in receipt of a 
formal request by the Hungarian Government. On April 20th, 
1923, the Roumanian Government explained its point of view, 
and on April 23rd, after discussing several draft resolutions 
submitted for the acceptance of the parties, the Council, which 
prosecuted this question with tireless activity, postponed the 
examination of the matter to its July session, at the same time 
requesting the parties concerned to make every effort to reach 
an amicable agreement in the meantime. Thereupon M. Adatci, 
Ambassador, in execution of a mission entrusted to him by the 
Council, invited the representatives of the two Governments to 
meet in Brussels on May 25th, 1923, to open, under his auspices, 
negotiations for an agreement. An agreement was concluded 
and signed by the representatives plenipotentiary of the two 
parties on May 29th, 1923. But the Hungarian Government 
disavowed its representative and persisted in this attitude which 
was censured by the Council. Whereupon the report of 
M. Adatci, recording the agreement reached, was approved by 
the Council, on the advice of Lord Robert Cecil, M. Branting 
and M. Hanotaux, who expressed their opinion that the special 
circumstances of the case, the agreement concluded at Brussels 
and the impossibility for the Council to fulfil its task if dele­
gates ivere to be disavowed “ called for the solution consisting of 
the acceptance of M. Adatci's report as drafted before this 
disavowal.” Now this report recorded the agreement of the two 
Governments on important points of which the first was that : 
“ the Treaty does not preclude the expropriation of the property 
of optants (that is, Hungarian subjects for reasons of public 
welfare, including the social requirements of agrarian reform.” 
The question of the absentees was also settled by mutual agree­
ment. All this must necessarily form the basis of any discussions 
which might lake place later as the result of the request 
submitted by the Hungarian Government itself to the Council of 
the League of Nations. The door remained open for subsequent 
deliberations. The matter was still before the Council. It was 
for the Hungarian Government to prosecute its request. It did 
not do so. After this decision of the Council which bears the 
date of July 27th, 1923, it did not follow up the procedure thus 
initiated. But it seems to have had recourse to an ingenious, a 
too ingenious method of trying to have the differences which 
separated the two Governments settled by another jurisdiction, 
and, on December 27th next, several Hungarian nationals came 
forward to submit to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal for settlement, 
on the occasion of a debate on private claims, two serious 
questions of principle on which the Hungarian and Roumanian 
Governments were in disagreement, but which had been settled 
by a decision of the Council of the League of Nations of July 
2jth, 1923, in consequence of an agreement between the two 
Governments.
The matter has not been taken out of the hands of the Council 
of the League of Nations. Far from this being the case, the 
Council has been expressly requested by the Roumanian Govern­
ment to proceed to the completion of its task. Its competence 
is certain. But the Hungarian Government asks the Council of 
the League of Nations to sanction indirectly the award of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal on the question of competence, by 
proceeding to appoint two deputy-arbitrators to carry on the 
work begun by the Tribunal. And that on the basis of this 
award, which went so far as to ignore the decision rendered in 
all competence by the Council and to contest the existence of 
the international agreement recorded by the Council, after very 
mature examination. We cannot admit the possibility of this 
procedure. We shall certainly not assert that in normal and 
ordinary cases it is not possible to assimilate the withdrawal by 
a State of its arbitrator from one series of cases to his withdrawal 
from all the cases before the Tribunal. We shall merely say that 
in this entirely new and quite exceptional situation, which it 
was impossible to foresee, the Council of the League of Nations 
cannot be obliged to condemn and to retract what it has itself 
decided, and, lending its hand to the prosecution of procedure 
essentially based on an award which has ignored and contested 
what the Council of the League of Nations had determined and 
asserted, acting in its full powers. It is infinitely preferable that 
the Council should continue the work of conciliation and 
appeasement to which it has so liberally and so generously 
devoted itself, and it is to be hoped that its generous and dis­
interested efforts will be crowned with success.
Apart from these considerations, it seems to me inadmissible 
in principle that the Council of the League of Nations, every lime 
that a Government recalls an arbitrator which it has appointed, 
should have to proceed mechanically to appoint two other arbitra­
tors. Suppose that a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal has still more 
flagrantly exceeded its powers and encroached on the attributes 
of another organisation, the Council of the League of Nations, 
is the latter mechanically to endorse this decision? We cannot 
admit this. It has another mission, a higher mission : that of 
mediator and conciliator. This it holds in virtue of Articles n, 
12 and i5 of the Covenant. Still more : it holds it by authority 
of the parties themselves. It is to the Council and to no other 
body that this mission was entrusted. We do not believe that 
there is any organisation better qualified to fulfil it. In questions 
such as those on which the members of the Council may be called 
upon to pronounce, there are not only considerations of pure 
law to be examined. Pure international; law is sometimes 
imperfectly defined. It is being made, it is being added to every 
day. When in the making, account is taken, it must be admitted, 
of the considerations of expediency, of the political, economic 
and even social considerations, on which it must rest. What 
body is more capable of pronouncing on such matters than the 
Council of the League of Nations? We do not even believe that 
it is any use, in cases of this kind, obtaining the opinion of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, a purely legal body, 
which only interprets and explains the generally accepted 
principles of international law, which in certain circumstances, 
such as in the Lotus affair, can only declare that there are no 
generally accepted principles, and which cannot, to the same 
extent as the Council of the League of Nations, take into account 
the exigencies of the political and the social life of the States 
between which it is called upon to judge.
Is the Council obliged to ask for the opinion of the Supreme 
Court? No one will maintain this, as it has itself declared. It 
will act in supreme independence, according to the needs of the 
hour, as it has done in the past, in the sovereign interests of 
word peace. In certain circumtances, it has obtained the 
opinion of the Permanent Court. In others it has not considered 
it necessary to do so, as in the Corfu incident, when, in spite 
of the very delicate legal questions which arose, it confined itself 
to obtaining the opinion of its Legal Committee. In the present 
instance it certainly seems urgent for a decision to be taken; and 
the principal objection to referring to the Supreme Court is the 
inevitable delay which would result. Now the official represent­
atives of Roumania have not hesitated to point out, with a brutal, 
but necessary frankness, the dangers of the present situation,. 
Centuries of serfdom in Roumania, of subjection to a foreign, 
race, have created this situation. Between Revolution or agrarian 
reform by expropriation for reasons of public utility there was 
no medium! Already in 1907, revolution had broken out in 
Roumania and was suppressed with bloodshed. If the rural 
section of the population feels that there is even a threat of the 
supension of this measure, a thing which is in any case out of' 
the question, or of its subordination to charges which would 
weigh it down and which Roumania could not support, there 
will be a danger of civil war.
Moreover, in its note to the Peace Conference, of February 
19th, 1920, Hungary asked merely that no property belonging 
to its nationals and existing in the territory of the former Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchy, should be expropriated in virtue of a 
measure which, in the same conditions, would not apply to the 
subjects of the expropriating State. In reality, however, their 
situation is identical, as a result of a series of enactments subject­
ing the Roumanians to exactly the same measures as the 
foreigners, and the law of July 3oth, 1921, formally consecrated 
this rule by making no distinction between them. Hungary 
can no longer object on this score. But beaten on this ground, 
she has increased her demands. She had asked for equality. 
She can no longer object on this score either. She has it. But 
she is asking for privileged treatment so as not even to suffer 
the consequences of the fall in the exchange since the decree- 
of expropriation, to the exclusion of the Roumanian subjects 
and the nationals of victorious States who, like the Roumanian 
Stale itself, and all its creditors, arc bearing the consequences 
of this fall. Is this admissible?...
In any case, the matter is before the Council. It has been 
submitted to it by both Parties. It does not seem possible for it 
to omit to complete a task entrusted to it by both Parties to the 
dispute and by the Treaty, and one which it has prosecuted with 
zeal, which it has in part accomplished and which it will bring 
to a right conclusion.
ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
•Just as we had completed the preceding opinion, a remarkable 
article was communicated to us, which has just appeared in 
L’Europe nouvelle (pp. i45o et seq.) and which comes from the 
pen of our learned colleague and friend. M. Alejandro Alvarez, 
the founder, with Mr. James Brown Scott, of the American Ins­
titute of International Research. In his opinion on the Hunga­
rian-Roumanian dispute given before the Council of the League 
of Nations, M. Alvarez reached a conclusion identical with our 
own. But he tackles and settles another question into which we 
did not go, because we did not consider it indispensable to do 
so, although our views may be deduced from our observations 
as a whole. It is the question of the rights of a State over the 
immovable property situated in its territory and belonging to 
foreigners. He begins by reporting, more completely than we 
have done, the conclusions adopted by the Committee of the 
Council of the League of Nations, and afterwards ratified by the 
Council, conclusions which were approved even by the delegates 
plenipotentiary of the Hungarian Government. These conclu­
sions may be summed up as follows : i) that the agrarian reform 
adopted by Roumanian law and the expropriation which it 
implies and consecrates apply to Hungarian nationals as to Rou­
manian subjects; 2) that the Hungarian nationals cannot be 
treated less favourably than the Roumanian subjects. The first 
point is incontestable from the point of view of general principles, 
to which Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon has not made the 
slightest derogation. It is indeed concerned only with excep­
tional war measures, as we have shown, and with exemption from 
the effects of the latter. To suppose that it could aim at or result 
in the regulation, for the present or for the future, of the peace 
régime between Roumania and Hungary, and the conferring on 
Hungarian nationals of an exorbitant privilege and one unknown 
in international law would be beyond comprehension. As to the
second proposition, it is a pure concession on the part of Rou- 
mania. It is justified from the point of view of equity, but it is 
imposed by no obligation, and many authors, even the most 
recent, teach in their works on international law that the lex rei 
sitae must be applied purely and simply.
We therefore think that we can adhere in full to the conclusion 
■of the learned opinion of M. Alvarez, while modifying the terms 
of it very slightly, and we are of opinion :
i) That the application of the Roumanian agrarian laws to the 
property of Hungarian nationals in Transylvania in no way comes 
within the scope of the' provisions of Article 25o, Article 282 or 
any other article of the Treaty of Trianon;
2) That the Roumanian Government, by applying the pro­
visions of its agrarian laws to Hungarian subjects as to its own 
nationals, has violated no principle of international law;
3) That it is, in any case, in no way bound to compensate 
them to a greater extent than its own nationals;
4) That the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal set up by the Treaty of 
Trianon, with a strictly limited mission, has no competence to 
estimate the damage caused to Hungarian nationals by the 
application of the Roumanian agrarian laws, which hve no 
relation to the exceptional war measures from which they are 
freed by Article 260 of the Treaty and to which they were 
subjected by Article 282;
5) That finally, since what is at stake is much less a legal 
question, since that has been solved, with the consent moreover 
of the parties concerned, than one of drawing the practical 
conclusions from it, it seems superfluous to ask for the opinion 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and it seems 
expedient that the Council should prosecute to the end, on the 
basis of general principles and of retroaction, the task to which 
it has dedicated itself.
We did not think ourselves obliged to make use, in this survey, 
of the very learned opinions produced by each party in support 
of its views, in particular those of MM. Dupuis, Pillet and de 
Lapradelle, in support of the Hungarian claims, especially’ as 
they have been reproduced in full in M. de Lapradelle’s collection.
We have not even made use of those produced in support of 
the Roumanian case, although it was not deemed necessary to 
reproduce them in that collection, not even that of M. Limburg, 
Counsellor of State, former bâtonnier de l’Ordre des avocats de 
La Haye, and member of the Dutch Delegation to the League of 
Nations, although we thought it very powerful. .When so 
essential a principle is at stake as that of the right of a State to 
expropriate the property of foreigners for reasons of public 
utility, we attach less value to opinions based on concrete cases 
than to the general theories set forth by the great lights of 
international law : Let us confine ourselves to mentioning : Von 
Bar (Lehrbuch des internationalen Privat und Strafrechts, p. g6); 
von Listz (Das Völkerrecht); de Louter (Droit international 
public); Fauchille (Droit international public, Vol. I, p. 53o); 
Philimore (11,4); Oppenheim (I, p. 3ao); Calvo (I, p. 35g); Weiss, 
Surville and Arthuys, etc., etc.; and among special works on 
expropriation : Dupont and Delalleau. We do not think that on 
the principle itself there can be any divergence of opinion. The 
property of foreigners is subject to expropriation in the same 
way as the property of nationals, the property of Hungarians 
situated in Roumania, like that of Roumanians. Article 232 of 
the Treaty was not enacted in order to submit them to this 
common law. Article 25o could not have been intended to free 
them from it by a really monstrous privilege, when the property 
of Roumanians and the property of all their Allies in the Great 
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The two following questions, which play a special part in the 
Roumanian-Hungarian dispute still pending before the Council 
of the League of Nations, have been submitted to the undersigned 
for his legal opinion :
a) Can the Council, apprised under Article n of the Covenant 
and Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon, refuse to appoint a 
judge?
b) Should the Council refer to the Court at The Hague for an 
opinion on the recommendations suggested to the Parties?
PART I.
The facts of the case.
Article 20o of the Treaty of Trianon provides as follows : 
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 282 and the Annex, 
to Section IV the property, rights and interests of Hungarian
(•) Translated from the French version.
nationals or companies controlled by them situated in the terri­
tories which formed part of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy shall not be subject to retention or liquidation in 
accordance with these provisions.
“Such property, rights and interests shall be restored to their 
owners freed from any measure of this kind, or from any other 
measure of transfer, compulsory administration or sequestration, 
taken since November 3, 1918, until the coming into force of 
the present Treaty, in the condition in which they were before 
the application of the measures in question.
“Claims made by Hungarian nationals under this Article 
shall be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for 
by Article 289.
“The property, rights and interesls here referred to do not 
include property which is the subject of Article 191, Part IX 
(Financial Clauses).
“Nothing in this Article shall affect the provisions laid down 
in Part VIII (Reparation) Section I, Annex III as to property of 
Hungarian nationals in ships and boats. ”
On the basis of this Article, a number of Hungarian nationals 
applied to the Roumanian-Hungarian Arbitral Tribunal in 
December 1923, alleging that the application of the Roumanian 
agrarian law to their movable and immovable property was 
contrary to the provisions of Article 200 of the Treaty of Tria­
non.
The Roumanian Government, through the intermediary of its 
official representative on the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal submitted a counter-application objecting to 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and declaring that the measures 
arising out of the agrarian law and concerning the property of 
Hungarian optants could not be regarded as « retention » or 
« liquidation » in the sense of Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon.
The Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, however, by a majority of two 
votes to one, delated itself competent by a decision taken on 
January 10th, 1927, and reserved the right itself to determine 
the matter.
Later (on February i4th, 1927) the Roumanian Government 
informed the Arbitral' Tribunal that it would refrain from dis­
cussing the substance of the question and that it would not allow 
its arbitrator to sit in connection with any of the requests 
submitted on agrarian matters (i).
The Council of the League of Nations heard the representatives 
of Roumania and Hungary at its meeting of March 7th, 1927.
In a detailed report, the representative of the Roumanian 
Government reviewed the whole question and declared that, in 
the opinion of his Government, the Arbitral Tribunal in taking 
its decision of January 10th, 1927, had exceeded the jurisdiction 
granted to it by the Treaty of Trianon and that, for this reason, 
the Roumanian Government did not consider itself bound by 
the said decision.
The Hungarian representative, for his part, proposed that the 
League of Nations should adopt the following resolution : “ The 
Council of the League of Nations, having heard the statements 
of the Roumanian and Hungarian delegates, notes that Rouma­
nia has decided to withdraw her national arbitrator from the 
Roumano-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal whenever the 
latter is called upon to decide an agrarian case, and that, in this 
event, the Tribunal cannot sit — a position, which is inad­
missible; appoints, in accordance with its practice and with 
the provisions of the Treaties, two nationals of States which 
remained neutral during the war to act as deputy-arbitrators in 
order that, in default of the national arbitrator of the opposing 
State, each State may be able to select a substitute ; and proceeds 
to the agenda.” (2)
The Hungarian representative concluded his remarks by 
stating his Government’s point of view once again in the follow­
ing words : “In my opinion the Council should appoint two 
neutral deputy-arbitrators, in accordance with its practice as 
quickly as possible, by which I mean during the present session. 
There must be no delay of justice.” (3).
The Council subsequently decided to have the question exam­
ined and appointed as rapporteurs Sir Austen Chamberlain 
and, at the latter’s request, the representatives of Japan and 
Chili (the “ Committee of Three ”).
(1) A more detailed account of what took place before the Mixed Tribunal 
on January 10th, 1927, seems unnecessary, since these facts are common know­
ledge and, moreover, since they appear to be of very little importance for the 
reply which I have to give to the two questions submitted to me.
(2) O[(icial Journal, 1927, page 370.
(3) Ol/icial Journal, 1927, page 370.
Sir Austen Chamberlain submitted the Committee’s report at 
the meeting held on September 17th, 1927.
After reviewing the whole question, the rapporteur set forth 
the results of the enquiry and draft resolutions, as follows :
“ The Committee was therefore obliged to seek a solution by 
other methods. A minute examination of the question of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal’s juridiction seemed to be of primary 
importance. It therefore asked the following questions :
“ 1. Is the Roumano-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
entitled to entertain claims arising out of the application of the 
Roumanian Agrarian Law to Hungarian optants and nationals?
“ 2. If so, to what extent and in what circumstances is it 
entitled to do so?
“ The Committee, after examining these questions and having 
them examined by eminent legal authorities, arrived at the 
following conclusions :
" The Mixed Roumano-Hungarian Arbitral Tribunal owes its 
esFaldishment to the Treaty of Trianon. It is an international 
tribunal and its jurisdiction is therefore fixed by the terms of 
the Treaty which created it. It has no jurisdiction beyond that 
which the agreement of the Contracting Parties has conferred on 
it. 'rhe limits of its jurisdiction are defined by Articles 289 
and 200 of the Treaty of Trianon.
“ The question at present submitted to the Council for 
examination relates to the claims addressed under Article 25o 
to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal by Hungarian nationals. The 
provisions of this Article prohibit the retention and liquidation, 
dealt with in Article 282 and in the Annex to Secton IV of Part X 
of the Treaty, of the property of Hungarian nationals situated in 
the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. They 
also provide for the restitution to their owners of goods freed 
from any measure of this kind and from any other measure of 
disposal, of administration or of sequestration, taken in the 
period which elapsed between the Armistice and the entry into 
force of the Treaty. They authorise the submission of claims, 
by claimants who are Hungarian nationals, to the Mixed Rou­
mano-Hungarian Arbitral Tribunal provided for in Article 289.
“ If it could be established in any particular case that the pro­
perly of a Hungarian national suffered retention or liquidation
or any other measure of disposal under the terms of Articles 282 
and 25o as a result of the application to the said property of the 
Roumanian agrarian law and if a claim were submitted with a 
view to obtaining restitution, it would be within the jurisdiction 
of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to give relief.
“ The Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is not competent to give deci­
sions on claims arising out of the application of an agrarian law 
as such unless the case mentioned in the preceding paragraph 
arises. In this latter case the jurisdiction of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal would not be ousted on the ground that the application 
■of an agrarian law was involved.
“ Since these considerations show that the claim of a Hunga­
rian national for restitution of property in accordance with 
Article 25o might come within the jurisdiction of the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal even if the claim arises out of the application 
of the Roumanian Agrarian Law, we shall proceed to the definition 
of the principles which the acceptance of the Treaty of Trianon 
has made obligatory for Roumania and Hungary.
" 1. The provisions of the peace settlement effected after 
the Avar of igi4-i8 do not exclude the application to Hunga­
rian nationals (including those who have opted for Hunga­
rian nationality) of a general scheme of agrarian reform.
“ Article 25o forbids the application of Article 282 to the pro­
perty of Hungarian nationals in the transferred territory. Under 
the terms of Article 25o the prohibition to retain and liquidate 
cannot restrict Roumania’s freedom of action beyond what it 
would have been if Articles 282 and 260 had not existed. Even 
if none of these provisions appeared in the Treaty, Roumania 
would none the less be entitled to enact any agrarian law she 
might consider suitable for the requirements of her people, 
subject to the obligations resulting from the rules of international 
law. There is, however, no rule of international law exempting 
Hungarian nationals from a general scheme of agrarian reform.
“ The question of compensation, whatever its importance from 
other points of view, does not here come under consideration.
“2. There must be no inequality between Roumanians 
and Hungarians, either in the terms of the agrarian law or 
in the way in which it is enforced.
“ Any provision in a general scheme of agrarian reform which 
either expressly or by necessary implication singled out Hunga­
rians for more onerous treatment than that accorded to Rouma­
nians or to the nationals of other States generally, would create 
a presumption that it was intended to disguise a retention or 
liquidation of the property of Hungarian nationals as such in 
violation of Article 260 and would entitle the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal to give relief. , The same would apply in the case of a 
discriminatory application of the agrarian law.
“ The prohibition against the holding of immovable property 
of Hungarians in the territories transferred to Roumania even if 
applied to all foreigners, would not be in accordance with the 
obligation which Roumania has contracted by the Treaty to 
permit Hungarian optants to keep their immovable property, but 
this is a question which does not come within Article 25o.
"3. The words “retention and liquidation” mentioned 
in Article 25o, which relates only to the territories ceded by 
Hungary, apply solely to the measures taken against the pro­
perty of a Hungarian in the said territories and in so far as 
such owner is a Hungarian national.
“ The right which the Allied Powers reserved to themselves 
under Article 282 to retain and liquidate Hungarian property 
within their territory at the time of the entry into force of the 
Treaty applies to the property of a Hungarian inasmuch as he is 
a national of an ex-enemy country. It is not sufficient that these 
measures entail the retention of Hungarian property by the 
Government and that the owner of this property is a Hungarian. 
The measure must be one which would not have been enacted or 
which would not have been applied as it was, if the owner of the 
property were not a Hungarian.
“ The Committee of the Council therefore ventures to suggest 
that the Council should make the following recommendations :
a) To request the two Parties to conform to the three prin­
ciples enumerated above;
b) To request Roumania to reinstate her judge on the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. ”
In opposition to the three principles proposed by the rapporteur 
and recommended to the two Parties by the Council as a basis of
settlement, the Hungarian representative argued that as the 
Council was a political authority it was not competent to deter­
mine a juridical question (4) and proposed that the Council 
should obtain the opinion of the Permanent Court of Interna­
tional Justice on the propriety of the three principles.
The Council reserved its decision on this point and proposed 
that, for the moment, the Parties should not take up a definite 
attitude regarding the three principles and should not announce 
their definite decision until their respective Governments had 
had an opportunity of studying these recommendations in detail.
The proposal made by the President of the Council and adopted 
by the Council wat as follows :
“ I proposed that the Council should pronounce on the 
recommendations contained in this first part of the report. I 
purposely, however, did not invite the two members of the 
Council who are parties to the dispute to give their opinion. 
I invited them not to give a definite reply before December in 
order that their Governments might have an opportunity of 
studying with care, and I trust favourably, the report of the 
Council'. !
“ I am confident that the two parties will agree, will reserve 
until December their formal opinion on this part of the report, 
and will inform the Secretary General, in sufficient time before 
the meeting of the Council of their definite decision in order 
that the Council may be in a position to consider what are the 
measures, if any, it may have to take.
“ If the parties accept this suggestion, I ask my colleagues 
to join me in submitting the recommendations contained in the 
report to the examination of the interested Governments, and 
in asking them to conform to the principles therein indicated. ”
PART II
Question x. — Can the Council, apprised under Article n of 
the Covenant and Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon, refuse 
to appoint a judge?
(4) “Speaking generally, and with all respect for the high moral and poli­
tical authority of the Council, the latter has no legal power to interpret the 
Treaty. It has no legal power to compel parties to accept the interpreta­
tion which results from its scientific convictions.”
(PUicial Journal, 1927, meeting of September 17th, 1927).
The reply to this question depends upon an interpretation in 
accordance with the meaning of Article 23g of the Treaty of 
Trianon.
Article 289 of that Treaty provides inter alia :
“ Within three months from the coming into force of the 
present Treaty, a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal shall be established 
between each of the Allied and Associated Powers on the -one 
hand and Hungary on the other hand. Each such Tribunal shall 
consist of three members. Each of the Governments concerned 
shall appoint one of these members. The President shall be 
chosen by agreement between the two Governments concerned. 
In case of failure to reach agreement, the President of the 
Tribunal and two other persons, either of whom may in case of 
need take his place, shall be chosen by the Council of the League 
of Nations, or, until this is set up, by M. Gustave Ador if he is 
willing. These persons shall be nationals of Powers that have 
remained neutral during the war.
“ If in case there is a vacancy a Government does not proceed 
within a period of one month to appoint as provided above a 
member of the Tribunal, such member shall be chosen by the 
other Government from the two persons mentioned above other 
than the President. ”
Paragraph 1 of the Annex to Article 23g of the same Treaty 
provides as follows :
“ Should one of the members of the Tribunal either die, retire 
or be unable for any reason whatever to discharge his functions, 
the same procedure will be followed for filling the vacancy as 
was followed for appointing him. ”
An interpretation in accordance with the meaning of 
Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon concerning the question 
here being examined : the appointment of deputy judges by 
the Council of the League of Nations, must be based on the 
following considerations :
The first three paragraphs of Article 23g and paragraph 1 of 
the Annex to that Article lay down the principles to be observed 
for the constitution and particularly the choice of members for 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. In regard to the question under 
consideration here, it is expressly provided that if, in case of 
a vacancy, a Government does not proceed within a period of 
one month to the appointment of a new national arbitrator, such 
arbitrator shall be chosen by the other Government from two 
persons whom it is the Council’s duty to propose.
The ratio of that clause is obviously as follows :
The fact that, if a vacancy on the Tribunal occurs in the 
circumstances provided, the parties have the right themselves 
to choose the new arbitrator from two persons proposed by the 
Council, shows that the authors of the Treaty wished to prevent 
the activities of the Arbitral Tribunal from being arbitrarily 
hampered by the unjustified action of one of the parties and 
the execution of the provisions of the Peace Treaty from being 
rendered impossible by the adoption of arbitrary methods.
A vacancy on the Tribunal may arise in various ways. Para­
graph i of the Annex to Articlte 23g expressly refers to vacancies 
due to the death or resignation of an arbitrator, or, as expressly 
stated, to the fact that one of the members of the Tribunal is 
“ unable to discharge his functions ”.
According to a considered interpretation of Article 23g, in all 
these cases the State to which the retiring judge belongs should 
— by the fact that the other party is granted the special right 
to appoint a judge — be precluded from the possibility of 
preventing the normal functioning of the Arbitral Tribunal by 
an arbitrary refusal to appoint its national arbitrator and of 
thereby defeating the ends of the Treaty of Trianon.
The object aimed at by the contracting Parties when they 
created the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals was, in particular, the 
definitive settlement by arbitration of certain disputes specially 
mentioned in the Treaty — an object which could not be attained 
unless the contracting parties previously laid down formal and 
material conditions which would enable the Arbitral Tribunal 
to function without hindrance in a normal manner.
In view of the fact that the arbitrary disorganisation of the 
Tribunal’s activities by one or other of the parties was a very 
possible eventuality, paragraph 3 of Article 23g provides by way 
•of sanction against the party guilty of such action that if a 
vacancy occurs on the Tribunal, the Government directly 
concerned is obliged to appoint a new judge within a period of 
one month; failing such appointment the other party is authorised 
to choose the deputy arbitrator from the two persons nominated 
by the Council.
According to these considerations, the right of one party to 
appoint also, in certain circumstances, the judge of the other 
party can be explained only by the intention to give further 
protection against any arbitrary or unjustified action by that 
other party.
From the foregoing remarks it will also be seen that this 
further protection exists only if the other party adopts an unjust­
ified attitude. If no such attitude is adopted by the opposite 
party, there can be no question of the protection of a right, 
since the protection applies solely to unjustified actions by the 
opposite party and not to justified actions.
In other words, to take a concrete case : If the vacancy on the 
Tribunal is caused by one of the parties in a justified manner, 
the other party is not entitled to ask that a new judge be 
appointed.
It is obvious that there may be cases in which it is considered 
that a vacancy has been caused in an unjustified manner; such, 
for example, would be the case if a national arbitrator were 
repeatedly insulted or ill-treated by the President of the Arbitral 
Tribunal or by the representative of the opposite party; or again, 
if the national judge of the other party were threatened with 
punishment if he failed to vote in a certain sense.
If, in such an event, a State withdrew its arbitrator, it would 
be justified in doing so and it would be most absurd to assert 
that the opposite party would then have the right to appoint 
another arbitrator to replace the one recalled.
The general rules regarding the interpretation of international 
Treaties also prove that Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon can 
be interpreted only in the way I have indicated. It is generally 
recognised that all international treaties are bona fide agreements. 
Any clause of a treaty must be interpreted in good faith. 
Referring to the interpretation of international treaties, M. Pra- 
dier-Fodéré writes as follows in his Traité de droit international 
public européen et américain, — i885, Vol. II, page 885 :
“ Since in interpreting given words, it is a question of attribut­
ing to them the meaning which should be presumed as being 
the most in accordance with the intention of the persons who 
used them, and since it cannot be presumed that any person 
would require the performance of an act which is not only 
physically impossible but also morally inadmissible, that is to 
say, so contrary to reason, that it cannot be associated with a 
person in possession of all his faculties, it follows that any 
interpretation leading to a physical impossibility or to an 
absurdity should be rejected. ”
No reasonable person would claim that, if the national 
representative of one of the parties has, by means of threats 
succeeded in bringing about the resignation of the national 
representative of the other party, and if the latter refuses to 
appoint a new judge, the opposite party would have the right 
to proceed to the appointment of that judge.
It would be acting contrary to the fundamental principles of 
good faith if a State,' whose judge has, by means of threats, 
forced the judge of the other party to resign, was further 
permitted to aggravate in a factitious manner the position of 
the other party by appointing a national of another State, chosen 
in accordance with the terms of Article 23g, to replace the 
national judge who resigned.
It goes without saying that, by reason of his acquaintance 
with his own national law, a national judge is more qualified 
than any other person — within the limits of the judicial field, 
of course — to safeguard the interests of his fellow-countrymen.
The first conclusion reached from the foregoing observations 
is that Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon interpreted according 
to the spirit of that article should be construed as follows :
It is only in case one of the parties causes, in an unjustified 
manner, a vacancy to occur on the Tribunal that the other party 
shall have the right to ask for the appointment of a new judge.
Or, to state this in positive terms :
Tf a vacancy has been caused in an unjustified manner, the 
right of the other party to fill that vacancy by' the appointment 
of a new judge does not exist.
But what are the cases in which a vacancy can be considered 
as having been caused in a justified manner?
We have already mentioned a certain number of such cases. 
The principle to be observed is that each specific case should be 
examined with a view to determining whether the withdrawal 
of a judge constitutes justified or arbitrary action.
In the Roumanian-Hungarian dispute regarding the exceeding 
of powers by the Roumanian-Hungarian Arbitral Tribunal 
following its decision of January roth, ig27, the question arises 
whether an exceeding of powers by the Arbitral Tribunal (and 
this point is still doubtful) entitled the Roumanian Government 
to withdraw its judge from that body, with the judicial 
consequence that, in that event, the Hungarian Government has 
no right to have a new judge appointed.
In order to settle that question we must first of all refer to the 
following general considerations relating to the legal force of 
decisions taken by Arbitral Tribunals.
Pursuant to the idea that the object of an arbitral award is 
definitely to settle a dispute, both State doctrine and practice 
unanimously agree that an arbitral award GIVEN IN A LEGAL 
MANNER has the effect of res judicata. This rule might be 
accepted as an incontestable international; principle.
Lammasch writes as follow : “ Provided that the Arbitral 
Tribunal has not exceeded its jurisdiction, an arbitral award 
has the effect of res judicata exactly as in the case of a judicial 
decision. ” (Rechtskraft, p. 91.)
In 1877, the Institute of International Law examined the 
question of the legal value of awards given by international 
courts of arbitration and took the following resolution :
“The award duly given settles, within the limits of its effect, 
the dispute between the parties. ” (Article 25 : Annual, !, p. i33.)
The text of Articles 54 and 81 of the peace protocols of 1899 
and 1907 is almost identical with the above :
“ The award, duly given and notified to the representatives 
of the parties, definitely settles the dispute without appeal. ”
Although it is an indisputable fact that, in its effect, any 
arbitral award given in due and proper form can be regarded as 
equivalent to a definitive decision, that is to say it can be 
regarded as having legal force both from the formal and material 
point of view, a thorough and detailed examination of State 
doctrine and practice shows that specific flaws in procedure, 
of a formal or material nature, neutralise that effect. If we 
examine the nature of these flaws and the influence they may 
have on the judicial value of an arbitral award, we are forced 
to conclude that there exists a considerable amount of confusion 
in the literature on international law. A study of the theory and 
practice adopted in State matters establishes one point on which 
there can be no doubt, namely : the existence of special 
circumstances in arbitral proceedings renders the arbitral award 
void. It is true, however, that opinions differ on the reasons 
for which an award becomes void.
Bulmerincq enumerates the ten following reasons :
r) Invalidity of the terms of submission ; 2) Flaw in the terms 
of submission ; 3) Absolute illegality ; 4) Inaccuracy of fact or 
error due to the parties or to the arbitrator ; 5) Insufficient hear­
ing of the parties ; 6) Partiality on the part of the judge; 7) Dis­
ingenuous treatment of one of the parties by the judge or 
dishonesty on the part of the latter; 8) Imposing of improper 
obligations ; 9) Disingenuousness on the part of one of the parties 
in regard to the other party.
The Institute of International Law reduced the number of 
reasons for which the execution of an arbitral award can be 
refused on the ground of nullity to four, viz :
a) Invalidity of the terms of submission;
b) Exceeding of powers;
c) Corruption proved against on of the arbitrators;
d) Essential error. (Annuaire I, p. i32.)
This question also played an important part in the Hague 
Conferences.
The Russian proposal of 1899, although recognising in 
principle that an arbitral award should be final, provided in 
Article 26 that the award should be considered void in the follow­
ing cases : /“ /
a) Exceeding of competence;
b) Corruption proved against the judge;
c) Nullity of the terms of submission.
In the course of the discussions, attention was called to the 
irregular situation that would arise if, in regard to the proceed­
ings of the International Arbitral Tribunals, a court of the second 
instance had authority to pronounce on the legal value of an 
award.
It was perhaps on account of this irregularity that Article 26 
of the Russian proposals was deleted (cf. Lammasch, Rechtskraft, 
p. 1.48 and ff.;. and for greater detail : International Peace 
Conference, Vol. IV, page i4g).
However difficult it may be to determine the flaws of procedure 
which may nullify an arbitral award, it will suffice, in the 
present case, to state that the fact that there has been an exceed­
ing of competence, “ insoweit diese reicht ”, undeniably has the 
effect of rendering the award null and void.
There can scarcely be any doubt on that point.
It is a recognised principle that an arbitrator acts in that 
capacity only in so far as he does not exceed the limits laid down 
for him in the terms of submission; this principle finds its 
expression in the axiom “ extra comprissum arbiter nihil facere 
potest
Nothing undertaken by the arbitrator beyond the limits of the 
sphere of competence defined by the terms of submission to 
arbitration signed by the parties can be regarded as the act of 
an arbitral judge nor can it, in consequence, have the effect of 
res judicata.
Writers on international law are surprisingly unanimous on 
that point.
Mallasch, for example, writes as follows : “ Finally, in regard 
to an application that a certain decision be declared void, only 
two of the grounds already admitted by the Institute of Law 
can be taken into consideration : corruption and the exceeding 
of the terms of submission ”. (Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, p. 221), 
and, further :
“ If the award is given by an arbitral tribunal outside the 
Permanent Court (reference is here made to the Arbitral Tribunal 
at The Hague), considering the possibility of there being an 
appreciable difference in the character of such Tribunals, any 
decision going beyond the terms of submission might be regarded 
as sufficient grounds for declaring the award null and void. ” 
(Op. cit. 226; cf. also Lammasch Rechtskraft, p. 167-169.)
Weiss deals with this point very clearly (R. D. J., 1910, 
p. 122) :
“ And when it appears to one of the parties that the decision 
given against it is the result of an exceeding of powers or is due 
even to the corruption or bad faith of the arbitrator, it shall be 
the right and strict duty of that party to refuse to execute the 
decision; and, as required by international custom, it shall 
acquaint the other party of the reasons for which it considers the 
decision null and void. ”
See also, in this connection, the opinions expressed by Meurer, 
Das Friedensrecht der Haager Konferenz, I, p. 348, and Zorn, 
quoted by Lammasch, Rechtskraft, p. 162 (5).
If from the foregoing, we reach the inevitable conclusion that 
the fact that the Roumanian-Hungarian Tribunal possibly 
exceeded its powers renders the decision of January 10th, 1927, 
null and void, the reply to the question asked above with a view 
to determining whether in a definite case of exceeding of powers 
the Roumanian Government is justified in withdrawing her 
national judge from the Arbitral Tribunal should undoubtedly 
be in the affirmative, for the following reasons :
The Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was created for the purpose of 
ensuring the execution of certain clauses of the Treaty of Trianon.
So long as the Arbitral Tribunal remains within the limits 
laid down by the Treaty of Trianon it is legally exercising its 
authority within a sphere of activity allotted to it by the contract­
ing parties (Allied and Associated Powers of the one part and 
Hungary of the other part). In these conditions, the Arbitral 
Tribunal is merely carrying out the wishes of the contracting 
parties.
If, however, the Arbitral Tribunal exceeds its competence, it 
leaves the sphere of the Treaty of Trianon and its actions should 
be regarded as actions that were not required by the parties. 
They are therefore irrelevant so far as the parties are concerned 
and cannot lead to legal consequences binding on those parties.
Consequently, if there has really been an exceeding of powers 
— a point which we are not called upon to examine here — the 
Roumanian Government was justified in withdrawing its national 
judge from the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 
for no Treaty obliges Roumania to instruct her national judge
(5) Certain authorities go so far as to declare that even an award of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice shall be considered to be null and void 
in the possible case of exceeding of competence (sotoeil diese nicht reicht). 
See for example the opinion expressed by Vezijls : “This case raises the gene­
ral question of the consequences that might ensue for the parlies in dispute 
if the Tribunal has obviously exceeded its jurisdiction. Notwithstanding Ihe 
lerms of Articles GO and 61 of the Statutes, there is no doubt that in such 
a case al least the relevant part of the award could not be legally binding 
on the parties. Since for the purposes of international justice any. applica­
tion based on the ground so frequently ciled in former arbitral procedure, 
namely “essential error", as an alleged reason for declaring an arbitral award 
null and void, should incontestably be excluded, it surely cannot be accepted 
in the case of an exceeding of competence on the part of the Tribunal". 
(Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, 1926, p. 521).
to take part in juridical discussions (pronouncement of awards 
contrary to competence) for which the Treaty of Trianon 
constitutes no basis in law.
Any reasonable interpretation of the provisions of Article 23g 
of the Treaty of Trianon, which in certain circumstances entitles 
one of the parties to appoint also the judge representing the 
other party, can only lead to the conclusion that this sanction 
is to guarantee the execution of the Treaty through the normal 
working of the Arbitral Tribunals against any arbitrary sabotage 
on the part of one or other of the parties.
Any judicial act by the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal which did not fall within the limits laid down by the 
Treaty of Trianon (here, in particular, the pronouncement of 
decisions outside its competence) would no longer be an act in 
execution of that Treaty and neither of the contracting parties 
could avail itself of the right provided by Article 23g, namely : 
to appoint a new judge, without acting in a manner contrary 
to its own intention manifested at the time of the signing of the 
Treaty.
The considerations set forth above lead to the following 
conclusion :
If, by its decision of January 10th, ig27, the Roumanian- 
Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal has really exceeded the 
limits of competence assigned to it by the Peace Treaty of Tria­
non, the withdrawal of the Roumanian judge from the discussion 
of the agrarian reform in question was justified and Hungary, 
on a reasonable interpretation of Article 23g of the Treaty of 
Trianon, would in no way be entitled to appoint a new judge to 
replace the one who has been withdrawn.
In the Roumanian-Hungarian dispute, however, the situation 
de facto is more complicated owing to the fact that Article 23g 
of the Treaty of Trianon expressly provides that, although the 
right to appoint a judge belongs to the parties, this judge must 
be chosen from two persons nominated by the Council of the 
League of Nations.
The question here arises of the duty which, from the juridical 
point of view, devolves upon the Council of the League of 
Nations in regard to the appointment of a judge to fill a vacancy 
on the Tribunal.,
In examining this point, we must start with the following 
general considerations :
Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon prescribes that these 
“ two other persons ”... shall be chosen by the Council of the 
League of Nations.
The following question now arises : Is the League of Nations 
bound by the provisions of Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon?
The text of Article 289 alone, if no account be taken of the fact 
that the Treaty of Trianon constitutes, conjointly with the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, one single Treaty, permits 
-of no conclusion as to the manner in which the Council of the 
League is to proceed. Taking into account, however, the fact 
that the Treaty of Trianon and the Covenant of the League of 
Nations forms one document, and that technically it is one single 
instrument, it undoubtedly follows that in virtue of Article 289 
of the Treaty of Trianon, certain duties devolve upon the Council 
of the League of Nations, duties, which, in principle, it is bound 
to fulfil.
This view of the question is supported by the procedure 
followed by the Council of the League of Nations :
Thus, on March nth, 1927, the Council of the League 
appointed a new President in place of the retiring President of 
the German-Polish Arbitral Tribunal. Further, when the 
German Government withdrew its representative from the 
Franco-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal at the time of the 
occupation of the Ruhr, the Council nominated two qualified 
persons to act as deputy judges, in execution of the provisions 
of Article 3o4 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles.
If under Article 239 the Council of the League of Nations has 
thus, in principle, the duty of appointing two judges in the 
conditions laid down in that article, the choice should be made 
in good faith and in tempus utile.
Given the foregoing considerations and taking into account 
the considerations of a juridical and general nature, a reply can 
now be supplied to thé following question :
In view of the fact that the Roumanian Government has 
refused to recognise the arbitral decision of January 10th, 1927, 
on the ground of an exceeding of powers, should the Council of 
the League of Nations accept the Hungarian proposal that the 
deputy judges be appointed in execution of the provisions of 
Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon?
In order to reply to that question, it must be considered from 
the point of view :
i) That an arbitral award given as a result of an exceeding 
of powers is a voidable act;
2) That, in case of an exceeding of powers, each party has the 
right to withdraw its judge in order to prevent further judgments 
from being pronounced in this matter;
3) That the obligation imposed by Article 289 of the Treaty 
of Trianon regarding the appointment of a new judge to replace 
the judge who has been withdrawn, does not exist in the case of 
an exceeding of powers;
4) That, in virtue of Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon, the 
Council of the League of Nations has the right to collaborate in 
the filling of a vacancy on the Tribunal;
5) That the Council of the League of Nations cannot, in 
principle and in general, refuse to cooperate in the appointment 
of a deputy judge;
6) That so long as there remains any doubt, however, as to the 
question whether the Roumanian-Hungarian Arbitral Tribunal 
has not, by its decision of January 10th, igzq, exceeded the 
jurisdiction assigned to it by the Treaty of Trianon, the Council 
of the League of Nations should refrain from appointing deputy 
judges;
By acting contrary to this rule, any action taken with a view 
to filling the vacancy on the Tribunal would be an injustice to 
Roumania:
7) That the Council of the League of Nations cannot proceed 
to the appointment of judges unless it has assured itself that it 
is in no way exceeding its powers (it must in any case examine 
the question).
For these reasons, the question asked at the beginning of this 
chapter, viz :
“ Can the Council, apprised under Article 11 of the Covenant 
and Article a3g of the Treaty of Trianon, refuse to appoint a 
judge? ”
Callis for the following answer :
“ So long as the Council of the League of Nations has any 
doubt regarding the question whether the Roumanian-Hungarian 
Arbitral Tribunal has not, by its decision of January 10th, 1927, 
exceeded the powers assigned to it by the Treaty of Trianon, it 
should refrain from appointing deputy judges. ”
PART III
Question 2. — Should the Council refer to The Hague Court 
for an advisory opinion on the recommendations which it has 
suggested to the parties?
Before attempting to reply to this question, the facts of the 
case must once more be recalled. It has already been stated in 
Part I that at its meeting of March 7th, 1927, the Council 
appointed a Committee of Three to examine the Roumanian- 
Hungarian dispute and to report on the question. As shown 
in the minutes of the meetings held by the Council of the League 
of Nations, both the Roumanian and Hungarian representatives 
gave their consent to this solution. (6)
This decision on the part of the Council to appoint a Committee 
of enquiry must be considered as perfectly regular.
With a view to settling a dispute by arbitration, the Committee 
of Three lays down three principles which it deduces from an 
interpretation of the Treaty of Trianon and these principles were 
submitted by the Council of the League of Nations to the parties 
for approval. The Hungarian representative proposed that the 
Council should ask the Court of International Justice for a report 
on the question whether these principles were really a conse-. 
quence of the Treaty of Trianon.
Is the Council obliged to ask for such a report?
(6) M. Tilulesco, the Roumanian representative said : "First of ah I must 
thank Sir Austen Chamberlain for kindly consenting to report on this question, 
and I should be very grateful to the Chilian and Japanese representatives if 
they would serve on the Committee of Enquiry to draw up the report to the 
Council.”
M. Cajzago, the Hungarian representative made Ihe following statement : 
“I also am happy to hear that Sir Austen Chamberlain accepts, and should 
be glad if the Japanese and Chilian representative would agree to the Presi­
dent’s proposal. I should like to thank them in advance for all the trouble 
they will have to take in order to help in settling this question.*
The answer to this question must first of all be sought in the 
Covenant. The Covenant refers only to an opinion of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice and states that the said 
Court shall give an opinion on the questions submitted to it 
by the Council or by the Assembly. There is no clause to the 
effect that the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations 
is under the obligation to ask the Permanent Court of Interna­
tional Justice for such an opinion.
It is, however, possible that a common law document might 
acquire that interpretation through custom. But even that is 
not the case here. The practice of the League of Nations permits 
of the contrary conclusion.
It will be remembered that in connection with the Corfu 
incident, certain members of the Council had expressed the 
wish that the Permanent Court of International Justice be asked 
to give an opinion. In particular, M. Branting, the Swedish 
representative did his utmost to induce the Council to ask for 
that opinion, but he failed to convince all his colleagues and 
the questions of law which had arisen were therefore submitted 
to a committee of jurists for examination.
There is a further example : In 1923, the Lithuanian Govern­
ment requested the Council of the League of Nations to obtain 
an opinion by the Permanent Court of International Justice on 
the attitude adopted by the Council in the Vilna affair. The 
Council did not grand Lithuania’s request.
The second question which is submitted to me is as follows :
Should the Council refer to The Hague Court for an opinion 
on the principles which it has recommended to the parties ?
Considering :
1) That there is nothing in the statutes which oblige the Council 
to ask for an opinion by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice; and
2) That a legal: principle established through custom cannot 
be proved,
the above question should be answered as follows :
The Council of the League of Nations is under no obliga­
tion to ask the Permanent Court of International Justice for 
an opinion on the principles submitted to the parties for 
their approval.
In view of the fact that the juridical obligation to solicit, at the 
request of one the parties, the opinion of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice does not exist, the question whether it is 
proper for the Council of the League of Nations to ask the 
Permanent Court of International Justice for an opinion on the 
material accuracy of the recommendations which it has made to 
the parties is rather a question falling within its own competence. 
A reply to that question of competence is not within the purview 
of the present report.
Kiel, November 26, 1927.

A new aspect of the Roumanian-Hungarian dispute* 1’
The affair of the optants before the Council 




Professor of Public International Law at the University of Lille.
On August 16th 1922, the Hungarian Government brought 
to the attention of the Conference of Ambassadors the expro­
priation by the Roumanian Government under -the agrarian 
reform of immovable properties belonging in the territories trans­
ferred by the Treaty of Trianon to the Kingdom of Roumania 
to persons who, while being natives of those territories, had 
opted for Hungarian nationality under the terms of Articles 63 
and 64 of the above-mentioned Treaty and Article 3 of the Rou­
manian-Hungarian Minorities Treaty.
“On August 3ist, 1922, the Conference of Ambassadors 
informed the Hungarian Government that its claims related 
entirely to the stipulations of the treaty between Roumania and 
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers concerning minorities 
and should, under that treaty, be addressed to the League of 
Nations. On a further request by the Hungarian Government 
the Conference of Ambassadors, in a letter dated February 27th 
1923, informed Hungary that she, oi' another member of the 
League shoud take the initiative in bringing the matter before 
the Council” (2).. 12
(1) Article published in the Reçue générale de Droit International public, 
N’ 5, 1927. Translated from the French version.
(2) This statement of facts is taken from the report by Sir Austen Cham­
berlain, rapporteur of the Committee of Three, at the Session of the Council 
from September 17lh to 19th 1927.
Hungary therefore applied to the Council and requested it 
to give- a ruling on the substance of the question ; to declare that 
the Roumanian legislative and administrative provisions of the 
agrarian reform were contrary to the Treaties; to ensure, as 
regards the future, that Roumania should act in conformity with 
the provisions of the Treaty; to order that the immovable pro­
perty of Hungarian optants should be restored to them and that 
it should in future be free from all charges contrary to the 
provisions of the Treaties and, finally, that full compensation 
for damage should be given to the injured parties.
The Council considered this question in April and July 1923.
On July 5th 1923, the Brussels negotiations opened in May 
between the Hungarian and Roumanian representatives upon the 
recommendation of the Council were the subject of protracted 
discussions. The Roumanian delegate appealed to the Brussels 
“Agreements”, and the Hungarian delegate stated that no agree­
ment had been reached.
With the exception of the Hungarian delegate, who abstained 
from voting and declared that in his opinion the question 
remained unchanged, all the Members of the Council took a reso­
lution requesting the two Governments to “do their utmost to 
prevent the question of the Hungarian optants from becoming 
a disturbing influence in the relations between the neighbouring 
two countries (3)”. The Council was convinced that the Hun­
garian Government “would do its best to reassure its nationals”, 
and that “the Roumanian Government would remain faithful to 
the Treaty and to the principles of justice upon which it declared 
that its agrarian legislation was founded, by showing proof of 
its good will in regard to the interests of the Hungarian optants.” 
- Such was the position when, from December 1923 onwards, 
a number of applications from Hungarian nationals or optants 
owning lands in the territories transferred to Roumania were 
Submitted to the Secretariat of the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal provided for in Article 289 of the Treaty of 
Trianon asking, among other matters, that the Tribunal should 
declare that the measures restricting their right of ownership, 
which had been applied to their movable and immovable property
(3) Minutes of the 25th Session of the Co-uncil. Official Journal of the League 
Nations. August 1923, p. 880 el seq., and Annexes 533 and 533 a (ibid., 
pp. 1009 cl seq.).
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by the Roumanian State, were contrary to the provisions of 
Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon, and that it should order 
the Roumanian State to make restitution.
In 1920, the Roumanian Government submitted exceptional 
applications implying the incompetence of the Tribunal. With­
out accepting the second method which, finally, was pleaded 
solely by the Government, to wit, that the measures taken in 
particular against the property of Hungarian optants could not be 
regarded as measures of retention or liquidation within the mean­
ing of Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon and, consequently, 
that they were outside the competence of the Tribunal, the latter, 
on January 10th, 1927, declared itself competent under. Article 
2oo, paragraph 3 of the Treaty of Trianon and called upon the 
defendant (Roumania) to forward her reply within a period of 
two months.
«On February 24th, 1927, Roumania informed the Tribunal 
that she would refrain from submitting her reply regarding 
the substance of the question and that, consequently, her 
arbitrator would no longer sit in connection with any of the 
agrarian matters brought forward by Hungarian nationals. At 
the same time, she submitted to the Council, in virtue of Arti­
cle 11, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, a request to allow her to 
acquaint the Council with the reasons on which her attitude 
was based.”
On March 7th, 1927, the Council of the League af Nations 
heard the statement of M. Titulesco, the Roumanian representa­
tive (4). Replying to that statement, the Hungarian represen­
tative asked the Council to appoint, “in accordance with its 
custom and the provisions of the Treaty, two deputy members, 
nationals of States which had remained neutral during the war 
so that each State might, if necessary, be able to choose a 
substitute for the arbirator withdrawn by the other State (5).
It was then that the Council requested the British repre­
sentative to report on this question at its next Session. The 
representative of Chili and the representative of Japan were 
requested to assist Sir Austen Chamberlain in the preparation 
of his report. Thus, the Committee, known as “the Committee
(i) Olficial Journal of the League of Nations, April 1927, pp. 350 et seq.
(5) La Relorme agraire en. Roumanie et les Optants hongrois de Transylva­
nia (levant la S. D. N. Bucarcst, State Printing Works 1927, p. 71, and Offi­
cial Journal of the League of Nations, April 1927, p. 370.
of Three” was formed, which during the June 1927 Session of 
the Council kept “in close touch with the representatives of 
the two Governments.”
(Deeming it impossible “to take a purely and strictly legal 
view of the Council’s duties, especially as it realised that the 
election of the two deputy members would not have finally 
ended the difference (6); the Committee attempted to bring 
about a general settlement which would have “terminated the 
controversy and led to better feelings.”
Neither of the two parties, however, was of opinion that they 
could accept the “conciliatory formulas proposed by the 
Council.”
After a last attempt at conciliation, on September 2nd, 1927, 
“being obliged to seek a solution by other methods”, the 
Committee of Three proceeded to a minute examination of the 
question of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction. In order 
better to examine this problem, the Committee took the opinion 
of eminent legal authorities (7). The examination made in 
these conditions, in so far as the substance of the question is 
concerned, led it to lay down the three following principles:
“1. — The provisions of the peace settlement effected after 
the war of 1914-1918 do not exclude the application to Hunga­
rian nationals (including those who have opted for Hungarian 
nationality) of a general scheme of agrarian reform.
“2. — There must be no inequality between Roumanians and 
Hungarians, either in the terms of the Agrarian Law or in the 
way in which it is enforced.
“3. — The words “retention” and “liquidation” mentioned in 
Article 25o, which relates only to the territories ceded by 
Hungary, apply solely to the measures taken against the 
property of a Hungarian in the said territories and in so far as 
such owner is a Hungarian national.”
Developing and at the same time defining its opinion, the 
Committee commented on the declaration of principle 3 as 
follows :
“The right which the Allied Powers reserved to themselves 
(6) Sir Austen Chamberlain's Report, 47th Session of the Council. Meeting 
of September 17th 1927, at 10 a. m. Doc. C. 47th Session, Minutes I (1), p. 4.
(7) Chamberlain Report, Ibid., p. 5.
under Article 282 to retain and liquidate Hungarian property 
within their territory at the time of the entry into force of the 
Treaty applies to the property of a Hungarian inasmuch as he 
is a national of an ex-enemy country. It is not sufficient that 
these measures entail the retention of Hungarian property by 
the Government and that the owner of this property is a Hunga­
rian.- The measure must be one which would not have been 
enacted or which would not have been applied as it was if the 
owner of the property were not a Hungarian.”
Principle 2 was supplemented as follows :
“Any provision in a general scheme of agrarian reform which 
either expressly or by necessary implication singled out Hunga­
rians for more onerous treatment than that accorded to 
Roumanians, or to the nationals of other States generally, would 
create a presumption that it was intended to disguise a retention 
or liquidation of the property of Hungarian nationals as such 
in violation of Article 200 and would entitle the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal to give relief. The same would apply in the case of 
a discriminatory application of the Agrarian Law.”
These principles being laid down, the Committee suggested 
that the Council : a) request the two parties to conform to them; 
b) request Roumania to reinstate her judge on the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal.
How did the Council reply to the Committee’s suggestions?
1) • The Council did not request Roumania to reinstate her 
judge; it did not appoint the two deputy arbitrators demanded 
by Hungary (8);
2) It considered that in virtue of Article 11, paragraph 2 of 
the Covenant and notwithstanding the Roumanian-Hungarian 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal’s decision of January 10th, 1927, it could 
request the two parlies to conform to the three principles 
formulated in the report (9).
(8) 47lh Session of the Council. Fourth public Meeting, Sept. 19th 1927 
at 3 p. m. Doc. c. (47th Session) Minutes 4 (1) p. 4 ct seq.
(9) It made a proposal to the parties whereby they retain full liberty of 
action (Declaration by M. Urrulia, Minutes 4, p. 4). Exercising this liberty, 
Hungary refused to accept the three principles of the report. Roumania, on 
the contrary, declared that she was prepared to accept the report if Hungary 
also accepted it.
The Council requested the two parties, in order to allow time for reflection, 
not to give their final answer to the proposal until December 1927.
3) The Council pronounced its decision without applying to 
the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory 
opinion. All decision was postponed until December 1927 on 
the question as to whether it were necessary to ask the Court 
for an opinion, as proposed by the President.
The above facts raise, inter alia, the following points which 
are the only ones which will be examined here.
1) Under the terms of Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon :
“a) Within three months from the coming into force of 
the present Treaty, a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal shall be 
established between each of the Allied and Associated 
Powers on the one hand and Hungary on the other hand. 
Each such Tribunal shall consist of three members. Each' 
of the Governments concerned shall appoint one of these 
members. The President shall be chosen by agreement 
betw'een the two Governments concerned.
“In case of failure to reach agreement, the President of 
the Tribunal and two other persons, either of whom may in 
case of need take his place, shall be chosen by the Council 
of the League of Nations, or, until this is set up, by 
M. Gustave Ador if he is willing. These persons shall he 
nationals of Powers that have remained neutral during the 
yvar.
“If in case there is a vacancy a Government does not 
proceed within a period of one month to appoint as 
provided above a member of the Tribunal, such member 
shall be chosen by the other Government from the two 
persons mentioned above other than the President. !
2) § i of the Annex to Section VI, Part X of the Treaty of 
Trianon lays down that :
“Should one of the members of the Tribunal either die, 
retire, or be unable for any reason whatever to discharge 
his functions the same procedure will be followed for filling 
thé vacancy as was followed for appointing him.”
3) According to Article 200 of the Treaty of Trianon :
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 282 and the 
Annex to Section IV the property, rights and interests of 
Hungarian nationals or companies controlled by them 
situated in the territories which formed part of the former 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy shall not be subject to retention 
or liquidation in accordance with these provisions.
“Such property, rights and interests shall be restored to 
their owners freed from any measure of this kind, or from 
any other measure of transfer, compulsory administration 
or sequestration, taken since November 3, 1918, until the 
:; coming into force of the present Treaty, in the condition in 
which they were before the application of the measures in 
question.
“Claims made by, Hungarian nationals under this Article 
shall be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided 
for by Article 239.”
4) Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations says :
“Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting 
any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared 
a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League 
shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual 
to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such 
emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the 
request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a 
meeting of the Council.
“It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member 
of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or 
of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting inter­
national relations which threatens to disturb international 
peace or the good understanding between nations upon 
which peace depends.”
5) Under Article i4 of the Covenant of the League of Nations :
“The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members 
of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of 
a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall 
be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an 
international character which the parties thereto submit to • 
it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any 
dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the 
Assembly.”
Three consequences result from these texts and general 
principles of international law :
i) The Council of the League of Nations was not called upon 
to appoint and could not appoint deputy judges to fill the 
vacancy on the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
caused by the withdrawal of the Roumanian arbitrator;
2) Relying upon Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, the 
Council could have validly complied with the Roumanian request, 
notwithstanding the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal’s decision of 
January 10th 1927;
3) It could have done this without recourse to the Court for 
an advisory opinion : far from being ’ obliged, in the 
circumstances of the affair, to have recourse to such an opinion, 
it would not and could not have been able to apply for it without 
disregarding the juridical regime governing applications for 
opinions.
First Point.
The Council of the League of Nations was not obliged to 
appoint and could not appoint judges in order to fill the 
vacancy on the Roumanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
caused by the withdrawal of the Roumanian arbitrator and to 
allow that organisation to continue its work.
Assuming (for the moment and contrary to the following 
explanation) that the Council had the power, in the circumstances 
of the affair, to appoint the judges, was it obliged to do so? 
Was its competence restricted? The reply must be in the 
negative, for the following reasons, which refer : 1) to the 
nature of the Council ; 2) to the overpowering necessity for it 
to conciliate the special powers (in the present case, collaboration 
in the execution of the treaties) conferred upon it by the treaties 
with the powers which it holds under the Covenant of the 
League of Nations; 3) to the text of the decision of January 10th 
1927.
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Before examining each of these reasons, we will briefly note 
that the form in which the treaty is expressed (Article 289) must 
not here be taken into account. It would in truth be very 
presumptuous to conclude that the competence of the Council 
is limited because the English text uses the imperative “shall” 
whereas the less categorical French text uses the simple future 
(“Le Président sera choisi à la suite d’un accord... Au cas où 
cet accord ne pourrait intervenir, le Président... et deux autres 
personnes susceptibles l’une et l’autre de le remplacer seront 
choisies par le Conseil de la Société des Nations...”). The law 
itself and its principles are of more import than the language 
in which it is expressed; the logic of institutions, the juridical 
mechanism and value of precedents are of more import than 
the grammar of two nations. We must not try to ressuscitate 
the dead or, like the famous judge killed by the wit of a Beau­
marchais, wish for inordinate affection for “form”.
Let us therefore have recourse to the substance of the law 
and its precepts. We have said that the law .contains three 
primary reasons in favour of the unlimited competence of the 
Council.
1. — First reason.
The Council of the League of Nations, like the League 
itself (10), is a political organisation. It is political :
a) By the conditions of its creation which caused it to appear 
among nations, after the opposition of small and medium 
Powers, as the body in which States with general interests were 
“always” to have “a just majority” vis-à-vis States with limited 
interests who were given temporary seats “without any agreement 
being reached as to the method of renewing” these seats;
b) By the very incidents which in the first place led to the 
gradual development of this great organisation and finally to 
the reform of September 1926, of which, however, a severe 
critic has said that : “its main factor is a Rule of Election 
of the temporary Members of the Council which is invested with
(10) Laiwaude (La Société des Nations, 1920, p. 8) writes : “The League 
of Nations is _ nothing more than a form of international political life." 
Scellé (Une crise de la S. D. N. ,1927, p. 2) regards it “as a phenomenon of 
international political and social organisation.” 
such, a circumstantial character that it (the Assembly) impliedly 
reserves the right to waive the application thereof.” (n)
Further, the Council of the League is political,
c) By the fact that it is recruited from the highest govern­
mental or diplomatic ranks of the States;
d) By the nature of the general competence which it exercises 
in the interests of peace and which is shown with characteristic 
force by the very language of Articles n and i5 of the Covenant 
(12) : “war”, “threat of war”, “dispute likely to lead to a 
rupture”, “circumstance whatever affecting international rela­
tions”;
e) By the nature of the special political powers conferred 
upon it by the treaties in respect of the Government of the 
Saar, the protection of Danzig, supervision of relations between 
States and Minorities, etc.;
f) By its procedure, which, notwithstanding the occasional 
incorrect use of the word “jurisdiction” when speaking of the 
activities of the Council, has nothing in common with the 
jurisdictional procedure which always gives rise to a ruling 
by the judge with the force of legal truth;
g) Finally, by the methods adopted to settle disputes, another 
author has recently declared (i3) that “they are all settled by 
diplomacy.”
If, as we believe, such is the dominating character of the 
Council, what conclusion, from the point of view of the question 
under consideration, can be drawn?
The political power, in other words, the power to take in the 
name of all parties concerned such decisions as are most suited 
to the needs of the community (staXt]) — irrespective of the size 
of that community — may well belong, according to the state 
of civilisation and period, exclusively or partially, directly or 
indirectly, to such or such organisation.
The varied nature of those organisations in no way affects
(1 1) ScEXLÊ, op. cil., p. 6.
(1 2) Rousseau : La Compétence de la Société des Nations dans le réglement 
des conflits internationaux, Paris, 1927, p. 20.
(1 3) Redslob : Théorie de la Société des Nations, Paris, 1927, p. 52.
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the fundamental character of the political power, that of taking 
decisions, in principle and inasmuch as restrictive standards 
have not for reasons of pure expediency limited its absolute 
liberty of action, which still remains the rule. Now, if we ask 
how, by imperative orders, the power will be exercised to limit 
the possibility, which in principle is unlimited, of the political 
power of decision in the name of expediency, we are faced by 
two facts : i) restriction — because it is a restrictive measure 
— must be laid down clearly, definitely and in such terms as 
to leave no room for doubt; 2) restriction — because it affects 
common interests — cannot be the act of anyone, it can emanate 
solely from the person or persons who are competent to speak 
on' behalf of the interests of every member of the community.
Let us apply these ideas to the present case and to the 
question raised thereby : could the Treaty of Trianon impose 
on the Council of the League of Nations the juridical duty 
of appointing judges in order to enable the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal to continue its work in the agrarian affair? We reach 
the following conclusion : the Council of the League of Nations 
is above all a political organisation : in general, therefore, its 
decisions must be based on considerations of pure expediency. 
To assert (as the Treaty is said to have done by certain parties) 
that it must appoint the judges would be equivalent to restricting 
the power, in principle unlimited, of the Council to take a 
decision on the ground of expediency. For such a restriction of 
the liberty of the Council to be possible, it would have had to 
/be laid down in incontestable, definite and suitable language ; 
now, we have already said that this quality is not inherent in 
the two texts ■— English and French — of the Treaty, since 
the former, more categorical, employs the word “shall”, whereas 
the latter (which is authentic) uses the future. Moreover, for 
the liberty of the Council to be restricted, for its absolute power 
of decision on the ground of expediency to be replaced by limited 
competence and the obligation to appoint the deputy arbitrators, 
such restriction would have to emanate not from certain members 
of the League of Nations (the signatories to the Treaty), but 
from the whole League, that is, from all its members who are 
equally judges, but only in so far as one of the organs of the 
League may refrain, in the name of the public interest, from 
exercising its competence to the fullesb extent.
2. — Second reason.
The necessity on the part' of the Council to conciliate certain 
special powers, which the treaties deemed fit to confer upon it, 
with its constitutional competence — that which it holds under 
the Covenant — prevented it from judging whether it was 
legally bound to appoint deputy arbitrators.
The Covenant is the fundamental law, the supreme law for 
the embryo political international League, which consists of the 
League of Nations, and this law is more forcible than the deci­
sions of the Assemblies or the resolutions of the Council. All 
the consequences arising out of this fundamental law for the 
organs of the League, in the form notably of the prerogative of 
general competence or special powers, partake of this force and 
this supremacy. If, therefore, it should happen that, in the 
highest interests of good understanding between nations on 
which peace depends, two or more members of the League agree 
to ask the Council to perform acts which are not included in 
the list of its special powers, it could comply only if such acts, 
in principle and consequence, were not contrary to the consti­
tutional competence (general or special) of the Council. If the 
performance of such acts involved any disregard on the part 
of the Council of the fundamental principles of the Covenant 
and the end in view — peace among nations — the Council 
could not be obliged to perform them. Consequently, far from 
the Council of the League being the automatic executor of 
decisions which the parties have perhaps intended to compel it 
to take, the Council has one and only one duty, not that of 
obeying the parties, but that of considering whether, by acceding 
to their requests it would not be acting contrary to the letter, 
spirit, text and aims of the Covenant.
In the present instance, therefore, one single duty was 
incumbent on the Council and would again be incumbent on 
it in similar circumsances, namely, that of deciding with the 
greatest degree of conscientiousness whether the appointment of 
deputy arbitrators (provided that were legally possible) would 
serve the ends contemplated by Article n, paragraph 2 of the 
Covenant : peace itself or the good understanding between 
nations upon which peace depends. When the question is asked 
in this way and the second point decided, is it not solved without
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any necessity of insisting upon it? Consequent upon the decision 
of January 10th, 1927, Roumania, placed by the award of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in presence of an exceeding of powers 
by that organisation, withdrew her arbitrator for all agrarian 
questions. The appointment of a third arbitrator would 
obviously not change the trend of the decisions of this juris­
diction of three : the deadlock in the relations between two 
neighbouring countries as the result of the decision of the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal would be intensified by the fact that the same 
cause would give rise to the same result : the prolongation of 
the dispute would render it more acute. To enable the Arbitral 
Tribunal by the appointment of deputy arbitrators to resume its 
examination of the agrarian affairs, would undoubtedly be to 
protect the interests of a jurisdiction accused of an exceeding 
of powers by one of the parties and admitted as such by the 
doctrine of incontestable authorities (i4), but it would not be to 
protect the higher interests of peace.
3. — Third reason.
Far from its being the duty of the Council to appoint deputy 
arbitrators to the end that the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal may be 
able to continue its work in the “agrarian affairs”, the decision 
of January 10th, 1927, by reason of its text, imposes upon it a 
duty in the circumstance to abstain from appointing them, even 
had it the right to do so.
The fact is that power, even based on political expediency, 
as in the case of that conferred upon the Council by Article 11, 
paragraph 2 of the Covenant (i5), cannot overstep the limits of 
the law, or, when there is no law, the limits of equity or 
morality. This, however, is what would happen if the Council 
considered itself bound to appoint, and appointed arbitrators in 
order to allow the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal which gave the award 
of January 10th, 1927, to resume its labours.
It is no longer necessary to produce proof that this decision 
is an exceeding of powers. This was admitted by the eminent
(14.) See J. Basdevant, G. Jèze, N. Politis, Les traités de paix ont-ils limité 
la compétence législative de certains Etats, in the Revue du Droit public et 
de la Science politique en France et à l'Etranger, 1927 (September), p. 442 
el seq. Adde Alejandro Alvarez : La réforme agraire : le litige hungaro-rou- 
main devant le Conseil de la S. D. N. Europe Nouvelle of Oct. 20, 1927.
(15) See the second point of this statement.
jurists whom the “Committee of Three” consulted and whose 
opinion they accepted (16); further, the exceeding of powers is 
shown clearly from the facts of the case. In fact, for the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal to have been able validly to declare itself 
competent to judge of the damage to the property of Hungarian 
optants in Transylvania, this damage must have arisen out of 
the measures of liquidation prohibited in the transferred 
territories by Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon. Now, without 
misinterpreting both the meaning of liquidation and the nature 
of the agrarian measures applied under the Roumanian legisla­
tion, it would be impossible to regard as liquidation measures of 
general application which, against compensation (though that 
may be deemed inadequate by the interested parties), have 
deprived the optants of the large properties affected by the agra­
rian reform. What, as a matter of fact, is liquidation? An 
operation whose origin and aim are a direct consequence of the 
late war. The first of these points has been clearly explained 
by Professor Gidel in his book le Traité de Versailles et les biens 
privés ennemis (17), the second, in particular, has just been 
explained by Professors Jules Basdevant, Gaston Jèze and Nicolas 
Politis, Greek Minister in Paris, in their remarkable work :“Les 
Traités de paix ont-ils limité la compétence législative de cer­
tains Etats (18).” “The system of the liquidation of property 
(German)” they write, “was for the purpose of supplying the 
Allied and Associated Powers with reparation funds when the 
resources (of Germany) are deemed inadequate to ensure complete 
reparation of the damage arising out of the war.” “Therefore”, 
they conclude, “measures of liquidation have two essential
(16) Declarations of Count Apponyi at the meeting of the Council of Sep­
tember 17th 1927, al 3.45’ p. m. (Doc. C, 47lh Session, Minutes 2 (I), p. 11 
at lop). “He (the British representative) said that, according to tho opinion 
oif the eminent jurists consulted by tho Committee of Three and whose opinion 
the Committee of Three has accepted — and this has not been so clearly 
stated anywhere in the report. — the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal had exceeded its 
powers..."
(17) Page 61, Professor Gioel writes : “During the war, thanks to the institu­
tion of measures of sequestration, it was possible to safeguard the property 
of physical and moral persons with which economic relations were prohibited. 
But after the war, in view of abuses by our adversaries and the responsibility 
of the Empires which had provoked the .war, it was impossible to base the 
new regime on the pure and simple restoration of pre-war conditions, and the 
liquidation of sequestrated properties became a necessary measure of libera­
tion inevitably imposed on nations whose material and moral responsibility is 
unlimited."
(18) Revue du Droit publie et de la Seienee politique, 1927, p. 418.
characteristics : i) they are acts of war or the consequences of 
war; 2) they only affect enemy property.” If the measure has 
no close connection with the war of 191/1-1918, that is, if it is not 
the direct and necessary consequence of war, and if it does not 
refer exclusively to enemy property, there is no liquidation under 
Article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles or of Article 23a of the 
Treaty of Trianon, with which we are now dealing, and the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided by Article 289 of that Treaty 
is incompetent to judge the consequences of the measure. This 
being so, what do we note in the case of the Roumanian legis­
lation relating to agrarian expropriations : 1} far from being 
confined to Hungarian nationals and injuring those nationals 
alone, the measure has been general, affecting without distinc­
tion, irrespective of nationality, the owners of land over a cer­
tain acreage; 2) the Roumanian agrarian legislation was not the 
direct and necessary consequence of the war of 1914-1918. This 
is proved by two considerations : a) It is an acknowledged fact 
that the idea of the reform dates from long before the “world 
war”, to be exact, from the time of the agrarian revolution of 
1907 (19) ; the law of July 17th, 1921, applicable to the Former 
Kingdom, that of July 3oth, 1921, which provided for the expro­
priations in Transylvania. The Banat, Grisana, were the comple 
tion of a work independant of the war of 1914-1918 and postponed 
on account of the war ; b) Roumanian episode of a social move­
ment which gave rise to manifestations in Lithuania (law of 
February i5th March 20th 1922), in Czechoslovakia (law of April 
16th, 1919), in Latvia (agrarian law passed at the third reading 
by the Constituent Assembly, September 16th, 1920), and the 
possibility of which was even contemplated in Germany (Cons­
titution of August nth, 1919, Articles i53 and i54), the agra­
rian legislation in Roumania has so little connection with the 
war of 1914-1918, she regarded it we might say with so much 
abhorrence that her whole aim and idea was, by the creation 
of small peasant holdings, with the internal disturbances to 
be feared if things remained as they were, to prevent a recur­
rence of the external conflicts leading up to social revolution.
(19) See La Réforme agraire en Roumanie el les Optants hongrois de Transyl­
vanie devant la S. D. N., March-July 1923. Paris, Jouve et C', publishers, 
p. 34 et seq. A Constituent Assembly was formed in 1914 with a view to 
modifying the Roumanian Constitution and to introducing into it the prin­
ciple of expropriation for reasons of social welfare.
The foregoing considerations justify the conclusion therefore 
that the executive measures of Roumanian legislation do not 
constitute the liquidation in the transferred territories forbid­
den by Article a5o of the Treaty of Trianon, and that the Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal could not declare itself competent, as it has 
done, to judge the affair in a general manner.
We are not guilty of any disrespect towards the juridical 
conscience of the majority which, within this Tribunal assumed 
the responsibility of the decision of January roth, 1927, in stating 
that this decision is an exceeding of powers because the arbi­
tral judge declared a series of questions to be within his com­
petence when they were not ; not to draw the conclusion of an 
exceeding of powers from the point of view under discussion 
would be a legal omission.
The exceeding of powers of the arbitral judge has the effect 
of rendering the award null and void. Entrusted by the parties 
to pronounce on one or more given points, the arbitrator has 
not the slightest authority to pronounce on those not submitted 
to him. As soon as the arbitrator exceeds his competence he 
becomes arbitrary; his action, which makes for peace when 
used on behalf of one or other of the parties, makes for force 
and violence when used against both parties; without any jus­
tified basis, it is only an illegal interference in disputes for 
which international law, which lags behind national laws, has 
not yet imposed the compulsory judge; without basis, it does 
not fall to pieces, because it has never existed. That which 
exists is the unauthorised exercise of a function, namely, the 
juridical function.
Against such an act, international law has unquestionably not 
provided penalties such, for example, as those imposed by more 
than one legislation against officials who exceed their powers. 
It is none the less true that to encourage the repetition of acts 
of this kind (which would be the case if, completed by the com­
petent authority, the above-mentioned organisation were enabled 
to maintain its point of view) would constitute an act contrary 
to international order. It cannot be the duty of any authority 
whatsoever to bring about such a result.
The foregoing considerations show that it was not the duty 
of the Council of the League of Nations to appoint deputy arbi­
trators. In the present circumstance, had it the power to do 
so? (20). Nothing could be more removed from the real facts. 
The Council of the League had not and has not, in our case, the 
power to appoint deputy arbitrators.
This will be conceded without difficulty : to appoint deputy 
arbitrators subsequently to be entrusted with the task of defining 
the law between parties by a compulsory decision amounts to 
imposing on each party a restriction which, to be legal, should 
previously have been formally accepted by both parties. Is this 
acceptance provided for in Article 23g a) of the Treaty of Trianon 
(taken from Article 3o4 (a) of Treaty of Versailles) and § i of 
the following Annex? This is the moment again carefully to 
read these instruments in their own text and not in the spirit 
which might be bestowed upon them by a unilateral interpre­
tation.
§ i of the Annex says that if, “for any reason whatever a Mem­
ber is unable to discharge his functions, the same procedure 
will be followed for filling the vacancy as was followed for 
appointing him.” In presence of the situation created by the 
withdrawal of the Roumanian arbitrator, our whole attention 
must therefore be concentrated on Article 23g (a) paragraphs i, 
2 and 3 of the Treaty of Trianon.
What do we find in this text?
i) On the one hand, it provides for the establishment of the tri­
bunal; 2) on the other hand, foreseeing, under sub-paragraph 3 
of point a), that a vacancy might arise within the tribunal, it deals 
with the continuance of its functions. The aim is ideal; if the 
method of realisation conceived by the treaty is less so, nothing 
can be done, even by the Council. The proof of this is furnished 
by a perusal of the text reading the sub-paragraphs of point a) of 
our Article in the following order : 3, 2, 1. If in case there is 
a vacancy, or if a member is unable for any reason whatever to 
discharge his functions, a Government does not proceed within 
a period of one month to appoint a substitute for the national arbi­
trator who has died, is ill, has retired or is unable for any reason 
whatever to discharge his functions, “the other Government” says
(20) It is thus that the question, at least in part, was placed before the 
Council itself on September 19th 1927 (Meeting of afternoon). “The points 
of international law raised by the matter are important", said M. Loudon. 
^First, there is the question whether, under Article 239 of the Treaty of 
Trianon, the Council has the duly, or only the right, to nominate substitute 
judges on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal." See Doc. C. 47th Session, Minutes 4
the text (Article 23g, sub-paragraph 3) shall choose the person to 
take his place. This power of the other Government, however, 
is not discretionary. Its choice is restricted : Article 289 (3) 
expressly says that it can be exercised only “from the two persons” 
(“other than the President”) who must satisfy certain conditions. 
Sub-paragraph 2 of Article 23g tells us who these two persons are. 
1) They shall be nationals of Powers that have remained neutral 
during the war (Article 289 (2) in fine) ; 2) they are exclusively the 
same (condition of sub-paragraph 3) as those chosen by the Coun­
cil (in application of sub-paragraph 2) to take the place, in case 
of need, of the President of the Tribunal, if the case provided for 
in sub-paragraph 1 in fine of Article 329 a) arises, to wit, if before 
the necessity of appointing the President arises, the Governments 
concerned have failed to reach agreement.
From which it follows that, in regard to the Council, if there is 
no necessity to replace the President of the Tribunal, or if, in the 
event of its being necessary to choose a President the Parties reach 
agreement as to the choice, there is no longer any reason for the 
Council to appoint the two persons — who are the same — envi­
saged both in sub-paragraph's 2 and 3 of Article 23g (a) of the 
Treaty of Trianon. In the dispute, which last September brought 
the Roumanians and Hungarians before the Council, the question 
of the Presidency of the Tribunal is outside the discussion. The 
agreement contemplated by paragraph 1 in fine of Article 23g (a) 
and by the opening words of paragraph 2 has not been reached. 
The Council, therefore, has not to appoint the “two other 
persons”, so that in so far as concerns the “other” Government 
(the Hungarian Government), the latter, even though it wished to 
do so, could not in its own favour apply the provision of para­
graph 3 of Article 23g.
The precedents which may be invoked against this conclusion 
are without force.
On March nth, 1927, the Council of the League of Nations 
appointed the President of the German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunal (21) to replace the resigning President, but this appoint-*  
ment, made upon the request of the German and Polish Govern­
ments, which had not been able to agree as to the nomination of 
a new President, was in strict conformity with the provisions of
(21) Seo Minutes of the 44th Session of the Council. Official Journal of the 
League o[ Nations, April 1927, p. 399 and Annex £61, p. 591.
§ i of the Annex to Article 3o4 of the Treaty of Versailles from 
which Article 289 (a) of the Treaty of Trianon is taken.
Nor could another and older precedent be accepted.
In January 1928, by way of reprisal against events which were 
still in the memory of all, and on the excuse that the political 
situation at that time did not permit of any useful co-operation 
between the German and French organisations, the German arbi­
trator, duly convoked, did not appear at the meeting of the 
Franco-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (22).
No doubt, at that time, even if the Presidents of the Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunals were chosen conjointly by the parties concerned, 
the Council of the League (a3) sometimes appointed neutral arbi­
trators to take the place of the defaulting national arbitrators. 
There is a point however that cannot be forgotten : in 1923, the 
absence of the German “organ” was put down to a political situa­
tion. In 1927, Roumania withdraws her arbitrator. Why? 
Because she believes she has reason to complain of a political situa­
tion? Not at all; 'because she has reason to complain that the arbi­
tral tribunal has exceeded its powers. This being the case, is she 
violating the recognised legal principles of arbitration? Here 
again, no. Professor Mérignhac {Traité théorique et pratique de 
l’arbitrage international, p. 23o et seq.), wrote, as early as 1895 
that “ Owing to the gravity of the interests at stake the arbitrator 
must have the right to withdraw by a simple measure of agreement 
without even being obliged to state the reasons for his with­
drawal...” Thus cannot he also do so when he can plead, not a 
political situation, but non-observance of the law? And in this 
case can it be admitted that his place could be taken by someone 
else? We will answer this question by referring to another author 
whose authority still lives. In his great work, “ Le Droit inter­
national théorique et pratique ” (Vol. 3, p. 482) on arbitration, 
Calvo admits the replacement of the absent arbitrator only when 
it is proved that absence was due to ill will on the part of that 
arbitrator. To sum up : in 1923, on the ground of political 
events, which had no connection with the work of the Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunal, and by way of reprisals against a troublesome 
occupation, a State withdraws its arbitrator and thereby disor-
(32) Recueil des décisions des T. 4. Ai. institués par les Traités de paix 
N” 24 (March 1923), p. 870 et seq.
(23) See the Minutes of the 23rd Session of the Council in the Official Jour­
nal of March 1923, p. 242 and Annex 446, p. 300. 
ganises the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. In 1927, another State, 
whose law is assailed by an arbitral award which was an exceeding 
of powers, exercises its right to stop the consequence of this 
exceeding of powers... What was regular in 1923 when, not on 
the ground of the Covenant, but of instinct, on that of arbitration 
and to put an end to an obvious attitude of ill will, the Council 
appointed neutral arbitrators to take the place of the defaulting 
national arbitrators, would no longer be regular in 1927 against 
a State which does not plead the political situation, but which, 
adopting a very different attitude, proves an exceeding of powers 
on the part of the tribunal and consequent prejudice to itself.
Second Point.
The Council of the League of Nations was validly able to recog­
nise the Roumanian claim on the basis of Article n, paragraph 2 
of the Covenant, notwithstanding the decision of the Mixed Arbi­
tral Tribunal of January 10th, 1927.
This assertion is based on the following considerations :
I. — The scope of Article n, paragraph 2 of the Covenant, 
in the language referred io above, is unlimited.
Il is in this article, in the name of any threat to peace or to the 
good understanding between nations upon which peace depends, 
that the Council finds the basis for action which, in order to 
realise the object of the article, must be and is freed by the text 
itself, in respect of its methods of application, from all limita­
tions. Dominated by the memories of the war, the Covenant has 
inscribed the word “ Peace ” on the frontal of the new interna­
tional order; it has entrusted the safeguarding of that peace to 
the Council, above any other organ of the League ; it had to give 
the Council absolute liberty as to the methods and formulas best 
calculated to ensure that peace.
It is worthy of note that all those who on any occasion 
whatsoever have had to give a doctrinal opinion on the scope of 
the powers conferred on the Council by Article u, paragraph 2 
of the Covenant hold that these powers are unlimited.
Professor Redslob, the author of the most recent and most sys­
tematic book in France on the League of Nations (Théorie de la 
Société des Nations, Paris, 1927), writes (p. 5o et seq.) in regard 
to Article 11 that : “ The scope of this article is extremely wide. 
It confers upon the League powers which, we might say, are
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unlimited. ” Thinking immediately of the nature of the methods 
of action of the» League under the same article, the author adds : 
“ It authorises it, nay more, it obliges it to employ all the 
methods calculated to maintain peace in the case of war or the 
mere threat of war... ” And, still further, he defines his thought 
as follows : “We are in presence of a block of marble the sub­
stance of which has been touched by no chisel. Its potentialities 
are unlimited. ” At almost the same time that M. Redslob, in 
his book on the Compétence de la Société des Nations dans le 
règlement des conflits internationaux (Paris, 1927), analysing 
(pp. 2g-3o and notably p. 33), the character of the legal scope 
of Article 11, M. C. Rousseau, in words very similar to those of 
Redslob, states “that it would be impossible to imagine a 
more general formula than that of Article 11.” Why should 
this astonish us, since “ the Council and the Assembly ” are 
“ above all, political organisations entrusted with the political 
settlement of international disputes ” (Ibid, p. 34). Unlimited 
powers resulting from a text which intentionally lacks precision, 
these are the features always noted by the commentators of 
Article il. For it must be observed that doctrine is always 
agreed on this point. That of Redslob in 1927 is only an empha­
sized reproduction of that of Larnaude, writing in 1920 {La 
Société des Nations, p. 12) : “The language of the law is decisive ; 
politics, on the contrary, express all decisions in flowing and 
elastic terms... A perusal of the most important articles of the 
Covenant shows this character of deliberate lack of precision. ” 
And the first article of the Covenant which illustrates this asser­
tion is precisely Article 11.
It is not only the specialists on the League of Nations who, in 
France, insisted and still insist on the unlimited character of the 
powers which Article 11, taken as a whole, have conferred on 
the Council. When finishing his Traité de Droit international 
public (Vol. 4, 1926, p. 667) not many days before the pen fell' 
from his hand in the silence and contemplation of his last medi­
tations, Paul Faudhille, passing a brief judgment on Article 11 
(for his hour was at hand), noted that the Covenant was very 
vague : “ It must therefore be inferred that the Council and the 
Assembly will have entire liberty in the choice of measures. ”
Germany is of the same opinion. Schücking and Wehberg 
say so pointblank (Die Satzung des Völkerbundes, 2nd Edition, 
Berlin, 1924, pp. 468-46g, D) in commenting on this article : 
What is required, “ according to the special provision of para­
graph 1, is above all to find a speedy solution of the question.” 
As to the appropriate measures (E. Die geeigneten Massna'hmen, 
p. 469), these are not merely opinions, or intervention between 
the two parties, but also any measure which may seem calculated 
to maintain effectually the peace of the world, a formula which 
the authors describe as valid for paragraph 2 as much as for 
paragraph 1.
In direct connection with the above theory, Strupp {Elements 
du droit international public universel européen et américain, 
Paris, 1927, p. 36), when examining Article n, also believes that 
“ it is for the League of Nations to determine what measures 
it considers calculated to bring about the desired result.”
It was, moreover, the theory of the unlimited competence of 
the Council, in virtue of Article n, which the eminent Pro­
fessor of the University of Rome, Signor Scialoja, submitted to 
the Council itself, at its Meeting of September 19,1927 (24).
What is the use, however, of reviewing thus a constant theory 
.which was solemnly confirmed, in the Council itself, in a passage 
which should be quoted at length from the “ Report approved 
by the Committee of the Council, on March i5, 1927, concerning 
Point 1 b of the French proposal for the reduction of arma­
ments.” — “It is impossible”, we read in this document (26), 
“ to place beforehand in rigid categories the infinitely varied 
events of international politics. It is impossible to circumscribe 
by resolutions, recommendations or expressed wishes the very 
extensive rights arising for the League out of its essential duty : 
effectually to safeguard the peace of nations. And further on : 
d) “ In virtue of Article 11, any war or threat of war is declared 
a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall 
take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safe­
guard the peace of nations.”
“ If there is no threat of war, but some circumstance threatens 
to disturb the good understanding between nations on which 
peace depends, this circumstance may be brought to the attention
(24) Minutes o[ the 45th Session o[ the Council, Opicial Journal o[ the League 
o[ Nations, July 1927, Annexe 96 a, pp. 832-833.
(26) See Doc. C 47th Session. Minutes 3 p. 2 : “What is, in that case the 
competence of the Council under Article 11 of the Covenant? This compe­
tence is not limited in. any way.*
of the Assembly or the Council by any Member of the League, 
so as to enable the Assembly or the Council to consider what 
should be done to restore this good understanding between 
nations ”...
Thus the theory recalled above—that of the unlimited powers 
of the Council' — “a Court of Justice ” entrusted with restoring 
a good understanding between nations by any appropriate means, 
is the only one which can be derived from the language of the 
whole of Article n, from its origin and from its nature.
a) Let us re-read the French text of Article n, paragraph 2 : 
“ Il est, en outre, déclaré que tout membre de la Société a le 
droit, à titre amical, d’appeler l’attention de l’Assemblée ou du 
Conseil sur toute circonstance de nature à affecter lés relations 
internationales et qui menace, par suite, de troubler la paix ou 
la bonne entente entre nations, dont la paix dépend ”, — “ Sur 
toute circonstance ” (any circumstance whatever)... The expres­
sion could not be more comprehensive : it embraces—as the 
practice of the League of Nations shows more and more — all 
situations, whether political or juridical (and even those in which 
law and politics are closely intermingled) and all acts : acts 
creating legal results (e. g. the affair of the expulsion of the 
oecumenical patriarch, February nth, 1926), executive acts (affair 
of the Upper Silesian frontiers, August 29th, 1921), collective 
material acts (e. g. affair of the incursion of bands of Bulgarians, 
April 20th,'192.3) or individual material acts.
Only one restriction is placed on the power which the Council 
possesses of dealing with “any circumstance whatever affecting 
international relations which threaten to disturb international 
peace or good understanding.” This is to be found in the clo­
sing sentence of Article 11, paragraph 1, to which paragraph 2 
supplies the inseparable sequel and conclusion : the Council 
cannot submit the question to itself. In order to take action it 
must wait until, at the request of any Member of the League, the 
Secretary General has summoned a meeting. But once it has met 
for the purpose of safeguarding peace, it recovers its complete 
liberty. The English text of Article 11, paragraph 1, is more 
expressive on this point than the French : “ And the League 
shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to 
safeguard the peace of nations ” (toute action qui pourra lui 
paraître sage).
Thus even if the question which may threaten good under­
standing is juridical in origin, the solution which the Council 
may propose need not be so in tenor, is it deems this to be wise 
for the sake of the peace for which it is responsible. The Council 
is dedicated by the Covenant, in virtue of Article n, much more 
to the “ safeguarding of peace ” than to the guardianship of the 
law, which is rigid in its principles and admits of no compro­
mise. — Since this is so, shall we not acknowledge that its 
authors were right not to specify the nature of the means to be 
employed by the Council and to concern themselves only with 
the “ effectual ” results of its action.
6) There is no need to be astonished at all this mechanism.
Redslob has already recalled this with reason (op. cit., p. 5i) : 
the empirical method of the Anglo-Saxons here also “ has set its 
stamp on the Covenant of the League.” Unchanging through 
the centuries, the race has conferred on the Covenant the elas­
ticity of its constitution, which was at the root of a great part of 
the success of its enterprises and which, transported into the 
sphere of its relations with the Dominions, produced that great 
result : an empire the bonds of which, though juridically loose, 
yet make for strength.
Moreover all this is not so new as might be supposed. Insti­
tutions evolve and become interrelated even though the mesh be 
invisible.
Article ir, paragraph 2, interpreted aright, is a new form of 
a procedure which has long been- known in international rela­
tions, and is here transformed, rejuvenated and purified. To 
reveal this aspect of its origin is to confirm its meaning and its 
scope : the unlimited powers which it confers on the Council. 
The name of this procedure is Intervention.
There is no need to dwell on its antiquity. The instrument of 
States which have material force at their command, intervention 
was sometimes exercised by a single Power sometimes by a group 
of Powers united by a temporary interest in solidarity; it was 
never exercised by all the States collectively, speaking on behalf 
of the international community. If intervention was sometimes 
exercised in the service of right in order to obtain reparation for 
some unintentional petty offence, or the violation of a contract, 
or to ensure respect for the most essential rights of humanity, 
very often, more often than not, it was employed on behalf of
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some personal interest. “ The personal interests (of States) ”, 
writes P. Fauchille in the paragraph on Intervention (Traité de 
Droit international public, vol. I., Part I, Peace, p. 545), “ were 
almost always the sole rule for their behaviour. When they 
thought that their policy or their ambition would gain by inter­
vening in the affairs of another State, they invoked the right of 
intervention. If they thought it to their advantage to avoid or 
prevent the active intervention of other States, they contested 
their right to intervene.” Hence the acts of interference in the 
internal life of weaker nations or in their internal destiny, which 
conceal personal designs when they do not openly betray or 
proclaim them, even while the intervention is alleged to be 
action to maintain the balance of power ; hence also, by way of 
“ counter-intervention ” (one offence begetting another where 
there is no tradition or treaty to prevent the abuse of these two, 
intervention and counter-intervention, either as regards the acts 
which justify them or the measures which set them in motion), a 
progressive decline or lapse into acts of war and into war itself 
(so-called peaceful blockade, occupation, bombardment).
Article ii, paragraphs i and 2, was an attempt to remedy some 
of these defects. While inheriting the idea contained in the Rus­
sian Note submitted in 1899 to the first Peace Conference, on the 
subject of mediation, which is also, to some extent, interven­
tion (26), it adds in reality a new contribution to the work of 
elucidating this obscure chapter of pre-war international law, 
the chapter on “ Intervention ”, Henceforth, in virtue of the 
Covenant and its metamorphoses, intervention (27) will, for the 
purposes which Article 11 has in view, be handled, in practice, 
exclusively by a body which is developing — one might almost 
say becoming gradually democratised. In this body, the small 
nations, a constant factor for moderation, who formerly had to 
submit to intervention, will permanently throw their weight on 
the side of compromise. This Body (in which each acts as a 
check on the other) is more and more in the public eye and 
subject to the criticisms of the world. And since the Covenant 
has bestowed upon it a moral responsibility which bears the 
marks of its origin and authorship, because this Body has to take
(26) Olof Hôijer, Le Pacte de la Société des Nations, Paris 1926, p. 190.
(27) This is the aspect which M. Le Fur discusses in his article : Philoso­
phie du droit international, Sec Revue générale de Droit international publie.- 
1921, p. 598.
action to safeguard peace otherwise it would be responsible for 
the consequences, — it cannot take refuge in abstention ; it 
must, with the fixed determination to obtain a practical and 
effectual result, make use of any means which the Covenant 
places at its disposal, a) material force, perhaps, and if it is 
necessary to go to such lengths, but force only in the last resort 
(whereas Intervention of the old type often had recourse to it 
straight away), — b) certain provisional 'measures (occupation 
of a territory by armies of small States), good offices, which 
consist merely of bringing the Parties together,— c) conciliatory 
measures, suggesting a solution of the dispute.
It was on this last alternative that the Council decided, when, 
on September 17th, 1927, it proposed that Hungary and Rou- 
mania should adopt the three principles recalled above when 
setting forth the facts ; this Roumania did immediately, subject 
to Hungary’s doing likewise. By so acting, the Council 
remained strictly within the letter and the spirit of the Covenant, 
which gives it unlimited powers for safeguarding peace, on con­
dition that in making use of these powers it does not set the 
destructive example of violating the law.
II. — Can it be said to have violated the law in urging the parties 
to disregard the award of January 10th, and to substitute for 
its ruling the three principles which it enunciates ? — Was it 
misapplying the law when it set over against res judicata by 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal the powers of Article n, para­
graph 2 ?
To maintain this would be an error.
A. — The authority of res judicata attaches only to a definitive 
award. — Here we shall be challenged. In Article 289 g of the 
Treaty of Trianon, the High Contracting Parties agreed “ to 
regard the decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal as final and 
conclusive.” True, but with this reservation, which is of the 
very essence of arbitration, and which is based on public order 
and recognised 'both by the theory and the precedents of arbi­
tration, namely that when the award given there was no 
exceeding of powers (as in this case, sec above, p. 377). How 
can an award be definitive when it does not exist? Before it can 
last and last for ever, it must first exist. The award of January 
10th, 1927, definitive P The award of January 10th, 1927, in 
force as res judicata ? This is an impossibility. There are only two 
alternatives : Either the exceeding of powers is certain and incon­
testable, which, by the way, we believe we have demonstrated 
it to be; in which case the award never existed, and no judge is 
required to affirm the fact; or, as M. Politis wrote in 1914 (La Jus­
tice Internationale, p. 92), long before the present case arose, 
“ if the exceeding of powers is not obvious, the course open to 
any who choose to take it is to come to an understanding with 
the opponent with a view to amicable agreement or renewed 
arbitration.” Arbitration or an understanding (such as Roumania 
asked the League to define in accordance with the spirit of the 
Covenant, which is the spirit of conciliation even more than 
of arbitration), it matters little. What matters is that, even on 
the second hypothesis, the award is not definitive.
B. — But even if the decision of January 10th, 1927, had had 
the force of res judicata, this force could not have constituted an 
obstacle to the Council’s acting, as it 'has done, on the basis of 
Article 11, paragraph 2.
The respect due to res judicata has its roots in the need for 
stability and social peace (see Lacoste : De la chose jugée en 
matière civile, criminelle, disciplinaire et administrative, 2nd Edi­
tion, Paris, 1904, and G. Jeze, Principes généraux de droit admi­
nistratif, 1914, p. 169). Because public tranquility demands that 
certain questions should not be repeatedly reopened, among 
which are those settled by a definitive decision of the judge, the 
need for regularity, peace and order among citizens of the same 
community having been learned in the course of time, the fun­
damental rule was laid down which is expressed in the old 
adage : “res judicata pro veritate habetur.” —The respect for res 
judicata, which was intended to pacify, to forestall vengeance 
and to prevent for ever the return of private strife, would lose 
its raison d’être, and would lead to the opposite result from that 
aimed at : public tranquility, if, owing to the circumstances, the 
obligatory and forced respect for res judicata, were to result in 
the aggravation of a certain social or political condition. From 
being a rule of wisdom, order, conservation, the rule would 
become, in that case, the source of fatal errors, disorder and des­
truction. — The wisdom of governments has caused them to 
proclaim and to obtain acknowledgment of their right to abstain 
from applying the law when public order demands that the law 
and its effects should temporarily be set aside (see Barthélemy, 
De la liberté du gouvernement à l’égard des lois dont il est chargé 
d’assurer l’application, in the Revue du Droit public et de la 
Science politique en France et à l’étranger, 1907, pp. 3o5 et seq.). 
The wisdom of the judges did not fail to provide for this difficulty 
when they acknowledged that those on whom the heavy task of 
preserving order in the State devolves had the power to ignore, 
temporarily or permanently, the respect due to res judicata.
The case — a celebrated one in French jurisprudence — which 
brought out this fundamental truth is not very far behind us. 
It has striking lessons to teach us in the present circumstances.
It would be superfluous to take the reader through the maze of 
facts and procedure which led to the decision given, on November 
3oth, 1923, by the Council of State in this country in the case of 
Couitéas v. the French State (see Sirey, 1923-3-27 et seq. with a 
note by the Dean, Me Hauriou and the conclusions of the 
Government Commissioner, M. Rivet; see also the note by Pro­
fessor Gaston Jèze in the Revue du Droit public et de la Science 
politique en France et à l’étranger 192/1, pp. 208). In this case, 
“ the Council' of State had to decide whether a colonist settled in 
Tunisia, to whom the administration persistently refused their 
support against the natives for the execution of an award of the 
civil Court, which had acquired the force of res judicata, was 
entitled to compensation for the dramage incurred.” The case, 
which was of exceptional gravity, opposed to principles, circums­
tances which affected the tranquility of a whole region; for it 
cannot he doubted (the official explanations are there to prove it, 
see Sirey, 1923-3-6/1, Column 2) that the forced evacuation, in 
virtue of the judge’s decision, of large tracts of land occupied by 
“ a whole tribe ” were bound to provoke resistance which might 
well develop into a general rising.
What did the Council of State decide?
Its decision is no secret. In accordance with the conclusions 
of its Government Commissioner, it said, as G. Jèze has expressed 
it (article mentioned above, p. 210), when summarising the argu­
ment of this eminent jurisdiction : “ It is the Government’s duty, 
when requested to put into force res judicata, to weigh the condi­
tions of this execution and it is its right to refuse the cooperation
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of armed force as long as it considers that this constitutes a 
menace to the order and security of the country ”, as long as 
internat peace is imperilled. When the execution of res judicata 
is hound to have more serious consequences “for the peace of the 
community ” than its non-execution, “ it is in the Government’s 
power to suspend or refuse the exception, as it is responsible for 
the order and security of the community ” (ibid., p. 211). — He 
adds that if from this non-execution (ibid., p. 2i3), abnormal 
préjudice results, “ it is equitable that pecuniary reparation 
should be made for this prejudice from the administrative 
resources ” (28). But this point of view, which is defensible 
when the financial resources of the community are set over 
against private interests of strictly limited extent, becomes inad­
missible if the unlimited extent of these interests is confronted 
with the impassable barrier of the preservation of the State.
Suppose we transport the principles of the Couitéas award 
from the limited sphere of national law and the interests of a 
private person and some hundreds of natives to the infinitely 
vaster domain of international law. The reasons on which they 
are based : the peace of the community, public tranquility, the 
imperative necessity for avoiding, not private war this time, but 
a disturbance of international relations which may lead to inter­
national war, are just as we found them a moment ago. Let us 
suppose further, in order the better to show, that the cases are 
parallel — and while maintaining strictly our contrary conclu­
sions — that the decision of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal of 
January loth, 1927, is innocent of any exceeding of powers, and 
let us ask ourselves what will be the effect of it in reality and in 
life. — The sentence admits the competence of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal for “agrarian affairs” in Transylvania ; in other words, 
it recognises the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to 
determine the conditions of the application of the Roumanian 
agrarian legislation to certain nationals of a foreign State who 
claim, not equality with the subjects, but real preferential treat­
ment. (This treatment consists, above all, of the conservation in 
kind of their property, as an exception to the general dispos­
session or, accessorily, of the payment of indemnities, in com­
pensation for property expropriated, which will take into account
(28) On this point (the right to compensation), the doctrine of the decision 
gave rise to contrary opinions.See D. Ducz, La re/tponsabilili..., p. 55). 
the depreciation in the currency of the country which has 
occurred since the expropriation). Consequently, the prospect 
which the award of January 10th, 1927, holds out is : either the 
disappearance of the small holdings of the peasants, which form 
the corner stone of social peace in Roumania, as the result of the 
collapse, in a whole section of the kingdom, of the agrarian 
reform, owing to the taking back of the land from its present 
holders, or else the instability of the finances, the overwhelming 
of the State financially by the weight of the indemnities which 
are de jure in excess of what is due and de facto beyond its 
resources.
In face of this peril, Roumanian opinion, already alarmed, 
may soon be in a ferment. —Even if the award of January 10th, 
1927, had been definitive (which it is not), could the Council of 
the League of Nations, on the pretext of not interfering with its 
execution, let the public order and the peace of Roumania run 
the terrible risk of a Peasants’ Revolt or of finanical collapse, 
that forerunner of revolutions? Rut the question is more compre­
hensive still.
Behind Roumanian public order, it is the public order of the 
whole of Europe, it is the peace of Europe and the world which 
is at stake. Even in the eyes of Hungary herself, who experienced 
the Red Terror of Budapest, Roumania stands on the banks of 
the Dniester, like a sentinel guarding a civilisation nearly two 
thousand years old, based on the family, on Christianity, on the 
liberty of individuals collaborating of their own free will, under 
the aegis of the law, in the interests of society; Roumania is an 
outpost in the service of all. If the great organisation entrusted 
with the sacred task of safeguarding peace had allowed her, if it 
were to allow her, to be molested in her public order, in her 
social peace, the sentinel would fall, and through the undefended 
breach would rush the reawakened spectre of universal war. 
The Council of the League of Nations could not desire this. Even 
if no exceeding of powers existed, in the interests of peace this 
great organisation would have been justified in setting aside the 
authority of res Judicata.
Third Point,
In the circumstances, the Council of the League of Nations 
was not obliged to have recourse to the opinion of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, and it was with reason that it 
did not adopt the Hungarian proposal (see the intervention of 
Count Apponyi, Minutes of the third public meeting of the 
Council held on September 19th, 1927, at 4 p. m., P- 5) that 
the opinion of the Court be asked as to “whether the three 
principles formulated in the report of the Committee of Three 
and adopted by the Council were really well founded.”
This affirmation is based on the following considerations :
I. — There is no text in the Covenant which lays on the Council 
the duty of asking for the opinion of the Court on 
any question or point whatever.
; Such a conclusion could certainly not be drawn from Article i4 
of the Covenant, which, in the French draft reads as follows; 
“ (La Cour) donnera des avis consultatifs sur tout différend ou 
tout point dont la saisira le Conseil ou l’Assemblée ”, whereas 
the English text is : “ The Court may also give an advisory 
opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the 
Council or by the Assembly. ” It is certainly in this sense of a 
simple option and not of a duty that the best authorities interpret 
the competence which the Council possesses to ask for the 
opinion of this Court (see de Bustamente. La Cour permanente 
de Justice Internationale, p. 274, § 238). M. Politis writes to 
the same effect (La Justice internationale, p. 172) : “ According 
to Article i4 of the Covenant, (the Court) is called upon to give 
an advisory opinion on any dispute or question referred to it by 
the Council or by the Assembly... ”
From this first principle, which cannot be questioned, it 
follows that the Council, on its moral responsibility, may, 
without even giving reasons for its refusal, refrain from acceding 
to the wish expressed by a State, that, on some dispute or some 
question, the opinion of the Court be asked for (see, on this 
point, the Memorandum of Judge John Basset Moore, Publica­
tions de la Cour, Series D, N® 2, 383).
The precedents supplied by the practice of the Council confirm 
this view. Professor Man'ley 0. Hudson took care to point this 
out in his very learned essay, published in November 1926, on 
the “ advisory opinions of the Court ” (The advisory opinions of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, publication of 
International Conciliation, November 192.5, N° ai4, p. 347 el 
sèq.). When, in 1923, the Corfu affair raised the question of 
the interpretation of Articles 12 to i5 of the Covenant, several 
members of the Council .were in favour of asking the Court for 
an advisory opinion. In the course of a prdlonged discussion, 
â great authority, the Swedish representative, the much regretted 
Mr. Branting, urged that the Council should ask the opinion of 
the Court (29). Nevertheless the proposal was rejected and it 
was to a special Committee of jurists that the Council entrusted 
the task of examining the questions drawn up by itself (3o).
Another precedent, also recalled by Manley 0. Hudson, is more 
typical, for the request for an opinion was made, not by a State, 
member of the Council, but by one of the parties to the dispute. 
In 1923, the Council of the League of Nations was again strongly 
urged, by the Lithuanian Government, to obtain the opinion of 
the Court on various questions rëlating to the action of the 
Council in the dispute over Vilna between Poland and Lithuania. 
The Council decided not to ask for the opinion of the Court. 
This abstention on the part of the Council was not approved by 
the Lithuanian Government ; it therefore placed its request on 
the agenda of the 4th and 5th Assemblies, but later, in each 
case (3i), it withdrew the request.
II. — From the fact that the Council is not obliged to ask 
for the opinion of the Court, it does not follow that it is always 
at liberty to ask for it.
Its competence is not discretionary, as one might be tempted 
to conclude from the English text of Article 44 in fine : “ The 
Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or 
questions referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly. ” 
If the real juridical régime of the opinions of the Court is to 
be understood, this text must be combined with general legal 
principles and with the other principles of the Covenant. In 
this connection, several observations must here be made, the
. (29) Minutes of the 26th Session of the Council of the League of Nations, 
Official Journal of the League of Nations, November 1923, pp. 1300 et seq. 
and. p. 1350.
(30) Ibidem, p. 1352.
(31) Acts of the 4th Assembly. Plenary Meetings. Official Journal of the 
League of Nations, p. 2 and Minutes 1st Commission. Annex 3, pp. 54, 56. 
Adde Acts of the 5th Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Journal of the 
League of Nations, pp. 10 and 115.
application of which to the case in point will corroborate the 
opinion advanced with respect to the affirmation made in regard 
to this third point.
First proposition. — The Permanent Court of International 
Justice, being an essentially juridical organisation, must not 
be drawn into political questions. The Council could not there­
fore have asked it, in September 1927, for its opinion on a 
question which has left the sphere of law and jurisdiction and 
has entered into the domain of conciliatory intervention.
; ;What was aimed at when the Court was created was “ a verit­
able and really permanent jurisdiction, composed of professional 
judges... giving their awards in an atmosphere of justice free 
from all political preoccupations, forming a body capable of 
creating traditions and drawing up a system of jurisprudence.” 
No commentary could better describe the true character of this 
Court than these lines taken from M. Politis’ work {La Justice 
Internationale, p. 157).
The personnel of the Court, to begin with, makes it a juridical 
body by origin and by temperament. To realise this, it is 
sufficient to refer to the very suggestive table, patiently drawn 
up by Strupp {Eléments, pp. 272-278), of the professions 
exercised by the Members of the Court. Out of sixteen names, 
there are nine jurists who are professors of law, two magistrates, 
one Lord Chancellor, one Minister, and one ex-Minister, of 
Justice.
The Court is given up to the examination of juridical questions 
by its competence ratione materiae. This competence extends, 
as is well known, to all cases submitted to it by the parties 
concerned and to all cases specially laid down in the treaties and 
conventions in force. The careful review in which M. Bloci- 
zewski recently passed all these cases (see La competence de la 
Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, in the Revue Géné­
rale de Droit International Public, 1922, p. 27 et seq.), demon­
strates superabundantly that the Court is on a strictly juridical 
plane. The demonstration is supported by the famous Article 36, 
paragraph 2, of the Statutes of the Court, which extends the 
obligatory competence of the Court only to all or some of the 
categories of disputes of a juridical order which are concerned 
with : a) the interpretation of a treaty; b) any point of interna­
tional law; c) the existence of a fact .which, if accomplished,
would constitute the violation of an international undertaking; 
d) the nature or extent of the reparation due for the non-fulfilL 
ment of an international undertaking.
What rules must the Court apply? Article 38 gives the 
answer : i) international conventions, whether general or special; 
2) international customs, as proof of a general practice accepted 
as lawful ; 3) the general legal principles recognised by civilised 
nations; 4) judicial decisions and the publications of the best 
qualified authorities, as an auxiliary method of determining 
the rules of law. (Note that equity, which is not excluded, may 
serve as a basis for the Court only if the parties are in agreement.) 
There again the judicial nature of the Court is manifested, since 
it judges according to established law.
As for the jurisprudence which the Court is drawing up, its 
whole value, which is essentially juridical, is brought out in the 
following comparison, publicly made on June 4th, 1926, by one 
of the most eminent authorities on international law, M. Weiss, 
Vice-President of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
between the work in progress of the new Court and that carried 
on by the Court of Arbitration : “The arbitral awards of The 
Hague, sometimes inspired by considerations which are not 
exclusively juridical, succeed one another and are not always 
alike. They are often the echo of the individual and dissimilar 
opinion of their drafter, and sometimes also they are1 the fruit 
of more less laborious diplomatic compromises, rather than the 
sure affirmation of an incontestable and uncontested rule of 
law. This is the defect which the Permanent Court of Interna­
tional Justice is meant to remedy (32). In this juridical 
atmosphere of the Court, the procedure of advisory opinion, 
the principle of which is open to dispute, is not sufficient to 
mitigate its juridical character. This is affirmed, no longer by 
theoretical commentators, but by the Court itself when, on 
April 21st, 192.3, the Council of the League of Nations submitted 
to it a request for an opinion on the affair of Eastern Carelia. 
It replied that it could not give an opinion since “ the Court, 
being a Court of justice, cannot depart from the essential rules
(32) Speech made by M. Weiss at the Institut de Hautes Etudes intematio- 
nales, 12, place du Panthicn, Paris, as Chairman of the meeting at which 
M. Demitre NeguJeseo, Professor of the University of Bucarest, Roumanian 
delegate to the League of Nations, gave a lecture on the Jurisprudence of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
which guide its activities as a tribunal, even when giving advi­
sory opnions ” (Publications de la Cour, Séries B, N° 5, Recueil 
des avis consultatifs, p. 29).
Now one of the rules governing the activities of judicial bodies 
is that they cannot be involved in questions of political or 
administrative expediency reserved for a competence other than 
their own.
This essential truth of internal national jurisdictions was 
bound to be carried over into the domain of the relations between 
the Permanent Court of International Justice and the Council. 
" The Court is not a political body ”, said Signor Salandra, the 
Italian representative, before the Council on September 26th, 1923, 
"and the jurists composing it sit as magistrates.” To refer 
political questions to the Court is “ to give the (latter a competence 
which its statutes do not confer upon it” (33). At a later meeting 
(that of September 27th), Lord Robert Cecil admitted freely that 
the Court “ was not instituted to settle political questions ”, and 
that « to the extent that the political side is at issue ” in any 
problem “ the Council remains sole judge in the matter ” (34).
This view, the only orthodox one, was taken again, quite 
recently, in the Salamis affair, which the Council began to 
examine at its forty-seventh meeting (September 28th, 1927). 
We read in the Minutes, reporting the declarations of one of 
the most eminent members of the Council : “ If the Council 
adopts the practice of asking the Court for an advisory opinion 
. on questions of which the Council is the sole judge, I am afraid 
that this procedure will damage the prestige of the Council and 
create the impression that it is incapable of settling such questions 
on its own authority. ”
Thus the principles and precedents are as clear as possible.
Their application to the Roumanian-Hungarian affair, as it 
came before the Council last September, is no less clear.
From the fact of the Roumanian request based on Article n, 
paragraph 2, of the Covenant, from the fact that the Council 
declared it admissible and examined it thoroughly, the affair of 
the Hungarian optants of Transylvania has left the judicial 
plane, that of the Court, and entered upon the political domain of
(33) Minutes of the twenty-sixth Session of the Council, Official Journal of 
the League of Nations, November 1923, p. 1331.
(34) Ibidem, p. 1342.
intervention on a basis of conciliation (as a beginning), that of 
the Council (or the Assembly). Quite legitimately, as we have 
demonstrated under the second point, the mission of collective 
mediator has been substituted for that of judge. Without delay 
— and with all the more haste as the dispute was an old one — 
this collective mediator set to work to find a solution of 
expediency. It might have proposed one of pure policy, of 
simple equity. It preferred to base it on principles which had 
the approval of a Committee of eminent jurists. This result 
does not affect in any way either the nature of the procedure or 
that of the proposals which it produced. (Being on the political 
plane, since entering on its new phase, the dispute is no longer 
a matter for any 'but the Council and does not call for an opinion 
of the Court.
Second proposition. — The request for the opinion of the 
Court was impossible, in default of interest.
A primary rule of procedure in all domains of the law is that 
the first condition for action is interest. This idea is expressed 
in the well-known adage : “ No interest, no action ”, and in that 
which says : “Interest is the measure of our actions.” Moreover 
this interest must definitely exist without appearing in an exclu­
sively material guise; in numerous cases, moral interest is 
sufficient as the basis for an action. From the domain of private 
law, this rule has passed into that of public law; it has there 
assumed so definite a character that systems of law which, like 
the French system, accept the submission to a jurisdiction, for 
cancellation, of acts of the administrative authorities, by action 
at law, make the exercise of the right of appeal dependent on a 
direct and personal interest.
This rule is based on considerations of order and social peace. 
It would be inadmissible if anybody, no matter who, could at 
any time set in motion the solemn apparatus of justice, without 
being prompted or authorised to do so by the necessity for 
defending a right, assailed or menaced. To tolerate the contrary 
would be to make the judges concur in a task of social disorder, 
whereas their raison d’être is to ensure discipline in the life of 
the community.
This being so, it seems impossible not to admit the same rule 
when it is no longer by action at law that a judge is being asked 
for the recognition and sanction of a right, but when a given 
authority is entitled (as in the case of various political organisa­
tions) to apply to him for an opinion. If there is not, is no 
longer, an interest behind the request for an opinion, the 
authority would be guilty both of highly incorrect behaviour 
towards the magistrates and of an anti-social act, in paralysing 
their function (when this function is recognised) as judge and 
as adviser, by submitting idle or futile questions. This point 
of view is a matter of common sense. In a briefer form no doubt, 
it is to this that the various constitutions of the American Union 
refer, which followed the example of the Constitution of Massa­
chusetts of 1870 (still in force), where it says : “Every branch of 
the legislature, as well as the Governor and the Council, shall 
have the right to obtain the opinion of the magistrates of the 
Supreme Court on important questions of law, and on solemn 
occasions ” (quoted by Manley 0. Hudson, The advisory opinions 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, publication of 
International Conciliation, November 1925, N° 2i4,' p. 353). A 
similar provision is to be found in the Constitutions of the States 
of New York of 1784, 1792 and 1902, Maine (1820), Colorado 
(amended in 1886) and South Dakota...
Far from invalidating our opinion that a request for an 
advisory opinion from the competent judges implies a real and 
present interest, the provisions alluded to above confirm it. 
From them it is evident that not only must there be an interest 
in the opinion being asked, but that this interest, far from being 
insignificant or of little importance, must be of a serious nature.
Moreover, not only has the point of view set forth above 
certain remarkable precedents in its favour, but the intrinsic 
character of the courts called upon to give an opinion must also 
be taken into consideration. Now when a Court of Justice is 
cailled upon to give an opinion, its character of Court of Justice 
is not outweighed by the special aspect presented by the 
conclusions to which it comes. So true is this, that in the Act 
passed in 1890, concerning advisory opinions in the Canadian 
province of Ontario (35) it is stated that “ the opinion of the 
Court shall be considered as an award of the Court ”, and that
(35) Revised statutes of 1914, c. $5, quoted by Manley O. Hudson. Ibidem^ 
p. 359.
against this opinion it will he possible to appeal, as against an 
award.
No longer in the constitutional sphere, but in that of interna­
tional institutions — in particular in that of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice, it was the Court itself which 
said (as we have already recalled) :
“ The Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot depart from 
the essential rules which guide its activities as a tribunal, even 
when giving advisory opinions. ”
The rule : “No interest, no action” is one of the essential 
rules guiding the activity of tribunals. The Court, the highest 
of all, cannot, any more than the most humble, depart from 
this rule, even when called upon to give an opinion. If then 
the request for an opinion cannot be based, or can no longer be 
based, on a certain and present interest, the request becomes 
impossible.
For the foregoing reason, a request for an opinion of the Court 
was no longer possible in September 1927. To realise this we 
must, at this point of out argument return to the history of the 
facts. What does this show? That at bottom the whole Rouma­
nian-Hungarian dispute turns on the following question : the 
Roumanian thesis asserts that all that Article 25o of the Treaty 
of Trianon forbids the Roumanian State is to subject the property 
of Hungarians in Transylvania to measures of liquidation. For 
the rest, the Treaty of Trianon cannot and could not establish any 
kind of preferential! treatment in favour of the Hungarian 
optants; on the same conditions as the Roumanian owners, and 
like them, the Hungarian optants can be expropriated for reasons 
of public welfare, and a fortiori for reasons of public necessity. 
To which the Hungarian argument (which it is hoped will prevail 
if the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal is relied on) 
replies by demanding, in favour of the optants, a veritable 
privilege of immunity from the application of the agrarian law 
(see de Lapradelle, Opinion concerning the agrarian affairs of 
the Hungarian nationals, Competence, p. 20, second proposition). 
“ In transferred territory, the nationals of the dismembered State 
cannot individually, and less still en masse, be deprived of the 
right to retain their property in kind! ” In which contention 
the Hungarian Government loses sight of the fact, which is 
nevertheless of paramount importance, that by an official letter 
to the Peace Conference, Count Apponyi himself demanded, as 
the maximum which could be granted to him, the equality of 
Hungarian nationals with Roumanian nationals (36). Now this 
equality was strictly recognised by the three points which the 
Committee of the Council, on the report of the six, induced the 
Council to set down as suggestions for an agreement between 
Roumania and Hungary. In these crcumstances any interest 
vanished which might otherwise have existed in the Court’s- 
being aked for an advisory opinion on the abstract value of 
these principles; for this second reason, in September 1927, the: 
Council was debarred from asking the Court for an advisory 
opinion.
Third proposition. — Supposing that the foregoing reasons 
had not rendered impossible a request for the opinion of the- 
Court, the Council could only have asked for this opinion with 
the unanimous consent, a) of the members of the Council, b) of 
the parties to the dispute represented on the Council, in virtue- 
of Article li, paragraph 5, of the Covenant.
A. — As the Covenant and the Statutes of the Court are silent, 
on this point, it has been debated whether the Council could 
ask for the opinion of the Court by a simple majority or whether 
it has to decide unanimously.
Those in favour of decision 'by a simple majority (Baker, 
Jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, British Year Book of 
international Law, 1926, p. 76, followed by a young Polish 
author, Gonsiorowski, Société des Nations et problèmes de la 
Paix, Volume 2, p. ^73) contest the necessity for a unanimous, 
decision, alleging first of all a fundamental distinction between 
the decision, the verdict of the Court and the opinion of the 
Court. Under B we shall see that this view is mistaken in that 
it confines itself to the terms of abstract law and does not take 
into account the actual bearing of the Court’s advisory opinion. 
Moreover, these authors think that they can support their point
(36) “We ask for a reassuring’ slaloment to the effect that no property 
belonging to our nationals on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy shall be sequestrated, liquidated or expropriated by virtue of a 
legal provision or by means of a special measure which does not apply, in 
the same conditions, to the subjects o[ the liquidating Ulate or o[ the State- 
pulling such a measure into [oree." 
of view by two other kinds of consideration, neither of which 
is conclusive.
i) A request for an opinion constitutes, so they say, one of 
those questions of procedure which, under Article 5, paragraph 2, 
of the Covenant are decided by a majority of the Members of 
the League represented at the meeting. It will be admitted 
that to reduce the request for the opinion of the Court to a simple 
question of procedure is not easy to reconcile with the prestige 
which surrounds this supreme tribunal ; what is more serious 
is that to assimilate unrestrictedly the request for an opinion to 
a question of procedure is quite erroneous. The request for an 
opinion may be a question of procedure, but in other and far 
more frequent circumstances it will not be one. In point of 
fact it has never been one since the Court began to give opinions. 
How then is it to be decided whether the request by the Council 
for an opinion of the Court constitutes or does not constitute a 
question of procedure? By dwelling on the intrinsic nature of 
the point or of the dispute to be submitted to the Court for an 
opinion. If the content of the problem to be submitted to the 
Court brings into play the rules intended to ensure the order, 
discipline and good working of the deliberations of the Assembly 
or the Council (Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Covenant), the 
question submitted for an opinion will be a question of procedure 
and the request for an opinion may be decided by a simple 
majority; but if the content of the point or of the dispute to be 
submitted to the Court for an opinion is concerned with the 
substance of the law, that is with the legal principles which 
determine rights and duties, the question is no longer one of 
procedure; to decide that the opinion of the Court must be 
obtained in this matter, the Council, bound by the general 
principles of Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, will have 
to decide unanimously to have recourse to the Court.
2) Those in favour of requesting an opinion on a simple 
majority vote, alarmed at the extreme precariousness of their 
original position, quickly fell back on other’ground. Remember­
ing that the Council appoints, on a simple majority vote, 
committees of jurists, which come within the definition of 
Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, they apply, arbitrarily 
and by extension, the principle of a majority decision to the
resolution 'by which the Council asks for the opinion of the 
Court (see Baker, loc. cit., p. 76). In so doing, their point of 
departure is the idea that the Council is pursuing the same end 
(that of obtaining information) when it appoints a special 
Committee of Jurists and when it decides to ask for the opinion 
of the Court (see Baker, loc. cit., p. 75); after which, from the 
identity of the ends pursued by two different procedures, they 
deduce the identity of the juridical régime (majority regime) to 
which the decision must be submitted which brings into play 
one or the other régime. They forget that the identity of jurid­
ical regimes is based on the identity of juridical natures and not 
on the identity of aims. New to set up an entirely new organ 
(a committee of jurists) in order to obtain its opinion and to 
decide to ask the opinion of a Court already in existence are two 
operations quite distinct in nature, since into the former (which 
is entirely creative) there enters a factor which does not appear 
in the second : the designation of a certain number of persons to 
be chosen by vote.
Our conclusion under A is, therefore, that no valid reason 
exists why the Council, in the matter of asking the opinion of 
the Court, should be allowed to set aside the general rule for its 
deliberations, which, except where otherwise expressly provided 
in the Covenant, is that of “ the agreement of all the members 
of the League represented at the Meeting (Article 5, para­
graph 1) ”,
Great authorities on legal doctrine have not hesitated to adopt 
this viewr. This is the case with Mac Nair in his article (An 
advisory opinion) in the British Year Book of International Law, 
1926, pp. i-i3, and Oppenheim in the fourth edition of the 
Traité de Droit international (Volume II, p. 55) : “ Except where 
the Council merely seeks an opinion on a question which is itself 
one of procedure, its decision to make a request is not a matter 
of procedure, and requires absolute unanimity of the members 
of the Council present at the meeting, including, if present, as 
they arc entitled to be, the representatives of the disputants. ” 
This point of view is also shared by another high authority 
on international law, M. Raoul Fernandès, iBrazilian Ambassador 
to Belgium, and Delegate to the League of Nations.
In a lecture given at the University of Brussels on January 
nth, 1927, the illustrious Brazilian jurist said :
“It would, he. quite inadmissible to assimilate the request 
for an opinion of. the Gouri to a. decision relating to invest 
igation or expert advice ; the League of Nations will give 
any value it. pleases to the conclusions of a Committee of 
inquiry or to those of experts, whereas it can only bow to 
the opinion.' of the Court. To have recourse: to the. latter 
is riot an expedient of procedure but a declining of 
competence. It. is thus entirely in- conformity with Article 5 
of the Covenant for the resolution, to be taken unan­
imously..” (37).
B. — The unanimity mentioned above is absolute unanimity : 
by which is meant : unanimity which includes even the votes of 
the representatives of the disputants, assuming that they exercise 
the rights conferred on them by Article 4, paragraph 5, of the 
Covenant (which is the case in the present phase of the Rou­
manian-Hungarian- dispute).
This principle is the only one admissible if the real bearing 
of the opinions of the Court is to be kept in sight. Doubtless 
the opinions of the Court are not, in theory, binding on the 
Council, but the persuasive force of these opinions is so great 
that, in practice, the Council never ignores their conclusions.
This character of an indirect award, possessed by the opinions 
of the Court, has been noted more than once. In his book already 
quoted several times (La Justice Internationale, p. 173), M. Politis, 
when speaking of the legal opinions of the Court on a dispute 
already in existence, did not hesitate to express his view thus : 
" (The Court) is asked to give an opinion which is, indirectly, 
an award. ” M. Travers is equally definite (La Cour Permanente 
de Justice International, in the Revue Generate de Droit Inter­
national Public, 1925, p. 44) : “ in pont of fact, the Council 
cannot fail to adopt the opinion of the Court ” — “ If it were to 
depart from it, it would appear to be violating the rules of law 
and, at the same time, it would be assailing the moral authority 
of the Court ” — Another author who has consecrated an 
exhaustive article to the organisation and competence of the 
Court, Fachiri (The Permanent Court of International Justice, 
1925, p. i35) observes that “ the advisory competence of the
(37) Raoul Fernandes ; Les Etals-Unis eti la Cour Permanente de Justice Inter­
nationale, Brussels, 1927. Publisher : Rene van Sulpcr.
Court offers, in cases of a juridical character, an indirect means 
of access to the Court which, in practice, may be utilised as a 
substitute for directly obligatory jurisdiction.” This is not 
all pure theory. That “the independence” of the Council 
“ would in some degree be annihilated ” when the Court had 
given an opinion, was admitted twice over of his own free will 
by the Italian representative on the Council of the League of 
Nations in 1923, at the Meeting of September 27th (38). There 
is nothing astonishing in this ; the contrary would result in the 
destruction xof the Court’s authority.
And let the Council but suggest, as it did in 1927 (see Meeting 
of September 19th, 1927, at 11. a. m. Doc. C/^th Session. 
Minutes 3, p. 2) when the matter was laid before it in virtue of 
Article 11, that it could take sanctions against the parties who 
did not fall in with suggestions obtained from the Court in the 
form of an advisory opinion, and it is still easier to understand 
the idea expressed by Fachiri that “ in cases of a juridical 
character ” the advisory competence of the Court is merely an 
indirect means of access to its obligatory jurisdiction. In these 
conditions, what becomes of the principle whereby a jurisdiction 
is obligatory only for the States which have accepted it? If this 
principle must be safeguarded, and it must, otherwise a certain 
violence Would be done to the States who had not signed the 
optional clause of Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statutes of the 
Court, there is no choice but to agree that the opinion of the 
Court can only be asked for by absolute unanimity of those 
present at the Council (or Assembly), including the represent­
atives of the parties to the dispute.
In applying these principles to the happenings before the 
Council in September 1927, we shall affirm that, if it had been 
possible, the request for an advisory opinion of the Court, ought 
to have been made by a unanimous vote of the members of the 
Council', including the Hungarian and Roumanian represent­
atives.
(38) See Minutes of the 26lh Meeting of the Council, Official Journal o[ the 
League of Nations. N. Nov. 1923, pp. 1339 and 1342 : ‘‘I admit that the opi­
nion of the Court would have great weight ; so much weight that it would bo 
difficult for us to hold a different opinion.”
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, .4.— THE FACTS
a) With a view to remedying difficulties of a social order, 
Roumania instituted, in 1913, an agrarian policy the object of 
which was to convert large landed estates situated in Roumanian 
territory into small holdings. This policy was pursued after 
Roumania’s entry into the world war. On March 22nd, 1927, 
the King promised that immovable property would be transferred 
to soldiers by means of measures similar to those which had, in 
general, been proposed in igi3. A clause in accordance with 
the tenor of the agrarian legislation was inserted in the Consti­
tution of 1917, voted by the Constituent Assembly elected in 
1914, and sitting, in 1917, at Jassy, with the expressly declared 
object of introducing the principle of expropriation in the general 
interest. After the declaration of Peace, the Roumanian Govern­
ment was forced to take steps particularly against the possibility 
of measures of a subversive nature (it must not be forgotten
(•) Translated from the French version.
that Roumania s neighbour was Russia, where private ownership 
had been abolished by dividing estates among the people); it 
voted two laws, one on July 17th, 1921, which applied to the 
old Kingdom, and the other on July 3oth, 1921, the object of 
which was expropriation of landed property in the newly ac­
quired territories; both of these laws were based on the amend­
ment introduced in the Constitution of 1917 (2) and provided 
for the expropriation of estates exceeding a given area, against 
pecuniary compensation. These laws made no discrimination 
between Roumanian nationals and the nationals of other States 
—particularly of Hungary.
b) Landowners domiciled in Roumanian territory but who, 
in accordance with the Peace Treaty of Trianon, had onted for 
their mother-country, Hungary, then protested against the ap­
plication of the Roumanian agrarian laws, particularly on the 
grounds that the sums to be paid in compensation would not, 
especially with the depreciation of the Roumanian currency, 
represent the equitable compensation which, in their opinion — 
supported by their Government—was due to them in conformity 
with the recognised principles of international law in force 
After submitting an application to the Conference of Ambas­
sadors, which was rejected for reasons of jurisdiction, Hungary, 
relying on Article 1 [ of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
appealed to the Council of that body requesting it to examine 
the substance of the question, to -declare that the measures 
introduced by Roumania were contrary to the provisions of 
Article 25o of the Treaty of Trianon and to order the restitution 
of the land and other property expropriated; finally, to order 
that full compensation be paid for the damage suffered by the 
Hungarian optants in Roumania. Negotiations opened in 192.3 
in Rrussels under the chairmanship of M. Adatci, appointed by 
the Council for that purpose, having failed, certain Hungarian 
nationals who had suffered damage as a result of the Roumanian 
—measures lodged a complaint with the Roumano-Hungarian 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (3) set up under Articles 23g and 25o 
of the Peace Treaty of Trianon, claiming that the measures 
imposed on Hungarian nationals domiciled in Roumanian ter­
ritory constituted acts contrary to Article 200 of the Treaty of 
Trianon which precluded all liquidation in regard to those nation-
(2) See the OHicial Journal o[ the League o[ Nations, 1923, p. 730.
(3) Hereinafter called the M.A.T.
als. Consequently, they demanded that their land be restored 
to them or that fair pecuniary compensation be paid to them.
Roumania, on the other hand, in 1926, argued before the 
M. A. T. that this Tribunal was not competent to deal with the 
matter since, according to the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, 
it could hear and determine only those questions mentioned in 
those provisions, which did not provide for situations of the 
nature of that which had arisen from the measures forming the 
subject of the dispute.
On January 10th, 1927 the M. A. T. declared itself competent 
(against the vote of the Roumanian arbitrator, who expressed a 
dissenting opinion) and cited in support of its decision Arti­
cle 25o, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Trianon; thereupon Rou­
mania, by a note dated Febuary 24th, withdrew her judge and 
refused to allow him to sit on the Tribunal for the 22 cases 
affected by the decision of January 10th, if, as was the intention 
of the Tribunal, the substance of the cases was discussed. At 
the same time, Roumania laid the matter before the Council of 
the League of Nations in virtue of Article n, paragraph 2, of 
the Covenant (4)- Hungary replied on March 7th, 1927, by 
requesting the Council to appoint two arbitrators, to be chosen 
from nationals of Powers which had remained neutral during 
the world war, in accordance with Article 289 of the Treaty of 
Trianon, in order that the M. A. T. might continue to func­
tion (5).
The British representative having been asked to study the 
question and to report at the next session of the Council and 
having asked that the representatives of Chili and Japan be 
appointed to act with him, the Committee so formed, known 
as the Committee of Three, which could not forget that the 
matter had originally been submitted to the Council not under 
Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon but under Article 11 of 
the Covenant, and that its intervention had been asked for, 
first of all by Roumania and then by Hungary, considered 
that it could not evade the duty imposed on it by the 
Covenant and confine itself simply to the election of two deputy 
members for the M.A.T. which the Hungarian representative had
(4) Official Journal of the League, 1027, p. 350 ff.
(5) Official Journal of the League, 1027, p. 370 ; the case of Ihe Agrarian reform 
in Roumania and the Hungarian optanls in Transylvania before the League of 
Nations, 1927, p. 71.
as a result of the proceedings demanded. If it did so, it would 
have failed to discharge its political duties as a mediator and 
conciliator (6) in the dispute which extended far beyond the 
actual terms in which it had been originally submitted by the 
two parties. Considering therefore that it could not take a purely 
and strictly legal view of the Council’s duties, especially as it 
realised that the election of the two deputy members would not 
have finally ended the difference (7), the Committee attempted 
to reach a solution which would have led to better feelings. 
No understanding having been reached owing to the failure to 
obtain the consent of the parties in dispute, the Committee, after 
having consulted eminent legal authorities (8) and having mi­
nutely examined the question of the M.A.T.’s jurisdiction, for­
mulated the three following principles:
1) The provisions of the peace settlement effected after the 
war of 1914-1918 do not exclude the application to Hungarian 
nationals (including those who have opted for Hungarian nation­
ality') of a general scheme of agrarian reform.
2) There must be no inequality between Roumanians and 
Hungarians, either in the terms of the agrarian law or in the 
way in which it is enforced. I
3) The words “retention and liquidation" mentioned in 
Article 25o, which relates only to the territories ceded by Hun­
gary, apply solely to the measures taken against the property 
of a Hungarian in the said territories and in so far as such owner 
is a Hungarian national.
Commenting on these three principales, the Committee 
declared:
In regard to N° 1 : “Article 2.5o forbids the application of 
Article 282 to the property of Hungarian nationals in the trans­
ferred territory. Under the terms of Article 260, the prohibition 
to retain and liquidate cannot restrict Roumania’s freedom of 
action beyond what it would have been if Articles 232 and 200 
had not existed. Even if none of these provisions appeared in 
the Treaty, Roumania would none the less be entitled to enact 
any agrarian law she might consider suitable for the require-
(6) The italics are the author’s.
(7) Report of Sir Austen Chamberlain, 47lh session of the Council, meeting oi 
Sept 17th, 1927, document C. 47th session Minutes I, page 4.
(8) Report C. c. p. 5.
ments of her people, subject to the obligations resulting from 
the rules of international law. There is, however, no rule of 
international law exempting Hungarian nationals from a gene­
ral scheme of agrarian reform.
“The question of compensation, whatever its importance from 
other points of view, does not here come under consideration. ”
In regard to N° 2 : “Any provision in a general scheme of 
agrarian reform which either expressly or by necessary impli­
cation singled out Hungarians for more onerous treatment than 
that accorded to Roumanians, or to the nationals of other States 
generally, would create a presumption that it was intended to 
disguise a retention or liquidation of the property of Hungarian 
nationals as such in violation of Article 200 and would entitle 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to give relief. The same would 
apply in the case of a discriminatory application of the Agrarian 
Law. ”
In regard to N° 3: “ The right which the Allied Powers reserv­
ed to themselves under Article 282 to retain and liquidate Hun­
garian property within their territory at the time of the entry 
into force of the Treaty applies to the property of a Hungarian 
inasmuch as he is a national of an ex-enemy country. It is not 
sufficient that these measures entail the retention of Hungarian 
property by the Government and that the owner of this property 
is a Hungarian. The measure must be one which would not 
have been enacted or which would not have been applied as it 
was if the owner of the property were not a Hungarian. ”
With these principles in mind, the Committee suggested 
that the Council should request: 1) the Parties to conform to the 
three principles; 2) Roumania to reinstate her judge on the 
M.A.T.
The Council did not accept this second suggestion nor did 
it appoint any deputy judges in accordance with the proposal 
made by the Hungarian Delegation; the latter had also suggested 
to Roumania that terms of submission should be prepared, sub­
mitting the question of a possible exceeding of powers by the 
Roumano-Hungarian M.A.T. to the permenent Court of Inter­
national Justice; this proposal was rejected by Roumania (g).
Acting in virtue of Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, 
and without taking into account the decision taken by the
(9) See Doc. C. I. c., p. 7.
M.A.T. on January joth, the Council prefered to confine itself 
to asking the two parties to accept the three theses set forth by 
the Committee, without requesting The Hague Court of Justice 
for an advisory opinion, also requested by Herr Stresemann.
B. — LAW.
I
The procedure followed or proposed for the purpose 
of settling the dispute.
a) The Proceedings before the Roumano-Hungarian M. A. T.
i) In declaring itself competent, did the Roumano-Hungarian 
Arbitral Tribunal exceed the limits of its jurisdiction ?
If so, what would be the consequences of this exceeding 
of powers?
ad) General considerations.
One of the consequences of the juridical character of any 
arbitral authority is that arbitral tribunals, which limit Ithe 
sovereign powers of States and owe their raison d’etre and juri­
dical existence to the will of those States, have no rights other 
than those expressly and definitely conferred upon them.
The principle: exceptiones sunt striclissimce interpretationis, 
must here be admitted with all its resulting consequences (io).
It follows that, if the Arbitral Tribunal did not scrupulously 
observe .the limits laid down for it, or if it deals with a question 
outside its jurisdiction, nothing has been done, nihil actum est; 
there is no decision and the injured party has no need to ressorl 
to juridical measures with a view to the cancellation of the 
so-called award (n).
When from the juridical point of view nothing has been
(10) Alvarez : VEurope Nouvelle of '20,10.27, p. 1153. Strupp : Die Zuständig­
keit der gemischten Schiedsgerichte des Versailler Friedensvertrags, 1023, p. 3 
and the writers quoted in Note 4 of this latter work.
(11) If, in cases of this kind, the parlies have frequently resolved to refer to 
another arbitral tribunal, which has dealt with this question of an exceeding of 
powers, it was, in my opinion merely a precautionary measure of psychological 
importance taken for the purpose of allaying public opinion ; from (he juridical 
point of view such a step was unnecessary ; an award merely establishes a [act 
(simply declaratory in its egecl}.
accomplished, there can be no reaction against an act which 
is juridical non-existent (12).
But if this is —in my opinion — incontestable, at does not 
follow that every interpretation, even objectively false, given 
by a certain arbitral tribunal >.to the clauses defining its jurisdic­
tion, constitutes in itself an excess of powers. It ;is universally 
agreed that an arbitral tribunal can declare or refuse <to acknow­
ledge its competence, in a preliminary decision (i3)..
There :is an excess of powers if, in inteipreting the text of 
terms of submission, on which its jurisdiction is based, it pro­
ceed ulra petita partium; if for example, it pronounces on a 
question the solution of which, although of interest for the con­
crete case, has not been requested by either of the parties; if ’it 
awards damages when none have been claimed, confining itself 
perhaps to the statement of an international offence, etc.
But this question should not be confused with the other, in 
which the arbitrators in declaring themselves competent, for 
example, reached that conclusion through considerations which 
are the expression of their judicial convictions, without any re­
fusal of justice. It is therefore a question of interpretation of 
the decision itself and especially of the effect of that decision.
The note relating to the case of the U. S. and Paraguay 
Navigation C° (i4) very rightly expresses the following opinion : 
“The arbitrator’s right to interpret the terms of submission is 
admissible only in so far as they exercise that right In a reason­
able manner ; if the controversy is distorted from its true sense 
through an abusive interpretation, the award becomes voidable
(12: See, with the numerous references, based on international practice .and 
doctrine : Strupp, Die Zuständigkeit der gemischten Schiedsgerichte in ihrem 
ganzen Umfang, pp. 57-64 ; and L-ArnADELLE-PoLiTis, 'Recueil des arbitrages inter­
nationaux, II, 1924, pp. 51, 420 Lammasch, Die Lehre von der Schiedsgerichts­
barkeit in ihrem ganzen Umfange, 1913, p. 217.
(13) See Lammasch, I. c., 166 ; Lapradelee-Politis, II, 51 (doctrinal note), I, 105 
(" who rightly say thatariy other view would lead to the conclusion that, when­
ever a plea of incompetence was submitted, the arbitrator would be obliged to 
admit it ”
See also : Meurer, Friedensrecht der Hager Konferenzen 1905, p. 330, Rolin 
Jacquemyns in the Revue de Droil international et de Législation comparée (refer­
red to as R. D. I. C.), IV, 139.
Fauchille, Traité de Droit ini. public I, Part 3, .1926, p. 548 ; Annuaire de I’lnsti- 
tul, I, 126. — See also Art. 73 of the Convention of 1907 on the amicable settle­
ment of international disputes .; Art. 36, IV of the Statutes of the Court .of 
International Justice.
See also Lauterpacht, Private ,lau> sources and analogies of international law, 
1927, p. .208.
(14) See Lapradelle-Politis, II, 51.
on the grounds of an excess of powers and the parties are free to 
disregard it. ” (i5).
But “ for an arbitral award to be invalidated, it is not suffi­
cient that the interpretation of the terms of submission to arbi­
tration be doubtful or even contestable; if this were so, arbitra­
tion would too often be a parody of justice, for if there were the 
slightest ambiguity in the terms of submission, the unsuccess­
ful plaintiff would be given too easy a pretext for evading the 
award on the ground that the interpretation given was erro­
neous. ” (16)
bb) What are the conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing, 
in so far as concerns the present case ?
i) Although neither the Treaty of Trianon nor the rules of 
procedure laid down by the arbitrators on July 10th, 1922 (17) 
contain any specific clause on this point, there is no doubt that 
the M. A. T. has the right to interpret the norms governing 
its jurisdiction. (See paragraph as above).
If therefore Roumania pleaded the incompetence of the 
M. A. T., it was the duty and right of the latter to examine the 
rule on which its competence is based. In a dispute which 
showed, in so far as the question of competence only was con­
cerned, certain points of similarity with the case here under 
examination, the Court of International Justice at The Hague 
expressed the following opinion :
“ The Court should, first of all, examine whether Article 23 
of the Geneva Convention (determining the jurisdiction of the 
Court) confers upon it the right to hear and determine the 
dispute submitted to it, and, in particular, whether the provi­
sions to be referred to in pronouncing upon the application are 
included among those regarding which the jurisdiction of the 
Court is established,” (t8) and as a result of its enquiry, the Court 
reached — 1. c. — the following conclusions, which have the 
same value in the present controversy :
(15) The italics are the author’s.
(16) The italics are the author’s. See also resolution No, 9 (26.7.27) of the Court 
of Justice, P. 32. It is true that jurisdiction is limited since it exists only to the 
extent recognised by the Powers; consequently, in the event of contestation, 
the Court can declare itself complètent only on condition that the weight o[ the 
reasons militating in favour o[ such competence is absolutely convincing. See 
also Ralston, Law and procedure of international laxv, 1926, p. 51.
(17) See the Decision of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, II, 1923, p. 826 ff.
(18) See Publications of the Arbitral Court, N  6, p. 15.*
“ In view of the decision which it is here asked to take, the ■ 
Court thinks it should examine the above questions even if such 
an examination obliges it to touch upon matters connected with 
ihe substance of the question, on the understanding, however, 
that nothing contained in the present award shall restrict its 
complete freedom of judgment in discussions of the substance 
of any arguments which may in future be advanced by one or 
other of the parties in connection ivith the same questions. ” 
(19). In the present case, Article a5o of the Treaty is the sedes 
materice. It is worded as follows :
“Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 282 and the 
Annex to Section IV the properly, rights and interests of Hun­
garian nationals or companies controlled by them situated in 
the territories which formed part of the former Austro-Hun­
garian Monarchy shall not be subject to retention or liquidation 
in accordance with these provisions.
“Such property, rights and interests shall be restored to their 
owners freed from any measure of this kind, or from any other • 
measure of transfer, compulsory administration or seques­
tration, taken since November 3, 1918, until the coming into 
force of the present Treaty, in the condition in which they were 
before the application of the measures in question.
“ Claims made by Hungarian nationals under this Article 
shall be submitted to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for 
by Article 289. ”
/
2) Before taking up the question of substance, the Roumano- 
Hungarian M. A. T., to which Roumania submitted her plea of 
incompetence, was therefore obliged to pronounce on the ques­
tion whether the measures which Hungary claimed to be mea­
sures of “retention and liquidation” in the meaning of Ar­
ticle 260, paragraph 1, were really of that nature from the juri­
dical point of view; for it was only in the case of such “ reten­
tion or liquidation ” imposed on persons mentioned in this first 
paragraph, that the Tribunal’s competence was justified. In 
proceeding to this examination, the two judges, representing 
the majority of the M. A. T., without taking into account the 
external aspect of the measures adopted, had to ascertain whe­
ther, from the nature of the measures taken and from the con-
(19) Author's italics. 
ception of Article 25o, they could fall to be dealt with under 
that Article;. Now, what were the considerations which led: the 
M. A. T.. to declare itself competent in the present dispute?
It is true that the M. A.. T. bases its argument on the fact 
that “in inserting’Article 200 in the Treaty of Trianon, the 
intention of; the Allied and Associated Powers was fully to pro­
tect the property, rights and interests of Hungarian nationals, 
situated within the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, from all the measures, mentioned in Article 23a and 
the Annexe thereto, Section IV,. as well as in Article 260 itself, 
and to place these properties, rights and interests under the 
régime of common international law.
“Whereas, in order properly to judge of the question of the 
competence of the Tribunal it must above all be ascertained 
whether or not the measures here objected to have the charac­
teristics of one or other of the measures which in the terms of 
Article a5o can give rise to claims that can be laid before the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal; and whereas if the Tribunal finds that 
such is the case it is furnished with elements sufficient to esta­
blish its competence, but it is only after examining the sub­
stance of. the. claim that the Tribunal will be in a position to 
judge whether the circumstances of the case are really of a na­
ture to justify the application of Article 25o; and whereas the 
statement made by the defendant to tire effect that these mea­
sures were taken in execution of the agrarian reform law in 
Transylvania, the Banat, Crishana and Maramures, has no bearing 
on the question of competence; and whereas it is only in the 
event of the Tribunal declaring itself competent that the defen­
dant can,, in submitting his arguments as to the substance of the 
matter, state his reasons based on agrarian reform legislation, 
or any other reasons of substance he may wish to advance to 
prove that Article. 25o should not operate in this case; an whe­
reas the (other) facts advanced by. the applicant are sufficient 
to show that, in. this, case, it is a question of a measure affecting 
the ownership of. ex-enemy, property in that it was taken away 
in. its entirety from the owner and. without, his consent; that this 
measure constitutes, a violation of the general, principle of the 
respect of acquired rights and oversteps the limits of common 
international law and. that it is quite in the nature of a liquida­
tion in the meaning of Article 25o and consequently falls to be 
included among the measures referred to in that article;, whereas 
the defendant claims that the measure referred to in Article 2&0 
under the name of “ liquidation ” is a war measure taken for 
war purposes, the most characteristic feature of which is that 
it affects ex-enemy property “ as such ” and that the expropria­
tions arising out of the agrarian reform do not, by their very 
nature, constitute liquidation since they are in no manner what­
soever differential measures and, in any event, are not measures, 
taken for war purposes; that they are therefore in no way in­
compatible with Article a5o; whereas it emerges clearly from 
the provisions of Articles 282 and 25o and from paragraph 3 of 
the Annex, Section IV, that' the liquidation in the meaning" of 
Article a5o can be either war liquidation or post-war liquidation, 
that the meaning of either of these operations is the same and 
that they differ only in their object; that, in both cases, it is a 
question of subjecting ex-enemy property, rights or interests to 
a treatment which constitutes a derogation to the rules generally 
applied in so far as concerns the- treatment of foreigners and 
to the principle of the respect of acquired rights...
For these reasons, and without attaching any importance to 
the above-mentioned negotiations at Brussels, when the Hun­
garian delegate, who was later disowned by his: Minister, did 
not contest — and this is confirmed by the minutes of these 
negotiations — that the Treaty of Trianon did not preclude the 
expropriation of property belonging to optants for reasons of 
public welfare, the M. A. T. declared itself competent (20).
This declaration of competence does not' seem satisfactory. 
While conforming to the terms of Award' N° 7 given by the- 
Court of Justice in what was, moreover, too “ slavish ” a man­
ner, — if the expression be permissible — it did not “touch 
upon” the substance of' the question in its considerations*.  It 
did not penetrate into the heart of the matter ; otherwise 
it would have seen that expropriation, in the meaning 
of the agrarian law, and' liquidation, in the meaning of Article 
25o, are two operations of an entirely different nature. In law, 
as it stand's at present, it is true that a mediocre decision cannot 
be regarded as an en tireless valueless decision! Otherwise, a 
great number of awards given by international1 and arbitral 
courts would be annulled; a glance at the great works of Lafon-
(30) See the text of the decision : Revue générale: du droit international public-, 
3rd series, I, 1927,, p. 1419, ; see further : Recueil de la jurisprudence des Tribu­
naux arbitraux mixtes créés par les traités de paix, IV, 1927, p. 424 ff. 
taine and Lapradelle-Politis will show that this point is fully 
proved. Now, the M. A. Tribunals created by the Peace Trea­
ties have taken more than one decision which, in this case, 
would rightly deserve to be cancelled. That, however, is not 
the opinion held by the creators of the international arbitral 
tribunals, that is to say, the Powers. They realise that even 
an unsatisfactory decision by an international court may even­
tually, particularly in a question of minor importance, serve to 
allay public opinion, and, in this respect, act as a means of as­
suring peaceful conditions. These considerations, however, 
cease to be conclusive in questions such as the Roumanian-Hun­
garian dispute. In this case, vital interests are at stake. Even 
if there has been no excess of authority but only too narrow 
an interpretation of competence by the M. A. T., Roumania will 
have no confidence in any future decision taken by a tribunal 
which has settled the preliminary question, although sub­
jectively and undesignedly, in such an unsatisfactory manner 
from the juridical point of view. The three principles laid 
down by the Committee, — and they are really juridical — 
show the result that would have been attained by a higher and 
less narrow interpretation by the M. A. T. The Committee 
should, in particular, have declared that the provisions of the 
agrarian law could well be reconcilied with Article 25o, instead 
of saying that this had no relation to the question of compe­
tence; it should not have confined itself to the curt and simple 
statement thai, since the measures taken affected the ex-enemies 
in Roumanian territory, that was sufficient to justify its com­
petence. Absolute formalism in juridical matters is never 
successful; there are cases — and the decision of the Court of 
Justice prove this — in which it is possible with the aid of 
subtle juridical psychology and a few words to win the absolute 
confidence of the two parties in dispute.
All who are acquainted with my articles, particularly on the 
subject of international arbitration, know that I am an ardent 
advocate of the principle of arbitration, which I regard as the 
greatest forward step and the grandest conception of our time, to 
use the description, applied by the much regretted F. de Mar­
tens, and (although 1 have on more than one occasion held a 
different opinion) I have the profoundest respect for the judg­
ments and advisory opinions of the International Court at The 
Ha;gue, but there are certain decisions of the arbitral tribunals 
which furnish, from the psychological standpoint, ample ex­
planation of the hesitation on the part of certain States to avail 
themselves of this means of averting war. There is another 
point of view : the possibility of losing its case should not, of 
course, lead a State to repudiate this noble institution. There 
are, however, some instances — and this is fully proved by the 
present question — where the wisdom of the drafters of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations calls for praise, in that the 
States are not compelled to refer all their disputes to arbitration 
or to an international authority but have at their disposal other 
organisations for the amicable settlement of a dispute. Al­
though reference to arbitration or to an international juris­
diction is the method par excellence of settling disputes which 
are purely or chiefly of a juridical nature, mediation by the 
Council is the most suitable method, provided that the dispute 
has or assumes (as in the present case) the aspect of a political 
controversy. Let us not be too inflexible and say that it would 
be compromising the cause of arbitration to submit a case pend­
ing before, or settled by, an arbitral tribunal, to the League.of 
Nations. Such a statement would have been justified in the 
past when this body was not yet in existence or was functioning 
only very imperfectly. Now that it does exist, it cannot de 
denied that it is preferable to reach a satisfactory amicable 
settlement than to see one of the parties dissatisfied and reluc­
tantly accepting a decision with it regards as unfair and which 
gives rises to a more or less marked feeling of animosity against 
the opponent who has won the case before the arbitral tribunal.
It was therefore with every justification and with really 
friendly intention that Roumania, rightly dissatisfied with the 
decision of the M. A. T. — and remembering the resolution 
voted by the Council in 1923, whereby the two Governments 
were invited to do their utmost to prevent the question of Hun­
garian optants from becoming a disturbing influence in the 
relations between the neighbouring two countries (21) — ap­
pealed to the League of Nations on the basis of Article 11, pa­
ragraph 2 of the Covenant, calling its attention to a circum­
stance which threatened to disturb international peace.
Hungary, on the other hand, who had applied to the same 
authority in 1928, requested the appointment of judges for the
(21) See OHicial Journal of the League of Nations, 1923, p. 886 ff., and Annex 
53, p. 1009.
M. A. T. to replace the Roumanian arbitrator, in order that the 
Tribunal might be in a position to settle the substance of the 
dispute. The events which followed have been set forth in the 
first part of this opinion. It only remains to examine them 
from the juridical standpoint.
2) The first question to be settled may be summarised as 
follows :
" Can the Council, appealed to under Article 110/ the Cove­
nant and Article 289 of the Treaty of Trianon, refuse to appoint 
an arbitror?
a) Assuming — as will be proved in b) — that Article n 
confers upon the Council of the League of Nations unlimited 
right to find a solution to the dispute submitted to it, does this 
right, derived from the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
which forms the first part of all the great Peace Treaties of 1919- 
1920, the Treaty of Trianon included, come into conflict (ac­
cording to the well-known expression: “ lex specialis derogal 
legi generali ”) with Article 289 of the Peace Treaty with Hun­
gary? Does this latter Article preclude the League of Nations 
from acting as it deems fit, that is, from refraining, for political 
reasons, from appointing an arbitrator indispensable to the 
question? In my opinion, the answer is in the negative. Al­
though Article 289 entitles the Council to appoint an arbitrator, 
in the event oj a vacancy, il cannot oblige it to make this ap­
pointment.
In so far as the League of Nations, acting under internation­
al law, is concerned, a treaty in force between other parties — in 
this case, the Treaty of Trianon — is res inter alios acta (for 
neither the League nor any one of its Members is identical with 
the signatories of the Treaty of Trianon, although the latter also 
accepted the Covenant embodied in that instrument).
The League of Nations, or, in this case, its competent organ : 
the Council, is absolutely free to decide whether it shall accept 
the offer (for it is no more than an offer) which that Treaty 
makes regarding the appointment of arbitrators or whether it 
shall reject it.
It is given the option and nothing more.
And even if the Council appoints an arbitrator, in a given 
instance, it can for political reasons and in accordance with (Ar­
ticle 11 of the Covenant, refuse to do so in another instance. The 
Hungarian Delegate was therefore wrong when he made the 
following statement before the Council on September 17th, 1927 
(22) :
“We do not ask a favour for ourselves. We have merely stated 
before the Council that this is an absolute obligation imposed by 
the Treaty. ”
This view entirely overlooks that res inter alios acta tertio nec 
prodest nec nocet <23). In the third edition of his masterly 
work (2/1) entitled : “ Corso di diretto intemazionale ”, M. Anzi­
lotti, judge at the International Court of Justice, writes as fol­
lows : “I trattati internazionali non sono obbligatori che per le 
parti contraenti : :obligatio tertio non gontraiiitur. Rispetto 
ai terzi, i trattati sono una res inter alios acta, da cui non pos- 
sono ad essi derivare nè diritti ne obblighi. Pochi principi di 
dirito intemazionale sono al par di questo sictiri e universal- 
mente riconosciuti. ” A Treaty is legally binding only on the 
States signatory thereto, “ cosi la Corte permanente di giustizia 
intemazionale nella senteza n° 7, del 25 maggio 1926 {Publica­
tions, pit. Series A, No. 7, page 29). ” .
There are, moreover, a fairly considerable number of clauses 
to be found in the Peace Treaties which grant such competence 
(and its accompanying burden is imposed in certain cases) either 
to the League of Nations or to other States. In this connection, 
reference may be made to the clauses which entitle certain 
States to a seat on international commissions. (To quote a few 
examples only, see Articles 34o, 3Zji, 3^7 of the Treaty of Ver­
sailles.)
Reference may also be made to the famous Article 2i3 of the 
Treaty of Versailles, on the disarmament of Germany, con­
ferring certain rights of supervision upon the Council of the 
League of Nations.
3) It is well that the Council of the League of Nations is not 
bound by the existence of Article 239, for such an obligation to 
appoint arbitrators would not be in harmony with the position 
which it occupies in virtue of the Covenant. The ingenious 
principle conceived in the Covenant is that which created a 
juridical bond between the Members of the League of Nations 
in virtue of which they submit their disputes to arbitral or ju-
(22) Doc. C, 47lh Session, Minnies I, p. 5.
(23) See Sinuri- : Eléments du Droit international publie universel européen et 
américain, 1927, p. 186 X.
(24) 1928, p. 369.
dicial authorities or to a Body which is primarily of a political 
character (25) such as the Council; this is a logical consequence 
of the development of international judicial institutions created 
to avoid war, of the principle of arbitration, mediation and con­
ciliation contained in the Bryan treaties and in the treaties signed 
by the United States in 1913 (26).
And as M. Alvarez has so clearly explained : “ the criteria 
which guide it are not of a juridical nature, the latter being 
frequently based on abstract logic or pervaded by the idea of 
absolute justice. It is especially and primarily inspired by poli­
tical criteria, which take into consideration all the aspects of a 
question, particularly the economic, social and politic aspects. 
In short, it follows the principle of social justice. It concen­
trates on the general interests of peace, interests which take pre­
cedence over all other considerations, and to attain that objec­
tive it can even depart from juridical rules if it deems proper 
to do so. ” See also the brilliant declaration made by M. Titu- 
lesco at the session of the Council of September 17th, 1927 (27).
Article 11 of the Covenant (28), which is perhaps the most 
important principle of this fundamental law of the League of 
Nations, is in perfect harmony with the general ideas just set 
forth; the text of this Article is as follows : “ Any war or threat 
of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of 
the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the 
whole League, and the League shall take any action that may 
be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. ”
In case any such emergency should arise, the Secretary Ge­
neral, on the request of any of the Members of the League forth­
with summons a meeting of the Council (29).
(25) Rousseau : La Compétence de la S. d. N., 1927, p; 19 ; Goxsiorowski, II, 
326 If.
(26) See Strupp : Eléments, p. 239 If. ; Gralixski : Le réglement pacifique 
obligatoire des di{[érends internationaux, suivant le pacte de la S. d. N., 1925, 
33 ; Goxsiorowski : La Société des Nations et le problème de la paix, 1927, II, 
323.
(27) L'Europe Nouvelle, 1927, p. 1354.
(28) Doc. 47lh Session, Minutes I, p. 3, para. 5.
(29) Paragraph 2 of this Article, on which the Roumanian request is based, but 
which however is o.i no direct interest al this juncture, is as follows : « It is 
also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring 
to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever 
affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or 
the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. » But the 
consequences of such a request — and this is the only point of interest here 
— are me by the first paragraph.
By this formula (3o), the League of Nations was, in a way. 
given full discretionary powers. It is therefore clearly proved, 
particularly by the English text (which is more definite than 
the French text, for although according to Article 44o of the 
Treaty of Versailles, it has the same force but it is reality more 
authoritative because the English text of the so-called Wilson 
proposals was the original) (3i) that the Council is free to take 
any measures which it considers to be most appropriate in the 
definite circumstance before it.
Under the cover of Article 11, the Council can act even with 
absolute authority (3a). As stated in the report approved by a 
Committee of the Council on May i5th, 1927 (33) : “ It is im­
possible to limit... the very extensive powers held by the League 
in virtue of its essential duty : that of taking any action effectual 
to safeguard the peace of nations. ”
Roumania succeeded in convincing the Council. This is 
also clearly shown by the words spoken by Herr Stresemann at 
the second meeting of the 47th session (see Minutes 2, page 9) : 
“there might (in the event of even a partial repeal of the agrarian 
reform) be danger of a revolutionary movement which perhaps 
would not have stopped at the frontiers of Roumania. ” (34).
The Council, in its capacity as guardian of the peace of the 
world, was competent, under the first paragraph of Article n, 
to propose (but only to propose, since it is merely a mediator and 
conciliator) (35) any solution which in its opinion seemed the 
most appropriate to remedy the situation. In proposing a solution, 
and since it did no more than make a proposal, which was not 
obligatory for the parties in dispute, the Council acting for the 
good understanding between the threatened States, would not 
even have to limit its attention to an arbitral award, the irrevoc-
(30) LIrxavde, La S. d. N., 1920, p. 12
(31) Schückinc-Wehberc, Salzung des Völkerbundes, 2nd. Edition, 1924, p. 467 ; 
A. Mezger, Die Auslegung des Versailler Vertrags, 1926, p. 45.
(32) This opinion is also shared by Rei>slob, Théorie de la S. d. N., 1927, 
p. 50 ff. : “The scope of this Article is of incommensurable breadth. The func­
tions which it assigns to the League are, so to speak, unlimited. It goes even 
further ; it obliges the Council to take all the measures necessary to maintain 
peace if war breaks out or if there is merely a danger of war in any country 
in the world.’
See also Rousseau, 1. c., 33, 34 ; Schückixg-Wehberg, 1. c., 468, 469.
(33) C. 1G9, 1927, IX, p. 1.
(34) See the impressive speech delivered by M. Titulesco, Doc. 47lh Session, 
Minutes 2, page 2.
(35) See Gonstorowski, II, 329.
able authority of which has been contested. As M. Politis, who 
was appointed rapporteur to the first commission of the first 
assembly (36), very rightly said : “Article 11 in no way confers 
upon the Council the right to impose a settlement of a dispute 
upon the parties without their consent. ” But, as M. Gonsio- 
rowski (37) points out : “ It is by its moral authority that the 
Council imposes its decisions. ”
And it can all the more impose its decision in this manner 
because if it were proved that there was an immediate danger of 
a revolutionnary movement in Roumania, and that this country 
had no other means of checking it, the Roumanian Govern­
ment, relying on the definitely established right of necessity 
in international law, could even refuse to conform to the de­
cision (38). And I concur in every world spoken by M. Titu- 
lesco (3p) who after having stated that the Council was compe­
tent, or as we have said, free to act in this matter, concluded 
with the following words : “The Council, in the exercise 
of the exceptional jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 289 of 
the Treaty of Trianon, cannot fail to recognise the essential task 
imposed on it by Article 11. Asa political body, it cannot 
ignore political contingencies. It must have the right to refuse 
to make an appointment which appears to it inexpedient and 
likely to affect international relations or to militate against its 
own satisfactory working. To deny the Council this right of 
judgment conferred upon it by Article n would be to reduce a 
body which is- invested with the highest and most difficult po­
litical mission to the rank of a mere machine.”
The considerations which led the Council to take its decisions 
are the same as those which seem to have prevented it from 
granting the Hungarian request that the question of the compe­
tence of the M. A. T. be referred to the Hague Court of Justice 
for an advisory opinion of the parties to the dispute, the dis­
content would not have diminished, since, from the political 
point of view, the question has become one of considerable im­
portance.
(36) Plenary meetings, page 493.
(37) L. c.
(38) Stbupp, Das VülkerrechlUche Deliht, 1920, p. 122, if. ; also, by the same 
author, Eléments 228 H.
(39) L. c„ p. 3.
4) It has been asked whether the Council was not under the 
obligation to refer the question of competence or any other mat- 
ter to the Court of International Justice at The Hague for an advi­
sory opinion. To raise this question is equivalent to advancing 
a negative answer (4o). Those who have made such a claim do
(40) Would a motion for obtaining an advisory opinion have required an abso­
lute majority vote or the unanimity of the Council ? The principle establi­
shed by the Covenant, Article 5, which is decisive requires — and this is the 
rule to be followed since (with the exception of the self-governing colonies 
referred to in (Article 1 of the Covenant) it is here a question of independent 
and equal States (see FnevTAG-LoniNGHovEN : Satzung des Völkerbundes, 1926, 
p. 20 ff.) — unanimity for “decisions” and “all matters of procedure, including 
the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters may be decided 
by a majority of the Members represented al the meeting.” The importance of 
the question asserts itself if we turn to Article 4, paragraph 5, which reads as 
follows : “Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be 
invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the 
Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of 
that .Member of the League." (Here again, the English text is clearer than the 
French text which says “...à y envoyer siéger un Représentant lorsqu’une ques­
tion qui l’intéresse particulièrement est portée devant le Conseil."') This means 
that these Members of the League have the same rights as the other Members 
of the Council, particularly in regard to voting. Now, would it have been 
necessary, in this case, to obtain Roumania’s consent before asking the Hague 
Court for an advisory opinion? Neither the discussions before the Council nor 
the opinions of the Court furnish a direct and absolutely conclusive reply to 
this question. Among the numerous authorities who have written on this 
matter, Mr. NAin (British Year Book of International Law, 1926, p. 139), who has 
perhaps examined it in greater detail than any other, reaches the following 
conclusions : “The League is founded on the principle of the independence of 
legal equality of Slates, except in so far as the terms of the Covenant depart 
from that principle. Absolute unanimity is the general rule, and the burden of 
proof is upon those who assert that in any particular instance absolute unani­
mity is not required. It is a commonplace that treaty provisions which are res­
trictive of independence must be restrictively construed, and I beg leave to doubt 
the soundness of the view that, as it were by a side wind, Slates which are 
Members of the League have thus in substance parted with one of the most 
cherished rights of a Stale, namely, not to litigate except by its own free choice. 
This opinion may be regarded as revealing the cloven hoof of the theory 
of sovereignly, now so unpopular, but that theory cannot be regarded as 
obsolete. Thus in the Eastern Carelia case we find the- Court saying (Publ. 
B. No. 5, p. 27) : 'It is well established in international law, that no Slate can, 
without its consent be compelled to submit its disputes with other Slates 
either to mediation or to arbitration or to any other kind of pacific settlement.” 
In these circumstances, I venture with diffidence to submit the view that the 
Council must be absolutely unanimous in requesting the Court for an advisory 
opinion, except when the opinion is not “substantially equivalent to deciding 
the dispute between the parties” but merely relates to the procedure or method 
to be adopted by the Council in settling the dispute.”
The passage quoted by Mr. Naiii is an extract from the opinion of the Hague 
Court on the Carelia case. The corresponding French text is : "Répondre à la 
question équivaudrait en substance à trancher un différend: entre les parties, >, 
Although this does not mean that the opinion is binding on the Council and 
that it seules the dispute, morally the Council generally accepts the conclusions 
reached by the Court recommended by the high authority of this world tribu­
nal. For the case in point, the opinion would be equivalent lo a decision on Ihe 
question submitted lo the Court.
not fully understand the rôle of the Court when giving advisory 
opinions to the Council of the League of Nations. Article 
of the Covenant is quite clear on this point : “ The Court may 
also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question re 
ferred to it by the Council or by the Assembly. ”
This means that the Court is obliged (since in this case, it is 
an organ of the League of Nations) to give an advisory opinion 
IF, and only IF, the Council asks it to do so. Hence, the Council 
has discretionary authority to exercise this right but in no 
case is it compelled to make such a request (Zu).
Here again, the right conferred on the Council by Article n 
is neither limited nor diminished in any sense. Count Apponyi, 
the principal Hungarian Delegate, was therefore entirely mis­
taken when he stated before the Council (see Doc. C. 47th Ses­
sion, 1. c. page 10) that the Council was under the formal obli­
gation to obtain an advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice on all questions of law; he was also wrong 
in protesting against the “ three Geneva principles ” proposed 
by the Committee of Three, adopted by the Council and recom­
mended to the parties as legal rulings in the present dispute.
These three principles recall to the mind of any person fa­
miliar with the law of nations the three famous Washington 
principles laid down ad hoc by the Arbitral Tribunal at Geneva 
in the well-known Alabama case. They recommend them­
selves, as we shall see later, because they are in conformity with 
positive international law.
It has been argued on behalf of Hungary that since it was 
not Hungary herself but her nationals, domiciled in New Rou- 
mania who appealed to the M. A. T., it w'ould be impossible to 
overlook this point. In other words, it has been claimed that,
For this reason I think the vote should be unanimous, ineluding the cotes 0/ 
the parties.
See further, Hudson : Advisory Opinions, Publications 0/ the Academy 0/ 
International Lata al The Hague, 1925, III, 379 ff ; also an article by the same 
author m the American Journal o[ International Law, 1926, p. 333 ff ; Wright, 
1. c. 1927, 139 ff. See also for the same conclusions^ reached however by different 
reasoning : Schündler, Die Verhindlinchkeit der Beschlüsse des Völkerbunds, 
1927, 25-29 ; Beuve-Méry, La compétence consultative de la Cour Permanente de 
Justice Internationale, 1926, p. 51 (“If the opinion of the Court has been given 
unanimously, although this opinion is only given as advice which is not binding 
on the ipolilical body which has asked for it, the latter cannot, in fact, take a 
different decision. Il is- under an obligation of fact, a kind of duly “de con­
venance."
(41) Bustamente : The Permanent Court 0/ International Justice, pages 247, 
348. Politis : La Justice Internationale, 1925, p. 72. 
in virtue of the Treaty of Trianon, the Hungarians have ac­
quired a persona standi in fudicio, a personality in interna­
tional law different from that of their State. Although I am an 
ardent advocate of the idea that it is not only States which are 
subject to international law (is), I cannot accept the thesis which 
grants subjective international rights to the nationals of States 
entitled to institute proceedings before the M. A. T. in their own 
name. When the States granted them this faculty, they did not 
do so with the intention of making them independent; they did 
so for reasons of convenience and without wishing to deprive 
themselves of the right to modify or even to abolish that faculty 
by further treaties between each other. This is in accordance 
with the old proverb : “ Salus publica summa lex esto ”. To 
claim as Count Apponyi did, that renunciation on the part of 
Hungary is impossible because the Treaty of Trianon has, indi­
rectly, become part of the national legislation of Hungary is to 
disregard the relationship existing between national and inter­
national law. A new Treaty which gives rise to a new law also 
gives rise to a modification of the law already in force.
The foregoing observations lead to the following conclu­
sions :
i) Any proposals made by the Council, relying on Article n 
of the Covenant, and, suggested to the parties in dispute, are in 
accordance with that Article and are, in that respect, legal in 
that the Council with its sovereign powers of decision considers 
them suitable to bring about a settlement;
2) Juridically speaking, a proposal made by the Council is 
merely good advice — the logical consequence of its role of in­
ternational conciliator — and is not legally binding on the par­
ties. For this reason, the argument advanced by Count Appo­
nyi (I. c., p. 10) in which he regards the three Geneva principles 
as a restriction of the liberty of the parties, finds no justification 
whatever, for he does not realise that these proposals are no­
thing more than proposals and a contractual agreement would be 
necessary before they could become obligatory for the parties;
(42) Strutt, Elements, 1. c., p. 22 if.
3) The existence of a lis pendens before an arbitral tribunal, 
regularly invoked by private individuals, does not preclude the 
Council from not availing itself of the right conferred on it by 
Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon to appoint arbitrators, nor 
does it prevent the parties from coming to an arrangement 
which they themselves consider equitable.
II.
Although we are firmly convinced that an understanding 
will be reached between the litigants, we nevertheless consider 
it our duty not to pass over the material question in silence, 
namely : Was Roumania acting within her rights in applying 
her agrarian legislation in the territories acquired in virtue of 
the Treaty of Trianon?
Without entering into all the details of the question which 
have been analysed for both sides by eminent authorities, we 
wish to state that:
i) There is no regular international rule which precludes a 
State from expropriating the nationals of other States, whether 
against or without compensation, on the understanding that in 
the application of these measures there is no difference in treat­
ment and no inequality between the nationals of the State 
applying them and foreigners (equality of treatment being the 
maximum that a foreigner can demand, in the absence of 
express Treaty provisions) and that measures must not be impo­
sed, in law or in fact, on foreigners and on certain foreigners as 
such (43);
2) Even to-day, there is no uniform national legislation in 
force in civilised States which requires that equitable compen­
sations must be granted to persons injured by expropriation, 
since modern States, such as Germany for example, have adop­
ted texts such as Articles i53 and r55 of the German Constitution 
of August nth, 1919, which provide for expropriation, in virtue 
simply of a Reich law, without compensation;
(43 ) Strupp, Das völkerrechtliche Delikt, 1920, p. 03, and particularly pp. 118, 
119 (i. e., the text of p. 119 and the note on page 120) ; also the limit between 
measures of expropriation and the régime of expropriation in Soviet Russia. 
Strupp, Intervention in financial questions, Lectures al the Academy of Inter­
national Law at The Hague, 1925, IV, multis locis.
3) If, in. theory, exceptions are sometimes made in the case 
of a change in territorial sovereignty, this view is merely the con­
sequence of out-of-date conceptions of natural law, which come 
into conflict with a positivism that disregards acquired rights, 
insurmountable for the legislator (44) ;
4) With the exception of the special cases mentioned under 3), 
such an international duty can only be the consequence of an 
international contractual obligation, either explicitly expressed 
or as the result of a clause providing for the treatment of the 
most favoured nation;
5) A measure precluded by a Convention can never be legiti­
mate, as regards that instrument, on the ground that the State 
applies it also to its own nationals (Decision of the Court of Jus­
tice, No. 7, Publications, p. c., p. 3a);
(44) a) So-called acquired rights arc irreconcilable with the modern concep­
tion of the all-powerful legislator. The latter may, within the limits of his 
international obligations and of his Constitution (which, moreover, is subject to 
modification) taKe any action he pleases. And, in this case, a foreigner cannot 
claim ä status more favourable than that of nationals.
b) The two Thost recent and competent authorities on the question of the 
Succession Slates, MM. Schönborn and Guggenheim write as follows :
1) M. Schönborn, Slaatensuccessionen, 1913, p. 53 :
“Rechtmässig erworbene Privatrechte der Einzelnen sind im Zessum unan­
tastbar für den Zessionar — sagt man (") ; in Wahrheit sind es im Regelfall 
genau so gut und mit genau den gleichen Einschränkungen wie im übrigen 
Staatsgebiet des Zessionars. Der moderne Kulturstaat respektiert im allgemeinen 
“wohlerworbene” Privatrechle seiner Untertanen, (wie auch der Slaatsfremden) 
überhaupt ;.'und viele Verfassungen sprechen diesen Grundsatz ausdrücklich 
aus. Dabei fist aber die Entziehung auch solcher Privatrechte durch Akte der 
Gesetzgebung oder auf Grund von Enleignungsgeselzen stets Vorbehalten, und 
das gibt auch bezüglich der in einem abgetretenen Gebiet vor der Abtretung 
rechtmässig erworbenen
?) M. Guggenheim, Beitrüge zur völkerrechtlichen Lehre vom Slaatenwcchsel, 
1925, p. 123 :
“Zweifellos entstammt das Postulat (°) solcher Einschränkung der dem Staat 
an sich zustehenden Befugnis, seine eigene Rechtsphäre selbstherrlich zu ges­
talten, dem Gedankenkreis des Naturrechts, das dem Individuum und der Gesell­
schaft unverrückbare vorstaatliche Rechte emrämt.
I. Nach dieser Lehre ercheinl die Gesetzgebung nicht als eine materiellungge- 
bundenc. Sie knüpft an jene unverletzlichen Rechte der Individuen, welche 
sie nur dann aufheben darf, wenn es der staatliche ordre public erfordert.”
PP. 124, 125, 120 : “Insofern... seine Bechtsauffassung von der des Vorgän- 
gerslaates abweicht, kann der Folgestaat nicht gehindert werden, Rechte der 
Subjekte aufzuheben, die der Durchsetzung seiner Eigenart, hinderlich sind. 
Sein ordre public geht unverletzlichen Rechten der Rechtssubjekte vor ; nur darf 
es bei der Aufhebung jener Rechte nicht willkürlich verfahren, indem es bei 
einem gleichartigen Tatbestände gegenüber ihm unterworfenen Rechlssub- 
jeklen verschieden verfärhel (’). Dies würde der Idee des Rechts wiederspre­
chen und Willkür bedeuten.
See also pp. 126, 127.
.'•) Italicised by the writer of this opinigg^ -
6) Article a5o of the Treaty of Trianon is not a clause of that 
nature, since it is obvious from its connexity with Articles a3a 
et seq. that it relates only to war and post-war liquidation, refer­
red to in all the Peace Treaties of 1919-1920, imposed on natio­
nals of the Central Powers, as such, and excluded from Arti­
cle 267 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain at the request of Austria 
in the interest of persons subject to foreign territorial sove­
reignty, but also in the interest of Austria herself in view of the 
fact that she was unable to pay the large sums required to com­
pensate individuals affected by liquidation. At the time of the 
drafting of Article on which Article 200 of the Treaty oj 
Trianon was based, no attempt was made to prevent expropria­
tions already being carried out, for imperative social rea­
sons (45);
7) It is this last point which is decisive. As already stated, 
it is here a question of the logical and inevitable consequences 
of a reform begun in igi3 and sanctioned in 1917, that is before 
the result of the war could be foreseen;
8) It is therefore wrong to compare, as M. Scelle does for 
example, this expropriation with that carried out or being car­
ried out in certain neiv States;
9) This is all the more true in that the idea and conception 
of the Roumanian expropriation are not applied, either in law 
or in fact, against foreign nationals, — Hungarian nationals in 
this case;
10) Not in law, because the enactments in question made no 
distinction between nationals and foreigners;
11) Not in fact, because there is no evidence (see No. 1) 
that the measures were taken chiefly against foreigners or against
(45) On liquidation, see Stbupp : Zuständigkeit..., 25 if. ; Fuchs, Die Grund­
sätze des Versailler Vertrags über die Liquidation und Beschlagnahme deutschen 
Privalvcrinögens im Auslande, 1927, p. 25 ff., particularly p. 32. See also the 
well-known opinions of MM. Basdevant, Jeze, Politis, pp. 11, 12, 15 ff.
See also the decision of the Court of Justice No. 7, p. 32 : “The régime of 
liquidation applies to German property as such.”
Sec also : Scelle, I, 1. c., and Gidel, Decision No. 7, in the Revue de Droil 
International (Recue de Droit international by LArnAOELLE-PoLiTis), 1927, I, 76 £f.
For the whole status causce el controversial, sec the Jurisprudence of the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, by M. de Lachapelle, 1927. See also Arch. der Frie- 
densvcrlräge, II, lli if. See for the origin of Article 2G7 of the Treaty of Saint- 
Germain : Bericht öber die Tätigkeit der Deutsch-Oster. Friedensdelegation in 
Sainl-Germain-cn-Laye, I, 1919, p. 186 ff.
nationals of a certain State, either openly or in a disguised man­
ner, — facts which if proved ivould constitute a veritable inter­
national offence and would compel Roumania (or any other 
State placed in the same position) to re-establish the situation 
which existed before the application of the illegal measures and 
to pay compensation (46);
12) Roumania cannot be blamed for the depreciation of her 
currency — a misfortune that overtook many other countries 
and from which the people of these countries suffered — until it 
can be proved that this depreciation did not affect all Rouman­
ians without distinction.
(46) See Decision No.7 (1. c.) p. 30 : “Such an abuse is not presumed, but the 
burden of proof is on the person making the allegation."

The case of the Hungarian optants before the Council 
of the League of Nations/1
BY
Albert WAHL
Professor at the Faculty of Law, Paris, 
Honorary Dean of the Faculty of Law, Lille.
I.
The difficulties which have arisen between the Hungarian 
and Roumanian Governments, the phases of which have been 
very numerous, led to a discussion which gave the Council of 
the League of Nations an opportunity of asserting, with admi­
rable clearness and a lofty conception of the problem, the nature 
and scope of the powers conferred on it by the Covenant of the 
League of Nations which forms the preamble to all the Peace 
Treaties. ;
The origin of the dispute is familiar to all. On more than 
one occasion, Roumania called upon landowners to make certain 
sacrifices in favour of the peasants whose precarious position was 
a source of'anxiety to the Government and who, moreover, had 
at various intervals resorted to acts of violence in order to 
show that they aspired to more favourable treatment; (reference 
to these incidents is necessary in order to judge of the 
attitude taken by the Council of the League of Nations in the 
conflict between the two Governments).
In May 1914, a Constituent Assembly was appointed with a 
view to permitting, by an amendment to the Constitution 
(which precluded expropriation for reasons of public welfare in 
favour of any persons other than the general community), 
expropriation of land in favour of the peasants. The war 
delayed the execution of the scheme but the Government mani-
(1) Article published in the Revue Politique et Parlementaire, No. 396, on 
November 10th, 1927. Translated from the French version.
fested its anxiety to bring it into operation by obtaining in 1917, 
that is during the height of the hostilities, the adoption of a 
Constitution under the terms of which the expropriated owners 
were to receive an annuity, the nominal capital of which, equal 
to the value of the expropriated land, was to be redeemed in 
fifty years and to bear interest at 5 %. The compensation there­
fore represented the actual value of the land expropriated, the 
national currency still being almost at gold parity.
The measure was extended to the territories allotted to Rou- 
mania after the war. In Transylvania, in particular, it was 
applied in virtue of the law of September 10th, 1919, which was 
ratified by Parliament in 1921.
The fall of the currency was . naturally disastrous to the 
owners; it was disastrous to persons of independent means, as 
was the case in all the other countries whose currency deprecia­
ted. Unless the amount of the compensation paid was increas­
ed, it far from represented the value of the land at the time 
the annuity was actually granted.
The only claims lodged were those of the “ Hungarian 
optants ”, that is to say the owners of Hungarian nationality 
whose land situated in Transylvania was subjected to the acts of 
expropriation.
The Treaty of Trianon, like all the treaties concluded regard­
ing the succession of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, differed 
from the Treaties concluded between France and the various ex­
enemy Powers in that it precluded the liquidation of Hungarian 
property in Roumanian territory. In consequence, the Treaty 
of Trianon placed Hungarians domiciled in the succession States 
on the same footing as the nationals of those States. As will be 
seen later, this was the maximum of the request submitted by 
the Hungarian Government itself; it was obvious that, in so far 
as its own nationals were concerned, it feared that measures 
might be taken whereby this equality of status would not be 
recognised.
The expropriated Hungarian nationals sued the Roumanian 
Government before the Roumano-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tri­
bunal requesting the latter to declare that the expropriation 
measures were contrary to Article 25o of the Treaty in that they 
indirectly amounted to the liquidation of property belonging to 
Hungarians; they further claimed the restitution of their land 
and, in case this should prove to be impossible, compensation 
equal to the value of the land.
There is no necessity to examine whether, from the point of 
view of law, this claim was justified, whether it was permissible 
to assimilate a measure of a general nature, voted and carried 
out in the interests of justice and public peace, and which, by 
reason of the considerations which had inspired it, affected na­
tionals, allies, neutrals and enemies without discrimination, 
with a measure of liquidation which consists (as in the case of 
all countries where it was carried out in application of the Trea­
ties) in abolishing purely and simply the property of enemy 
nationals and charging its value against the compensation to be 
paid by their Government. It is also unnecessary to examine 
whether, according to the spirit of the Treaty of Trianon, enemy 
nationals could be recognised as holding rights more favourable 
than those held by owners of any other nationality, and 
whether, in precluding the liquidation of property belonging to 
Hungarians, the Treaties had not merely intended to prevent 
any measure which would result in Hungarians being treated 
less favourably than nationals. As will be pointed out below, 
the Hungarian Government itself expressed an opinion on this 
latter point.
; II.
However that may be, the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was appeal­
ed to by the Hungarian nationals.
That they had the right to do so is incontestable. It was for 
the Arbitral Tribunal to discover whether it was competent, that 
is, whethei’ the affair came within the category of disputes for 
the settlement of which it had been created, - especially those 
relating to the interpretation and application of Article a5o.
Notwithstanding the conclusions of the Roumanian Govern­
ment, the Tribunal declared itself competent.
The Roumanian Government then withdrew the judge whom 
it had appointed; it was fully entitled to do so since the treaties 
contain no provision which obliges a magistrate to sit and since 
they even provide for the same procedure as that followed in the 
absence of the judge representing one of the High Contracting 
Parties.
The Roumanian Government laid the affair before the Coun­
cil of the League of Nations.
By a cross demand the Hungarian Government claimed the 
application of the procedure to which we have just referred, 
namely, that of Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon whereby if 
in case there is a vacancy a Government does not proceed to 
appoint the judge as provided the other Governement shall 
choose him from the two persons nominated by the Council of 
the League of Nations.
In appealing to the Council, the Roumanian Government 
was merely relying on Article n of the Covenant of the (League 
of Nations under which each Member of the League may bring 
to the attention of the Council any circumstance whatever affect­
ing international relations which threatens to disturb the good 
understanding between nations upon which peace depends.
The Council asked the opinion of six eminent jurists of diffe­
rent nationality; on their unanimous opinion it took the view, 
also unanimously, that the two parties must conform to the 
definite rules contained in Sir Austen Chamberlain’s report 
which made a definite distinction between expropriation — 
which is outside the competence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
— and liquidation, which is within its competence.
Roumania accepted the terms of this report, Hungary rejected 
them.
The report comes to the following conclusion : “ In the event 
of a refusal by Hungary, the Committee considers that the 
Council would not be justified in appointing two deputy mem­
bers in accordance with Article 23g of the Treaty of Trianon. ”
III.
By thus depriving the Hungarian Government of the right 
to choose a judge to complete the Arbitral Tribunal and the 
Arbitral Tribunal itself of the possibility of pronouncing on the 
question, did the Council of the League of Nations misinterpret 
its role? Did it evade an obligation imposed on it by the Cove­
nant?
The reply presents no difficulties.
The essential role of the League of Nations is the safeguarding 
of peace.
The very terms of the preamble to the Covenant declare that 
it was signed “ in order to achieve international peace and secu­
rity. ”
Neither the Assembly nor the Council have any other essen­
tial mission.
“ The Assembly may deal with any matter within the sphere 
of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world ”, says 
Article 3.
“The Council may deal with any matter within the sphere of 
action of the League or affecting the peace of the world”, adds 
Article 4.
The Council may therefore be appealed to by one or other 
of the High Contracting Parties in regard to questions which are 
serious enough to be regarded as of a nature to threaten peace.'
This, moreover, clearly emerges from Articles i3 and i5 of 
the Covenant. According to Article i3 the Members of the 
League have agreed to submit to arbitration any dispute which 
they recognise to be suitable for settlement by arbitral award. 
A question cannot, therefore, be referred to arbitration without 
the consent of the two Governments concerned; — this, more­
over, is in conformity with the most elementary principles : arbi­
tration rests upon terms of submission, that is, upon a contract, 
which indicates the substance of the dispute and the names of 
the arbitrators.
Neither the Roumanian Government nor the Hungarian Go­
vernment proposed arbitration when their mutual consent was 
necessary. Apart from arbitration there remained therefore 
Article i5, which lays down that “ if the dispute likely to lead 
to a rupture ” is not submitted to arbitration it shall be laid 
before the Council on the sole condition that one of the Go­
vernments gives notice of the dispute to the Secretary General, 
“ who will make all necessary arrangements for a full inves­
tigation and consideration thereof. ”
This is the kind of solution which would unquestionably 
have been reached if the Roumanian Government after having 
vainly pleaded incompetence had, as it might have been led 
to fear in view of its failure on this point, found itself in pre­
sence of an award of the Arbitral Tribunal condemning it to 
make payment in gold to the expropriated Hungarian land­
owners. Article 15 of the Covenant in declaring that the 
Member’s of the League are not only authorised but are obliged 
to bring to the attention of the Council any dispute likely to 
lead to a rupture in no way restricts this right and this obliga­
tion in case the Arbitral Tribunal has given an award on the 
affair. In point of fact, the peace treaties provide that the High 
Contracting Parties agree to regard the awards of the Arbitral 
Tribunal as final which necessarily supposes, however, that the 
tribunal is a real tribunal, that is, that it pronounces 
within the limits of its competence and not. outside the mandate 
conferred upon it. Further, however final they may be, and 
though limited to its competence, it is none the less possible 
that, in view of the feelings to which they may give rise, these 
awards may be of a nature to threaten peace. And then is the 
time for the intervention of the Council of the League of Nations 
since, without exception and in any circumstance the mission 
of that organisation is the safeguarding of peace.
It is obvious a fortiori that the intervention of the Council is 
legitimately solicited by one of the Governments between which 
has arisen a dispute calculated in the opinion of that Government 
to involve a rupture as a result of a first award of the Arbitral 
Tribunal, which leads it to foresee a second still more serious.
This Government justly relies on Article 4 of the Covenant, 
that is, on the role directly assigned to the Council by the 
Covenant. It would be absurd to maintain that for the appli­
cation of Article 4 the dispute must have assumed a definite 
character, that it must have materially manifested itself. For 
the Council to take a decision it has only to recognise that peace 
is threatened.
And without doubt it is for the Council alone to decide finally 
whether peace is at stake since no authority has been set up above 
it to examine the justification of such decisions.
Thus, not only is it legitimate, but it is very wise that during 
the course of proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal the 
Council of the League of Nations should intervene at the request 
of one of the parties, or even automatically, with a view to 
safeguarding peace. In this way, not only does it fulfil the mis­
sion entrusted to it by the Covenant, but it avoids the necessity 
of having to fulfil it later when the dispute has perhaps become 
embittered and its intervention less effectual.
IV
Neither does the Covenant settle the methods of procedure 
to be followed by the Council for the safeguarding of peace. By 
the very fact of its silence on this point, it leaves such methods 
to the discretion of the Council even as the latter determines its 
own procedure.
In the present case, the Council took the view that it would 
safeguard peace by abstaining from appointing a judge to take 
the place of the judge who had withdrawn. By following this 
line, the Council was only acting entirely within its rights.
Thus, even if the Council, under the text of the Covenant, 
must appoint the judges to take the place of those who have 
withdrawn, this obligation would be imposed upon it only 
subject to the fundamental mission conferred on it by the Co­
venant. Having as absolute rôle the safeguarding of peace and 
being obliged to subordinate everything to this rôle, which is 
the only one entrusted to it by the Covenant, it cannot be bound 
to make an appointment which might appear to be of a nature 
to threaten peace among nations.
Moreover, the ' peace treaties impose no obligation on the 
Council in so far as concerns the appointment of judges. They 
say that each of the Governments concerned shall choose one of 
the judges of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal and that if it does not 
proceed to do so the judge shall be chosen from the persons 
nominated by the Council of the League of Nations. There is 
nothing here which indicates an obligation; it is not said that 
the Council must appoint the persons from whom the judges are 
to be chosen.
In a word, the Council has no obligation in this respect; and 
even assuming that such an obligation did exist, it would still be 
subject to the mission entrusted to that organ to take any deci­
sion that may be deemed wise to safeguard peace.
V
In presence of these considerations and in view of the abso­
lute power conferred upon the Council, it might seem unneces­
sary to examine the reasons which led the Roumanian Go­
vernment to appeal to the Council and the latter to refuse to 
appoint a judge to the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
There is however a certain interest in showing the profound 
wisdom underlying the attitude of the Roumanian Government 
and the resolution taken by the Council.
However justified may be the confidence inspired by the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, there is no doubt that owing to its 
composition its awards are, in fact, often given by one judge; 
we cannot forget, moreover, that there is no appeal against 
these awards. Although there may be countries at the lowest 
level of the judicial evolution which have the system of a single 
judge, there are none which refuse all appeal against the deci­
sions of the first judge, or which are not convinced of the neces­
sity of entrusting the awards given by him to examination by 
several judges. The numerous interests without precedent 
which are entrusted to Arbitral Tribunals and which are not 
simply material interests, give rise to a certain amount of 
apprehension in respect of the absolute powers of the Arbitral 
Tribunal. If, without opposition, it is allowed to take decisions 
which may involve not only the wealth of private individuals, 
but also the stability, peace and independence of States, it is 
obvious that the peace treaties did not intend to confer upon 
it such rights. Now, such abuses would of course be justified 
if it were admitted that the Arbitral Tribunal is judge of its own 
competence and that on the request of a Government or private 
individual, it could therefore take upon itself to examine any 
questions that it liked by merely asserting that they came within 
the scope of those to be referred to it under the treaties. If we 
may count on the lofty spirit of equity by which the judges 
are indisputably animated, it would, in order to avoid such 
flagrant results, be sufficient justification for the intervention 
of the Council of the League of Nations for these results to be 
theoretically possible.
The Roumanian Government could not possibly accept an 
award which decided the dispute in favour of the Hungarian 
optants. To take back from the peasants land which had 
belonged to Hungarians would have given rise to insurrection. 
The new dispossessed owners would certainly not have submitted 
to worse treatment than that accorded to the peasants who had 
received land belonging to nationals, to Allies or to neutrals, 
or, more especially, to be deprived of their property in favour 
of ex-enemy subjects; to compensate the Hungarian optants in 
gold was a possibility which could not be contemplated without 
giving rise to a certain amount of ridicule, for even assuming 
that the resources of the country would allow of such compen­
sation, it is impossible to imagine that the Roumanian people 
would agree to new taxes to furnish enemy subjects with com­
pensation which had not been granted to Roumanian landowners, 
nor that the latter would agree to such inequality of treatment, 
aggravated in their case by the share of the new charges intro­
duced with a view to paying the optants which they would be 
called upon to assume.
The Roumanian Government could obviously only refuse to 
apply the award which might have been given against it by 
the Arbitral Tribunal. Article i5 of the Covenant would thus 
have come into play.
That Government, and the Council with it, considered it 
wiser to avert any kind of conflict, from the first decision. The 
situation would certainly have been more delicate after a deci­
sion giving the victory to the optants; the Roumanian Go­
vernment would have been accused of consenting to defend : 
itself on the substance of the question after unsuccessfully 
pleading incompetence, of showing thus that it had hoped to 
obtain a favourable decision and of evading the execution of a 
sentence which, if it had been in its favour, it would have 
accepted. >
Moreover, if ever a sentence given on competence was calcu­
lated to prejudice the substance of the question, it was that which 
dismayed the Roumanian Government. No doubt the Arbitral 
Tribunal did not directly take a decision as to whether the dis­
possession of the Hungarian optants was, or was not, liquidation 
as prohibited by the Treaty of Trianon; it merely stated, to justify 
its competence that its mission is to give judgment on any case 
of expropriation of Hungarian property and it reserved for the 
substance of the question the point as to whether, de /acto, the 
expropriation was the consequence of the agrarian reform and 
whether, de jure, the compensation was adequate. As soon, 
however, as the Tribunal declared itself competent under the 
very provision of the Treaty which forbade the liquidation 
of Hungarian property, it was permissible to suppose that it 
considered the measure to be one of liquidation; which must 
necessarily lead it to consider that the agrarian reform could not 
apply to the Hungarian optants. And this prejudice resulting 
from the declaration of the competence of the Tribunal was 
another reason why the Boumanian Government, if it had 
continued the suit after this sentence, might have incurred the 
reproach of having accepted in advance a final award which it 
could not have failed to foresee.
VI
In submitting the question to the Council of the League of 
Nations, it made use of its right under Article n, paragraph 2r 
of the Covenant to call the attention of the Council to what 
seemed to it a circumstance “ affecting international relations ” 
which threatened “Ho disturb international peace or the good 
understanding between nations on which peace depends The 
Council considered, in its sovereignty, that the case was one of 
those in which, according to the first paragraph of the same 
article, it “ shall take any action that may be deemed wise and 
effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.” The measure taken 
was thus legitimate.
Moreover it was in harmony with the concern which the 
Council had shown some years before with regard to the possible 
consequences of the difference of opinion existing between the 
two governments; for as early as July 5th, 1928, it recommended 
that both governments should “ do their utmost to prevent the 
question of Hungarian optants from becoming a disturbing 
influence in the relations between the two countries ”, and, in 
particular, that the Hungarian Government should “do its best 
to reassure its nationals.”
Thus the Council strictly applied the texts which determine 
its attributions, or rather its sole attribution. It exercised its 
right, in making it impossible for the Arbitral Tribunal to judge 
the substance of the question, and it fulfilled its duty, since 
Article 11 recommends it as a duty to take any action that may 
be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard peace, and since, some 
years ago, it had already shown that it realised the disturbances 
which might arise out of the question of the optants.
The Committee of the Council took care, moreover, to inter­
pret its mission in the widest sense, by approving, on March 
15th, 1927, a report prior to the dispute in question : “It is 
“ impossible to circumscribe by resolutions, recommendations 
“ or expressed wishes the very extensive rights arising for the 
“ (League out of its essential duty ; effectually to safeguard the 
“ peace of nations.... If there is no threat of war but some 
“ circumstance threatens to disturb the good understanding 
“ between nations on which peace depends, this circumstance 
“ may be brought to the attention of the Assembly or the 
“ Council by any Member of the League, so as to enable the 
“ Assembly or the Council to consider what should be done to 
“ restore this good understanding between nations. ” (Official 
Journal of the League of Nations, No. of July 7th, 1927, p. 832.)
If when exercising its mission, the Council of the League 
of Nations were to go' so far as to ignore a decision given in 
final instance by a jurisdiction of any kind, particularly by 
a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, there can be no hesitation in thinking 
that it would be acting entirely within its rights, since, as we 
have shown above, the Covenant places above everything the 
task of safeguarding peace, entrusted to the League of Nations.
But the Council did not go to such lengths; it did not set 
aside the decision by which the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal declared 
itself competent. In other words, it did not declare that the 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was mistaken in proclaiming its own 
competence; it cannot be denied that it had doubts as to the 
justification for this decision, but in any case it did not annul 
the sentence. In other words, it gave no award.
The Council cannot therefore be reproached with having 
disregarded the authority of international justice, by substituting 
its own decision for that of the Arbitral Tribunal. It would 
even have had the right to treat the latter as negligible, if the 
duty imposed on it by the Covenant had seemed to indicate, this 
course.
VII
Nor can it be reproached with not having obtained a sufficient 
number of opinions to convince it that it was giving a just 
decision.
When it stipulates that all questions of procedure which come 
up at the meetings of the Council must be .settled by the Council 
itself, Article 5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
obviously leaves the Council free to obtain any advice which it 
may think fit to seek, but in no case does it oblige it to ask 
for an opinion. Article i4, in entrusting the Council with the 
task of preparing the organisation of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice defines this liberty of the Council, espe­
cially as regards recourse to the opinion of the Permanent Court, 
for it says that apart from its competence on disputes of an 
international character which the parties thereto submit to it, 
the Court shall also give an advisory opinion on any dispute or 
question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.
Consequently, the Council has to decide on its own sove­
reign authority whether the opinion of the Court must be asked; 
in any case it is under no obligation on this point.
The indications of the Covenant have been faithfully followed 
by the report quoted above, which contains the sentence : “ If 
the Council deems it necessary for the accomplishment of its 
task, it may, in certain appropriate cases, ask the Permanent 
Court for an advisory opinion, or owing to particular circum­
stances obtain the opinion of a Commission of jurists appointed 
by it. ”
Here again, therefore, the Council is entirely free. It may 
decide without obtaining any advisory .opinion, if it thinks fit 
to obtain guidance, it does so by the appropriate measures, and, 
in particular, it considers whether it is necessary to have re­
course to the Permanent Court. It is understandable, more­
over, that recourse to this high jurisdiction could not have been 
declared obligatory without the risk of ruining the very institu­
tion of the League of Nations; for there is no doubt that cases 
might arise in which any delay resulting from the necessity 
of obtaining an outside opinion would be fatal. ■ It may not 
have been on account of such a fear that the Council of the 
League of Nations, in the dispute between Hungary and Bou­
rn ania, abstained from asking the opinion of the Permanent 
Court, but the argument none the less serves to show that, 
had those who drafted the Covenant insisted upon recourse to 
the opinion of the Permanent Court, they would have been 
guilty of an absurdity.
The Council, which might have given its decision without 
reference to anyone, considered that the question submitted to 
it touched upon delicate juridical points; it appointed jurists 
whose unanimous opinion added to the moral force of its deci­
sion. It is difficult to see what more it could have done.
Perhaps also the Council thought that past circumstances— 
viz. the attitude of Hungary herself—did not make it expedient 
to consult the Permanent Court. It would have been not only 
useless but contradictory to have recourse to it. At the Peace 
Conference Hungary herself demanded, as the maximum of 
guarantee, the treatment accorded by the Succession States of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire to their own nationals. In its 
letter of August i3th, 1919, the “Commission of the New 
States ” declared that the property of the Hungarian optants 
should remain, without prejudice of any kind, under the regime 
of the national law, and that the insertion of an additional clause 
to this effect was unnecessary.
To ask the Hague Court whether the Hungarians were en­
title to preferential treatment, in virtue of Article a5o of the 
Treaty of Trianon, would imply asking this high juridiction a 
question to which Hungary had replied in advance to the Hague 
Court, or else that it is meant to state that the treaties have 
granted that country more than she herself asked on behalf 
of her nationals.
VIII
It is certain, in short, that, in this dispute, which was 
destined to become celebrated, the Council of the League of 
Nations acted within the limits of its rights, which were inten­
tionally made very extensive; that it fulfilled its role in taking 
charge of a dispute which threatened to become a cause of dis­
turbance, misunderstanding and perhaps off conflict; that it 
took a sane view of the facts and was right in manifesting its 
conviction that nothing can restrict its mission of dealing 
“ with any matter affecting the peace of the world, ” “ by the 
maintenance ”, as the preamble to the Covenant expresses it, 
“of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations 
in the dealings of organised peoples with one another.”
It may be presumed that on this score its decision will often be 
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